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This thesis is about space, law and control: how their relationship unfolds in the 
contemporary city, and how normative orderings emerge out of the urban mess, 
with particular attention to how this occurs in the extraordinary spatio-temporal 
context of mega events. The work is premised on the elaboration of an original 
spatial ontology through the notions of life, materiality and event, which 
culminates with the introduction of the notion of atmosphere and rhythm, and 
their folding into the concept of urban tuning. This understanding allows for re-
thinking the spatiality and materiality of the urban from a non-dichotomous, 
immanent perspective, thus providing a novel way to investigate the spatiolegal 
configurations and the form they assume in the present-day city. Consequently, 
the thesis explores the exceptional relation between law, space and justice in 
modern and ‘post-modern’ times, by looking at contemporary forms of control 
and their on-going reformulation of urban space according to the twin 
requirements of consumption and immunity. Through this approach, I wish to 
push forward the urban and legal geographical debate, exploring the evolution of 
the spatiolegal into new, potentially oppressing logics of control, as well as 
delineating a radically material, ethico-politically worthwhile and strategically 
adequate concept of justice. Since I conceive urban mega events as paradigmatic 
contexts to investigate urban processes, I employ the 2010 World Cup in South 
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It was always the same places in the streets, in the houses or in the 
parks that set oﬀ my spells. Each time I entered these spaces, the same 
swoon and the same vertigo overtook me. Veritable invisible snares 
placed here and there in town, not any diﬀerent from the things that 
surrounded them—with ferocity they lay in wait for me to fall prey to 
the special atmosphere they exuded. Were I to take a step, a single step, 
and enter such a ‘cursed space,’ the spell became inevitable. The spells 
belonged to me and to the places where they occurred in the same 
measure. It’s true that some of these places contained a ‘personal’ 
malevolence, but all the others were found in a trance themselves much 
before my coming ... The doctor had prescribed quinine: another cause 
for amazement. I found it impossible to understand how the sick spaces, 


















City is contradictions, and seeking to overcome them is 







As neoliberalism surfaces as the ‘new planetary vulgate’, world cities become the core of a 
market-driven process of state withdrawal from public services and social protection, with 
the resulting void filled by market forces and the symmetrical rise of state’s influence 
through restrictive social control measures, ad-hoc legislation and intrusive surveillance 
technologies, complemented by the boom of private-security.2 The ‘entrepreneurial city’ 
goes global: the urban space undergoes dramatic reformulations according to the needs of 
business and financial sectors, consumption and tourism, and the everyday life is shaped by 
the rhythm of privatisation, commercialisation, ‘beautification’, securitisation.3 The city is 
increasingly fragmented into spaces of ‘controlled consumption’, where novel technological 
and legal security devices are tailored to the requirements of the consumer society, 
prioritising the need for every socio-economical transaction to be safe, predictable, efficient 
and cost-effective, and thus shaping the everyday life accordingly.4 
                                                          
1
Massimo Cacciari, La Città (Pazzini, 2009) p. 42 (my translation). 
2
Pierre Bourdieu and Loic Wacquant ‘New Liberal Speak: Notes on the New Planetary Vulgate’ Radical 
Philosophy, 2001, 2-5;  
3
T. Hall and Ph. Hubbard: The Entrepreneurial City. Geographies of politics, Regime and Representation (Wiley, 
1996); David Harvey, ‘From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The Transformation in Urban Governance in 
Late Capitalism’ Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography 71(1) 1989; after a phase of so-called urban 
de-industrialisation, in which capital flew out of the city to colonise the countryside, the last quarter of 20
th
 
century has seen a re-colonisation of the post-industrial city by capital, a process now occurring globally and at 
a relentless pace [see for instance Smith, Neil. The New Urban Frontier: Gentrification and the Revanchist City 
London [Routledge, 1996]. David Harvey has stressed that this process of capitalist urbanisation was structural 
to capitalism itself, that is, a necessity for the capital in order to absorb ‘the surplus product that capitalists are 
perpetually producing in their search for surplus value’ [David Harvey, ‘The Right to the City’ New Left Review 
53, 2008, pp. 23–40]. It goes without saying that this process occurs always in extremely peculiar and context-
specific ways, and this warns against any simplistic ‘globalising’ reading. See for instance the insightful 
contribution of Befu on this regard: H. Befu, “Globalization theory from the bottom up: Japan’s contribution”, 
in Japanese Studies 23(1) 2003, 3–22  
4
See Michalis Lianos, 'Social Control after Foucault' Surveillance & Society 1(3) 2003: 412-430; Clifford D. 
Shearing & P.C. Stenning, ‘From the Panopticon to Disneyworld: The development of discipline’, in A.N. Doob 
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As public spaces increasingly assume the aesthetic, socio-cultural and legal shape of 
shopping malls (the so-called ‘mall-isation’ of public space), private spaces like the shopping 
malls themselves increasingly carry out the functions once performed by marketplaces or 
city squares: ‘mass private spaces’ in which private ownership is coupled by public 
significance and functions, private and public security overlap, and surveillance and 
exclusion are tightly enforced.5 Complementing these processes is the ‘neo-medievalism’ of 
gated communities, in a dramatic symmetry to the imposed seclusion of sprawling slums 
and ‘hyper-ghettos’.6 Unavoidably, the emergent aesthetics of consumption and security 
produces exclusionary effects on the so-called ‘flawed consumers’, those incapable to enter 
the cycle of consumption since lacking the resources and/or unwilling to do it: ‘unfit’ to be 
included in the society, they are situated “below, and thus outside, the class order”, as the 
definition of underclass aptly, if discriminatorily, conveys.7 
Of course, these changes are much more irregular and tentative than this brief overview 
conveys. Yet, their relevance in re-shaping the urban is out of question: they trigger deep 
ontological transformations which profoundly affect our being-in-the-world or more 




The theoretical challenge to address these traumatic modifications has been especially 
taken up from the 70s onwards by a series of thinkers (e.g. Henri Lefebvre, David Harvey, 
Manuel Castells, Edward Soja, Richard Sennett, Peter Marcuse, Mike Davisetc.) whose 
critical perspective to the study of the urban, in radical discontinuity with the mainstream 
approach (e.g. Chicago Schools etc.), would frame and deeply influence urban theory in the 
following decades. Particularly inspired by the thought of Marx, and situated in a counter-
position with respect to the Enlightenment Project, so-called critical urban theory assumes 
the investigation of the urban and its processes as absolutely central to gain insights into the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and E.L. Greenspan (eds) Perspectives in Criminal Law: Essays in Honour of John Ll. J. Edwards (Canada Law, 
1984);  
5
 See Allison Wakefield, Selling Security: The Private Policing of Public Space (Willan Publishing, 2003); K. Gray 
and S.F. Gray. ‘Civil rights, civil wrongs and quasi-public space’, European Human Rights Law Review 1, 1999; 
Kempa, M; P. Stenning, and J. Wood. ‘Policing Communal Spaces: A reconfiguration of the Mass Private 
Property Hypothesis’, British Journal of Criminology 44 (4) 2004; 
6
 See for instance Nezar Alsayyad and Ananya Roy ‘Medieval Modernity: On Citizenship and Urbanism in a 
Global Era’ Space and Polity, 10 (1) 2006, 1-20; Davis, Mike Planet of Slums (Verso, 2006); on the notion of 
‘hyper-ghetto’, see Loic Wacquant, ‘Ghettos and Anti-Ghettos: An Anatomy of the New Urban Poverty.’ Thesis 
Eleven 94, 2008, 1-7. 
7
 Zygmunt Bauman,  Work, Consumerism and the New Poor (Open University Press, 2005)  
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logics, apparatuses, spaces and temporalities of neoliberal capitalism, and thus to detect its 
contradictions, unfold its hidden structures of power, ideology and exploitation, and 
eventually open the possibility for constructing a more just, equal and sustainable 
urbanism.8 It is not possible to offer an even brief account of the various relevant 
contributions emerged from this ambient. Likewise, an attempt to pinpoint their flaws 
would unavoidably result in brutal generalisations and simplifications. Yet, since the latter is 
what introductions are about, I argue that what many of these works appear to suffer the 
most is a certain imbalance, that is, a tendency to overemphasise economic and financial 
processes over other dimensions of city-life, as well as an excessive reliance on a rather 
deterministic structural-functionalism, often with the consequence of atrophying the 
possibility for social agency in the city, insofar as confining it only to direct, reactive, 
romantic or spontaneous oppositions to the logics of the capital. What seems to lack 
particularly, although with relevant exceptions, is a radical attention to everyday life, not 
simply understood as an oppositional and reactive dimension to the oppressive structures of 
capitalism, but rather as productive in its own terms, and thus inexplicable only through 
those lenses.9 Using terms I am to qualify more precisely in the first chapter, Martina Low 
rightly observes that many works within this field, notwithstanding their efforts to propose 
a recursive understanding of structure and space as mutually co-constituting, in the end 
provide an unbalanced picture according to which (capitalist) structures produce urban 
space whilst social agents can only at best re-produce it.10 In fact what seems to be shared 
across these works, notwithstanding their differences, is a common tendency to take for 
granted a series of problematic dichotomies (e.g. abstract/concrete, structure/space, 
global/local, power/resistance etc.). Corollary then is the propensity to confine instances of 
alternative and emancipatory political action into the supposed ‘concreteness’ of 
embedded, localised and face-to-face ‘direct action’, somewhat understood as more 
                                                          
8
Neil Brenner offered a very useful overview of ‘critical urban theory’ in a recent article [‘What Is Critical Urban 
Theory?’ City 13 (2–3) 2009, 198–207]. As he summarises, critical urban theorists mostly share the following 
keystones of critical theory as epistemological foundation of their field of studies: the need for theorisation of 
urban processes under capitalism; the awareness of the historical contingency, as embedded in power 
relations, of every knowledge on urban question; the rejection of instrumentalist, technocratic and market-
driven forms of urban analysis; the quest for “alternative, radically emancipatory forms of urbanism that are 
latent, yet systemically suppressed, within contemporary cities” (p. 204) 
9
Goonewardena stresses that significant in this sense is the relatively little attention that these authors give to 
such thinkers as Walter Benjamin, George Simmel, Guy Debord or even to key parts of Henry Lefebvre’s 
oeuvre (subordinating his works on ‘everyday life’ to the ‘politico-economical’ ones) see ‘Marxism and 
Everyday Life: On Henri Lefebvre, Guy Debord and Some Others’ in Space, Difference, Everyday Life: Reading 
Henri Lefebvre, eds. Kanishka Goonewardena et al (Routledge, 2006) pp. 117-133.  
10
Martina Löw, ‘The Constitution of Space: The Structuration of Spaces Through the Simultaneity of Effects and 
Perception’, in: European Journal of Social Theory 1 (11) 2008 – Although Low notes that this limit can be 
already located in the work of Lefebvre, it appears more evidently in the conceptualisations of some of his 
followers, most notably Harvey and Soja. 
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‘authentic’ and genuine vis-à-vis cold, reifying and oppressive capitalistic abstractions. More 
pessimistically, this sometimes leads to apocalyptic narratives of ‘loss of control’ in the 
increasingly globalised and de-localised world of flows. More optimistically, to the exaltation 
(within and beyond the so-called ‘cultural turn’ – see below) of temporary, actual or 
imaginary counter-spaces where to unleash the liberating and chaotic potential of urban life 
against the forces of domination.11 More problematically, to the yearning for a different (or 
‘differential’) urban space where the contradictions of the contemporary metropolis would 
be dialectically overcome, a post-conflictual utopia of peaceful and creatively-disordered 
deliberation where more authentic forms of human agency would be restored: a mythical 
space indeed, still relying on the never-abandoned and ideologically-troubling nostalgia for 
the ideal form of the Greek polis.12 As I will emphasise in the following pages, both such an 
anachronistic nostalgia as well as the romantic and ultimately fetishising emphasis on the 
'concrete' (as local, immediate, direct etc.) versus the 'abstract' are dangerously close to – 
and thus unwittingly prone to co-optation by – conservative politics, that on the priority of 
authenticity, roots and soils have always been grounded.13 Moreover, the promise to 
dialectically overcome the antagonism and contradictoriness of the urban in the end 
positions these works, rather uncomfortably, within the path of the ‘pacifying’ ethos of the 
very Enlightenment Project that it was believed they fought against. To be sure, these are 
admittedly ungenerous, although to some extent unavoidable, generalisations. I do not 
intend to overlook the significance as well as the singularity of many of these important 
contributions to urban theory. However, my aim here is to emphasise some of the 
problematic tendencies they share, tendencies that have been arguably prominent in 
conducing the field to what already twenty years ago Nigel Thrift defined an ‘urban 
impasse’.14 
                                                          
11
For instance, the ‘spatial tactics’ of Certeau’s urban dweller, whose transversal re-appropriation of the city 
constantly re-imagines and transgresses its rigid and panoptical logics; the liberating potential of disorder, as 
for instance in Sennett’s famous book, or the strategic constitution of Temporary Autonomous Zones proposed  
by Hakim Bey. Certainly interesting, these works are ultimately unable to escape the tendency to romanticise 
the urban and its emancipatory potentials, and thus offer models of political action which does not seem to 
provide a truly ontological challenge to the given order. See Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life 
(University of California Press, 1984); Richard Sennett, The Uses of Disorder: Personal Identity & City Life (W.W. 
Norton, 1992); Hakim Bey, T. A. Z. The Temporary Autonomous Zone, Ontological Anarchy, Poetic Terrorism 
(Autonomedia, 1985/1991) 
12
On the notion of ‘differential space’ see Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Wiley-Blackwell, 1991). For 
a punctual critique of this concept and generally these ‘nostalgic’ tendencies, see Marcus Doel. 
Poststructuralist Geographies: The Diabolical Art of Spatial Science (Rowman & Littlefield, 1999) 
13
See for instance Slavoj Žižek, The Ticklish Subject: the Absent Centre of Political Ontology (Verso, 2000) pp. 
258-67; Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Andreas. ‘Law’s Spatial Turn: Geography, Justice and a Certain Fear of 
Space.’ Law, Culture and the Humanities 7 (2) 2011, p. 6;  
14
The observation was famously moved by Nigel Thrift, ‘An Urban Impasse?’ in Theory, Culture & Society 10, 
1993, 229-238.  
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As critical urban theory appeared to be in need of novel ways to approach the urban and its 
on-going changes, the so-called ‘cultural turn’ seemed to indicate the direction to follow. 
Animated by a post-modern ethos of hermeneutics, interpretation and deconstruction, this 
multi-faceted perspective played a significant role in shaking urban theory from its self-
assured comfort, prompting a more accurate attention for “the significant banality of 
everyday life in the city” and its flowing and unpredictable character, as well as destabilising 
the rigidity of supra-structures in the face of the moving and flowing complexity of the 
world.15 These hermeneutical dérives of interpretation offered insightful ways to re-thinking 
and re-imagining the urban. Yet, the ‘cultural turn’ was not immune from shortcomings. Too 
often, its emphasis on the role of ‘discourses’, ‘representations’ and ‘narratives’ was still 
thought within a dualist approach. Whilst the order of the priority between structures and 
everyday life, discourses and buildings, strategies and tactics etc. appeared to be reworked 
– such dichotomies were still left unchallenged. Frequently, ‘flowsy-flowsy’ narratives of 
transversality, transgression and creative chaos surrendered to the temptation to 
aestheticise the urban, as well as to the highly-problematic ethico-political corollary of 
celebrating unpredictability and disorder as emancipatory per se.16 The ‘cultural turn’, in the 
end, seemed to be able to produce a merely epistemological and ‘textual turn’, falling short 
of addressing ontologically the urban question.17 
If Marxist structures (especially in their more ‘orthodox’ acceptation) appeared to be too 
rigid to grasp the turbulent, common and conflictual materiality of the urban, postmodern 
hermeneutics proved to be far too loose. In fact, and notwithstanding their notable 
differences and often mutual antipathies, both attitudes in the end implicitly converge in 
assuming the city as ‘a bounded unity and a stable object’ of research, an ontological unity 
that is, either over-determined and dislocated by the capital or de-constructed and re-
imagined by its inhabitants and their practices.18 A common assumption encapsulated in 
what Weizman defines as a conception of “space as simultaneously too soft and too hard”, 
too hard since built realities are understood as “solid, fixed and unchangeable”, too soft 
                                                          
15
Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift. Cities: Reimagining the Urban (Wiley, 2002) p. 9; On the urban ‘cultural turn’ see 
for instance Michael Dear, The Postmodern Urban Condition (Blackwell, 2000); Watson, Sophie and Gibson, 
Kathie, eds. Postmodern Cities and Spaces (Basil Blackwell, 1995); Edward W Soja, , Postmodern Geographies: 
the Reassertion of Space in Social Theory (Verso, 1989) 
16
Amin and Thrift, Cities, op. cit. p. 150; Ash Amin 'Rethinking the urban social', City 11 (1) 2007, 100-114: p. 
83; Understood in this sense, the trenchant definition by Storper of the urban cultural turn as a mirage – that 
is “something which is chimerical, fascinating, often beautiful, and possibly quite pertinent or useful, but which 
nonetheless leads us astray” – appears as quite pertinent. See Michael Storper, ‘The Poverty of Radical Theory 
Today: From the False Promises of Marxism to the Mirage of the Cultural Turn.’ International Journal of Urban 
and Regional Research 25 (1) 2001, 155–179: p. 155. 
17
See for instance the special issue of Urban Studies 36 (1) January 1999.  
18
Ignacio Farías and Thomas Bender, Urban Assemblages: How Actor-Network Theory Changes Urban Studies 
(Routledge, 2009) p.  12 
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since assuming “the possibility of agency [as only] existing in the mere literal subversion of 
the existing”, i.e. in interpretative ‘re-imagining’.19 No surprise then if the initial reaction to 
the perceived impalpability the cultural turn’s interpretative ‘bulimia’ would be the 
symmetrical call for a ‘return to the concrete’, i.e. a ‘re-materialisation’ of the urban.20 
Again, it is not difficult to see the problematic character of this position, insofar as proposing 
yet another re-prioritisation internal to the very same dichotomies (material/immaterial, 
abstract/concrete, flows/solidity) whose ideological presupposition still leaves 
unchallenged.  
What should be challenged instead, I argue, is not the strategic insufficiency of immaterial 
representations and interpretations, but rather their very assumption as immaterial vis-à-vis 
a supposedly concrete and material reality out-there – in other words, the ‘fixation with the 
binary’ that in different forms still plagues urban studies.21 The way out of the impasse does 
not lie in any reactionary ‘re-materialisation’, but rather in letting emerge the always-
already material character of the tangible/intangible, human/nonhuman, representational/ 
non-representational bodies whose moving associations constitute the urban.22 A folding, 
that is, aimed to “uncovering the material geographies of urban provision, and the intricate 




This is the thick breeding ground of inspirations and disappointments out of which the 
present research emerges. The firm conviction that guides me is that there is no possibility 
to produce an all-encompassing structure able to account for urban space once and for all: 
even the most striated city secretes smooth spaces.24 On the other hand, resorting to the 
hermeneutical infinity of the postmodern flux of endless interpretations is of no use. Finally, 
it is not by reacting with horror to postmodern relativism by taking refuge on some 
supposedly ‘more authentic’ concreteness that a way out is to be found. 
                                                          
19
Eyal Weizman, ‘Political Plastic (Interview)’, in Collapse Vol. VI: Geo/Philosophy (Urbanomics, 2010) p. 276.  
20
As stated by Loretta Lees, ‘Rematerializing geography: The ‘new’ urban geography’ Progress in Human 
Geography 26, 2002: 101-112 
21
E. Pieterse, 'Building with Ruins and Dreams: Exploratory thoughts on realising integrated urban 
development through crises', Urban Studies 43(2) 2006, 285-304: p. 300 
22
See Alan Latham and Derek P. McCormack. 'Moving cities: rethinking the materialities of urban geographies.' 
Progress in Human Geography 28 (6) 2004, 701 -724; 
23
Amin,  'Rethinking the urban social', op. cit. p. 108;  
24
Gilles Deleuze, and Félix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus Capitalism and Schizophrenia [from now on: ATP] 




I understand the urban as an ontology of moving bodies, human and nonhuman, tangible 
and intangible: a word uttered on the phone, a code of law, a way of walking, an airstrike, a 
religious dogma, a book, a season, an idea of nation, an impetus of fear, the appearance of 
police forces on the street, the chant of hooligans coming from blocks away, graffiti on the 
wall, CCTVs hovering above, the popular feeling about CCTV, the expectation of a riot, of a 
job promotion, of an assault... The urban as a multiplicity, an immanent being-together of 
bodies, a materiality of objects, people, ideas, sounds, noises, expectations, affects: a 
dynamic and turbulent spatiality unaccountable either through the determinism of 
structures or the anarchism of flows.25 I assume the social field as a vibrating agglomeration 
of agencies in which movements intersect, singularities stratify and then collapse, 
formations emerge unstably and then calcify more or less stably: a conflictual matrix of 
heterogeneous assemblages of bodies, multiple scales and juxtaposed spatio-temporalities. 
Yet, this is not another postmodern celebration of disorder, uncontrollable flows and chaos. 
The ‘shape’ of the urban is neither over-determined by (supra)structures nor denied by 
incontrollable flows, but rather emerges immanently out of the common spacing of being-
together, in all its turbulent, unpredictable, conflictual and nonetheless ordered character. If 
I agree with saying that in the city “no singular logic or unity may be assumed”, this should 
not lead to a “simple displacement of the local by the global, of place by space, of history by 
simultaneity and flow, of small by big scale”, but rather to “a subtle folding together” of 
such oppositions.26 There is no separation between physical and ideological spaces, abstract 
structures and concrete everyday life, flows and ‘solid rocks’, discourses and buildings.27 
There is instead the way in which these elements ‘get’ and ‘hold’ together, the way in which 
different scales overlap and clash within the urban, simultaneously contributing to its 
solidification as well as opening the potential for its alteration. No opposition, that is, yet 
multiple concatenations and frictions. Order and disorder coexist and overlap in the urban 
space, and thus the challenge is to find a way to account consistently for how the urban is 
tuned – i.e. how normative orderings emerge immanently in the city – without resorting to 
conceptual binary-traps, cumbersome dichotomies or dialectical promises.  
                                                          
25
As I will have the chance to explain further later on, my use of the term ‘body’ is consistent with the Spinozist 
definition provided by Gilles Deleuze: “a body can be anything: it can be an animal, a body of sounds, a mind or 
idea; it can be a linguistic corpus, a social body, a collectivity” Gilles Deleuze. Spinoza, Practical Philosophy (City 
Lights Books, 1988) p. 127 
26
Amin and Thrift, Cities op. cit. p. 150; Amin, 'Rethinking the urban social', op. cit. p. 103 
27
This is the problem of David Harvey when he criticises “the reduction of everything to fluxes and flows, and 
the consequent emphasis upon the transitoriness of all forms and position”, to which he opposes the need to 
look at ‘permanences’, i.e. all the “things, institutions, discourses” etc. which surround us, i.e. “the ‘solid rock’ 
of historical-geographical materialism” [David Harvey, Justice, Nature & the Geography of Difference 
(Blackwell, 1996) p. 7-8; As Doel rightly stresses, here Harvey is still assuming a supposed separation between 
‘flows’ and ‘solid rocks’, leaving absolutely unchallenged the ontological separation which instead the 
materialism I am following seeks to debunk [Doel, Poststructural Geographies, op. cit. p. 17]. 
8 
 
Accordingly, we need a special kind of constructivism, one which is simultaneously more 
‘abstract’ than naive empiricism and more ‘concrete’ than social constructivism, ‘between’ 
or rather ‘beyond’ the sterile opposition between subjectivism and objectivism, as well as 
resolutely ‘post-human’.28 This entails looking at the way urban bodies enter in relation by 
producing socio-material assemblages whose solidity is never pre-given, but rather always 
potentially dislocated and exceeded by multiple possibilities – e.g. the potential for a new 
encounter, an aggression, a phone-call, a deluge and other more or less expected events 
which, even when not unfolding into actual occurrences, nonetheless constantly haunt and 
destabilise urban life. This approach, in other words, wishes to avoid any pacified and 
pacifying description, instead focusing on the encounters and clashes between bodies in the 
city; the combinations and frictions between the different, ‘abstract and concrete’ scales, 
processes and practices which insist in urban contingencies; the intensity that each situation 
harbours, the consequent potential for events to surface and the preventive practices aimed 
at its neutralisations. It is exactly in the relations, tunings, frictions, conflicts, excesses and 
events in which the getting-together of the ‘bodies’ constituting the city unfolds, I believe, 
that lie at the same time the privileged context of urban research, the battle-ground of 
biopolitical logics of control and the ethico-political potential for justice.29 
Moving from this suggestion, in the next part of this introduction I draw a brief cartography 
of the present thesis. The purpose is both to provide the reader with a compass to orientate 
through the chapters, as well as with the possibility to retrace the impulses, inspirations and 




An overarching question originally prompted this thesis: once we get rid of deterministic 
structuralism and yet resist the temptation to being swept into the interpretative vortex of 
the cultural turn, then how do we account for the fact that the urban ‘hold together’ 
nonetheless, how is it tuned, and how are we to address its immanent ordering(s)? 
Answering to this question brought me a long way from the disciplinary confinement of 
urban ‘studies’ and ‘urban geography’. Paramount, I believed, was to firstly subject the 
notions of space, matter and life to a critical rethinking. This, it goes without saying, 
required a trans-disciplinary ambition. These are surely promising times for doing so: the 
                                                          
28
See John Law, After method. Mess in Social Science Research (Routledge, 2004) p. 20  
29
The concept of battleground is a reference to the work of Federico Rahola. The notion of ‘mess’ is a 
reference to that of John Law (see the precedent note) 
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mounting influence played across different fields by the philosophy of Deleuze, Merleau-
Ponty, Serres, Sloterdijk, Latour and so on; the correlated geographical (re)discovery of the 
thought of Spinoza, Tarde, Heidegger, Whitehead, James, etc.; the recent turmoil provoked 
in philosophical circles by the ‘speculative turn’. The impulses of these (and other) inspiring 
tendencies keep generating a creative atmosphere conducive to novel, alternative and 
radical ways of thinking. Within this ambient, a markedly ontological shift deeply modifies 
the way of thinking and living the urban. Hitherto revered oppositions – such as those 
between individual and society, human and nonhuman, global and local, abstraction and 
concreteness – are radically overcome, as the attention turns to the affective, eventful, 
relational, material, excessive and overflowing geographies producing the urban. A 
significant and still tentative direction of thought, that is, whose potentialities require new 
concepts, theories, approaches and terminologies to be fully unfolded and used.30 As 
Latham and McCormack observe, there is a  
pressing need to increase the sophistication of the conceptual and empirical tools 
employed to think through the materiality of the urban … to engage with the 
incorporeality of the material [providing] a way to holding on the expressive 
excessiveness of the urban31 
This is the first objective of my thesis, i.e. critically reworking the concepts of space, 
materiality and life so as to develop conceptual tools to be used to think, observe and 
engage with the urban and its immanent orderings. As suggested above, this attempt was 
inspired by the need to go beyond transcendent and dichotomous perspectives, and thus to 
have done with their nihilistic presuppositions. It is on the (theological, philosophical, 
political) flirting with the concept of negativity, the related assumption of a separation 
between Being and non-Being (i.e. nothingness), and the corollary reliance on the notion of 
operation as a way to articulate such a separation into a given configuration, that I locate 
the paradigm of the instrumental will to know and control that traverses Western thought. 
With this observation, I do not wish to flatten historical differences and material 
contingencies into an all-encompassing and supposedly ‘original’ principle, one which 
moreover I would pretend to be able to uncover through nothing but another hubristic 
performance of that precise ‘will to know’. It is instead an attempt to indicate more 
precisely the philosophical attitude that guides this research, as well as to provide a point of 
reference through which appreciating its effort. In fact, this perspective proves instantly 
useful to qualify the key preoccupation which orients the first chapter: overcoming the rigid 
dualism of structuralism and the inconsistency of postmodernism, as it is seemingly done 
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through the emerging directions of ‘relational’, ‘affective’ and ‘materialist’ geographies, 
must be a carefully calibrated enterprise, if we are to avoid falling in yet another cul-de-sac. 
Although, as explained above, I have been certainly motivated in pursuing these ‘post-
structural’ directions, at the same time I experienced a certain discomfort. The general 
atmosphere of enthusiasm, optimism and affirmation which pervades the uncritical 
acceptation of such concepts as network, relation, affectivity, movement, dislocation, 
multitude, unpredictability – simply put, did not convince me. This was something I began to 
elaborate especially through my parallel reading of the works of Gilles Deleuze and Giorgio 
Agamben beneath whose several differences, I believe, lies a similar ethico-political 
attitude, almost a ‘mood’, which is rather inconsistent with the reckless elaboration of 
certain ‘Deleuzians’, and whose creative potential I find as much at odds with the almost de 
riguer criticism to which the Italian philosopher is routinely subjected in contemporary 
debates. Very important in this sense was my still partial encounter with the in-the-making 
philosophy loosely gathered under the umbrella-definition of the ‘speculative turn’. In these 
at times brilliant and thought-provoking, as well as at other times simplistic and arrogant 
works, I found an exasperation with contemporary philosophy that chimed with mine. This 
did not necessarily lead me to endorsing these theories, or to fully engaging with them, 
since their multifaceted, still partial and scattered directions would have deserved a specific 
endeavour which is beyond the purpose of this thesis. Instead, I took inspiration from their 
fundamental claim, namely the possibility to somewhat overcome the human-world 
correlation so as to open up thought to the cosmic contingency of a world not-for-us. It is 
the powerful conceptual intensity provided by this cosmic dimension (cosmic since 
absolutely post-human and impersonal and beyond 'worldly' preoccupations), that gave me 
the inspiration to theorise the above-mentioned exasperation into a strategic approach. 
Accordingly, I began to realise that significant problems emerge in the relational closures 
which theories such as Latour’s actor-network (ANT) appear to predicate, as there are in the 
uncritical praise of movement and dislocation of some post-structural positions. Are not 
these approaches risking reproducing both the totalising closures and the accelerated de-
localisations which characterise the ‘world’ of contemporary neoliberal capitalism and its 
biopolitical logic of control? I certainly needed to develop a clearer understanding of the 
latter, and yet I already sensed the need to rework some of these perspectives, not simply 
dismissing, but critically challenging them. Born within this theoretical mood, the first 
chapter is an attempt to build an original ontology able to account for the relational 
character of being-together as well as for the material excess that always overcomes the 
reduction of a situation to its relations. To do so, I elaborate on the Deleuzoguattarian 
concepts of virtual, machine and event, so as to delineate what I term a ‘demonic vitalism’, 
11 
 
through which I seek to overcome the impasses of nihilism without falling into the 
contradictions of so-called ‘naive vitalism’. Accordingly, I propose to understand space as 
populated/constituted by human and nonhuman, tangible and intangible bodies which are 
simultaneously singular and in-relation, always taken into concatenations and yet never 
exhausted by them: each body, and thus every situation is absolutely contingent, and as 
such always carrying an eventful potential that grants a capacity to swerve from being 
reduced the actuality of social, physical, biological, psychological relations. 
Having defined my theoretical framework, I return to the question of the urban and its 
ordering, so as to define more precisely my conceptual tool-box. Two are the concepts I 
indicate in this context: atmosphere and rhythm, and consequently their affective and 
dromological folding into ‘atmo-rhythmical’ tunings. These tunings, I contend, must be 
understood as the immanent, emergent wavelengths in which the multi-scalar getting-
together of the urban bodies is ‘ordered’. Through this concept I strive “to be close to the 
phenomenality of practices, without relapsing into a romanticism of the everyday, and of 
action for itself”.32 It is in other words a simultaneously phenomenological and ecological 
understanding, dependent on a notion of materiality that debunks any presupposed 
separation between abstract and concrete dimensions. I stress that I am not using these 
concepts as mere aesthetic devices. These tunings, through their immanent emergence, 
conflictual interplay and crackling frictions, are an absolutely strategic tool to explore the 
urban in its antagonist and eventful materiality. In fact, I suggest, it is exactly on the 
creation, shaping and contestation of these tunings that urban politics resides.33 
If at this point I have been provided with a way to look at the urban in creative and 
potentially productive ways, I sensed that the question of ordering needed to be addressed 
more directly. What is the concept of urban tuning, I asked myself, if not a way to grasp the 
immanent materiality of the normativity of the city? Although eschewing the reductionist 
temptation to posit it as an all-explaining trope, I contend that the ‘spatiolegal’ is the fil 
rouge connecting both the normative emergence of urban tunings, as well as the attempts 
to ‘direct’, ‘steer’ and ‘re-tune’ them which characterise the logics, techniques and practices 
of contemporary neo-liberal capitalism, declined in the biopolitical modes of the post-
disciplinary ‘societies of control’. To unpack this suggestion, I needed to elaborate an 
understanding of normativity consistent with the theoretical lens so far constructed. How to 
account in fully material terms for the interrelation between law, space and justice? The 
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second chapter addresses this question, pursuing the thesis’ second overarching objective, 
that is: providing an ontological conceptualisation of the triptych of law, space and justice, 
whereby setting the scene for the exploration of the urban control that will follow. In this 
sense, the second chapter builds a bridge between the spatial ontology of urban ordering 
developed in the first, and the discussion of the biopolitical forms of contemporary ‘control’ 
which I pursue in the third. It does so through three main steps. First, by employing and 
reworking the well-known concept of ‘state of exception’, I personally elaborate on the 
relation between law and space, indicating with the notion of spatiolegal architecture of 
modernity the exceptional configuration in which it has been articulated in modern times. 
Second, I discuss some compelling critical approaches by which this configuration has been 
addressed and challenged, especially focusing on ‘relational’ and ‘deconstructive’ 
perspectives. Although stressing their several merits, I detect two main limits in these 
perspectives, which brutally simplifying can be indicated as, respectively: on the side of 
‘relational’ approaches, the inability to fully address the eventful dimension of the 
‘spatiolegal’, which leads to a generally unsatisfying engagement with the ‘juridico-ethico-
political’ question of justice; on the side of deconstruction (especially looking here at the 
contribution of Derrida), the inability to address in radically material terms the ‘cosmic’, 
non-juridifiable contingency of justice. Consequently, I observe, if on the one hand they 
prove effective in debunking and indeed deconstructing the spatiolegal architecture of 
modernity, these approaches appear unequipped to deal with the traumatic ‘evolution’ this 
configuration undergoes in contemporary times. Third, I conclude by proposing a fully 
material and demonically vitalist understanding of the spatiolegal (and thus of the relation 
between law, space and justice) in concatenated and excessive, relational and eventful 
sense. Through the concepts of space, materiality and life, I begin to sketch the contours of 
an affirmative biopolitics in which law is rescued from its ‘exceptional’ and ‘operational’, 
immunitary and appropriating mechanism, and oriented towards the dimension of justice, 
understood in radically excessive, eventful and material terms. In fact, complementing what 
I observed above, I believe that it is on the attempt to neutralise the eventful potential from 
the urban, and thus of the potential for justice to emerge, that the game of contemporary 
biopolitics is being fought.  
Eugene Thacker notes that “any theory of biopolitics will also have to interrogate the 
morphologies of the concept of ‘life’ just as much as the mutations in power”.34 Novel 
understandings of the spatiality and materiality of life always trigger novel models of 
control. Every affirmative biopolitics is threatened by its dark side. Therefore: what occurs 
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when it is the immanent normativity of life, the immanent tunings of urban life, to 
become the direct target of strategies of biopolitical control? Whilst reflecting on this, I 
came across a short piece by Karl Palmas, where at some point he demands: “are today's 
specialists on Deleuze and Tarde the social engineers of our time?”35 In this question 
resonates the Situationist concept of ‘recuperation’, usually employed to indicate the co-
optation (i.e. ‘recuperation’) and thus ‘neutralisation’ of radical artistic practices by 
Capitalism.36 I realised that the above question needed to be complemented by the 
following: what is the blind connection between contemporary forms of radical thought 
and contemporary forms of biopolitical control? I decided to address the first of these two 
questions directly in this chapter, pursuing the third objective of the thesis, that is, 
accounting for the configuration in which the spatiolegal is re-shaped in contemporary 
times. I approach only partially the second question at this stage, since I fully address it in 
the final chapter and in the conclusion. The third chapter draws heavily on Gilles Deleuze 
notion of control in order to define the way in which the spatiolegal architecture of 
modernity, tied to sovereign and ‘dualist’ mechanism of exception, evolves – or more 
precisely, ‘folds’ – into what I term the spatiolegal architecture of control, i.e. the juridico-
economical configuration (the real abstraction) that characterises neo-capitalist societies of 
late (or post) modernity (i.e. the so-called ‘societies of control’ and, more precisely, the 
contemporary 'metropolis'). This signals the immanent, unauthorised and impersonal 
emergence of a configuration of bio-power, ontologically producing a world of systemic 
closure traversed by a cybernetic ethos of procedures, regulations and feed-back processes. 
Rather than an apocalyptic description of our doomed condition, however, this is a more 
pragmatic attempt to make sense of converging tendencies in the field of marketing, 
security and law, by looking at the configuration they take into the contemporary 
metropolis. To delineate this framework I join the ontology developed in the first chapter 
with the spatiolegal framework proposed in the second. This allows me to emphasise the 
way in which both ‘spectacular’ and ‘managerial’ sides of power appear to merge into 
processes of ‘modulation’ of urban tunings, in which commercial and securitarian logics are 
no longer distinguishable, consistently with what Thrift, after Sterling, terms the security-
entertainment complex.37 Eventually I introduce the notion of brandscaping, as a way to 
account more precisely for the way these converging processes unfold into the common 
objective of producing commodified experiences of safety and safe experiences of 
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consumption in the city. In other words, simultaneously secured and enticing spaces 
stabilised by legal injunctions, pacified from conflict and antagonism, and defused from 
eventfulness so as to be safe, consumable and capitalisable. Originating from the realm of 
experience economy, the notion of brandscaping, I observe, allows for providing the 
concept of control with a more markedly spatial and affective nuance, and thus a sharper 
focus on its simultaneously phenomenological and ecological character. Moreover, it offers 
a useful methodological tool to explore urban control with reference to more direct and 
explicit attempts at ‘retuning’ the urban within specific spatio-temporal contexts. 
The last consideration leads to the fourth chapter, where I set to explore the city of 
Johannesburg, in South Africa, in the context of the 2010 FIFA Football World Cup. There is a 
consideration guiding this chapter: i.e. that ‘mega events’ (such as the World Cup or the 
Olympics) are not exceptions, but rather explicitations of emergent configurations of 
control in the city. They are thus relevant both as an object of study in themselves, as well 
as, perhaps more significantly, as a methodological tool to explore the urban more in 
general. The fourth objective of thesis then is to explore the immanent ordering of 
Johannesburg (i.e. the immanent normative tuning of the assemblage of bodies, spaces and 
laws which populate the city), and then to account for the ‘World Cup brandscaping’, 
understood as a city-wide attempt to re-tune the city by reformulating its concatenations of 
bodies, practices and spaces. Special attention is given to the way the space of the city is 
reshaped into a network of interconnect geographies of care and control, security and 
entertainment, consumption and immunity. Of course, this case study can only partially 
illuminate the complex reflections which precede it. Yet, as a significant instance of urban 
‘retuning’, that is, of brandscaping in-the-making, it provides a compelling context to ground 
and expand the conceptualisations developed in the first three chapters into the contingent 
normativity of urban space. Moreover, the chapter shows the relevance of the conceptual 
tools developed vis-à-vis the investigation of the materiality of the urban and its tunings, as 
well as the paradigmatic significance that the mega event plays in this regards. Finally, it also 
proposes a way to understand, use and perform ethnography as a unique tool for the 
researcher to ‘attune’ to the tuning of a city, and thus particularly apt to explore the 
contingent unfolding of urban phenomena. 
In the fifth chapter I seek to draw together and somewhat project forwards the vectors so 
far extended. If the third chapter concludes with a rather threatening picture of a 
suffocating and event-defusing brandscaping, here I perform a recalibration by seeking to 
provide a partial answer to the overarching question posed by Sinnerbrink: how to 
construct “a political philosophy and practice adequate to the deterritorialising dynamic 
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of global capitalism”?38 The fifth objective of this thesis, therefore, is that of indicating a 
‘counter-strategy’ aimed at reaching simultaneously the maximum degree of abstraction 
and concreteness, in this way offering a way to plug into and exploit the frictions and cracks 
in the apparent smoothness of control, to make ‘inoperose’ its exceptional operation, and 
thus open up the urban to its eventful potential, possibly conducive to the generation of 
alternative and potentially ‘just’ spatiolegalities. This strategy, I stress, is tied to an 
understanding of ethico-political action deprived of its operational hubris: inoperose acting, 
that is. To define the latter I sketch the contours of an ethico-political interventionism 
through a conceptual analogy, the image of the surfer, an abstraction through which I seek 
to achieve a consistent degree of strategic 'concreteness', whilst simultaneously preventing 
its recuperation within the deterritorialised ethos of control. Through another abstraction, 
the concept of whiteout, I thus propose to apply such model to the law/justice 'relation', 
thus seeking to overcome the seemingly inescapable alternative between a ‘justice within 
law’ and a ‘justice without law’. This allows me to gesture to an ethico-political strategy 
which tries to stay at the radical interspersion of law and justice, in their immanent and 
excessive spatiality, without moving beyond the terrain of the spatiolegal, but rather forcing 
law to transform sur place. The de-activation of its spatiolegal mechanism of exception, I 
contend, holds the potential for reorienting law towards a non-immunitary and inoperose 





What is an assemblage [agencement]? It is a 
multiplicity which is made up of heterogeneous terms 
and which establishes liaisons, relations between them, 
across ages, sexes and reigns – different natures ... 




A PhD thesis is an assemblage of different bodies, spaces and times. It emerges out of their 
conflictual encounter, between the contingency of its generation and the formal scaffolding 
to which it is expected to comply. Of course, a thesis is supposed to show internal 
coherence, clear-cut structure and ‘original contribution to the advancement of knowledge’. 
Yet, this thesis is deeply suspicious with the ethos of ‘result’, ‘coherence’ and ‘excellence’ 
which underlines these requirements. Of course, a thesis is necessarily all these things. Yet, 
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it cannot be reduced to them. As the contemporary academic climate shows, if this occurs 
then research is de-potentiated from its intensive potential, made innocuous, and thus 
vulnerable to being co-opted.  
Deleuze famously observed that two are the ways to read a book: one, by treating it as a 
“box with something inside”, to be interpreted and analysed by looking at what does it 
signify; another, instead, “relates the book directly to what’s Outside”, as “one flow among 
others ... into relations of current, countercurrent, and eddy with other flows ... flows of 
shit, sperm, words, action, eroticism, money, politics, and so on”. The question this second 
way of reading prompts is an eminently strategic one: “does it work, and how does it work? 
How does it work for you?”40 
For all its immunitary attempts to enclose itself into a self-contained box, a PhD thesis is as 
much a flow among other flows. Prompted by and seeking to answer specific strategic 
questions, it emerges from and contributes to produce problematic fields. Yet, it is not 
meant to overcome them by providing all encompassing solutions. Instead, it must create 
tools to traverse them each time, producing novel connections, creating new intensities, 
opening alternative lines of flight. 
Accordingly, this thesis is conceived as an ensemble of mutually cross-referencing sections, 
multiple strata in non-linear relations, a rhizomatic interplay between various tools (i.e. 
different theories, disciplines, concepts, authors, examples etc.). At times their combination 
can generate confusion in the reader, a sense of theoretical overcrowding as well as 
uneasiness for some seemingly problematic juxtapositions. Some concept, author and 
argument may appear more times along the thesis, whilst other may be only briefly touched 
upon, thus seeming underdeveloped or decontextualised. Certainly, this is to some extent 
unavoidable given the number of tools the thesis wishes to employ, and the limited space in 
which they can be exposed. Yet, there are precise methodological justifications for this.  
As Bryant observes following Lévi-Strauss’ notion of bricoleur, what counts is not the 
internal and organic coherence between the heterogeneous tools employed, but rather 
“whether the product formed from these parts manages to attain some degree of 
consistency in the formation of a new object.”41 More precisely, the aim of this thesis is not 
that of sublimating relevant differences into an all-encompassing and homogenous 
trajectory, but rather that of providing space for different ideas, positions and disciplines to 
encounter, so as to produce frictions and generate the sufficient intensity for the creation of 
new conceptual assemblages. Therefore, more relevance is given to the conceptual intensity 
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that the concatenations of these tools can generate, than to the possible destabilisation to 
the coherence of the thesis’ structure that their ‘misplacement’ or supposed ‘shallowness’ 
could provoke. Simply put, not all the tools require the same degree of sharpness. Some are 
required to appear only in a singular combination, others are to be repeatedly and yet 
differently handled, deterritorialised and reterritorialised along the thesis trajectory, in this 
way gaining more complexity, theoretical depth and strategic edge. As it will be evident to 
the reader, such rhizomatic combinations and recombinations are certainly not meant to 
deny structure and order, but rather to produce a productive oscillation in the thesis, 
whereby keeping its structure open to its outside. Although this oscillation always runs the 
risk of dissolving the thesis into mere inconsistency, at the same time it is necessary, I 
believe, to keep it alive, open and flexible enough to produce something novel.  
Therefore, the thesis is conceived as a rhizomatic space in a ‘spiralling’ movement, 
oscillating between its inside and its outside, often returning back to its steps, addressing 
different concepts more than once, only to propel itself forwards yet again, adding at each 
step more theoretical sedimentation and stability, as well as generating each time new 
holes in its structure, new lines of flight escaping its closure. The footnotes, to which I 
recourse extensively, play a key part in this strategy, simultaneously respecting the 
consistency and readability of the thesis, and yet at the same time boring holes through its 
texture through which gesturing to other potential directions. Lars Lerup proposed an 
architectural practice which strives to avoid the urge to produce a given, self-sufficient and 
finished work. He termed it ‘building the unfinished’, refraining from result-oriented ethos, 
yet without abdicating the task of building something: inoperose architecture, that is, 
making buildings able to ‘make space’ for the irruption of the potentialities, conflictuality 
and excesses of being-together, rather than preventively closing them off.42 This thesis 
wishes to do something similar, not simplistically and cowardly averting the task of 
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This chapter elaborates the spatial ontology that sets the ground for the rest of the thesis. 
Three are the main tasks. First: defining space as ontological, immanent and conflictual 
getting-together of human and non-human, tangible and intangible bodies. Second: 
accounting for the singular ‘double-structure’ of such bodies and for the materiality they 
share. Third, addressing the emergence of ordering in the urban, that is, how rhythms and 
atmospheres immanently tune the urban being-together.  
Two are the considerations orienting this tripartite task. First, as already anticipated, the 
need to fully overcome the ‘fixation with the binary’ which has characterised spatial thinking 
until recent times. That between deterministic structures and postmodern flows is a fake 
alternative that must be challenged, complexified and ultimately folded onto a different 
perspective. Second, the suggestion that the newly emerging directions constituted by 
‘relational’, ‘affective’ and ‘materialist’ geographies, which I mostly endorse, must be 
critically challenged and carefully calibrated if we are to release their potentialities without 
falling into uncomfortable positions. The chapter is organised in three parts and an 
explicative intermezzo. 
In the first part I reflect on the spatial promises of the so-called ‘relational turn’ in rescuing 
philosophy from the impasse of abstract and dichotomous thinking. I do so by sketching the 
unorthodox sociology of Gabriel Tarde and tracing its indirect influence into the ‘sociology of 
association’ of Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory (ANT), as well as touching some of 
Heidegger’s spatial intuition through their explicitation in Peter Sloterdijk’s Theory of 
Spheres. The main problem with ‘networks’ and ‘spheres’, I contend, is their inability to 
satisfyingly account for the notion of event, i.e. the ontological excess without which their 
ontologies generate a totalising and suffocating spatiality in which the potential for ethico-
political action is drastically defused.44 The consequence is a troubling vulnerability to 
contemporary forms of biopolitics, or indeed a tendency to relapse into conservative 
thought. The paradigmatic form of this problematic outcome, I argue, is to be traced back to 
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the concept of negativity. In the intermezzo that follows I thus begin to sketch what I mean 
by that, addressing the notions of negation, separation and operation. 
How to avoid the perils of negativity without falling into the affirmative strictures of a 
freezing relationalism? To begin answering this question, in the second part I elaborate the 
concept of materiality through a brief confrontation with Graham Harman that allows me to 
indicate my position more precisely. I then move to the thought of Gilles Deleuze and 
especially his (and Guattari’s) concepts of virtual, machine and event, which I use as tools to 
delineate what I term ‘demonic vitalism’, thus proposing an understanding of space as a 
material multiplicity constituted by the getting-together bodies, which are simultaneously 
singular and in-relation, always taken into concatenations and yet never ‘exhausted’ by 
them.  
The apparent mess in which the getting-together of bodies manifests itself always retains an 
“immanent capacity for order to occur”.45 This is the question that the last part of the 
chapter addresses. Two are the conceptual tools I introduce for this purpose: the notions of 
atmosphere and rhythm, whereby I wish to address the affective and dromological 
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To begin with, this approach must be distinguished from both contractualist (or 
individualistic) and organicistic (or holistic) models of society, equally unable to account 
consistently for the ontological spatiality of being-together. Contractualist and neo-
contractualist understandings simply de-spatialise social relations, depicting an ideal co-
existence of rational individuals engaging in enlightened deliberation in order to harmonise 
and thus safeguard their particular interests. To put it simply, these models, so dear to 
Habermas, Rawls and their followers, are “spatially and materially blind”, and their 
prioritisation of rational communication leaves the ‘mysterious pre-rational solidarities’ 
constituting any ‘community’ unaccounted for.47 On the other hand, organicist models 
conceive society as an autonomous organism which encompasses its ‘members’, a sort of 
‘mono-spherical container’ (ontologically) separated from the individuals, whose smooth 
subsumption within its organic body would be guaranteed by institutional apparatuses. 
Most exemplificative is Emile Durkheim’s conception of a transcendent and all-
encompassing society, in which individuals are subsumed by means of sharing ‘social facts’, 
that is, collective representations external to individuals, pre-existing – and thus 
unexplained – conditions for human agency.48 
It is against and beyond both perspectives that the work of Gabriel Tarde is situated. Tarde 
is a long-forgotten, recently rediscovered (mostly thanks to the work of Gilles Deleuze and, 
more explicitly, Bruno Latour) and at the moment quite popular figure of late-19th century 
French thought. Contemporary and great opposer of Durkheim, he vehemently refused the 
latter’s approach: according to him there are no ‘transcendent’ social facts, collectively 
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shared among human beings as result of the existence of a ‘society’ which supersedes 
them.49 There is no society, but rather sociality, an immanent and contingent process of 
emergence of social formations as heterogeneous agglomerations of human and nonhuman 
elements, affects, ideas, opinions, traditions, assumptions, things.50 Against the 
presupposition of a uniform, coherent and homogenous society, Tarde asserts that “facts 
(including social facts) are contingent compositions emerging out of a complex of difference 
and repetition”.51 Against the presupposition of a self-contained, self-identical individual, 
‘difference’ is radically assumed as the original condition of existence, with identity being 
only a modality of difference, thus wholly inadequate as explanatory principle.52 Employing 
Leibniz’s famous term, Tarde suggests that ‘monads’, rather than individuals, are the 
minimal component of society: monads are not given ‘subjects’, but rather agencies, that is, 
notions and prejudices, perceptions and expressions, knowledge and desires. Latour 
summarises it precisely: 
In the same way as Tarde refuses to take society as a higher, more complex, order than 
the individual monad, he refuses to take the individual human agent as the real stuff out 
of which society is made: a brain, a mind, a soul, a body is itself composed of myriad's of 
'little persons', or agencies, each of them endowed with faith and desire, and actively 
promoting one's total version of the world53 
This neither means to accept a chaotic picture of society, nor to deny the crystallisation of 
the social around stable distributions of ideas, feelings, opinions, practices: i.e. the 
emergence of orderings. However, differently from Leibniz’s monadology, where a 
transcendent God guarantees the harmony, Tarde’s neo-monadology conceives orderings as 
emerging out of the “immanent and constitutive action of every monad”.54 Controversially 
(as we are to see below), and clearly influenced by late-19th century studies on hypnotism, 
Tarde gave the notions of imitation and repetition a crucial role in accounting for the way 
order emerges in society and ideas (‘inventions’) are spread: “any specific innovation – for 
example the pronunciation of a word or behavioural patterns for standing in line – may 
radiate and create resonances by being repeated by many humans or other species, over 
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and over again”.55 What surfaces is a ‘socio-biological’ model: likewise multi-cellular 
organisms, sociality is constituted by the imitative repetition and propagation of singular 
acts, or events, producing agglomerations which are always potentially variable (they can 
always be revolted regardless of their degree of solidity), to some extent unpredictable (we 
are never able to perfectly forecast if a single act, or idea, will spread enough to form a 
crystallisation), performative (dependent on repetition, movement, action), contingent 
(immanent to a spatio-temporal situation, to certain human and nonhuman 
agglomerations), and can undergo processes of standardisation through routinisation and 
even, more fixating, hierarchisation and reification into rules.56 
 
2. 
Behaviour can no longer be localized in individuals 
conceived as preformed homunculi; but has to be 
treated epigenetically as a function of complex 
material systems which cut across individual  
(assemblages) and which transverse phyletic lineages 
and organismic boundaries (rhizomes). This requires 




A continuous and unavoidable co-interaction characterises sociality: by means of refusing 
notions of collective consciousness and pre-existent social laws, this micro-sociology offers a 
glimpse within the impersonal spatiality we are looking for.58 A problem however surfaces 
as result of centring the functioning of social interaction on the notions suggestion and 
imitation, as Tarde does. Namely, the implicit assumption of social beings as absolutely 
passive: automatons, that is, ‘acted upon’ by repetitive processes of imitation, 
somnambulism, contagion.59 This automatised model encounters serious difficulties when 
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having to account for the emergence of the new. As Brighenti argues, this threatens it to fall 
back on the perspective it was seeking to eschew, i.e. individualism: “the corollary of the 
idea of automatic obedience is the idea of an individual origin of the repeated elements ... 
What is repeated through imitation, for Tarde, has an origin somewhere, and such origin is 
deemed to be individual and private”.60 Elias Canetti for instance would propose a different 
and more complex understanding, according to which social agency is neither located in 
some individual or indeed ‘micro-individual’ actor nor in transcendent containers, but rather 
at the level of the social formation itself: an immanently distributed agency. Accordingly a 
crowd, for instance, “as soon as it exists at all ... wants to consist of more people: the urge 
to grow is [its] first and supreme attribute”.61 Tarde instead, seemingly unable to leave 
behind the heritage of positivist criminology and the influence of 19th-century hypnotist 
psychology, ultimately risks to relapse back on what Bonta and Protevi term ‘implicit 
methodological individualism’: notwithstanding the individual has been ‘fragmented’ in 
multiple ’little persons’, what is postulated is a sort of ‘neuro-horizontal’ model of a 
“‘society of minds’ composed of a population of ‘autonomous agents’”, whereby the axiom 
of ‘individual origin’ is ultimately left unchallenged, merely shifted to a smaller dimension.62 
The de-spatialising understanding that such a ‘mentalist’ interpretation assumes somewhat 
mirrors contemporary cyber-theories of ‘networked society’, which either praising or 
regretting the supposed ‘elimination’ of space brought about by ITs, remain in fact blind vis-
à-vis the ontological spatiality of the social. At times, this problem surfaces also in the 
recent (direct or indirect) strands of Tarde’s revival, often complemented by the reliance on 
a model of ‘psychological automatism’ that seems to re-propose the ‘bodily closures’ typical 
of individualistic models.63 
In fact, there is a debate over who is responsible (either Tarde or his followers) for relapsing 
back onto such a pseudo-individualism. Moreover, as Blackman observes, the 'spatial 
blindness' of some of these ‘mentalist’ interpretations systematically overlook the 
ontological quality that notions such as ‘imitation’ and ‘suggestion’ assume in his thought.64 
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According to Thrift, “for Tarde space is key” and arguably, as Borch emphasises, Tarde’s 
analysis shows a sophisticated understanding of space that prefigures its use for compelling 
investigations on the materiality of the urban.65  
In any case, the purpose here is not that of embarking on an in-depth exploration of Tarde's 
thought but rather, whilst keeping these considerations into account, that of tracing his re-
surfacing in one of the most interesting contemporary attempts to make sense of the social: 
Latour's actor-network theory (ANT). The latter, I contend, appears to share with Tarde a 
similar difficulty vis-à-vis providing a fully satisfying account for the question of the 
emergence of the new, i.e. the eventfulness of the social.  
 
3. 
the event is not what occurs, is within what occurs66 
 
According to Bruno Latour – who invested him as ‘forefather of actor-network theory’67 – 
ANT follows indirectly the footsteps of Tarde in seeking to account “for how society is held 
together, instead of using society to explain something else”, that is, without resorting to 
transcendental supra-structures or hidden social forces which would determine social 
action, as well as without relying on a subjective and anthropocentric understanding of 
individual.68 Stuck on a world of only-human actors, sociology has been myopic as regards 
the number of participants in the associations forming the social. Instead, especially in the 
case of critical sociology, Latour’s favourite target, it has resorted to all sorts of hidden 
structures of power and exploitation as social explanations – structures which would guide 
the action of social members without them being aware, and that the social scientist would 
nevertheless be able to uncover by following the right method.69 The resulting vision is that 
of a society made up of isolated subjects acting in a vacuum, a Newtonian world organised 
around friction-less social laws (we are soon to see the crucial influence this assumption has 
played on legal thought). ANT’s way out from this impasse is a ‘flat ontology’, based on a 
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symmetry between human and non-human entities. ANT does not provide objects with 
agency, as it is often misunderstood. Instead, it denies agency as much to humans as to non-
humans, rather looking at the associations they form, and the way agency emerges as 
‘distributed’ across these networks: accordingly, individuals are “relata … [which] have no 
independent existence outside of the relation”.70 
However, ANT tends to provide a somewhat ‘anaemic’ language and, by leaning towards a 
post-phenomenological attention to networks and multi-scalar prolongations, seems to 
overlook the spatial consistency of the here-and-now, what Latham and McCormack refer to 
as the ‘this-ness’ of space, i.e. that which “exceeds the language of networks, connections 
and lines ... something tangible about collective events that is both intensive and extensive 
at the same time”.71 For this reason Brighenti proposes to complement ANT’s “ecological 
sensibility to the prolongation of the here-and-now” into concatenations of ontologically 
heterogeneous elements, with a “phenomenological sensibility to the here-and-now” – an 
‘ecological phenomenology’, that is.72 This is a useful suggestion, especially in 
methodological sense, yet one that still leaves untouched the key question haunting ANT: 
namely, how does 'real' change occur, how do events happen? Whilst the networked 
ontology proposed by Latour is undeniably useful when describing “the steely 
accumulation” of social associations – i.e. the way social components ‘get together’ 
crystallising in assemblages – it appears rather inadequate to fully account for the 
‘lightening strikes’ of change.73 According to Nigel Thrift, ANT assumes an “attenuated 
notion of the event”, that is, as the merely immediate and concrete moment of 
performance, thus leaving unaccounted for the overflowing potential that every event 
carries within, the eventfulness of its taking place.74 In Deleuze's words, “the event is not 
what occurs (occurrence), is within what occurs”.75 Lacking such an ‘excessive’ 
understanding, ANT appears unable “to conceive of difference as such”, i.e. to think the very 
taking place of difference, an ultimately ‘calamitous’ inability, as Doel observes, since it 
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leaves this model exposed to being ingested within the post-political play of ‘equal 
differences’ that Capitalism is about (more on this below).76  
Let us pause for a moment. Above I noted that classical dualist approaches (subject/object, 
individual/society) are unable to grasp the immanent complexity of spatiality. Well aware of 
this, Latour has conceived a flat ontology able to avoid falling into the axiom of (whatever 
micro) ‘individual origin’ of the new, at the same time denying any status to a transcendent 
notion of ‘society’. In order to overcome the ‘false’ alternative of dualism, ANT’s ‘sociology 
of associations’ has prioritised relation as the elementary social fact.77 Although 
theoretically necessary, the ‘relational turn’ performed by ANT thus appears insufficient. As 
I am to explain further through this thesis, I believe the source of such an impasse should be 
located in the prioritisation of the ‘relation’ as the elementary ontological element. This, in a 
nutshell, is the critique moved by some contemporary strands of philosophy which, while 
taking inspiration from ANT’s radical overcoming of the human/nonhuman divide, 
nonetheless contest its relational reductionism, what from now on I will refer to as 
'relationalism'. As Bryant observes, if the social is reduced to the ‘relational’, with no excess 
‘held in reserve’, are not we left with a “frozen universe without any change”?78 Moreover, 
by reducing an entity to its relation with other entities, would we still be able to actually 
speak about an ‘entity’ (i.e. a ‘being’, ‘body’, ‘object’) as such?79 Note that this is no 
sophistic nit-picking. Latour’s approach moves radically against the ‘project of 
Enlightenment’ of social sciences, whose will to know the society by reducing it to hidden 
laws – to be uncovered and explained through the right methodology – would be central to 
the evolution of a set of economical, political, securitarian, legal savoirs which fed 
biopolitical models of ‘population management’ from the 19th century onwards.80 If these 
are the stakes of Latour’s critique, then it is absolutely crucial to ask whether his ‘merely 
relational’ picture of society runs the risk of offering a further rationale to (rather than 
debunking) such a will to know, simply prompting a methodological re-calibration of its 
strategies and practices towards more adequate ways to monitor, trace and control (or 
indeed, ontologically produce) the relations that constitute the social. Later on I will support 
this statement by exploring the contemporary evolution of techniques and technologies of 
surveillance and data-mining in the increasingly undistinguishable field of economics and 
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security. Although lacking at this stage the instruments to corroborate this observation, its 
ethico-political significance can be stated already: the problem of any approach grounded 
on the systematic reduction of beings to their relations (relationalism), is that of defusing 
the social from the eventful – and thus, I will contend, 'emancipatory' – potential that it 
harbours.  
Let me qualify that although I endorse the critique moved by Harman to ANT, I do not agree 
with his pars construens, as I am to show soon.81 Although with absolutely different 
outcomes, this chapter is nonetheless inspired by his suggestion that “space is not just the 
site of relation, but rather of relation and non-relation”.82 This raises different questions: 
how are we to overcome the freezing effects of relationalism without falling back into (more 
or less implicit) individualisms? How could we conceive the spatiality of being-together 
beyond ‘isolation’, at the same time preserving an excess of potentiality irreducible to the 
‘relation’ itself? Answering to these questions requires dealing more explicitly with an 
ontological notion of spatiality. Heidegger’s spatial intuitions and their explicitation, 
developed by Sloterdijk, are very useful in this sense.   
 
4. 




Notwithstanding he is mainly known as a temporal thinker, with Martin Heidegger the 
notion of space, or rather, ‘spatiality’, takes a fundamentally ontological relevance. Prior to 
show the way in which such a notion converges and indeed pushes forwards the spatial 
narration I am building, a brief contextualisation is required. The reader will excuse the 
theoretical density of the next paragraphs: it is bound to rarefy as long as its ‘spatial’ 
consequences will become apparent.  
Notorious for any critical geographer is René Descartes' reduction of space to a mere 
extension, separated from – and internalised by – thought. By severing res cogitans and res 
extensa, Descartes frames the thinking subject as a ‘spectral hunter’ performing incursions 
in space only then to return, as an autonomous subject, into the a-spatial ivory tower of his 
mind.84 Cogito ergo sum: this is the formula for a ‘digestive philosophy’ swallowing up space 
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and reducing it to mind’s own substance: cogitatum.85 Notwithstanding his fundamental, 
say ‘revolutionary’ differences with Descartes, Immanuel Kant similarly ‘minimises’ space, 
no longer as an inert extension, but internalising it as an absolute, a priori background, the 
‘condition of possibility’ for knowledge itself, ultimately a tabula rasa lacking any depth and 
infinitely malleable by the subject and its representations.86 
Phenomenology emerges out of dissatisfaction for the spatial blindness of these 
understandings. By turning the attention to the ‘concrete’ experience of the subject’s 
involvement in space and among things, it seeks to bring the cogito down to earth, to throw 
it into the contingency of lived experience. Edmund Husserl develops a quasi-performative 
understanding of space as a life-world emerging out of subject’s pre-theoretical interaction 
with the world. Likewise, the early Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s notion of pre-reflexive, 
incarnate consciousness expresses the subject’s pre-representational experience of 
Erlebnisse, i.e. everyday life.87 Phenomenology’s main limit– indeed paralleling the limit of 
many spatio-legal approaches we will deal with in the next chapter – is arguably its 
reduction of space to an epistemological question (the manifestation of phenomena to the 
subject), which however leaves unquestioned the subject/object separation and thus the 
ontological unity of the subject itself. By simply shifting from a-spatial, transcendental 
consciousness to the spatially-embedded, everyday experience, Husserl still maintains a 
factual understanding of contingency: the subject has been ‘brought back onto space’, but is 
still kept ontologically separated from it.88 
To go beyond the impasse of Husserl’s ‘factuality’, Heidegger creates the notion of facticity, 
a veritable turning point for Western thinking towards a proper spatial ontology. Facticity 
means that there is no transcendental being isolated from space: every being is always-
already a being-in-the-world. The original condition of being is not a Cartesian 
contemplation of the world from the tower of mind, it is rather a dislocating being-thrown 
onto the world, a being-there (Da-sein). However, differently from earlier phenomenology, 
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for Heidegger this does “not mean simply being contingently in a certain way and a certain 
situation”.89 In Merleau-Ponty’s words, “our body is not primarily in space, it is of it”:90 
Da-sein “is-in” the world in the quite specific sense of being-together-with the world or 
taking care of it … the spatiality of Da-sein is therefore existential presence, not mere 
‘insideness’ … space cannot be an absolute, fixed structure that is the same for 
everyone—like for example Descartes’ res extensa or Kant’s a priori space. Rather, space 
is best understood as spatiality (Räumlichkeit)’.91 
The quality of Da-sein is that of blurring any distinction “between life and its actual 
situation, Being and its ways of Being”, subject and object, thus folding (and yet not 
necessarily ‘dissolving’) essence into (co)existence.92 Hence the late Merleau-Ponty’s precise 
observation: “[Husserl] has persuaded us that we are flux of individual Erlebnisse, whereas 
we are a field of Being”, always pre-personally ‘co-immersed’ in an ontological spatiality.93 
Isolation is the mere illusion most notably shared by the liberal legal subject, to be able to 
ponder in a vacuum, that is, to transcend space – a transcendence with respect to which, 
however, we are radically powerless, since always being-situated, unable to gain distance 
from the contingent spatiality which we are. 
As the attentive reader has surely noted, the Heideggerian move, for all the differences, 
shares a fundamental aspect with Latour’s one: a strong relationalism which seems to 
‘entrap’, almost to dissolve beings in the relationality of the being-in-the-world. I hold that 
this is only partially true. Prior to dwell on this point, however, I introduce another German 
philosopher who fully unfolds the implicit spatial relationality of Heidegger’s thought. 
 
5. 




As Da-sein, the human being goes “out of himself, out of the merely factual and biological 
character of its condition”.95 Da-sein is thus an ‘e-motion’: “being in the world ... is a 
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precious formula for saying that the fact of being in a movement of extraversion towards 
things always precedes our reflection”.96 This being-outside-oneself (ek-stasis) as an original 
dislocation, or dispersion [ursprungliche streuung], is the ontological condition of being and 
the key of its constitutive räumlichkeit.97 Surely an ontology of space – contra his 
appreciations as mere temporal thinker – Heidegger’s is also, quintessentially an ontology of 
movement: spacing.98 
In his recent magnum opus, Peter Sloterdijk seeks to make explicit such ‘spacing’ by posing a 
seemingly trivial question: where is actually the Da-sein when it is thrown into the world? 
Sloterdijk’s answer evocatively makes explicit the materiality of Da-sein’s ek-static 
movement through a terminological invention: the Da-sein is in a sphere, or rather, its 
being-in-the-world is better understood as being-in-a-sphere, since space-creating beings is 
what we are. Being-in-a-sphere is to be understood as a sort of diving in a “medial mode of 
being [that] implies that the surrounding medium loses its object status”.99 According to 
Sloterdijk, during the evolution of his thought Heidegger gradually “misunderstood the act 
of diving as resolution to take over the fate of being”, thus abandoning the promising 
analysis of the ‘where’ of existence, to embark instead the investigation of the ‘who’, with 
well-known infamous consequences.100 Sloterdijk wants to obviate for this deviation by 
developing further these spatial intuitions. Since we are always out-of-joint, always going-
outside-oneself as well as always inside-a-situation, the very condition of being is that of 
‘inhabiting the dislocation’. Yet, and this is the crucial question of Sloterdijk’s project: how 
do we inhabit this dislocation, how do we inhabit the outside?101 I do not think, as Latour 
rather too abruptly states, that the significance of Sloterdijk’s project lies in spatialising an 
otherwise a-spatial Da-sein.102 Heidegger was not blind to space as it is sometimes 
suggested, and Sloterdijk in this regards simply provides an interesting spatial vocabulary 
useful to unfold these implicit premises. In fact, the relevance of his spherology rather rests 
on having made explicit the fact that being-in-the-world, as inhabiting-the-world, always 
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entails a praxis of world-making: “to inhabit always means to build spheres” and this occurs 
in the always co-constitutive ‘coming together’ of humans and non-humans.103 
Sloterdijk employs the metaphor of foam so as to convey the peculiar quality of being-
together in the contradictory dynamic engendered by the tension between the necessity to 
“produce and occupy a – to take – place”, and the impossibility for two bodies to occupy the 
same place.104 Bodies are always in ek-static movement, co-producing a space, i.e. spacing 
through their involvement with other (human and non-human) bodies. A bus, an assembly, 
a residential building, a city: foam is a way to account for a sociality beyond the atomism of 
contractualist models and the homogeneity of holistic ones: not a contract, but rather a co-
traction, concatenations of heterogeneous elements ‘held together’ immanently, by the 
sum of their singular, mutual tensions. Like Buckminster Fuller’s tensegrity structures, ‘foam 
sociality’ is only accountable for through immanent, co-constitutive imbrications of 
material-semiotic relations.105 
By merging Heidegger’s spatial intuition with Tarde’s multi-cellular sociality Sloterdijk 
produces a spatial ontology which comes very close to Latour’s project, providing with an 
extremely useful methodological approach to study urban agglomerations, as I will 
demonstrate later on. Moreover, by accounting for the oscillation between the movement 
of being-together and the necessity of co-existence and thus co-immunity, Sloterdijk makes 
explicit the implicit spatiality of Latour’s somewhat ‘anemic’ networks.106 However, for all its 
relevance, it is impossible not to note how Sloterdijk’s foams, just like Latour’s networks, 
seem to produce a relationalism in which space is postulated as ‘co-produced in-between’, 
and thus a radical notion of event – as the excess that overflows both the 
‘phenomenological here-and-now’ as well as its ‘ecological prolongations’ – is nowhere to 
be found. As Morin notes, Sloterdijk’s ‘foaming’ is grounded on the assumption that “there 
is only one terrestrial globe and that this globe is finite”: therefore the crucial question is 
‘how to synchronise’.107 As I am discussing more in depth later in this and in the third 
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chapter, such rather pacific and indeed conservative injunction prefigures a claustrophobic 
relationalism bound “to stiffening and ultimately block[ing] any understanding of the world 
as an opening or as the circulation of sense”.108 Both sides of the Western individual-society 
dualism are grounded on a fundamentally defensive, immunitary urge to protect against the 
risk of chaos – from the ‘crude chaotic aggregate’ which troubled Kant, to the ‘brutish’ state 
of nature which obsessed Hobbes. What the ‘relational turn’ risks then, whilst pretending to 
get rid of such an immunitary obsession by displacing the dichotomous separation on which 
it is grounded, is to merely translate that immunitary paradigm from the ‘subject-object’ 
distinction to the subject-object (or indeed object-object) relation, ultimately erecting yet 




I believe the deadlock into which relationalism appears to end up, and that will become 
more and more clear as this thesis proceeds, should be addressed by asking two specific 
questions: what does relationalism (in its different forms) seek to immunise against? Is this 
attempt successful? The short answer is: relationalism emerges as an ultimately 
unsuccessful attempt to eliminate the notion of ‘negativity’ in order to build an ‘affirmative’ 
ontology. To start unpacking this sentence, in the next intermezzo I briefly introduce the 
question of negativity, mainly by referring to the ontological ‘separation’ it implies. 
Obviously, here I can only provide a simplified account of such a paramount philosophical 
issue. What I am more concerned with, however, is first to offer a preliminary clarification of 
the ontological and ethical questions here at stake. Second, to begin providing more 










It is in this sense that I interpret Harman’s observation about the risk of relationalism to reinsert “an 
opposition in which the autonomous is always the merely ideal and the real is always the relational” in Prince 
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Nothingness Separation Operation 
 
What shows itself on the threshold between Being and 
non-Being, between sensible and intelligible, between 
word and thing, is not the colourless abyss of the 




Parmenides’ philosophy is an earthquake, a fault line splitting Western thought into two 
paths bound to remain separated for millennia. This is what result from his notion of Being 
as one, simple, immutable and eternal. Emanuele Severino, who dedicated his work to 
explore the consequences of this ancient fracture, observes that Parmenides’ Being is 
‘nullifying’, insofar as de facto postulating a separation between Being and what Being is 
not: non-Being, no-thing, nothingness. In other words, by freezing Being into an absolute 
oneness, Parmenides presupposes, implicitly and unwittingly, the unspeakable evidence of 
nothingness. Arguably, this is the foundational act of nihilism, i.e. the belief that what things 
come from- and go towards- is no-thing. It follows, Severino suggests, that Parmenides’ 
separation ‘consigns’ beings to nothingness, that is, to a movement of be-coming ex and ad 
nihilo.111 We can put it another way: a ‘nihilistic becoming’ (the coming of beings from and 
towards nothingness) is posited as separated from a one, eternal and thus isolated Being. 
The legacy of such a separation on the philosophy to come is uncontestable.112 
In this thesis I will often come back to this point, which I see as the paradigmatic 
explicitation of what Foucault has defined as the instrumental will to know and control 
which traverses Western thought, and that is made most forcefully explicit in contemporary 
biopolitics. Prior to continue, I must qualify that my approach does not wish to flatten 
radical historical differences into all-encompassing explanations. In the sense recently 
proposed by Agamben, I do not understand the ‘paradigm’ as a hypothesis through which 
explaining “modernity by tracing it back to something like a cause or historical origin”, or as 
a ‘signifier’ whereby joining heterogeneous phenomena into a smooth syncretism. Instead, I 
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assume it as a “singular case that is isolated from its context only insofar as, by exhibiting its 
own singularity, it makes intelligible a new ensemble whose homogeneity it itself 
constitutes”.113 A specific example, that is, which by means of being exposed, ‘gives life to a 
new problematic context’, and therefore enters in analogical (and thus non dichotomous, 
i.e. beyond the general/particular dichotomy) relation with other examples, not by 
flattening their differences but rather expressing the shared problematic fields out of which 
they strategically emerge.114 This is how I understand the Parmenidean separation, that is, 
as the production of a problematic field in which ‘operation’ is assumed as the necessary 
mode of action in order to articulate the separation, by managing (as well as achieving 
immunity from) the dangers of the nihilistic outside which had thus been postulated.  
In fact, what the separation of Being from Becoming (i.e. the becoming of beings) implicitly 
entails is the ‘isolation’ and thus disposability of becoming itself, i.e. the disposability of 
beings. It is, in other words, the presupposition of their becoming amenable to – i.e. an 
instrument of – manipulation: here we find in nuce the instrumental paradigm of techné.115 
We could even argue that the history of Western (political, theological, philosophical) 
thought can be framed as emerging out of this problematic field, that is, as an attempt to 
bridge and articulate such a separation into an operation, i.e. to build apparatuses whose 
operations would be able to manipulate, control and determine the becoming of beings 
according to projects.116 A specifically immunitary urge traverses this attempt: that is, an 
effort to immunise (the individual, the community, the society, God etc.) from the 
unpredictability and chaos of nihilistic becoming. As a preliminary definition then, let us 
assume the operational paradigm of techné as the will to control and manipulate beings, 
presupposed on the preliminary ‘separation’ and thus isolation of beings themselves, so as 
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to make them available for manipulation: a separation between Being and Becoming in 
which what is enshrined is ‘the will that the becoming of beings would occur according to a 
project’.117 This is the hypothesis then: I contend that a philosophical position grounded on 
the ‘separation’, i.e. the presupposition of negativity, is bound to fall within the paradigm of 
operation, i.e. the logic of techné.118 
We could further observe how it is from this very presupposition of nothingness that the 
reduction of (human) being into praxis, that is, an ‘operator’, is prefigured. Sloterdijk locates 
the archetype of such reductionism in the book of Genesis, where ‘man’ is shown as created 
by God from clay, i.e. by means of performing the most ancient technical operation: 
pottery.119 Accordingly, Western thinking has understood beings as what are separated 
from, and ‘given shape’, i.e. created by, God, History, Nature, Fate. Since beings are defined 
as what come from, and go towards ‘nothing’, their very ‘(be)coming into existence’ is 
always presented as depending on a creation ex nihilo, a production, an operation: a 
praxis.120 In other words, it is the presupposition of an ‘original nothingness’ which appears 
to ground the faith in the self-production of man through an ‘art’, i.e. a techné.121 Sloterdijk 
makes explicit this point in his sweeping polemical account of the tendency in philosophy, 
sociology, psychology, anthropology, to describe human beings as ‘creatures of lack’, 
homines pauper, constitutively and ontologically poor, and thus condemned to ‘fill’ such a 
negativity by producing a ‘culture’, and thus involving themselves into result-oriented 
‘projects’.122 Even Heidegger’s notion of ‘throwness’ (geworfenheit), he argues, is ultimately 
haunted by an implicit negativity: ‘thrown’ into the abyss of contingency, the Da-sein 
appears to be structured as an ontological poverty or, as Latour ironically puts it, an original 
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‘nakedness’.123 There is an etymological fil rouge that connects the terms iactus (thrown), 
sub-iectus (subject, literally ‘thrown below’) and pro-iectus (project, literally ‘thrown 
forwards’). It is from a presupposed separation that the human being is immediately defined 
as the ‘one who projects’, that is, the one who operationally (technically) manipulates 
(insofar as separated from) beings in order to produce actual results.124 Accordingly, human 
freedom is understood as the freedom to ‘give a positive sense to Nothingness’.125 A self-
evident corollary thus complements the above-stated hypothesis: any philosophical 
enterprise that wishes to be radically ‘emancipatory’ cannot avoid dealing with, and 
challenging, this paradigm.  
Sloterdijk suggests to reformulate the existential condition of ‘being-thrown’ into a ‘being-
transported’ (etre-porté), according to which living beings are not (economically, 
psychologically, ontologically) poor, but rather originally ‘rich’, that is, beings of the ‘too 
much’, always-already ‘transported’, i.e. ‘taken’ into concatenations.126 Likewise, Latour’s 
positive and affirmative ontology sets up to substitute existential notions of ‘original lack’ 
with the richness of a networked ontology. According to Benjamin Noys however, such 
approach, in its attempt to exclude (i.e. immunise from) ‘negativity’ in the name of a 
positive, vitalistic, affirmative ontology, is bound to produce a totalising, stiffening and thus 
ultimately co-optable model. Co-optable because, as it is explored in depth in the following 
chapters, the totalising closure of relational ontologies ultimately mirrors the totalising 
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closure of contemporary neo-capitalist ‘societies of control’, and is thus exposed to their 
logic of manipulation. In Noys’ words,  
Latour would create his own fantasmatic totalisation of the world ... despite Latour’s 
claim to remove an abstract capitalism and replace it with a world of rich concrete 
actualities, his evacuation of negativity reproduces the vision of an entirely seamless 
capitalism that he claims to contest.127 
I fully endorse Noys’ critique. Yet, I contest his diagnosis. According to him, negativity is not 
to be ‘evacuated’, but rather fully ‘traversed’ and ‘dealt with’. Conversely, at the core of the 
troubles produced by these ‘relational’ approaches I do not see the willingness to eliminate 
negativity, but rather the very failure of doing so or, more precisely, the failure to eliminate 
its unconfessed presupposition. I thus preliminary argue that the relational approaches of 
ANT and Spherology are ultimately unsuccessful attempts to ‘evacuate’ negativity insofar as, 
by performing a shift from the notion of separation to that of relation, they ultimately leave 
the former unchallenged. To put it in words which are to become clearer soon: seeking to 
immunise their ontologies of relation against the negativity of separation (and thus the 
‘nihilistic becoming’ this entails), these approaches ultimately end up reaffirming it: the 
linear, dichotomous logic of separation is not overcome, but more strongly and 
subterraneously reiterated by the ‘flattening’ of its two ‘poles’ into an immanent and 
impenetrable circularity. This is what I suggest: the inability to properly challenge the notion 
of separation exposes them to an uncritical and troubling compliance with the paradigm of 
operation.128 It follows, as I will show, that the supposedly emancipatory ethico-political 
stances proposed within these ‘relational’ ontologies are, at best, extremely vulnerable to 
the legal, securitarian and economical operations of contemporary biopolitics; at worst, fully 
complicit, albeit unwittingly, with them. Only a thinking that would go radically beyond any 
separation (either articulated dualistically or dissolved into seamless immanence) can avoid 
the reduction of space to an ultimately calculable, measurable and probabilisable form, and 
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thus susceptible to be ontologically shaped by the abstract form and the actual (sociological, 
neurological, psychological, cybernetic etc.) operations of contemporary biopolitical control. 
In a nutshell, here is what is a stake with spatial thinking: the possibility to develop a non-
operative, ‘inoperose’ ontology able to eschew the ever-rising manipulation of techné. An 
ontology, that is, neither grounded on an immunitary separation with respect to an outside, 
nor stuck within a seamless and uneventful relationalism. This is what I begin to delineate in 
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Above, I observed that the notion of being-in-the-world presupposes a ‘relation’ as 
ontological foundation. With the concept of Da-sein the subject/object distinction is 
dissolved into the original, situational relationality of the being-there: accordingly, beings 
are understood as ‘bundles’ of situated relations, pure relata. On the other hand an implicit 
nihilism emerges from this ‘throwness’. How to escape this double deadlock? Heidegger’s 
late thought provides us with a potential line of flight. 
Especially in the Beitrage zur Philosophie, whose spatial relevance has already been 
emphasised,130 Heidegger progresses from establishing the notion of the throwness of Da-
sein, as he did in his early works, to actually investigating the ‘modality’ of that original 
being-thrown, i.e. its ‘event’.131 In fact, the hyphenation plays a key role in the term Da-Sein: 
it points to the fact that Da-sein cannot be reduced to a given state of affairs – a merely 
relational being-there – but is rather to be understood as the ontological ‘event’ of being-
the-Da, being-the-there, that is, an occurring event, a singular taking-place: “Da-sein is never 
objectively present in space, not even initially”, it rather takes place.132 Accordingly, each 
being is the centre of a radical oscillation ‘between’ Being and Da-sein.133 Being is a 
becoming-Da-sein, neither static nor dynamic, neither isolated nor relational but 
paradoxically beyond these dichotomies: a ‘swerving taking place’, an eventful event.134 This 
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swerving poses the bases for a radical non-Euclidean and eventful spatiality: the spatiality of 
being-together is characterised by the continuous occurrence of being-the-there, the taking 
place of beings. What emerges is not a merely relational being-together, and certainly not a 
community of isolated individuals. Instead, a space which is populated-constituted by 
entities, beings, which are singular and in-relation, that is, taken into concatenations as well 
as always simultaneously (at least potentially) ‘swerving’ from, and thus never exhausted by, 
the concatenations themselves. 
This complex and seemingly paradoxical spatiality should be understood not only against 
Kantian and Cartesian ‘spaces’, but also against notions of space as produced by 
intersubjective interaction (Goffman), phenomenological performativity (Butler), socio-
economical processes (Harvey): that is, against any of these variously sophisticated 
approaches, all directly or indirectly implying the measurability and calculability of space.135 
In the same sense, this spatiality pushes beyond Latour’s network and Sloterdijk’s foaming, 
since the swerving actualisation of beings appears to be never exhausted, i.e. ‘completed’ 
by their relations.136 Doel’s above-mentioned critique of ANT’s inability to think difference 
as such, that is, to account for the taking place of difference, assumes here its full cogency. 
The becoming-Da-sein is not a linear, processual passage from a possibility to a reality – one 
in which the possible would be fully realised (and thus extinguished) into the reality of 
relations. It is rather a ‘swerving’, or a ‘swinging’ [kehrig] event or, more precisely, an 
‘event-ing’ which cannot be exhausted by the relationality of being-in-the-world, since 
always immanently beyond the merely ‘actual’ relations, although never ‘ontologically’ 
separated from them.137 
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It is in this direction that, with more or less convincing results, contemporary philosophy is 
turning its attention to, as testified by the popularity gained by so-called ‘speculative 
realism’ (SR). Perhaps its most representative text is Quentin Meillassoux’s After Finitude. In 
this admittedly incomplete work, the Kantian revolution – namely, the overcoming of the 
Cartesian dichotomy between the thinking subject (res cogitans) and extended object (res 
extensa), and thus the shift from the notion of substance to that of cor-relation as the 
central category of thought – is posited as the key moment of modern Western philosophy: 
“by ‘correlation’ we mean the idea according to which we only have access to the 
correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the 
other”.139 What SR aims to do, to put it simply, is to ‘break open’ the human-world 
correlation, so as to account for the ontological nature of beings independently from the 
latter. To propel this intention is a key ethico-political potential, i.e. the possibility – through 
a radical reorientation towards a world assumed as utterly independent from human 
existence, cognition, imagination: a 'world not for us' – to perform a radical decentring of 
the anthropological premises still haunting contemporary philosophical thought. This core 
question is being tackled in very different and differently satisfying manner by different 
thinkers within this movement, and the exploration of these ramifications is certainly 
beyond the scope of this thesis. Yet, the conceptual intensity the question provides has 
certainly proved stimulating in orienting my attempt to unfold a non-relational and eventful 
potential for ethico-political action to be exposed through an adequate understanding of 
justice. In this section I focus on a particularly controversial branch of SR, namely ‘Object-
Oriented Ontology’ (OOO).  
Regardless of its limits, which I am to underline soon, by briefly dealing with this perspective 
and especially with one of its major proponents (Graham Harman), I will be able to qualify 
and calibrate the trajectory I am pursuing more accurately. In fact, OOO, and Harman in 
particular, somewhat mirror the trajectory of the thesis so far, insofar as similarly accepting 
the key insight coming from ANT, whilst at the same time striving to avoid falling into its 
problematic ‘relationalism’. The prioritisation of the human-world correlation, the argument 
goes, has led to systematically overlooking the independent status of other entities, de facto 
reducing the world to a world for us, i.e. at our disposal. Therefore, following ANT’s crucial 
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de-prioritisation of the human-world correlation in favour of other non-human relations, 
OOO pushes this perspective further by seeking to account for beings (or, as they refer to 
them, ‘objects’) regardless of ‘our access to them’, denying contra ANT that relations can 
fully define and exhaust them.140 The question of whether OOO’s somewhat simplistic 
dismissal of correlation ultimately entraps its thinkers into a tangle of problematic 
contradictions is not crucial here.141 What I find more interesting is the 'orientation' it 
pursues.142 Particularly significant is the argument that relations do not exhaust the entities. 
As above observed, if beings are fully defined by their relations (if an object is ‘nothing other 
than its relations’), what is implied is the possibility, by tracing these relations, to ultimately 
being able to define, produce and manipulate any entity. Arguably the very logic of techné, 
its fundamental ‘abstraction’ (see below), appears to be premised on such a reductionist 
relationalism. Conversely, if beings are never fully accessible and accountable through their 
relations – i.e. if each being singularly embodies a radical excess – then there would be no 
savoir or techné able to fully access, predict and control them. This is what Harman 
contends: “an object might be measured or registered by its relations, but can never be fully 
defined by them”.143 The ethico-political consequences of this reasoning are vast. Yet, is 
Harman proposal satisfying?  
 
3. 
poetic words do not originally belong to men nor are 




Both Harman and Latour assume that every human and non-human, tangible and intangible 
being is equally material, in the sense that ‘everything exist differently, but everything 
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equally exist’. In Deleuze’s terms, “a body can be anything: it can be an animal, a body of 
sounds, a mind or idea; it can be a linguistic corpus, a social body, a collectivity.”145 When 
we assume that the beings (or bodies, objects) constituting reality are equally ‘material’, we 
should pursue this affirmation in its deeply ontological sense, beyond any trivial dichotomy 
between word and world, text and context, thought and matter, representation and reality, 
abstraction and concreteness. From classical materialism to postmodernism, the difference 
between a given, concrete, hard ‘matter-stuff’ and an immaterial, abstract, textual flow of 
representations and narrative have been mostly left unchallenged.146 Both the hard-core 
materialist who pragmatically suggests to look at the ‘concrete’ reality so as to uncovering 
its laws through the appropriate scientific method, as well as the sceptical post-modernist 
who frowns upon this suggestion by affirming the infinite hermeneutical dissemination of 
interpretations which such an enterprise would produce, secretly agree in opposing the 
concrete materiality of the ‘hard stuff’ out there to the immaterial abstraction of thinking 
and the impalpability of interpretations. Their disagreement is epistemological rather than 
ontological. Instead, the ‘orientation’ towards objects of OOO is an attempt, in the vein of 
the Latourian enterprise, to produce a proper ontological move, ‘flattening’ the 
material/immaterial division into a horizontal ontology. Yet, how to perform this move 
whilst avoiding a reductionist relationalism? By briefly looking at Harman’s ultimately failed 
attempt it is possible to emphasise the risks of his enterprise, thus clarifying how the 
present thesis seeks to avoid them.  
To put it simply: Harman contends that an object is at the same time real and sensual, 
autonomous and relational.147 Through a thought-experiment, he seeks to explain what 
such a non-relational autonomy means. Let us take three entities: a ‘private’ and intangible 
human product, such as an object of my imagination only known to me – Harman imagines 
a ‘monster X’, (MX); a ‘public’ human product, such as a well-known philosophical 
movement (e.g. the SR movement); a human-independent object, such as his cats.  Harman 
states: “if I fall tonight into a dreamless sleep, the monster will cease to exist. Monster X is 
entirely dependent on my thinking of it. The same is by no means true of the cats”.148 The 
cats have both a real (non-relational) and sensuous (relational) existence, whilst the MX has 
not, existing only insofar as in-relation with my mind.149 Different is the case of SR: though 
being a human-produced object, it can become a ‘real object independent of its creators 
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and consumers’, i.e. autonomous. The discriminant is the following: “real objects exist 
‘whether we like it or not’, but intentional [i.e. sensual] objects can be vaporized by a simple 
act of shifting our mind elsewhere.”150 An important, if quite untenable presupposition is 
implied: the possibility of a purely individual and private origin of thoughts, as well as of the 
capacity, for the thinking subject, to wilfully possess, control and ‘vaporise’ them (as it 
happen for the MX). In other words, a ‘proprietary assumption’ guides this reasoning: the 
lack of ‘possession’ and control over an object (e.g. SR) appears to sanction its status as 
autonomous, non-relational, and thus fully ‘real’. 
In fact, it only takes a shift of scale to make this equation explode. If MX is ‘dependent’ on 
its correlation with me who ‘thinks’ it, is not at the same time SR dependent on the 
correlation with, say, mankind? According to the reasoning above, my death would make 
MX vaporise just as human extinction would make SR disappear.151 Therefore, 
notwithstanding the differences in longevity, number and variety of bodies which they can 
affect, MX and SR must be understood as ontologically equal, equally material. If we really 
are to embrace a radical understanding of materiality, we need to avoid re-introducing 
subterranean dichotomisations. This is the case since Harman postulates not simply the fact 
that a ‘being must be free of all relations’, but the possibility of this being actually so. Let me 
explain. As I elaborate below, what I contend is that bodies have an independency from all 
relations in the sense of a non-relational, ‘virtual impotentiality’ that sanctions both their 
‘persevering’ in what they are, as well as their being ultimately irreducible to the relations in 
which they unavoidably enter. According to Harman instead, this non-relational condition 
must be ‘fully actual’. Describing this purely non-relational status as “a state of perfect 
sleep, in which an entity would be real without entering further relations at all”, he thus 
relates such a ‘dormant object’ to a drop of water, which in the depth of the ocean is 
“perfectly real without ever being discovered, caressed or capitalised.”152 Evidently, this 
position is only tenable, ironically, from the very anthropocentric perspective Harman 
sought to displace: the dormancy of a drop of water here is postulated qua human-
independent, yet it remains a mystery how a drop of water can ‘actually exist’ without ever 
being ‘discovered or caressed’ by other drops of water, for instance. Likewise, how could a 
cat survive without its relation to, at the very least, the air it breaths, the soil on which it 
stands? Virtually non-relational, bodies are always actually involved in relations. To contend 
otherwise would be to suggest that both the cat and the drop of water are like those 
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individuals of liberal tradition, understood as actually abstracted from space into the realm 
of rational deliberation: liberal individuals and Harman’s objects will end up being equally 
vacuums. Moving from an attempt to de-prioritise the ‘correlation to humans’, we are 
ultimately served with a perspective that seemingly prioritises the ‘independence from 
humans’.153 In other words, it appears that in his anxiety to preserve the concreteness, that 
is, the ‘autonomous reality’ of the object against its dissolution into relations, Harman infers 
an untenable analogy between ‘actuality’ and ‘reality’, and ultimately abs-tracts objects 
from their spatiality. This ‘actual’ non-relational dormancy (a stance that from now on I will 
refer to as actualism) is as preposterous as the positing of a “methodical abstraction from 
every situation” that characterises classical liberal theory.154 Against the contradictory 
outcome into which Harman falls, the material ontology I propose entails the acceptance of 
the materiality of every being, both humanly-produced and human-independent: between 
MX, SR and cats, or whatever human-independent object, there is no ontological difference: 
they are all material, all dependent on (very different) sets of (either human or nonhuman, 
tangible or intangible) relations for their existence, though never fully definable and 
exhausted by them. Even more radically, this entails to accept that not only rocks or cats, 
but even our more private thoughts are never fully ‘ours’, i.e. never fully for us. What I 
suggest is that, in my opinion, the key questions at stake with the attempt to challenge the 
human-world correlation are: first, that of dismantling the proprietary and immunitary logic 
of possession that underlines it; second, that of opening it up to the cosmic contingency of 
its 'event'.155 
Instead, in his immunological attempt to guarantee the self-sufficiency and concreteness of 
objects, Harman’s actualism projects a frozen ontology made of only-actual beings which is 
as unable to account for change as with Latour relationalism is.156 Even more 
problematically with respect to the latter, the implicit ‘isolation’ into which Harman seems 
to confine objects is bound to re-introduce nihilism within his ontology, and a consequent 
vulnerability to the logic of techné. In fact, the uneventful ‘closure’ that this ontology of 
‘being without event’ produces, is troublingly fitting with a conservative political stance that 
encourages acceptance of the status quo, and appears to be merely content with carving 
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out for itself the ‘administrative’ task of finding the best way to organise it.157 As Berry 
observes, this is “not so much philosophy as philosography, where rather 
than understanding the world, there is an attempt to describe it, and a worrying tendency 
towards the administration of things through a cataloguing operation.”158 
How to simultaneously exceed both the perils of relationalism and actualism? I believe 
Deleuze’s concept of the virtual is invaluable in order to fully pursue the seemingly 
paradoxical task of thinking simultaneously beyond relation as well as separation, towards 
the conception of a non-relational side of beings, which is not actual, and yet fully material, 
i.e. concrete and real.159 
 
4. 
a life is never fully actualised, but endures a real 




Through the notion of ‘virtual’ we are able to ride the line of flight opened by Heidegger’s 
swerving all the way onto Deleuze’s concept of event. I am not necessarily suggesting that 
between the two authors there is more in common than the French philosopher would like 
to admit. My aim is not that of producing posthumous philosophical friendships. Instead, I 
wish to join their insights as ‘tools’ of a productive assemblage whereby to delineate the 
spatial ontology I have in mind.  
The virtual could be (partially) defined as the field of the possible ways-of-being of a given 
‘body’. In this sense, we could say that the virtual is a multiplicity expressing the potential 
modes of a being, “the structure of a space of possibilities ... the space of all the possible 
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states that a given system can have”.161 It is important to understand the concept of 
multiplicity in a non-trivial sense. Deleuze, through the philosophy of Bergson and the 
mathematics of Riemann, distinguishes between discrete and continuous multiplicities: 
whilst the former can be counted, since numerical and quantitative, the latter are non-
numerical, qualitative, continuous and heterogeneous.162 When discussing the ‘virtual 
multiplicity’ then, we are not referring to a numerical multiplicity, according to which the 
virtual would simply indicate a set of already-given, countable possible states always-already 
possessed within an actual body. This misunderstanding, which freezes space into a real in 
which there would be only actual relations, results form a typical confusion between the 
concept of ‘virtual’ and that of ‘possible’, a major mistake indeed, since it is exactly to 
challenge the classical dichotomous opposition between ‘possible’ and ‘real’ that the 
concept of virtual was created. Differently from the possible, which is by definition not real, 
the virtual is real, although non-actual. It is real since it has real effects on the actual. In this 
sense it is material: though being non-actual, it continuously ‘haunts the actual’.163 This does 
not mean that actual and virtual are separated, or that a pacific symmetry can be postulated 
among them: they affect each other, in a radical, swerving asymmetry, between the real 
potentialities of the virtual and their relational actualisation. Actual and virtual are to be 
understood as ‘the two sides of the Real’, only formally but not ontologically distinct: neither 
a dualism, nor a univocity, but rather a double structure. Through this concept we are able to 
revoke the Parmenidean separation, without simply falling into one side of the split, i.e. 
either a hyperactive ontology of becoming or a static ‘order of being’: 
Being is univocal…..A single voice raises the clamour of being ... There are not two 
‘paths’, as Parmenides’ poem suggests, but a single ‘voice’ of Being which include all its 
modes164 
There is a need for a qualification here. The reader could legitimately ask whether this quote 
is not implying a separation, that between a ‘univocal’, virtual Being, and the actual, 
relational ‘modes’ in which it unfolds. If we are to understand actual and virtual as two 
separated ‘realms’, then the consequences are two equally untenable solutions: a frozen 
actuality without virtuality (as either in the relationalism of ANT or in the actual dormancy of 
Harman), or an ascetic, immaterial escape into a pure (virtual) chaos in which no actuality 
takes hold.165 The latter, according to a recent trend of critique, would be exactly the 
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deadlock that Deleuze’s philosophy of the virtual would lead to. Most notably, Alain Badiou 
has argued that Deleuze assumes the virtual as an all-encompassing and undifferentiated 
‘bare substratum’ out of which actual entities would emanate – a sort of Plotinian God.166 If 
this is the case, actual beings would be no more than ‘sterile abstractions from a deeper 
movement of flux or becoming’, lacking a proper ontological status.167 Accordingly, this 
would imply a philosophy whose “main task facing any such creature is to loosen and then 
dissolve [‘material’ and ‘situational’] limitations in order to become a more adequate or 
immaterial vehicle for that virtual creating which alone individuates it.”168 This is, the 
critique goes, an eminently a-political stance which advocates an ascetic retreat into “a 
quasi-mystical contemplation of the boundless power of creation, of which actuality is only a 
limitation”, and that would crucially move away from the crucial ‘situatedness of political 
action’.169 The key problem with such a-spatial and immaterial philosophy (literally leading, 
as Hallward puts it, ‘out of this world’) would be that of ultimately consigning entities to the 
manipulation of biopolitical techniques and technologies of control. Consequently, Zizek can 
follow Badiou by accusing Deleuze and Guattari of being the unwitting prophets of neo-
capitalism.170 
We will have to wait the third chapter to explain more precisely the sense of the last two 
sentences, and the fifth chapter to fully clarify how my position seeks to avoid this outcome. 
Yet, although the ethico-political significance of this gesture will become fully apparent later 
on, it is important from now to rescue the notion of the virtual from potential 
misunderstandings, especially from the major one of confusing it with an ‘undifferentiated 
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substratum’ – a sort of ‘bare origin’ of all entities. The presupposition/production of bare 
substratum (bare life) is, as I show in the next chapter, what grounds the exceptional logic of 
law's spatial appropriation. Hence the need to qualify promptly the incompatibility of the 
notion of virtual with such a characterisation – into which, instead, Latour’s ambiguous 
concept of plasma appears to fall.171 Two quotes are helpful for this purpose: 
The univocity of Being does not mean that there is one and the same Being; on the 
contrary, beings are multiple and different ... the univocity of Being signifies that Being is 
Voice that it is said172 
the essential in univocity is not that Being is said in a single and same sense, but that it is 
said, in a single and same sense, of all its individuating differences or intrinsic modalities. 
Being is the same for all these modalities, but these modalities are not the same. It is 
‘equal’ for all, but they themselves are not equal. It is said of all in a single sense, but 
they themselves do not have the same sense173 
How can we unfold this notion of a ‘being’ shared by all entities without crystallising it into a 
plasmatic substratum out of which those entities would emanate (and that consequently 
would deny any ontological status to the entities themselves)? First, I need to explain how 
such a ‘Being’ could be defined as an inorganic ‘life’ in which and through which beings 
endure, a life which is not an all-encompassing whole, but rather a non-relational 
(im)potentiality ‘structural’ to every being. Second, I have to account for the ontological 
singularity of these simultaneously relational and non-relational beings.  
 
5. 




The first step requires to understand the notion of virtual as a potentiality emancipated from 
the insipid status of a possibility, and at the same time not confounded with mere actuality. I 
believe an aid in this sense can come from a reflection which traverses all of Agamben’s 
work, and that stems from his analysis of the famous Aristotelian distinction between 
dynamis (potentiality) and energeia (act), whereby the Philosopher sought to contest the 
thesis according to which potentiality only exists in the act, i.e., when actualised.175 Instead, 
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Aristotle contends that a potentiality exists, i.e. it is real, independently of its actualisation. 
In this sense, potentiality is essentially defined as the possibility of non-exercising the 
potentiality itself, just like the piano player has the potential of playing the piano insofar as 
he is able not-to play the piano. Potentiality is the form of a non-actualised presence, a 
(virtual) impotentiality. The radicalism of this theory should not be underestimated: to 
understand potentiality as a precise quality, already-determined by the act, is to reduce it to 
something amenable to control by the will (as in Harman’s above example), an instrument 
for a projectual operation, or indeed a form to be shaped through discipline. In other words, 
what this notion de-activates is the proprietary mechanism of the I-subject, grounded as it is 
on the possession and control of one’s will and faculties. This proprietary mechanism, on 
which as we are to see the legal subjection rests, is made ‘inoperose’ by this notion of 
impotentiality, that sanctions the existence of a potentiality non-exhausted by its 
actualisation:  
Contrary to the traditional idea of potentiality that is annulled in actuality, here we are 
confronted with a potentiality that conserves itself and saves itself in actuality. Here 
potentiality, so to speak, survives actuality and, in this way, gives itself to itself176 
In the terms employed so far, impotentiality appears exactly as what, in every being, is the 
potentiality not to be reduced to relations, to swerve away from any operation. According to 
Bryant, each object has ‘demonic’ or ‘volcanic’ powers, in excess to any relation or local 
manifestation.177 To him, this means that objects have “the capacity to operate, even though 
they weren’t operating. They [retain] the power of life, just not the local manifestation of 
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life”.178 Accordingly, the ‘demonic’ powers of objects are understood as ‘capacities to’ which 
an object possesses, an understanding which, I believe, still maintains the relation of 
possession in place, and thus does not fully challenge the paradigm of operation. More 
promising to think the non-relational side of the virtual seems to me Agamben’s notion of 
impotentiality, which gestures towards a concept of ‘inoperose’ and non-proprietary 
potentiality, which as such cannot be possessed and operated but only, and necessarily 
commonly, used.179 Differently from Bryant, whose use of the adjective appears as merely 
aesthetic, in Agamben the term ‘demonic’ seems to assume a more strategic and non-
rhetorical meaning: ‘demonic’ is ‘in every being, the possibility not to be ... the 
impotentiality’. On the other hand, the notion of ‘evil’ refers to one’s ‘fearful retreat from it 
[from the demonic] in order to exercise – founding ourselves in this retreat – some power to 
be’.180 Differently from a naïve and in this sense ‘evil vitalism’ unable to escape the 
proprietary paradigm of operation, I thus propose to endorse a demonic vitalism which 
would allow for thinking the virtual not as a mere capacity to, but rather as the eventful 
impotency through which we live a life in ‘incessant excess to its own forms and 
actualisations’.181 Agamben has beautifully expressed this quality of Deleuze’s vitalism, as 
the simultaneous overturning of transcendence without falling into the suffocating 
immanence of relationalism, in his analysis of his very last text, Immanence: a Life... Deeply 
convinced of the ‘strategic relevance’ of the title’s unusual punctuation, Agamben suggests 
that the colon means “neither a simple identity nor a simple logical connection” between the 
notion of ‘immanence’ and that of ‘a life’, but rather 
introduces an agencement of a special kind, something like an absolute agencement 
that also includes ‘nonrelation’ or the relation derived from nonrelation ... In this sense, 
the colon represents the dislocation of immanence in itself, the opening to an alterity 
that nevertheless remains absolutely immanent 
Moreover, he adds that the ellipsis which follows the term ‘life’  
maintain the term "life" in relation to its pure determinability and, while carrying it into 
this virtual field, exclude the possibility that the indefinite article "a" (i.e., one) might (as 
in Neoplatonism) transcend the Being that follows it.182 
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52 
 
This ‘inorganic life’ is what allows any human and nonhuman being to ‘persevere’ in itself (in 
the sense of a Spinozian conatus, i.e. the immanent desire to persevere in one’s being) by 
swerving simultaneously from a suffocating closure from relations (the cage of hyper-
individualism) as well as from a hyper-active dissolution into fully actual relations (the cage 
of relationalism), radically exceeding and thus debunking the dualism between an 
undifferentiated and homogeneous ‘bare life’ and an already-determined ‘individual life’.183 
Each body is a demonic double. Hence, following Spinoza and Nietzsche, the truly ethico-
political question becomes that of a body’s ‘inclination’: either a movement of composition, 
as an opening into the spatiality of common relations; or a movement of closure, as a 
reactionary denial of co-spatiality in the form of the immunitary self-closure of the ‘actual 
individual’. These are not ‘given’ states, but rather the two indefinite tendencies between 
which each body is polarised.184 Actually reaching one of these tendencies, as Meillassoux 
observes, would simply lead to as many forms of death: on the one hand, a ‘monadological 
death’, i.e. an absolute closure from space and its relation, just like the cat deprived of air, 
the SR deprived of its thinkers. On the other hand: a death “by dissipation and progressive 
disappearance ... an infinite madness ... [becoming] a pure point of passage, a pure centre of 
communication of all things with all things”.185 Death as the end of all relations (the dormant 
object), death as dissolution into all relations (the Latourian object): a body, as Deleuze 
would never tire to say, is always in the middle, not as ‘in-between’, but rather as a fold 
exceeding these never completely-inhabitable (since never fully separated) dimensions.186 
To understand objects, or bodies, in this way is to understand them as double-structures, 
and thus never fully graspable, reducible, manipulatable, always situated within a relational 
here-and-know, and yet never actually resolved, i.e. stuck into that. Demonic vitalism avoids 
the chaotic condition of being ‘constantly enrolled into activity’ that characterises naïve 
vitalism, and rather affirms the ontological (reserve of) impotentiality that each being 
harbours. What keeps a body ‘alive’ is this ‘inoperose potency to swerve’:  not a ‘capacity to 
do’, therefore, but more importantly a ‘capacity to undo’: an ‘inoperose potentiality’ that, as 
we are to see, by ‘making inoperose’ the operational mechanism of appropriation, unleashes 
the excessive eventfulness of the materiality of being-together, opening up each situation to 
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the contingency where ‘life’ is put-at-stake, and thus where the battleground of 
contemporary biopolitics lies.187 
 
6. 




Through the concept of double-structure we are able to hold together a notion of virtual as 
an impotentiality, a sort of ‘inoperose’, quiet power, as well as the actual relationality in 
which always unfolds. Let us be clear: I am not implying that materiality is ‘only’ relational. 
Materiality is actual and virtual, relational and non-relational, paradoxically material and 
immaterial, as Anderson and Wiley suggest: “The qualities that we consider to be 
immaterial are internal to matter but, importantly, do not coincide with the essential 
properties of a thing ‘in itself’ or the properties of a thing ‘in relation’”.189 An excess, that is, 
which overcomes every relation, and that the virtual allows for thinking as radically 
material, never transcendently ‘beyond’, or ‘outside’, but rather as the swerving and evental 
taking place of any entity, the unavoidable fact that each being ‘must be in some place and 
occupy a space’, its geo-sophical ‘rootedness’.190 
Beyond freezing relationalism, actualist isolations or transcendent abstractions, we are thus 
facing a truly radical materialism based on the simple formula that everything does matter. 
This is certainly consistent with the call of ‘new’ materialist philosophies to re-evaluate the 
importance of a materiality which is independent from, i.e. not for, us: every entity equally 
‘matters’ (although in unavoidably different ways). Not in the sense of everything being 
neutral. Quite the contrary. There is no 'innocence' in matter, as there is no actual isolation 
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of beings. This is the second meaning of the formula: every entity matters in the sense of 
‘mattering’, by entering in relations with other bodies, affecting and being affected, never 
fully neutral from the power relations in which unavoidably gets entangled. Equally, 
intangible bodies such representations, images, ideas, are not to be assessed vis-à-vis their 
reference to a system of truth, but rather according to the material processes they trigger, 
the ontological concatenations they produce, as well as the eventful, swerving potential 
they harbour: “the capacity of an idea to put a mass in movement, to modify the balance of 
a ﬁeld of power or to induce this or that behaviour is not dependent on its truth-value”.191 
Since everything does matter, every thing takes place, and this taking place is material, 
ontologically productive, and as such susceptible of being explored:  
everything takes-part and in taking-part, takes-place: everything happens, everything 
acts. Everything, including images, words and texts ... and so even representation 
become presentations; as things and events, they enact worlds ... in their taking-place 
they have an expressive power as active interventions in the co-fabrication of worlds192 
It is by assuming this always-excessive, eventful taking place of matter, that we can 
overcome the totalising rigidity of networks without falling onto unformatted ‘plasma’, or 
indeed a chaotic nihilism. A final step is left, however, to clarify more precisely how such an 
‘excess’ on which every being’s (im)potentiality to swerve lies, rather than being ‘another 
kind’ of relation, is the non-relational ‘event’ of the relation itself. It is exactly by turning to 
the notion of event that we are able to account for that.  
 
7. 




In his very first essay, the young Jean-Paul Sartre waged an attack to the notion of I-subject. 
The emersion of the ‘Ego’, he noted, is constituted by a ‘reflexive’ act of consciousness 
which thus establishes the status of the I-subject as the centre of will. Yet, this 
consciousness, prior to turn onto itself, i.e. to become ‘reflexive’ (i.e. self-consciousness), is 
‘irreflexive’. This is the literally unthinkable, ‘irreflexive ground’ of any reflection, and as such 
is impersonal and non-subjective. Sartre calls it transcendental field, what does not belong to 
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any subject, since ‘purified of the I’, or the latter’s immanent ‘condition of possibility’, the 
‘event’ of its surfacing: not a shapeless whole, but what in any body is the “first condition 
and an absolute source of existence”.194 Ronchi suggests to understand the transcendental 
field as a paradoxical non-relational relation or, more precisely, as what actually grounds any 
(cor)relation (being-world, subject-object, object-object): ‘the constituted is the correlation 
I-world, the subject-object nexus. The constituent is the event of that correlation, which has 
no other place than in the correlation, yet cannot be said as correlation’.195 If any entity can 
only exist by entering into relations (since there cannot be entities standing in the void), the 
transcendental field would be exactly the impersonal ‘potential’ to enter in relations as well 
as simultaneously to swerve from being reduced to them. To indicate the way 
concatenations emerge immanently in the social field, Deleuze and Guattari create the 
concept of machine: in the ontological, vibrating and conflictual co-immersion of being-
together, machines are ‘immanent ordering logics’. Let us imagine various voices singing 
randomly, which suddenly become tuned on a certain, common wavelength: we could say 
that this tune at the same time constitutes, and is constituted, by the voices themselves. A 
machine is an "impulse without determined goals” which ‘selects’, ‘invents’, i.e. machines 
the voices, holding them together whilst keeping them heterogeneous.196 Take the famous 
riddle of the silence – ‘if you mention me, I am gone’ –, where what is implied is a 
constitutive, unspeakable absence as the groundless ground of any expression, and translate 
it to an affirmative notion of Being as Voice, where negation is substituted by machination: 
‘if you mention me, I am machined’.197 Being and Becoming, one and all, univocity and 
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pluralism, virtual and actual: these terms can never exist ‘in separation’, and are only given 
in a tension which cannot be dissolved into one of the two terms. 198  
This is what Deleuze’s notion of event expresses: at the same time the actualisation of 
matter into a given state of affairs, as well as the very eventfulness, its swerving taking 
place, which always prevents a body from merely coinciding tautologically with its actual 
relations: “the event is not what occurs (occurrence), is within what occurs”.199 This is not 
only to say that every relation, every concatenation is prone to dislocation, in a continuous 
movement of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation. More precisely, it means that in 
every occurrence, every taking-part, every entering in relation, there is an ‘event’, i.e. the 
taking place of these relations. What does it mean? In a famous passage, Deleuze sought to 
explain this point by differentiating between the viewpoint of a soldier within the battle, 
and the enigmatic ‘viewpoint of the event’:   
the battle hovers over its own field, being neutral in relation to all its temporal 
actualizations, neutral and impassive in relation to the victor and the vanquished, the 
coward and the brave ...  Never present but always yet to come and already passed ... 
“Where” is the battle? This is why the soldier flees when he flees and surges when he 
surges, determined to consider each temporal actualisation from the height of the 
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eternal truth of the event which incarnates itself in it and, alas, incarnates itself in his 
own flesh.200 
Woodward perfectly summarises the sense of this seemingly esoteric passage:  
the view from the event is the aggregate view, the wordly perspective, of divergent 
perspectives ... a manifold of changing perspectives, forces and relata. The event is not 
simply non-representational, it is non-presentational.201 
That is, the ‘viewpoint’ of the event, and thus what grounds its excess, should not be merely 
confounded with what escapes the representational cognition of a subject. It is not simply 
what is actually there, ‘present’ to the soldier, yet unperceived by him, since only affecting 
him pre-consciously, pre-subjectively and non-representationally.202 Contrary to these 
ultimately phenomenological simplifications, what the event’s viewpoint concerns is not 
even ‘presented’, since it is a virtual multiplicity, that is, it “concerns an emerging situation’s 
‘making-available’ a multiplicity of viewpoints (potentially) to the bodies (humans, bits of 
matter, animality, languages and so on) that compose it”.203 This is the deep sense of 
Spinoza’s maxim: “we do not know what a body can do”. Not simply an epistemological and 
‘correlational’ limit (i.e. our incapacity to know), but an ontological statement (i.e. 
independently from us, a body is never exhausted by its relations): we do not know what a 
body can do because “only the event can know what a body can do”.204 Hence the non-
relational status of the event: its virtual viewpoint without representation or presentation is 
exactly the unthinkable point of view of a world indifferent to us, that is, a world not for us: 
‘consciousness without witness, spectacle without audience’.205 This is what is permitted by 
a radical understanding of materiality as an eventful taking place, in the sense of being 
always open to a post-human, impersonal and thus 'cosmic' contingency: neither in the 
temporal sense of an ancestral world before us (or indeed future world after us), nor in the 
spatial sense of something occurring billions of kilometres away from us, but rather in the 
‘geo-sophical’ sense of a world not-for-us, utterly indifferent to our inescapable involvement 
with it, to which we are nonetheless open here-and-now.206 In every body, and thus in every 
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situation, lies the potential (‘reserve of potentiality’, ‘demonic’ power, impotentiality...) 
opened by contingent eventfulness, what provides every one with a inoperose potency to 
swerve, granting one’s ultimate irreducibility to the actuality of social, physical, biological, 
psychological relations. 
From this seemingly ‘abstract’ observation a profoundly empirical philosophy emerges. How 
to account for this excessive materiality, how to follow the machinic concatenations in 
which the social is striated, without at the same time reducing space ‘just’ to relations? 
Deleuze has a paradoxical formula for answering this question: transcendental empiricism. 
Through this model, he is able to cut through transcendental subjectivism and objective 
empiricism, ontologies of presence and flat ontologies of relations.207 In fact, 
‘transcendental’ here is employed in reference to a field of enquiry which is ‘beyond’ the 
human, the personal, the subject/object distinction, but also, as we saw, beyond ‘mere’ 
relations. The ‘ethico-methodological’ proposition here is the injunction to be ‘faithful to 
the event’, i.e. to be faithful to a world not for us, a world never fully reducible to the 
relations we trace.208 This injunction should not be understood in spontaneistic, simplistic or 
ascetic terms. We are not heading ‘out of this world’ as Hallward and others rather 
simplistically propose.209 Quite the contrary: we are heading towards an absolutely 
‘situated’ practice, in the geo-sophical sense just unfolded (that is, being simultaneously 
here-and-now in a world not-for-us). A ‘practice’ which, in the precise words of Nunes, “is 
premised on experimenting with the virtualities ‘of this actual’ and never (pace Hallward) on 
an experience of the virtual”.210 
The density of the last section will be unpacked through the thesis. In the fourth chapter, I 
will draw some methodological suggestions. Coherently with the spiralling structure of this 
thesis, in the fifth I will come back to this radically impersonal, post-human and cosmic 
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notion of event in an almost specular manner, this time however to reflect more in depth on 
the ethico-political significance of such geo-sophical position by linking it to the notion of 
justice. In the in next, final part of this chapter instead, I propose a way to convey this 




























Atmosphere Rhythm Tuning 
 
1. 
only empiricism knows how to transcend the 
experiential dimension of the visible without falling into 
Ideas, and how to track down, invoke and perhaps 





We have now the equipment to provide the understanding of the urban anticipated in the 
introduction with theoretical substance, addressing it as a spatiality populated, and indeed 
constituted, by differentiating, persevering and swerving bodies, simultaneously singular 
and in-relation, bodies that can “be measured or registered by [their] relations, but can 
never be fully defined by them”.212 A spatiality which is never fully totalisable into a frozen 
actuality: not a closed One-All, but rather an open whole, always carrying a ‘more’, an 
eventful excess.213 Whilst immanent orderings deny the relativism of a postmodern chaos, 
this ‘more’ is what revokes, ontologically, the presumption of measurability. The city is a 
surface where events take place, materially, and are joined in machinic concatenations, a 
“state of thriving differences which do not submit to any categorisation, identification or 
totalisation”, an agonistic field of ‘free play’ in which ideal distance or peaceful dialectics are 
mere chimera.214 Pace Hobbes, conflict is not the denial, but rather the very fibre of society, 
the ontological condition of being-together. In the spatial matrix of this 'molecular civil war' 
the various (human/nonhuman, tangible/intangible) bodies, space-times and scales exist 
and insist, constantly encountering and clashing, producing frictions, variations of intensity, 
eventful potentialities.215 Yet, this is no chaos. The urban multiplicities appear to be 
constantly tuned into orderings immanently emerging ‘between’, or more precisely 
excessive to the smooth space of flows and the striated space of structures.216 No dialectical 
model can account for the complex interspersions and frictions between the 
‘phenomenological concreteness’ of the here-and-now and its ‘abstractions’ and ecological 
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prolongations, as well as for the apparatuses and dispositifs which constantly seek to 
‘pacify’ these orderings by depriving them from their eventfulness – more or less intentional 
attempts always haunted by an ever-present, abstract-and-concrete surplus. How to 
account then for the immanent ‘tuning’ of the city, its ‘mechanism of immanence’?217 What 
is needed is, first, a ‘more abstract’ naive empiricism, oriented towards “the necessary [non-
phenomenological] excess of experience: that which overfills any sense of immediacy”.218 
Second, a ‘more concrete’ social constructivism, stuffed with a post-human and machinic 
concept of materiality. An eminently ‘empirical’ and strategic approach, that is, whereby 
investigating the affective and dromological dimension of being-together, looking at 
contingent concatenations,  affective fields and overlapping movements generated by urban 
bodies, as well as taking into account the intensive and post-human excess always 
overflowing their taking place.219 
It is in order to pursue this aim that I introduce two conceptual tools, atmosphere and 
rhythm, as a way to provide this urban approach with more theoretical depth, 
terminological precision and methodological sharpness. Subsequently, I join them into the 
notion of (atmo-rhythmical) tuning, a non-dichotomous tool which I propose to use in order 
to explore strategically the urban space by being faithful to its resonant eventfulness, that 
is, to its simultaneously relational and excessive ontology. 
 
2.                                      
the unhistorical is like an atmosphere within which 
alone life can germinate and with the destruction of 




Propelled by the recent ‘affective turn’ in geography and urban studies (in particular the 
work of more and less visionary German scholars such as Schmitz, Bohme, Sloterdijk etc.), 
the notion of atmosphere has recently gained increasing popularity in the fields of 
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architecture, marketing, design, urban planning, politics etc. In my opinion it is an extremely 
promising way to radically approach space – provided, that is, that simplistic interpretations 
and reactionary applications are eschewed. This is not simple, since the concept’s literal 
impalpability tends to generate various, confusing and often contrasting understandings. 
According to a list of possible definitions drawn at a recent symposium on the subject, 
atmosphere is usually referred as ‘sharing’, ‘combination’, ‘in-between’, ‘feeling’, ‘spatial 
experience’, ‘enigma’.221 
Gernot Bohme suggests that an atmosphere is not a subjective feeling nor an objective 
effect but something in-between, a “quasi-objective feeling ... the common reality of the 
perceiver and the perceived”.222 To Martina Low, spatial formations, “not visible per se – one 
sees the social goods and their situating but not the space as a whole – are nevertheless 
materially perceivable … Spaces develop their own potentiality which can influence feelings. 
This potentiality of spaces I call ‘atmosphere’”.223 According to others, atmospheres are a 
way to refer to a ‘potency of space’ separated from individuals and affecting them pre-
consciously, that is, in that half-second delay between the effect and our conscious 
registering, in the sense that, in Brennan’s words, “the ‘atmosphere’ or the environment 
literally gets into the individual”.224 These are relevant understandings, however betraying a 
tendency to reduce atmospheres to ‘external effects’ affecting individuals: either in the 
ideological interpretation of atmosphere as a sort of ‘veil’ concealing power relations, or in 
more sophisticated phenomenological approaches, it seems, the individual-space separation 
(either in subjective or pre-subjective sense) remains unquestioned.225 Sloterdijk, as noted 
above, eschews such problematic ‘externality’. Yet, his interpretation reduces the notion of 
atmosphere to a space ‘in-between’, thus presupposing a totalising relationalism which 
seems to leave the eventful potentiality of atmospheres unaccounted for.226 More promising 
in this sense is Bissel’s description of the subtly tense atmosphere of UK trains, always 
overflown and ‘haunted’ by a “distributed space of expectancy existing as a diffuse field of 
potential”, which is real and material, not actual yet always on the verge of being 
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actualised.227 There is literally more in atmospheres than simple ‘embodiment’, 
‘performance’, in-betweeness. In Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ words, an atmosphere “can 
never be seen as a synthetic totality because of its excess.”228 Such ‘more’ cannot be simply 
addressed by taking into account the pre-conscious, non-representational, “lived immediacy 
of actual experience, before any reflection of it”, as Thrift’s ‘quasi-phenomenological’ 
approach proposes.229 An atmosphere necessarily “exceeds lived or conceived space-
time”.230 
Why is this point so relevant? As Martin explains, the “excess necessitates an appreciation of 
how objects and spaces have the wherewithal to escape their ‘contextual containment’”.231 
In this precise sense, I maintain that addressing the excessive and overflowing character of 
atmospheres is directly related to the strategic task of developing an ethico-political 
approach which challenges their reduction to simply an instrument for control and 
manipulation. In fact, in chapter 3 we are to see more in depth how the unwillingness to 
radically address such atmospheric excess threatens to unwittingly turn Sloterdijk’s 
spherology into a conservative recipe for biopolitical control. Atmospheres are not to be 
understood as co-tractions, as Sloterdijk does, but rather as an abs-co-tractions, an ugly 
term nonetheless able to simultaneously convey their relational and evental, abstract and 
concrete character.232 Although atmospheres emerge from a “coming together of people, 
buildings, technologies and various forms of non-human life in particular geographical 
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settings”,233 they are to some extent “autonomous from the bodies that they emerge from, 
enable and perish with”, always resisting from a reduction to a ‘totality’ for us.234 
In the following pages we are to observe how such an ‘autonomy’ should be also intended in 
the sense of a self-generating legality (auto-nomos) which “demands a position within (only 
from within can one experience an atmosphere) yet riding a line of flight that exceeds this 
and pushes the creative limits of immanence always further”.235 Such autonomy is well 
captured in Deleuze’s notion of affects as a becoming which overwhelms and overcomes 
those who undergo them.236 In Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ words:  
Although firmly rooted in the here of the body, the affect portends to its virtual 
becoming, in its excess. This excess, collectively yet autonomously, is the atmosphere.237 
Atmospheres can be said to be kept ‘alive’ by the excessive eventfulness they harbour, the 
swerving potential of their contingent taking place that keeps them open and generative of 
lines of flight, and at the same time threatens their disaggregation. Accordingly, 
atmospheres overflow the bodies, rearranging their molecular status into machinic 
assemblages which can be disorienting, oppressive, empowering, carrying away: this is the 
machinism of atmospheres, where their political value lies. The cultivation of these lines of 
flight and thus of their eventful potential, I will suggest, yields an 'atmospheric ethics' that 
contrasts the instrumental reduction of atmospheres to mere objects of common 
engineering practices. This not to deny the relevance this (unavoidable) praxis play in 
allowing for (as well as constituting our) being-together, but more importantly to emphasise 
the risk for such reductionism to overlooking the problematic role these practices can play in 
the pacification of being-together via the defusion of its eventfulness, as it is often the case 
in the atmospheric manipulations generated through techniques and technologies of law, 
marketing, design, planning, architecture and so on.238 
Thrift once noted that cities are not just the sum of their various networks: there is a sort of 
materiality, a non-physical tangibility, simply conveyed (although certainly not 'explained') 
by the empirical fact that ‘you know you are in particular cities rather than in others’.239 If 
this seems a simplistic statement, I believe it has a much deeper meaning that the one Thrift 
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himself perhaps intends. To immerse oneself in the atmosphere of New York, Istanbul or 
Amsterdam is to transpierce a materiality which paradoxically transcends networks whilst 
being immanent to them: the virtual multiplicity of a city, its evental viewpoint, its material 
taking place. Latham and McCormack exactly refer to this sort ‘tangible quality’, “both 
intensive and extensive at the same time”, as an atmosphere.240 Not only phenomenological, 
this is simultaneously an ecological materiality, of which “objects, spaces, actors, subjects, 
events and practices not present in the here-and-now of the locale can be important and 
even crucial components”.241  
Let me qualify: I am not implying that we do not sense or, worst, that we are determined by 
atmospheres. The task, as McCormack suggest, is that of seeking to envisage “the affectivity 
of atmosphere … in ways that engage a range of more-than-human processes and relations 
while also remaining attentive to how these processes and relations are potentially sensed in 
moving bodies”.242 First then, bodies are not determined by atmospheres, although they are 
always part of them, unthinkable outside of them. Second, this is not to imply that bodies 
simply dissolve into them. Although unable to exist in vacuums, i.e. outside of the spatiality 
of atmospheres, each body preserves its singular, non-relational and swerving potential. 
Third, of course bodies ‘feel’ atmospheres. In fact, we can say that our ‘sensing’ of 
atmospheres is neither inexistent nor autonomous, neither determined (objective) nor 
subjective: my ‘sensing’ of an atmosphere is unavoidably part of this very atmosphere, 
constituted and constituting it.243 Likewise, culture, class, gender and other social 
‘frameworks’ do not simply ‘pre-structure’ the perception of space and atmosphere – as Low 
seems to suggest –, they are rather components of the atmosphere itself.  
Neither deterministic nor totalising closures, it is important to finally qualify that 
atmospheres are not immobile either. Nor are they univocal in cities (as the comment on 
Thrift above seemed to suggest). They are instead multiple, moving and clashing. Differently 
from the self-enclosing tendency of structures, atmospheres are machinic, open to, 
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communicating and most importantly conflicting with other atmospheres.244 Conflict is both 
within and between atmospheres. Indeed, we could even argue that the orderings of a city 
emerge out of the rhythmical syncopation of these intra- and inter-atmospheric encounters 
and frictions, that is, out the excessive atmospherics of the poli-atmospheric materiality of 




Breath, you invisible poem! Pure 
Exchange unceasing between the great                                      
Ether and our existence. Counterweight  




There is rhythm in atmospheres. In McCormack’s terms, atmospheres are “space[s] of 
affective materiality actualized through the ongoing movement of bodies”.246 There is 
rhythm between atmospheres too. Rhythmic is the way atmospheres circulate, clash and 
overlap in urban space. Complementing their affective quality, the concept of rhythm 
provides them with a further dynamic as well as temporal nuance. Similarly to them 
however, in order to be applied effectively to the investigation of urban space, the material, 
conflictual and eventful character of rhythm must be fully unfolded. To do so, first of all 
rhythms must be understood as a way to overcome the unproductive dichotomy of 
difference and repetition which aliments the oppositional configurations into which the 
urban is often frozen. In other words, the opposition between the encroachment of 
everyday life through capitalistic and disciplinary routines, and the differential exuberance 
supposedly lying beneath these oppressive iterations. Another variation of the dichotomous 
fixations (e.g. movement vs. staticity, order vs. disorder etc.) plaguing urban theory, that is. 
A way out from this impasse is to think repetition beyond merely oppressive and/or 
stiffening terms. Even in significant accounts, repetition is usually assumed only as a 
question of institutionalisation and routinisation, to indicate the way structures are 
embedded into material practices (Giddens) or habitus crystallises (Bourdieu). Within these 
terms also the concept of rhythm tends to be referred to negatively, as an immunitary 
“protection from practices which are unpredictable, other, different – in other words, 
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protection from arythmical practices”, where ‘emancipatory potential’ supposedly lies.247 
Yet, this is not all. There is more to repetition than mere repetitiveness. There is more to 
rhythm than immunity.  
Already in Tarde we observed a model of sociality able to hold together imitative repetition 
and differential invention, thus stressing the creative potential which repetition harbours. 
As Derrida has emphasised, the ‘performative embodiment’ of a norm (e.g. Bourdieu’s 
notion of habitus as ‘incorporation’ of the norm) cannot be taken as merely repetitiveness, 
since it is always a contingent event which every time takes place, and as such inserts a 
break within the supposedly smooth process of rule-internalisation.248 There is eventfulness 
in repetition. This is what Deleuze stresses. Repetition is never mere ‘repetition of the 
same’, but rather of the ‘singular’: an always-swerving, change-triggering and space-
producing taking-place within the spatiality of the now-here and its overflowing no-where. 
The repetition, that is, is an ‘ontological exception’ to the dichotomy of particular and 
general, and as such it cannot be thought in separation from, but rather as always 
integrated with difference, in rhythmical co-constitution: a difference-producing 
(differential), eventful repetition.249 Repetitions are always contingent and it is from their 
differential taking place that the rhythmic syncopation that shapes the everyday life of the 
city emerges.250 This is not to say that repetition necessarily generates rhythms, but rather 
that rhythms should be understood in the co-essentiality of repetition and difference.251 
Elaborating on Bachelard, Lefebvre’s rhythmanalysis has probably been the most famous 
attempt to deal systematically with urban rhythms, i.e. the ‘music of the city’, what provides 
tempo to its spatial overlappings: 
every rhythm implies the relation of time with a space, a localised time, or if one 
wishes, a temporalised place. Rhythm is always linked to such and such a place, to its 
place, whether it be the heart, the fluttering of the eyelids, the movement of a street, 
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or the tempo of a waltz. This does not prevent it from being a time, that is an aspect of 
a moment and a becoming'252 
As often occurs with Lefebvre, however, radical and innovative directions remain entangled 
within a dialectical framework which ultimately defuses their potential. Thus, in his 
investigation of the way the everyday rhythms of the city are embedded within the logics of 
capitalistic mode of production, the oppressive ‘abstract space’ and ‘linear time’ of the 
capital are discussed in opposition to a ‘differential space’ in which strictures and 
contradictions will be overcome, a dialectical sublimation whose problematic attempt to 
supersede (rather than face) conflict has been already criticised.253 A residue of humanism 
complements this understanding, i.e. the craving for ‘more humane’ rhythms to be opposed 
to the inhuman velocities of the capital. Whilst Lefebvre righty stresses the relevance of the 
concept of rhythm as a way to recalibrate the problematic abandonment of ‘the living body’ 
by Western philosophy, this attempt is resolutely centred on the human body, and on the 
related immunitary concern with restoring its unity and integrity “as the proper yardstick of 
a reappropriated social space”.254 In this way, rhythmanalysis risks to develop into either a 
romantic exaltation of disorder vis-à-vis the ‘oppressive routine’ of the city, movement 
versus stability, the slower and humane rhythms of the ‘local’ (e.g. ‘slow food’) versus the 
schizophrenic post-industrial speed of the capital, and so on.255 Yet, if aptly recalibrated 
towards a post-human, excessive, eventful and radically material understanding, the 
Lefebvrian analysis can be rescued from these limitations, so as to unleash its ‘schizoanalytic 
potential’.256 
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Firstly, as Borch suggests in his proposition to integrate Tarde’s approach with Lefebvre’s 
rhythmanalysis, while performing the latter we should resist the temptation to focus only on 
processes of stabilisation and adaptation, and also address the contingency of the rhythmic 
processes, the interruptions, variations and destabilisations which constantly punctuate 
their apparently smooth unfolding.257 Second, if again Borch stresses the significance played 
by Lefebvre’s focus on the relation between rhythms and materiality in the city (in this way 
offering a way, he adds, to complement the Tardean model), such suggestion should be as 
much complemented with a more radical, machinic and post-human understanding of 
materiality. Not only fleshy, concrete, human and stabilising: rhythms are also abstract, post-
human, excessive and tumultuous. Accordingly, they are not only the “coordinates through 
which inhabitants and visitors frame and order the urban experience”.258 More precisely, 
they are machinic emergences of patterns out of urban space, “ecologies of coexistence of 
heterogeneous elements”, in the mutual folding and unfolding between spaces, events and 
bodies.259  
Through an explicit atmospheric language, Deleuze and Guattari define the notion of 
ambiance (i.e. atmosphere) or milieu as a vibratory “block of space-time constituted by the 
periodic repetition of components”, and rhythm as what coordinates these “heterogeneous 
space-times”.260 Following this inspiration then, the ‘folding’ and ‘unfolding’ of overlapping 
and vibratory urban atmospheres can be understood as immanently and rhythmically tuned 
into given ‘frequencies’ in the city. Yet, this is still not enough. Coordination is only one of 
the modes of rhythm. This is not only to say that every rhythmical stabilisation is constantly 
bound to dislocation. More precisely, it is to say that rhythms have an excessive quality 
which prevents them from being reduced to the mere repetitiveness of institutionalisation 
via normative structures, as well as to simple instances of synchronisation. There is always a 
conflictual materiality in the rhythmic process that “cannot be reduced to a quiet interaction 
order” à la Goffman.261 Rhythm is conflict. Rhythm emerges out of conflict. It is not the way 
through which overcoming conflict and abstractions into some post-conflictual utopia, but 
rather the ‘abstract-and-concrete’ way through which conflict is experienced, traversed and 
lived: a “line of flight through the chaos”.262 Most significantly, rhythms sanction the 
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emergence of resonant syncopations between the excessive inter-atmospheric and intra-
atmospheric frictions of the urban (i.e. the seismic frictions between the different scales that 
overlap intersect its surface, between the bodies that populate it, between the abstractions 
that insist on and produce its spatiality), that is, the potential surfacing of novel urban 
‘tunings’. In Deleuze’s words, the rhythm is "a vital power that exceeds every domain and 
traverses them all”.263 A paradoxical refrain of urban excesses, that simultaneously joins and 




The urban is tuned as result of the affective materiality of atmospheres and the dromological 
punctuation of intra- and inter-atmospheric rhythms. Looking at urban space through this 
prism allows to focus on the affective an dromological getting-together of urban bodies in 
simultaneously actual and virtual terms, observing the atmo-rhythmical tunings emerging in 
the smooth and striated surface of the city, as orderings that neither determine nor pre-
structure, and yet guide and orient the urban, never fully representable, and yet felt, as in 
the vaporous being-in-an-atmosphere or being-in-the-rhythm: a radically impersonal being-
tuned. 
There is obviously a stabilising force in these ‘atmo-rhythmical tunings’. They are the way 
cities immanently hold-together. At the same time, there are constant frictions and 
dislocations within and between the apparent peacefulness of urban atmospheres, and 
intensive potential is constantly produced by the apparently ‘repetitive’ unfolding of urban 
rhythms. Indeed, it could be argued that frictions and excesses are what the urban is about, 
eventful atmospherics of conflict more or less stably tuned into poli-atmospheric rhythms, as 
well as more or less effectively dislocated by novel atmo-rhythmical irruptions. 
Rescuing it for a moment from its usual romantic aestheticisation, and taken in radically 
material terms, the traditional notion of ‘urban enchantment’ could be thus said to refer to 
nothing but the intensive frictions produced at the encounter between the different bodies, 
scales, processes and practices which insist and overflow the here-and-nows of the city. In 
other words, to the very materiality of the excessive eventfulness of the urban, what keeps it 
simultaneously together and alive, against the double menace of a totalising closure and a 
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disintegrating dissolution.264 Urban tunings, in this sense, are the excess “that holds bodies 
together ... what emerges when bodies are held together”.265 As just suggested, in these 
excessive frictions, and more precisely in the intensive generation of resonant atmo-rhythms 
they trigger, lies the potential for transforming the urban, for the good as well as for the bad. 
Accordingly, the notion of urban disenchantment, beyond its often nostalgic use, should be 
meant to refer precisely to the neutralisation of the eventfulness from the city, the 
‘smoothing out’ of its atmospherics of conflicts into a pacifying, totalised and predictable 
tune. Discernible thus appears the strategic value of this conceptualisation. Could not we 
argue that it is exactly on the creation and contestation of these ‘tunings’ that ethico-
political action is grounded?  
Among the most sensible to such a radically ‘materialist’ understanding of urban politics 
have been the Situationists, true ‘expert in atmosphere’ (as well as rhythms), as Wigley puts 
it, and fully aware of its value as ‘basis for political action’.266 As hinted in the introduction, 
this and other equally radical inspirations have been too often defused into the romantic 
aesthetics of ‘re-imagining’ practices and oppositional ‘tactics’ or, even worst, in the 
spontaneistic ethos of ‘going with the flow’. In fact, is not ‘going with the flow’ the ultimate 
expression of the reduction of bodies to sort of ‘automatons’, moulded and determined by 
urban tunings just as the leaves by the wind are? Accordingly, could we not argue that by 
theorising the dissolution of the subject into rhythmical and atmospheric relations, post-
structural theorists are proposing highly problematic political stances which would arguably 
make us all more and more vulnerable to non-subjective, purely relational, affective and 
‘attuning’ form of control?267 
This question, which I will elaborate in different ways in the next chapters, encapsulates the 
sense of the exploration of the materialities of being-together that has been carried out so 
far, as an effort to develop a spatial and material ontology able to account for the relational 
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character of space without succumbing to a preventive (i.e. anti-evental) relationalism, 
whose problematic connivance with biopolitics I am to investigate soon. Accordingly, 
through this approach I wish to offer a useful tool to investigate the way in which 
biopolitical apparatuses seek to manipulate, control and capitalise on the spatiality of being-
together (as I explore in the third chapter), to address the materiality of a truly radical urban 
politics (as I elaborate in the fifth chapter), as well as to offer a methodological instrument 
for the researcher to empirically attuning to the city and exploring its tuning (as I show in 
the fourth chapter). The next chapter sets the stage for these converging endeavours, by 
reflecting genealogically and theoretically on the relation between law, space and justice, 




























My task is changed: not to uphold the law, or another 





How to think the material interrelation between law, space and justice? This question, 
encompassing the whole thesis, orients this chapter around two main purposes. First, the 
chapter builds a bridge between the spatial ontology of urban ordering (developed in the 
former) and the discussion of the forms it takes in contemporary times (produced in the 
following), by providing the thesis with a significant spatiolegal lens. Second, it sets the 
stage for the overarching objective I will pursue in the rest of the thesis, namely an 
ontological conceptualisation of the triptych of law, space and justice, through a radically 
material understanding of law and an elaboration of the notion of justice as its eventful 
excess. The chapter is structured into three parts.   
In the first part I trace the evolution of the ‘spatiolegal architecture’ of modernity through a 
personal re-elaboration of the notion of ‘state of exception’. I also provide a critical look at 
some sociological and legal-geographical perspectives, as well as at some of the most recent 
insights coming from so-called ‘critical legal geographers’. Following what I observed in the 
first chapter, I sense that these compelling perspectives tend to overlook the excessive and 
evental quality of space: in spatiolegal terms, this equates to an unsatisfying engagement 
with the ‘juridico-ethico-political’ question of justice. In the second part I move to one of the 
most compelling attempts in this direction, Jacques Derrida’s ground-breaking essay Force 
de Loi. Rather than devoting myself to a dissection of Derrida’s thought, I seek to detect 
some fault lines within his strategy of legal deconstruction. In brief, I suggest that this 
strategy falls short from providing a radically material account of the excessive dimension of 
justice. Consequently, it leaves the backdoor open for the problematic re-insertion of 
nihilism (and thus of the paradigm of operation which on nihilism thrives). In the third part, 
employing the Deleuzoguattarian dyad of logic and nomic, as well as Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos’ concept of lawscape, I propose an alternative way to think the materiality of 
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the spatiolegal in both its concatenated and dislocated dimension. Applying what I argued in 
the last chapter as regards the notion of event to the ‘juridico-ethico-political’ dimension, I 
thus stress the need to develop a properly material and 'cosmic' conception of justice, and 
to conceptualise the law/justice ‘relation’ in ways which are alternative to transcendental, 
dialectic, socio-empirical and even networked models. This allows me to begin sketching the 
contours of an affirmative biopolitics in which law is rescued from its negative-only 
acceptation. I conclude by observing, however, that the latter enterprise must be carefully 
calibrated if we are to develop a strategically valuable approach to the spatiolegal capable 
























Space of Exception 
 
1. 




What is the ‘space’ of modernity? Unavoidable simplifications lurk behind this question, and 
yet we need to go through them in order to begin this exploration. Let us however keep in 
mind the heuristic presupposes on which it stands. Carlo Galli observes that the 
conceptualisation of pre-modern (Western) space emanates from the rift between ‘Greeks’ 
and ‘Barbarians’, West and East, Europe and the rest. ‘Pre-modern space’ is conceptualised 
as already imbued with intrinsic qualities, inherently diverse, not simply chaotic but rather 
having its ‘own’ complexity, a space whose ‘differences are qualitative, prior to be physically 
drawn’, and ‘whose logic and whose boundaries precede the work and the will of man’.270 
For instance, the political space of the polis is ‘intrinsically and naturally provided with a 
sense which reverberates on politics’, a multiplicity always-already traversed by the 
necessary conflict of its contradictory tendencies (oikos/polis, aristocracy/democracy 
etc.).271 More generally, the earth is assumed as a space to be explored, annexed and 
feared, a space to be ‘occupied without being counted’, not a space to be represented bur 
rather to be ‘explored by legwork’.272 Prior to modern geography, the drawing of maps is 
based on the account of explorers’ journeys, filled with elements (rocks, fountains, trees) 
whose presence on the map depends on their contingent relevance vis-à-vis the explorer’s 
path.273 For classical age and throughout all middle ages, the idea of a space with intrinsic 
qualities and differences is perfectly conciliated with that of a superior harmony organising 
them, consistent with Plato’s “idea of a complex, organic and objective order of being”.274 In 
his ‘immunological’ genealogy of ‘common spaces’, Sloterdijk defines the classical belief on 
the onto-theological unity of the cosmos as the postulation of a ‘metaphysical globe’, which 
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insulates human beings within an ideally ordered and harmonious Whole, and thus 
immunises them from the perils of the Outside – of a ‘nihilistic becoming’, that is, 
superficially denied by the order of being, and yet always-already present as its (concealed) 
presupposition.275 
Modernity emerges from the structural collapse of the cosmological globe, as result of the 
‘explosion’ of a spatial contingency which can longer be fitted within its ordered wholeness. 
Luther, Copernicus, Columbus... An earthquake of enormous proportion shaking the 
religious, cosmological and geographical foundations of this cosmos. The ‘project of 
modernity’ consequently appears as the attempt to find refuge from the radical dislocation 
which ensues.276 It is, in other words, the reaction to this potential collapse and, more 
precisely, the explicitation of the fact that a common immunity under a unitary cosmos is 
not simply an evidence to be assumed, but rather a project to be actively and ‘technically’ 
pursued.277 Whereas before modernity the map is the construction of a copy of the world, 
subsequently it is the world to be shaped according to the map: as Heidegger reminds, 
modernity is the faith in the capacity to reduce the world to image, the faith in re-
presentation: a cartographic revolution.278 Accordingly, now there will be politics, economy 
and law to determine a space which is no longer to be ‘occupied without being counted’, but 
rather to be ‘counted in order to be occupied’, a space to be re-presented.279 
Here it is not relevant to locate historically and chronologically this evolution, that in any 
case should not to be assumed in simplistically linear terms. What I am more concerned 
with are its spatiolegal consequences, namely the role played by the ‘abstracting’ logic of 
representation as a mechanism for articulating the (presupposed) separation between law 




Law could be seen as the crystallisation of the infinite quest to put order on space. The 
history of legal thought is that of a relentless attempt to immunise law from space in order 
to control it, categorise it, partition it. An attempt grounded on a fundamental and never 
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fully abandoned presupposition: i.e. the separation between law and space. Whereas this 
presupposition is evident in classic ‘Natural Law’ conceptions, once these naively 
transcendent models will be overcome the separation won’t be abandoned, but rather 
reworked: from a taken-for-granted dichotomy into a precise articulation. It is in Kant that 
such articulation takes its most radically self-enclosed form. The separation seems to 
dissolve: “judgment in general is the ability to think the particular as contained under the 
universal”, i.e. law’s intervention on the world is articulated through a logical operation, the 
subsumption of the particular into the universal.280 Correlation, as we saw, is “the idea 
according to which we only have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and 
never to either term considered apart from the other”.281 Kant applies this logic to law, by 
internalising “the relationship between objects and representations within representation 
itself”, and thus dismissing any ‘legal externalism’.282 Accordingly, “cases do not stand 
externally or indifferently before a judge but appear as cases (legal cases, cases at law) only 
insofar as they have always already been subsumed by the law”.283 Complementing this 
smooth gesture of subsumption is its automatic self-denial: law elevates itself onto an 
objective, positive, pure status, simultaneously depurating its operations from the 
conflictuality in which they occur, and instead appearing as self-evident, de-politicised, 
“rational, benign and necessary”.284 
However, the contingency of space lies beneath this image of purity. In fact, is not space the 
very “condition of legal judgement and the limits of its reason”, or perhaps more precisely, 
the condition of (im)possibility of any legal apparatus?285 When Benjamin notes “the curious 
and at first discouraging experience of the ultimate undecidability of all legal problems”, or 
when Derrida observes that “each case is other, each decision is different and requires 
absolute interpretation, which no existing, coded rule can or ought to guarantee 
completely” – are they not indirectly referring to the impossibility for law to ever tame the 
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excessiveness of spatiality?286 Any attempt to do so entails an uncertain leap. A 
performative break is implicit in every judicial interpretation. There is always an exception 





As the popular proverb goes: exception probat regulam in casibus non exceptis – i.e. ‘the 
exception proves that the rule works in non-exceptional cases’, or: ‘the exception proves 
the rule’. Behind self-evident proverbs often deeper meanings lie. Whereas Sherlock 
Holmes’s rationalism bluntly dismissed it (“the exception disproves the rule”),288 Benjamin, 
Schmitt and Agamben have been willing to take its consequences to the extreme. Here is 
Schmitt:  “the rule as such lives off the exception alone”289 and, in slightly reworked version, 
Agamben: “[the exception is] the very condition of possibility of juridical rule”.290 What this 
amount to is unmasking law’s direct application to the world as a fictio juris:  
every general rule demands a regular, everyday frame of life to which it can be factually 
applied and which is submitted to its regulations … a homogeneous medium. There 
exists no norm applicable to chaos.291 
Law’s application is always premised on an ‘a priori mechanism’, a topological machine 
whereby the “the space in which the juridico-political order can operate” is created and 
defined.292 Any spatiolegal intervention depends on a prior and violent “foundational 
ontological gesture” whereby the where through which the spatiolegal is to be articulated in 
the form of a cartographic representation is constituted: a state, or a space of exception.293 
There is no rule – both in the sense of rule and ruling – without a space of exception, as the 
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etymology suggests. The term ‘exception’ literally means to take in the outside (from ex, 
outside, and capere, to take). In fact, the mechanism of exception is the dispositive allowing 
to ‘take in’ the chaotic, ever-escaping outside (life, world, space...) and domesticate it, that 
is, to simultaneously including space by excluding its conflictual, eventful and contingent 
materiality.294 
Let us take this reasoning to its logical consequences: a state of exception always 
presupposes an undifferentiated outside. This is what lies beneath the Kantian 
presupposition that ‘cases’ are always-already subsumed by the law rather than standing 
externally to it: an external and undifferentiated chaos (an ‘absolutely disaggregated 
something else’), out of the encounter with which legal cases would be constituted.295 Zizek 
has suggested that Kant has been “the first to detect [the] crack in the ontological edifice of 
reality”, the horrifying possibility that the “empirical nature (contrary to transcendental 
‘nature as a whole’) may not be unified, coherent, and systematic but a ‘crude chaotic 
aggregate’”.296 As it is known, it is in order to solve this potential contradiction that Kant 
would resort, in the Third Critique, to the teleological conception of an a priori finality which 
guarantees the ontological coherence of reality and its superior purpose.297 A not so 
dissimilar problem was faced by the Christian theologians when, in order to allow for the 
concept of ‘free will’ to flourish over the cage of an ineluctable Fate, they had to conceive 
God as necessarily withdrawn from the world: the co-substantiality of God with the world 
would have otherwise denied any possibility for human free will, since everything would 
have occurred according to God’s will. Thus, faced with the possibility of the heresy of a God 
‘separated’ from the world (and thus of a world ultimately independent from God), they 
resorted to the superior finalism of the ‘divine providence’.298 In this sense, and overturning 
Zizek’s interpretation, could we not argue that the evidence of an undifferentiated, ‘chaotic 
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aggregate’, rather than being the blind-spot that threatens the Kantian enterprise, is its 
ultimately-denied presupposition? If this is the case, Kant’s ‘providential’ immunisation from 
the possibility of a ‘chaotic outside’ would hide the fact that it is on this very presupposition 
(i.e. on such negative ground) that the subsumptive mechanism of exception of the 
transcendental judgement rests. In the same vein, could we not contend that the 
unspeakable possibility of a chaotic world ontologically separated from God is not the 
theological blind-spot of Christianity, but rather the actual presupposition legitimising the 
whole ‘economy of salvation’ (the ‘divine techné’) on which it rests?299 Seeking to provide a 
definitive answer to these questions, if ever possible, would certainly lead this thesis astray. 
Yet it is important to remain within the problematic field they open. Complementing the 
above-quote by Schmitt then: not only ‘there exist no norm applicable to chaos’, in fact, 
every norm implicitly presupposes the evidence (and thus the disposability) of an external, 
undifferentiated and homogenous chaos.  
The insufficiency of the simple critique of legal abstraction per se – according to which legal 
abstractions produce an impalpable grid of legal categories and boundaries (public and 
private, state and individual, individual and individual) which deny the contingency of socio-
spatial relations – begins to appear. What should be primarily taken into account is the 
“originary spatialisation that governs and makes possible every localisation and every 
territorialisation”.300 The projection of any politico-legal ‘geometry’ firstly requires the 
erasure of complexity out of space, that is, the flattening of space into an undifferentiated, 
homogenous and empty surface or (which is exactly the same) an ‘absolutely disaggregated’ 
homogeneous chaos.301 A ‘spatial erasure’, that is a blank surface or tabula rasa, is the basic 
requirement of every representation, legal representations included.302 We could locate this 
mechanism in various instances: the colonisers flattening the aboriginal space into a terra 
nullius in order to be able to project over the blank surface their grid of property rights;303 
Thomas Hobbes equally flattening the pre-social human co-existence into an 
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undifferentiated state of nature, thus presupposing a chaotic and homogenous spatiality on 
which he was then able to project his statist geometry. Against holistic attempts to 
overcome society’s mutual exclusion by postulating a more original ‘communion’, we should 
keep in mind that every separation is grounded on the presupposition or, more precisely, 
the ontological production (see below) of an undifferentiated (either pessimistically chaotic, 
optimistically common or abstractly absolute) spatiality, i.e. a preliminary erasure which 
denies space as a differential and heterogeneous (rather than undifferentiated and 
homogenous) material complexity of bodies ‘independent’ from us.304 Let me thus reassert: 
the simple presupposition of a supposedly undifferentiated, uncontrollable chaos outside 
the law, far from being a radical destabilisation of the legal enterprise, is its ontological 
presupposition. What naive legal critiques miss, then, is exactly the double move grounding 
what I term the ‘spatiolegal architecture of modernity’, i.e. the flattening of space and the 
geometrical projection of legal categories over it – i.e. the production of a space of 
exception. The originary gesture is that of positing a ‘wedge’ (Geertz) between Nomos and 




Notwithstanding the latter is not a provocative conclusion, it is often left unaccounted for in 
current spatiolegal debates, with the consequence of overlooking the preliminary erasure 
on which every legal state of exception is premised.305 This is an important mistake, since it 
leads to (rightly) criticising the alleged abstraction (i.e. de-spatialisation) performed by the 
formal, legal text, by (wrongly) counterpoising it the supposedly concrete, real, spatial con-
text, in this way neglecting the latter’s as much ‘artificial’ character (and, conversely, the 
former’s as much ‘real’ consistency). A good deal of responsibility for this outcome should 
be ascribed to the encounter between sociology and law. 
Transversal to the dissatisfaction with the out-wordly understandings of law as divine, 
natural and absolute, social sciences gradually infiltrated the legal project in order to 
depurate it, we could say, from any yearning for a (‘divine’, ‘natural’, transcendental’) 
beyond. Any superior finalism was to be brought ‘down to earth’, available to the work of 
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socio-empirical techné.306 In fact, the socio-empirical approach conflates ‘higher principles’ 
(being it god, morality, truth or justice) within law: justice ceases to orient law beyond itself, 
and rather ends up corresponding, in a circular argument, to the very deployment of the 
right method, that is, of the correct legal procedure, to the point of becoming redundant.307 
As Constable observes, both positivist and sociolegal approaches converge “in affirming that 
the connection between law and morality [as well as justice] is an empirically contingent 
matter of social factors”.308 This implies a genuine “faith that sociological enquiry or 
empirical knowledge of institutions and practices of society can improve law and that law 
can improve society”.309 Accordingly, “socially descriptive accounts of legal systems”, 
whether supported by the appropriate methodology, are assumed to be able to unearth the 
role and functioning of this ‘exclusively social’ law as an “instrument or strategy within a 
field of social power”.310 The blindness of natural law for the contingency of means is 
replaced with a symmetrical indifference to the absoluteness of ends.311 
Yet, this move away from higher principles is only apparent. In the last chapter I followed 
Latour in criticising the sociological presupposition of the ‘social’ as a ‘stable and absolute 
third term’, an all-encompassing and homogenous quality shared among social actors and 
framed according to laws guiding their action. This presupposition, in fact, re-enacts the 
double move just described: the ontological flattening of society onto a homogenous body 
(the ‘social’ as the new centre of correlation), and the subsequent drawing of sociological 
categories over it, thus providing law as well as many other disciplines with powerful 
explanatory social lenses to supposedly uncover the ‘hidden laws’ of the social.312 Of course, 
with the advent of post-colonialism, feminism, post-race, post-structuralism and other 
critical movements, the sociological faith in the empirical observation and the neutrality of 
the social scientist has been radically shaken. Yet, critical sociology did not necessarily 
overcome the founding paradox of sociology itself: applied to law, it provided invaluable 
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tools to contest and debunk the latter’s ideological character, yet often ending up being 
entangled within its own contradictions.313 
Admittedly, in the last two paragraphs I embarked on a rather selective and to some extent 
ungenerous generalisation of an extremely complex and multifaceted evolution. Many are 
the relevant exceptions in this narration. However, what I intended was a heuristic overview 
with the purpose of emphasising how the various movements reformulating legal thinking 
against the classical perspective of a transcendental, formal law, seem to share the same 
(negative) starting point, i.e. an ontological separation – and the corollary ‘operational’ 
willingness to link and bridge it – which is differently declined in the supposed gap between 
an abstract law and a contingent reality, a formal law and a law-in-action, a formal and a 
material constitution, validity and efficacy, text and context, law and space, and so on. In 
Zartaloudis’ terms, these are instances of a shift from a ‘vertical’ to a ‘horizontal’ 
transcendentalism which, rather than challenging the logic of exception, in the end 
reproduces its functioning.314 Again, overlooked is the fact that the concrete and empirical 
space to which many sociological and critical thinkers propose to turn the attention to, is as 
much abstract (and material) as the geometrical grid that legal categories project over it. 
The inability to acknowledge that a ‘double move’ – erasure and partitioning– is at the origin 
of law’s dealing with contingency, means that these necessary critiques would mainly 
remain confined within the very opposition – i.e. law and space (or law and world, law and 
life...) – on which the whole spatiolegal architecture of modernity is centred, and which they 
were supposed to debunk in the first place. It follows that the dichotomy of 
abstract/concrete is still taken for granted, and the materiality of the spatiolegal still left 
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Law is a force, like gravity, through which our worlds 
exercise an influence upon one another, a force that 





I believe that the same aporia founding the sociological approach to law is also to be found 
in the impasse into which ‘legal geography’ has come to find itself by taking for granted a 
reductive understanding of space (what Pottage terms a ‘weak specification of contingency’) 
and thus missing the very potentiality a proper spatial perspective would entail.316 Legal 
geography is a loose, trans-disciplinary project propelled by the ‘spatial turn’ in social 
sciences and most importantly by the contribution of ‘neo-Marxist’ geographers and urban 
scholars such as David Harvey, Ed Soja, Peter Marcuse and others who, mainly inspired by 
the ground-breaking work of Henri Lefebvre, oriented geographical research towards the 
need to ‘embed’ notions of law and justice onto space, an attempt which would differently 
unfold through such notions as just city, environmental justice, territorial justice, right to the 
city and, lately, spatial justice.317As just observed, feminist and post-colonial geography also 
played a key role in attracting law towards space, especially problematising key spatiolegal 
biases – private/public, ethnocentrism and so on – and developing important approaches 
often able to move beyond the limits of (post)Marxism.318 
With the usual tardiness came the law.319 However, as Delaney recently noted, legal 
geography often remained within an impasse, precisely because of its inability to overcome 
the conceptual dualisms between law and space, as it appears both in the ‘spatial fetishism 
of the early ‘regionalist’ school’ and in the ‘unbalanced instrumentalism’ of ideological 
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critiques.320 Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos has recently indicated three main ways in 
which law’s spatial turn has been (and is being) misunderstood and thus defused from its 
radical potential. These are: the reduction of legal space to the concept of jurisdiction, that 
is, to a legal re-presentation, an approach which thus misses spatiality altogether; the 
idealisation of space as a fluid, dynamic process, which implies “a certain critical concept of 
the law as particular and embodied” that overlooks the conflictual, violent and dislocating 
character of space, instead reducing it to a pacific and malleable instrument to be used as a 
‘panacea for social injustice’, and that ends up instead being further colonised by law 
itself;321 the side-stepping of space understood as just one among other dimensions to be 
added to the social, an approach which misses altogether the relevance of the ‘spatial turn’ 
in shaking the foundation of the (legal) project of modernity.322 Yet, thinking about law and 
space is not a peaceful and fluid side-project for the legal enterprise – it actually entails 
disturbing the very assumptions of law, bringing to the front its materiality, ‘questioning its 
ethics’ and thus gesturing towards its justice.323 This materiality cannot be reduced to the 
production of inter-subjective performativity, since it ontologically precedes subject/object 
distinction. It cannot be approached through a simple critique of the ‘immateriality’ of legal 
representations in the name of "an illusory desire for the 'concrete'".324 It is not a question 
of ‘re-materialising’ law, or 'embedding' it onto space. Yet, it is exactly in these terms that 
legal geographers initially approached the question, that is, seeking refuge from the radical 
contingency of space either in de-spatialising representations or in the comfort of empirical, 
concrete, processual, pacific, performed and embedded con-texts: Ils n'ont jamais été 
spatiales. As a result, the tendency has been that of oscillating between an ‘abstract’ or 
‘vertical’ state of exception (according to which space is ‘denied’ through representation) 
and a ‘concrete’ or ‘horizontal’ state of exception (according to which space is ‘frozen’ 
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through sociological structures and empirical method, and thus still ‘excepted’ from its 
complexity), that is, from one side to the other of the spatiolegal architecture of modernity, 
in the inability or unwillingness to actually address its ontological presuppositions. 
It is to overcome this impasse that an innovative tendency recently emerged, loosely 
gathered under the label of Critical Legal Geography (CLG) and attempting to think law and 
space more radically, in their mutual co-constitution. Nicholas Blomley proposes the notion 
of splice to indicate crystallisations of spatiolegal dialectics, which tend to appear as 
hegemonic ‘order of things’ and thus non-negotiable. Splices are on-going, continuously 
reformulated: splicing(s) whose role in making the world for us is crucial.325 Likewise, Chris 
Butler follows Lefebvre’s triadic conceptualisation of space (conceived, practiced, lived) – 
avoiding its crudely structuralist interpretation – in order to understand the simultaneous 
role of zoning law as “both a codification of dominant representations of space, and a 
technical mechanism for reproducing that dominance, by inscribing them in physical uses of 
land”.326 Initially elaborating from Lefebvre, David Delaney has produced perhaps the most 
compelling attempt, re-asserting the need to overcome the ‘unhelpful dichotomy’ of 
law/space towards an understanding able to account for law’s materiality in both tangible 
and intangible terms.327 As he qualifies, the purpose of critical legal geography is not to re-
materialise law but rather to acknowledge its always-already materiality, at the same time 
avoiding to reduce law/space’s “irreducible interpenetration” into a sort of ‘identity’.328 He 
thus proposes the notion of nomosphere to refer to the way spatiolegalities are constantly 
produced out of performative interaction. The nomosphere is:  
the cultural-material environs that are constituted by the reciprocal materialization 
of ‘the legal’, and the legal signification of the ‘socio-spatial’, and the practical, 
performative engagement through which such constitutive moments happen and 
unfold ... we ... are never outside of the nomosphere, never free of its effects; never 
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not pragmatically engaging nomospheric traces. But, again, we are not merely in it. 
Indeed ... our very being-in-the-world, is a fundamental dynamic component of it329 
The notion of nomosphere covers a wider spectrum than the merely legal, encompassing 
rules of custom, politeness, family, religion and so forth.330 In this sense law is seen as a 
condensation of our being-together in the form of the emergence of spatiolegal 
crystallisations sanctioning the becoming-illegal of certain events. Telling instance, Delaney 
notes, is the notion of ‘hostile environment’, in which the materiality of the nomosphere as 
well as its on-going juridification is explicit, in the way a behaviour –  such as intrusively 
‘patting’ an employee or uttering abusive comments – is re-defined from simply being 
‘impolite’ or ‘annoying’ to be illegal, thus defined as an act producing an ‘hostile 
environment’, i.e. having  the requisite degree of ‘pervasiveness’ to be experienced as 
oppressive by the victim.331 This goes to show how signs, gestures and other elements play a 
material and atmospheric effect (affect) both in generating immanent and material 
normativities, as well as in recalibrating the scope of legal action: in this case – significantly 
resonating with the discussion that is to follow – law can be said to assume an atmospheric 
orientation, that is, it becomes able to detect, assess and punish environmental 
perturbations.332  
Although it is an important contribution to the spatiolegal debate, such conception however 
falls short from addressing the evental dimension I discussed in the first chapter. Let me 
qualify. The concept of nomosphere aims to show how “nomospheric processes are 
generative of a sense of place” through their inter-penetrating space-producing 
performativities, emphasising “the situated character of social life” and, against tendency to 
give the law an ‘other-worldly inflection’, reasserting its reliance on a resolutely 
‘sociologically and phenomenologically’ inflected spatiality.333 Yet, I contend that what 
appears to be missing here is exactly the non-transcendent ‘other-worldliness’ of the 
spatiolegal, the eventful excess that prevents it from being reduced to merely sociological, 
phenomenological and, more generally, relational  definitions. In other words, what remains 
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unaccounted for is the very event of justice. Without this emphasis, the nomosphere seems 
to be bound to remain ‘too wordly’, too actual, producing a sort of hyper-positivistic and 
ultimately suffocating understanding of the spatiolegal as an ‘immanent horizon of actuality’ 
that leaves no room for the generation of alternative normativities.334 Notwithstanding law 
is made more flexible, material and atmospheric (encompassing such dimensions as the 
‘extra-legal and sub-legal’, human and nonhuman, imaginary and physical, experiential and 
spatial), it is still understood instrumentally as a tool to pursue an ever-more encompassing 
juridification of the world, penetrating and preventively neutralising the eventfulness of 
being-together, rather than (in the terms I will employ later on) as a tool to make space for 
the emergence of such excessive potential.335 Delaney observes that juridification should 
not be stigmatised as necessarily negative. I agree. Yet I believe the question is not that of 
either praising or demonising 'juridification', but more importantly that of envisaging a sort 
of 'inoperose juridification', that is, the potentiality for a non-juridical use of law – a concept 
I develop in the final chapter. In this sense, the 'use’ of law Delaney proposes appears to be 
still thought within a purely operational and exceptional paradigm. Accordingly, the world 
remains a world for law, always ultimately juridifiable, whatever its complexity.  
Similar problem seems to encounter Sloterdijk’s concept of nomotop, i.e. the normative 
architecture of co-existence or the ‘moral ether’ holding together society as a system of 
immanent tensions in permanent ‘action’ upon bodies.336 If Delaney’s nomosphere 
encompasses a broader dimension than that of mere legality, including the wider sphere of 
rules, norms, customs etc., Sloterdijk’s nomotop connects law even more radically with 
human and nonhuman materialities, as well as to a more markedly ontological, rather than 
merely phenomenological, dimension, stressing its being always-already imbricated in the 
spatiality of co-belonging in the form of an ‘atmospheric tension’ which exercises a 
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permanent attraction on a collective.337 As for his more general conceptualisation however, 
in this ‘spatiolegal’ application of spherology the significant attention to the rhizomatic 
dynamism of the co-constituted normative ‘foaming’ of being-together is not accompanied 
by an engagement with its eventful dimension, i.e. justice. Both for nomosphere and 
nomotop, “the in-between of shared situations … is what there is and all there is”.338 
Moreover, in both models surface a tendency, as Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos stresses, to 
“compartmentalis[e] the nonhuman in relation to a spatially determined human 
community", so that “the human remains a central figure of perception, performance or 
action”.339 
These approaches are valuable attempts to think the spatiolegal in ways that eschew the 
problematic quest for ‘bridging the gap’ or ‘drawing a link’ between law and space (and thus 
the implicit assumption of law/space dichotomy), which instead characterises many works 
in this area. This welcome and necessary move is not sufficient however, if we are to avoid 
falling into the operational paradigm of separation yet again. To qualify: whilst they 
brilliantly debunk, deconstruct and unmask the aporias of the legal side of law (law as logos) 
by showing its always-already spatial character, these ‘nomospheric investigations’ are yet 
to deal with the non-juridifiable, impersonal and post-human event of the spatiolegal: in a 




Again, we encounter the impasse of relationalism, namely the tendency, once the 
dichotomical categories of modernity have been debunked, to produce a frozen picture of 
the world which offers little hope for creation and resistance. Producing a sophisticated 
account of the affective, nonhuman and immanent materiality of the spatiolegal, yet failing 
to account for its excessive dimension, risks opening to an instrumental understanding of 
law: as a result, these supposedly emancipatory theories appear to set the scene for the 
emergence of a ‘new’ spatiolegal architecture of exception whose main purpose (expressed 
through the various juridical, economic, securitarian apparatuses), is exactly that of defusing 
the eventfulness from space. An obvious question follows: how to prevent contemporary 
spatiolegal speculations from reproducing an updated and post-structural form of legal 
hyper-positivism, i.e. an all-encompassing nomosphere, whose ontological closure only 
                                                          
337
According to this understanding, Sloterdijk conceives culture as multiple tensions of ‘co-tractions’ which 
‘hold together’ the members of a collectivity tying them to immanent rules [ibid. pp. 434-443] 
338
Thrift, I JUST DON’T KNOW WHAT GOT INTO ME, op. cit. p. 85 
339
 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, ‘Atmospheres of Law’, op. cit. p. 3 
90 
 
demands the necessary recalibration of sociolegal instruments (through neurological, 
cybernetic and other savoirs) to ensure a total juridification of the world? How to keep law 
‘open in possibility’, thus necessarily increasing its flexibility and spatial ‘awareness’, yet at 
the same time avoiding to provide it with ever-more sophisticate instruments to become  
all-ingesting? In other words, how to orient law towards the contingent fact of its taking 
place in a world not for law? 
An answer, I suggest, is to be searched within what is missing in the above-analysed 
approaches, namely a satisfying engagement with the question of justice. Justice, I contend, 
is the excessive eventfulness of the spatiolegal, and it is through justice that we can avoid 
producing another ultimately co-optable spatiolegal ontology. Two are the objectives we 
thus face: first, providing a radical understanding of the spatiolegal as concatenated and 
dislocated, and fully emancipated from “the centrality of a human, anthropocentric and 
anthropomorphic subject” which the above models still seem to betray;340 second, providing 
a material understanding of justice as not only ‘excessive to law’ (that is, not simply as a still 
juridifiable excess), but rather as law’s 'non-jurifiable event'. Two objectives which almost 
tautologically overlap, as a tripartite configuration seems to surface, according to which the 
interrelation between law and space, as ontologically inseparable and yet non-coincident 
dimensions, must be thought in connection with the idea of justice, i.e. the event of any 
spatiolegal concatenation, the always-present line of flight which provides the potential for 
piercing through the nomospheric closures. 
This rather condensed sentence must be unpacked. Whilst the second task will occupy the 
fifth chapter, I begin to elaborate the former in the present one. Prior to do that, however, I 
turn the attention to what I deem as one of the most interesting attempts to think justice as 
a radically excessive event: Derrida’s La Force de Loi. Pinpointing the merits and the limits of 
this attempt, and more generally of the strategy of deconstruction applied to the 
















How to offer an even brief and simplistic account of the millenary philosophical, theological 
and political meditation on the idea of justice? The classical ‘image of law’, using Deleuze’s 
term, was that of power subordinated and delegated to the higher Good and its co-
substantial notion of dike.341 Justice, in this sense, is what denies law’s supposed self-
sufficiency, forcing it to thrust itself beyond the narrow confines of its legalistic comfort-
zone, towards a higher principle to which it has to tend and depend, and with respect to 
which humankind’s hypothetical conformity would render law itself pointless. Within this 
context justice is not a peaceful goal to be smoothly achieved, but rather an ‘ontologically 
intractable’ dimension, ‘a-logical’ insofar as constantly contradicting law itself, indefinitely 
breaking the ‘harmonic rhythm of the logos, its all-encompassing and governing hubris’.342 
There is an ontological conflict at the root of the law/justice interrelation, a conflict that is at 
the same time a paradoxical necessity. In other words, although law, ‘as calculation and 
harmonising knowledge incessantly seeks to avoid, remove and overcome the paradox’, it 
ontologically needs dike, since justice is what allows the law to ‘move’ and to strive ‘beyond’ 
itself, to prevent its own collapsing into the closure of a total(itarian) juridification.343 On the 
one hand, this is what the ‘nomos’ (i.e. law) of the polis ultimately gestures towards, i.e. the 
subjection of space to its rational and ordering logos: a spatiolegal tautology. Yet the polis is 
quintessentially ‘democratic’ and as such constantly swerves from any totalitarian attempt 
at suffocating it. An ‘atmosphere of democracy’ traverses it, the breeding ground of justice, 
an inclination towards ‘freedom’ which has the Janus-face of a pharmakon, i.e. 
simultaneously a cure and a poison: as Cacciari reminds, it is at the same an ‘indispensable 
remedy against the tyrannical hubris, and yet it unavoidably produces the anarchical hubris, 
the terrible separation between Nomos and Dike’.344 
The necessity to keep alive the conflictual excess of the city appears to be gradually 
forgotten with the advent of modernity. As a consequence, rather than as a dislocating 
force, justice is increasingly assumed as a pacifying and sedating tool to ‘bridge the gap’ and 
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neutralise conflict. Initially, this entails assuming a metaphysical, immaterial notion of 
justice as coming from above (e.g. from Nature, God, Reason, Universal Rights and so on). 
Subsequently, the ultimate inconsistency of this impalpable justice (always mismatching the 
factical spatiality of beings), opens the path towards its positivist dissolution into law itself. 
According to a schema we already observed, either projected into some ethereal 
transcendence or flattened into a legal immanence, the law/justice separation remains 
unchallenged.345 Take for instance the locus in which this logic can be observed at its purest, 
i.e. Kant’s elaboration of a law simultaneously emancipated from transcendent principles 
and empirical conditions, a law that is "the representation of a pure form, and is 
independent of content or object, spheres of activity or circumstances”, i.e. a pure ‘form of 
law’, where the reference to higher principles has fully folded onto a circular self-
reference.346 According to Deleuze this law, 
defined by its pure form, without substance or object or any determination whatsoever, 
is such that no one knows nor can know what it is. It operates without making itself 
known. It defines a realm of transgression where one is already guilty.347 
A law, in other words, which preliminary defines the where of its application, a priori 
reducing the world to a world for law.348 This is, as already seen, the paradox of a law which 
pretends to judge over a world which is always-already abstracted into a space of exception. 
In Agamben’s terms, a law that is ‘applied through its disapplication’.349 Justice, I contend, is 
the line of flight away from this paradoxical closure, provided it is thought beyond such 
nihilistic separation, in the sense of what Zartaloudis indicates as a ‘non-juridical justice’ or, 
as I propose below, a ‘cosmic’ justice.350 This means to understand it as both immanent and 
excessive to the spatiolegal concatenations, inseparable from (they unavoidably belong to 
the same world) and yet non-coincident with law itself, since utterly not for law (non-
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juridifiable). Evidently, the main limit that the approaches described in the end of the first 
part of this chapter betray, I argue, is that of missing this dimension, and thus ultimately 
falling short from challenging the closure of total juridification. How to think an excessive, 
evental notion of justice, without however falling back into the nihilistic articulation of yet 
another separation? Could we rework the Greek schema, by conceiving a justice which 
would play the role of a self-subversive force inside the law, constantly dislocating it and 
thus preventing its self-referential closure? This is the path undergone by Derrida and his 
powerful critique to the sovereign transcendence of law (i.e. the spatiolegal state of 
exception). Besides its merit, the relevance of this contribution also rests in the (more or less 
admitted) inspiration it has provided for a whole strand of critical legal thought. In an 
unavoidably brief and condensed way, the next section focus on Derrida’s famous article La 
Force de Loi, where he sought to develop a notion of justice as a ‘sabotaging’ force which 




this is the very definition of ghostliness, as that which 
inhabits the clouded border between materiality and 





In his work, Derrida attacks the Western ‘ontology of presence’ by removing its metaphysical 
‘grounds’, infinitely differing and deferring its dichotomical structures into a paradoxically 
‘groundless foundation’, so that the classical categories of ontology are radically dislocated, 
inescapably haunted by a ‘ghost of undecidability’. To understand how Derrida’s 
‘hauntology’ applies to law, it is useful to start from language, the breeding ground of 
deconstruction.  
In a recently republished essay, Umberto Eco divides Western attempt to achieve a ‘general 
representation of knowledge and/or the world’ into two main models.
353
 On the one hand, 
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the dictionary: i.e. a static system, faithful to the Platonic presupposition of a given, stable 
and thus fully knowable Order of Being, reflecting the confidence vis-à-vis the possibility of 
drawing precise point-to-point correspondences between the text and the world. On the 
other hand, the encyclopaedia: i.e. a dynamic model, emerging in response to the surfacing 
awareness of the always incomplete, evolving and ‘open’ character of knowledge, and thus 
aware of the need for a system of knowledge to be sufficiently ‘flexible’, so as to be able to 
take in new discoveries as well as to always contingently provide with the contextualised and 
finalised information required.
354
 To the ‘arborescent’ staticity of the dictionary the 
encyclopaedia opposes a continuous, boundless and rhizomatic movement of hypertextual 
navigation, a flow which is not blocked by pre-given text-world correspondences, but rather 
kept in motion by flexible rules of reasonability which regulate the ‘passage’ between 
notions. A concern for procedures of movement, connection and circulation replaces the 
striving for analytical definitions of stability.355 
Keeping in mind the heuristic value of this otherwise simplistic distinction, let us frame 
deconstruction in its light. In fact, deconstruction is in the first place a strategy to debunk the 
‘linguistic state of exception’, that is, the dictionarial presupposition of an unproblematic 
correspondence between signifier and signified, on which the structural stability of language 
supposedly rests.356 By emphasising its lack of foundations (or the foundation being exactly 
‘a constitutive lack’), deconstruction problematises this correspondence, unfolding the 
always undecidable and thus overflowing and excessive character of the sign. Derrida’s 
famous concept of differànce encapsulates this indefinite spatio-temporal dislocation 
(differing and deferring) of the signifier-signified correspondence, and thus the constitutive 
impossibility to ever tame and remove its necessary excess, its never exhausted ontological 
‘trace’.357 Consequently signification, i.e. the exceptional operation of language, is bound to 
be endlessly displaced. In this way, Agamben observes, Derrida is able to “call into question 
the primacy of presence and signification for the philosophical tradition” – yet, the Italian 
philosopher adds, does he “truly call into question signification in general”?358 According to 
Agamben, the answer is negative: deconstruction sanctions the constant displacement of 
                                                          
354
Ibid, p. 44 
355
Ibid, p. 519 – On the difference between arborescent and rhizomatic systems of thought, see Deleuze and 
Guattari, ATP, op. cit. ‘Introduction’ 
356
Agamben refers to language’s sovereign “attempt to make sense coincide with denotation, to stabilize a 
zone of indistinction between the two in which language can maintain itself in relation to its denotata by 
abandoning them and withdrawing from them into a pure langue (the linguistic “state of exception”)”, Homo 
Sacer, op. cit. p. 22 
357
On the crucial notion of ‘trace’ in Derrida see for instance Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology (Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1976)  
358
Giorgio Agamben, The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans (Stanford University 
Press, 2005) p. 103  
95 
 
signification by the irreducible excess of the sign and yet, whereas language is unable to find 
‘rest’ in stable correspondences, its exceptional operation ‘keeps on running’, although into 
an infinitely disseminated motion.359 As a result, the paradigm of operation is ultimately left 
unchallenged. To further elaborate this observation let us see how Derrida translates this 
strategy to the legal field by seeking to answer the following question: “does deconstruction 




First of all, the ‘juridico-ethico-political’ sense of justice which Derrida seeks to unfold must 
be framed within his conception of ethics. This is centred on the ontological (or rather, 
hauntological) condition of undecidability, before which we are paradoxically called to take 
the ethical responsibility to decide. In fact, a ‘true’ and ‘just’ decision can only unfold from a 
radical undecidability: “a decision that didn't go through the ordeal of the undecidable 
would not be a free decision, it would only be the programmable application or unfolding of 
a calculable process. It might be legal; it would not be just”.361 This is a never-ending, ever-
haunting ordeal: “the undecidable remains caught, lodged, at least as a ghost – but an 
essential ghost – in every decision, in every event of decision”.362 Law, Derrida explains, is 
always inhabited by the ‘ghost of undecidability’ (la hantise de l’indécidable), which ‘exceeds 
and contradicts’ law, sanctioning the instability and restlessness of every legal decision.363 
Justice appears as an impossibility, and yet also as the very condition of possibility of law, its 
transcendental principle. In other words, the impossibility inserted at the core of law by its 
indeterminacy is also the condition of possibility for justice to emerge in the form of a 
necessarily un-predictable event: justice’s possibility lies in “the paradoxical necessity of 
performing an act [of judgement] which is actually impossible”.364 Justice agitates the 
staticity of law’s state of exception, forces it to move, producing ‘a certain movement within 
law, a movement which may be ruptured in a new manner’.365 Against its sociological 
reduction to a merely ‘empirically contingent matter of social factors’, in Derrida resonates 
the ancient meaning of dike, justice as the arrow to which law must tend and depend: 
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96 
 
because of this overflowing of the performative ... always excessive ... justice ... has no 
horizon of expectation (regulative or messianic) ... remains, is yet, to come, à venir ... the 
very dimension of events irreducibly to come366 
Rather than being a regulative idea(l) postulating a horizon as “the opening and the limit 
that defines an infinite progress or a period of waiting”, justice demands urgency, it ‘does 
not wait’, it must be done: “the instant of decision is a madness ... [it must] defy dialectics ... 
[a] decision of urgency and precipitation, acting in the night of non-knowledge and non-
rule”.367 Derrida assumes the ‘place’ of decision as an abyssal (abgrund) ‘groundless 
foundation’, a non-linguistic and non-representational event occurring in the solipsistic 
solitude of a ‘pre-ontological void’.368 In this night a ‘lightless star’ shines, the transcendental 
to-come of justice paradoxically ‘guiding’ the law towards the impossible possibility of its 
event. 
Yet, how to avoid two as much doomed alternatives, i.e. the never-ending deferral of 
decision (seemingly implied by the very impossibility of the decision itself), or the reactive 
(and reactionary) self-justificatory decisionism? Aware of this risk, Derrida stresses that 
deconstruction is not “a quasi-nihilistic abdication before the ethico-politico-juridical 
question of justice”.369 Justice is indeed to be reached through and beyond law: “law is not 
justice. Law is the element of calculation ... but justice is incalculable ... justice is an 
experience of the impossible”;370 yet every decision must “be both regulated and without 
regulation”, that is, the “incalculable justice requires us to calculate”, from our paradoxical 
position within the “unstable distinction between justice and droit, between justice (infinite, 
incalculable, rebellious to rule and foreign to symmetry, heterogeneous and heterotopic) 
and the exercise of justice as law”, as calculation.371 Is this extremely insightful reflection 
ultimately able to debunk the paradigm of operation? Is it able to satisfyingly account for the 
materiality of law? I believe we should ultimately answer negatively to both questions. By 
addressing the second, an answer to the first will simultaneously emerge. Let me explain.  
The attempt to reach a ‘justice without law’, prefiguring a ‘pre-ontological’ void as the 
‘where’ from which the ethical event (of justice/responsibility) would emerge, confines the 
latter within a solipsistic and ultimately a-spatial vacuum, producing a fracture in the 
immanence of the spatiolegal which amounts to re-inserting a negativity at the very core of 
ontology and ethics: in this sense, as Agamben contends, “‘groundless’ simply means ‘on 
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negative ground’”.372 Noys criticises Derrida for ultimately failing to ‘accept’ and ‘traverse’ 
this ‘spectral negativity’, and instead withdrawing from it, seeking to fill it with a quasi-
mystical, ‘transcendent superessentiality’: “deconstruction fills out spectrality as such, as a 
reified ‘positive’ and irreducible moment that comes from on high”.373 In this interpretation, 
in the manner of a Kant facing the unspeakable possibility of nature as a ‘crude chaotic 
aggregate’, Derrida would ultimately escape the unbearable negativity to which he has 
opened ‘thought’ into a teleological refuge.374 I would argue instead that Derrida’s ultimate 
failure stems from his inability to fully remove negativity from the epicentre of metaphysics 
in the first place: in Zartaloudis’ words, his problem is that he “may have not gone far 
enough”.375 The problem is not the renunciation ‘to deal with’ negativity. It is its very 
presupposition. Accordingly, could not we retrace in this attempt ‘to fill out spectrality’ a 
resurfacing of the paradigmatic urge to immunise from a pre-supposed nothingness? 
Obviously, Derrida is careful to avoid ‘responding’ to negativity by resorting to the 
calculating logic of techné. Yet, his rather mysterious, quasi-fideistic solution can only 
partially eschew, and is ultimately unable to challenge the latter’s paradigm. Consequently 
this justice, though posited as extra-legal, appears to be still thought within the legal system 
and its systemic closure of the world, that is, within the legal state of exception. Although 
infinitely dislocating the latter, justice seems unable to ultimately block the operational 
repetition of its enclosing and juridifying ontological gesture. Accordingly, justice remains 





According to Timothy Campbell, by assuming the ‘state of exception’ as the originary 
politico-legal relation, Agamben is then unable to satisfyingly account for the radical 
difference introduced by the advent of contemporary biopolitics.377 On the same vein, 
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Kalhed Furani observes that a blind-spot haunts Agamben’s framework: his notion of state of 
exception overlooks the threshold between the state of exception, and the ‘becoming of the 
state of exception’, that is, the fact that the “state of exception can signal something more 
than a stasis. It can also signal a techne.”378 Whatever their accuracy with respect to their 
target (which I dispute), these observations are useful in order to qualify the problem of 
deconstruction when applied to the spatiolegal: namely, notwithstanding its effectivity in 
debunking law’s ‘static’ state of exception, deconstruction appears as unequipped to deal 
with its evolution into a dynamic state of exception. To repeat: deconstruction conjures a 
powerful critique to the former, liquefying the stability of its point-to-point correspondences 
into a continuous dislocation. It inserts at the core of the legal system an undecidability, i.e. 
the impossibility for the ‘operation’ of law to ever ‘bridge’ the law/space separation, to ever 
tame space. By removing its grounds as well as the ‘outside’ against which it is supposed to 
erect its geometry, deconstruction debunks the transcendent structures of the spatiolegal 
state of exception, which now faces the ontological impossibility of its own operations. Yet, 
the powerful critique that ‘legal deconstruction’ moves to the spatiolegal architecture of 
modernity appears ultimately unable to dismantle its core logic (i.e. the paradigm of 
operation).  
As Ghering has observed, differently from language, contemporary legal discourse is not so 
naïve to assume law as a system of truth. It is instead well aware of law’s paradoxes and 
‘schizophrenia’:  
to the extent that legal discourse sees itself as a normative discourse (in contrast to 
metaphysics) and is capable of reflecting accordingly, it is aware of its own 
inconsistencies (as well as of its violent character) ... Deconstruction  was made for truth 
discourses, not for the ... jaded normativity of legal affairs379 
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Even more explicitly, it could be argued that deconstruction itself, by emphasising the 
undecidability at the core of the static state of exception, plays a key role in propelling the 
surfacing of such ‘legal awareness’. Likewise an endlessly signifying language which, before 
the evidence of the utter undecidability of its signification, finds its justification exactly in the 
now ‘emptied’ operation of signification itself, so the spatiolegal state of exception, given 
the impossibility of its operations (and thus the inconsistency of their by now dissolved 
‘purposes’), assumes the operations themselves as its own self-fulfilling and self-justifying 
purpose. Facing the immanent closure triggered by deconstruction (i.e. the awareness of the 
lack of a transcendent ‘outside’, and thus of the ontological impossibility of any attempt to 
tame it), the spatiolegal state of exception  
assum[es] both this impossibility and these techniques ... [as] the final possibility of an 
exhausted system, which folds back onto itself in order, in a mechanical fashion, to 
collapse in on itself. The Outside becomes the Inside, and the Inside now has no 
limits.380 
Derrida was well aware of the risks of this closure, and his notion of justice à venir is exactly 
an attempt to avoid it in the direction of a transcendental excess. Yet, this paradoxical, 
mysterious, irrational and mad justice appears as too impalpable, immaterial and ‘empty’ to 
really problematise the operational paradigm of exception. Thus, although Derrida stresses 
that this justice is not 'messianic', what seems to be ultimately produced is a sort of 
‘petrified messianism’, i.e. a law nullified from its content and as such kept alive only in its 
operations.381 Although dislocated and indefinitely disseminated by deconstruction, law 
continues to operate its enclosing gesture, its exceptional mechanism remaining “intact 
while we await the grand and shattering arrival of the event ‘to come’”.382 Criticising Derrida 
for placing the ethical decision within a non-linguistic, non-representational and pre-
ontological void, Ruedin observes that since  
language is not a second order system of representation, but rather an originating 
mode of living the world, the linguistic gesture and the private act of responsibility 
(pace Derrida) are no longer incompatible; in fact, they occupy the same ontological 
space383 
Likewise, law and justice occupy the same ontological space, and there is no possibility to 
‘shatter’ the spatiolegal situation in which we are through a solipsistic ‘leap of faith’ 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the in a quite different way organized  discourse of law, the – as one may say – jaded normativity of legal 
affairs” (p. 169) 
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occurring in a pre-ontological vacuum.384 Instead, the inability of deconstruction to 
ultimately problematise the law/space separation appears to engender an as much 
problematic law/justice separation, obliquely re-proposing the basis structure of Western 
tradition, i.e. the pseudo-dialectic of law and justice.385 I contend that to postulate the 
chaotic dislocation of law via the anarchic and subversive notion of justice is not a sufficient 
strategy to overcome the ‘great impasse’ of separation.386 The positing of justice as ‘chaos 
within the law’ remains entrapped within the operational closure of a world for law, i.e. an 
undifferentiated chaos ready to be incorporated by law as a ‘weak’ and ‘juridified 
contingency’.387 As Severino observes, the ‘will to control’ must eliminate the transcendent 
immutable ‘idols’ in order to be able to fully control the chaotic becoming which those idols 
deny. The latter are, so to speak, essentially anti-nomical: they ultimately prevent the 
spatiolegal state of exception from fully unfolding.388 This is what deconstruction ultimately 
misses: the fact that the state of exception always-already 'contains the seeds of its own 
deconstruction'.389 
As we are to see in the next chapter, what thus emerges is a new configuration, a dynamic 
spatiolegal state of exception, no longer concerned with colonising, striating and 
crystallising space anymore. Once emancipated from any of these statically ‘territorial’ 
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operations, as well as from any ‘transcendent idol’, what remains is only the self-referential 
concern with ‘correct procedures of movement between connection and correlation’, ‘rules 
of passage’ rather than ‘true’ correspondences between the text and the world: the state of 
exception becomes literally ‘encyclopaedic’, no longer static or dichotomical but moving 
rhizomatically at warp speed in a smooth and boundless globe.390 The above mentioned 
paradox of a law which pretends to judge over a world, whilst such a ‘world’ is only a 
projection of law’s state of exception, is thus transferred to the paradox of an impossible 
justice which ultimate becomes “an aestheticized disinterested formula ‘without 
engagement’ ... a sterile law in itself”.391 As a consequence, the eternally waited-for justice 
ultimately collapses into law, that is, blurs into due procedures, efficient know-how, 
problem-solving routines, social control technologies, bureaucratic apparatuses, securitarian 
control and all other technical and technological operations, dissolving into social policy, 
grounded “in social knowledge, in cost-benefit analyses of facts and values, and in socially 
constructed (and constructing) procedural systems and institution of principles, rules and 
norms”.392 The dichotomies which, as we saw above, remained unchallenged within the 
sociolegal approach (e.g. law-as-text and law-in-action, or, transcendence and immanence, 
general and particular, will and accident, law and its application, law and space, law and 
justice) are now overcome, only to blur in a functional correlation. In words I am to qualify 
further in a few pages, it could be said that law’s vibrating dislocation is no longer 
abstracted into an a-spatial frame of reference (i.e., an abstract state of exception) nor 
sought to be contextualised and frozen through socio-empirical means (i.e. a concrete state 
of exception): the dislocated, ‘pragmatic and impersonal’ mechanism of exception ‘keeps on 
running’, absolutely deterritorialised and dislocated, since it is this very movement and its 
constant lubrication to become law’s self-referential purpose.393 What is produced is a sort 
of ‘immobile movement’, akin to the frozen dynamic of a jet d’eau, whose smooth 
circularity constantly defuses the potentiality for the emergence of events, since it is exactly 
this eventuality (the contingent opening of a non-juridifiable world that justice prefigures) 
that the centripetal movement of the legal operation neutralises: swept into this idle 
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movement, justice is unable to “breaking open the circle”,394 can only observe it from 
outside, can only offer its endorsement, ultimately becoming a sort of “critical apology”, a 
justification for the legal system itself: “justice is identified with the administration of 




Deconstruction always arrives late, always preceded by the self-deconstruction of the 
spatiolegal system itself. By failing to provide this ghostly justice with the ontological 
materiality it deserves, and ultimately presupposing a negativity at the core of ontology, 
justice risks being ultimately consigned to the machinations of contemporary biopolitics (see 
next chapter).396 Justice is not an impossible à venir, but rather an excessive potentiality 
which is here-and-now, an absolutely material and cosmic event. This is what “put[ing] the 
material into the Derridean ghost of the undecidable” should mean: to simultaneously 
assert the inescapability of every situation, as well as the cosmic contingency to which, 
through which, every situation is opened to the non-juridifiable potential of a post-human, 
impersonal, and yet absolutely material and present justice.397 The fifth chapter is dedicated 
to this endeavour. In the next section instead, I explore some (direct and indirect) 
approaches to the spatiolegal that are more consistent with the understanding of 
materiality developed in the last chapter to the spatiolegal.   
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Let us remind the formula stated above, everything does matter: legal representations and 
things, texts and contexts, fences and CCTVs, the seats in a tribunal hall and the legal notion 
of dignity. Law is always concatenated in atmo-rhythmical tunings, not simply as a set of 
rules we rationally and pragmatically decide to follow, but also as an affective force 
materially felt on bodies, both abstract and concrete, an abs-co-traction. It cannot be 
accounted for by uncovering ‘hidden’ power relations buried in the recesses of the ‘social’, 
since it emerges out of its immanent spatiality. Likewise, ‘power structures’ cannot be used 
as an all-encompassing explanans, since they are only one among the elements machined in 
these tunings. Nor law can be understood only in the terms of a ‘social pressure’, as the 
classic sociological approach would pretend, since it is more precisely a material and 
affective force, moving and ordering people, producing connections, often independently 
from, and in any case irreducible to its supposed ‘truth-value’.398 In the city law acts as “the 
regulator of spaces between places, connecting and severing urban beings, urban objects, 
urban desires and fears, amongst themselves and with whatever is imagined to be outside 
the urban.”399 This understanding opens an avenue of promising investigations on urban 
normativity. Let us take the tensegrity of the urban space of London, where the incoming 
darkness of the night merges with the appearance of a black, hooded boy, connected with 
the affective pressure of Anti-Social Behaviour legislation: a normative tuning has emerged. 
Or, imagine the post-human normativities produced by foxes in the city nightlife, generating 
a climate of fearful attentiveness in other small animals, and exploiting the connection with 
the waste legislation, as well as the normative routines, which inform the practice of leaving 
bags of rubbish outside the door, on the street. The presence of law in these atmo-
rhythmical tunings is not only to be thought in the form of legislations such as the 
atmospheric ASB law, but also in the various operational proxies in which it blurs, like CCTVs 
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or wall signs or police operations, for instance.400 Accordingly, the urban appears as a post-
human “tensegrity of expectations stabilised by injunctions and menaces”, a ‘holding 
together’ in common vibration resulting from the ‘normative stress’ of rules, to whose 
materiality beings tend to become gradually numb, as expectations are integrated into 
routines and normative tensions stabilised into normal conditions.401 Yet, law is not only 
about numbing effervescence and stabilising tensions. There is a normativity which is more 
complex than such a negative acceptation suggest, one which has not to do with immunity 
and stabilisation, but rather with vulnerability and dislocation. Above I observed that the 
legal state of exception emerges as an immunitary paradigm aimed at bridging a 
presupposed (and denied) separation. According to this conception, since the ‘human 
condition’ is constitutively one of disorder, disequilibrium and poverty (i.e. an originary 
lack), the ‘latent attitude of human life’ is that of ‘compensation’, re-equilibration, re-
ordering (i.e. of filling the lack through operations). The emergence of the legal apparatus is 
explained accordingly: ‘to be human means to be entrapped by norms’, that is, to 
systematically repress the chaotic being-together into the ‘functional separation’ of 
normative, co-immunitary systems.402 If life, as Esposito observes, is what ‘by definition 
tends to escape its own place’, then ‘from this turbulence the law must immunise life: from 
its irresistible tendency to overcome itself ...  law must sacrifice the intensity of life for the 
necessity of its conservation’.403 This is the negative and immunitary understanding of law 
which the state of exception expresses, and classical critiques of violence as well as 
deconstruction fight against. In this section I look at a more complex way to think the law, 
beyond its negative-only acceptation. This means to assume the spatiolegal as characterised 
by both territorialising and deterritorialising tendencies, however without ascribing the 
former to a ‘rational law’ and the latter to an ‘intractable space’: instead, they are to be 
understood as the two inseparable faces of the law/space relation, i.e. the double structure 
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Law, Deleuze and Guattari stress, is first of all the law of the State, of logos and striation. 
Law of the logos is violence and order at the same time, despot and legislator.404 Law’s state 
of exception is grounded on this violent installation, i.e. the ‘flattening’ of the ontological 
multiplicity of space and the projection of an ordered politico-legal geometry. This, 
however, is only a part of the story. An ‘other’ law is to be taken into account. This is what 
Deleuze and Guattari term the law of the nomos. Although ‘nomos’ is the Greek word 
designating the law itself, what they wish to turn the attention to is the more original and 
nomadic etymology of the term, which indicates a meaning in direct ‘opposition to the law 
of the polis’, i.e. a ‘scattering’ rather than a partitioning, ‘distribution’ rather than allocation: 
in fact, a “special kind of distribution, one without division into shares, in a space without 
borders or enclosure”.405 The nomadic law of smoothness is always ‘exceptional’ vis-à-vis 
the logic law of striation, that is, exceptional vis-à-vis the latter’s state of exception, and 
thus vis-à-vis law’s attempt to transcend itself – just as the smooth space is always 
exceptional, i.e. irreducible, to any striation, never fully colonisable. This is not to say that 
two laws are in place. Smooth space and striated space “exist only in mixture”; likewise, 
nomic and logic law cannot exist independently from each other: no smooth without 
emersion of striation, no strata without secretion of smoothness, but rather degrees of 
smoothness and striation: these are the two ‘characters’ of the spatiolegal, its logic and 
nomic qualities, only formally but not ontologically distinguishable.406 
Let me qualify: the nomic is not the violence of law. As Benjamin famously stressed, violence 
is inscribed in law since its very inception: the ontological gesture of law, its flattening and 
partitioning of space, is constitutively violent.407 There is as explained a structural relation 
within law, between its violent installation and the purified ordering it produces, between 
the two poles of violence and order: a structural couple held together by the logic of 
exception. Yet, the nomic is foreign to this coupling. When discussing the State as the 
quintessential representation of the logos, Deleuze and Guattari define the nomic in terms 
of a radical exteriority to the state apparatus (a ‘war machine’ opposed to the ‘state’), as the 
constitutive blind spot (the ‘obscure nomos’) of the state’s structural correlation between 
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the two poles of the despotic and the legislating.408 In other words, the nomadic law is what 
dislocates the two Janus-faces of the law of the logos: the ‘structural relation’ between the 
two poles of the logic (i.e. the state of exception) should not be confused with its ‘dynamic 
tension’ with the nomic. In fact, the nomic is what always put the structural relation out-of-
joint, constantly de-territorialising the legal territorialisations produced by the state of 
exception: “there is a great danger of indentifying the structural relation between the two 
poles of political sovereignty, and the dynamic interrelation of these two poles, with the 
power [puissance] of war”.409 The spatiolegal emerges out of “coexistence and competition, 
in [the] perpetual field of interaction” of nomic and logic, smooth and striated: the nomic 
and the logic are inseparable and yet non-coincident, the two irreducible sides of the 
spatiolegal.410 
Although the nomic of law is always irreducible to its logic structuration, at the same time it 
is necessary for law to ‘move’, and thus to ‘swerve’ so as to prevent law from ‘coinciding’ 
with space – i.e. from becoming a totalitarian tautology. This prefigures a restlessly moving 
spatiolegal materiality, never coincident with the comfortable regularity of the Kantian 
subsumption from particular to universal, nor with a merely fluid and processual 
understanding of legal spatiality, never peacefully dialectical, but rather a syncopated, 
complex rhythm of territorialisation and de-territorialisation.411 What has been defined as 
law’s state of exception – either as a transcendental abstraction, or empirically grounded 
through sociological approaches to law, or more ‘critically’ translated onto ‘hidden’ 
structures of power relations – should be thus seen as a constant attempt of the law of the 
logos to naturalise, domesticate and tame its own ‘opaque core’, this non-representational 
force always-already distributing bodies onto space, exceeding and dislocating the logos 
itself, since a-logical. There is a constitutive impossibility for the law of logos, for both its 
‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ states of exception, to ever conquer, domesticate, tame and expel 
its nomic normativity, thereby fulfilling its ‘all-ingesting’ dream412 – and the reason should 
begin to surface: any attempt to ‘tame’ such a nomic spatiality presupposes a separation 
between the logic and the nomic, which is what I am denying. 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos proposes to explore the inseparable and non-coincident form 
of the spatiolegal by translating it into the interrelation between the law and the city, 
through the notion of lawscape, namely “the ever-receding horizon of prior invitation by the 
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one (the law/the city) to be conditioned by the other (the city/the law).”413 This concept is 
congenial to my attempt to think the spatiolegal in itself, i.e. without presupposing one of 
the two terms (law/space) as already given, whilst simultaneously avoiding to suggest their 
identity: lawscape is an ontological continuum simultaneously traversed and agitated by a 
difference which prevents its collapsing into a mere tautology.414 Moreover, it also allows 
for thinking the logic/nomic dyad not only as a one-way relation between an ordering and a 
disordering force, but as a recursive process, and with an explicitly urban dimension. 
Accordingly, between the law and the city there is a turbulent relation of reciprocal 
invisibilisation, each side ‘needing’ the other to project its own ‘dream’, and simultaneously 
to prevent this dream from being actually fulfilled: the law seeks to invisibilise the city since 
it fears its demonic (nomic) spatiality, and yet necessarily “‘relies’ on the city, 
‘acknowledges’ its continuum, constructs a rigidity between them that resists the 
surrounding liquidity”;415 on the other hand, the city seeks to invisibilise law by projecting its 
deterritorialised space of joyful and pacific disorder.416 The two extremes to which each of 
the side of the lawscape tends to are never pre-given, as well as never reachable ‘self-
perpetuating myths’, constitutively utopian, that is, without place: a “holy city of justice 
perpetually floating in a post-conflict space”, and “a law without a city [i.e.] a law without 
materiality, an abstract, universal, immutable law that trammels the globe”.417 The vanishing 
point in which these two utopian tendencies mutually fold, I contend in the next chapter, is 
the ‘abstract form’ that the spatiolegal takes in contemporary neo-liberal societies, what I 




Therefore, first, since law can never be out of space, it is ontologically powerless vis-à-vis 
transcending its ‘situation’: whatever its attempts, law would never be able to ‘step back’ so 
as to gain the clear distance which would allow for its unilateral action, since this would 
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mean stepping back from itself.418 Second, law is never ‘alone’ but always part of a 
spatiolegal assemblage of human and nonhuman bodies, and thus is to “be observed in the 
framework of an immediate continuity of heterogeneous elements, not all of which 
reducible to a rational-normative scheme, acting in the social field”.419 Third, the spatiolegal 
is always concatenated and dislocated. The materiality of spatiolegal concatenations is not 
frozen into mere actuality: law is always-already material both in the actual situation and in 
the ‘virtual field of expectancy’ in which it wafts as a virtual (although always on the brink of 
being actualised) materiality. There is always a virtual multiplicity haunting the ‘actual’ 
manifestation of law itself into given things, signs, norms, performances, thus overflowing 
the inter-penetration of bodies, their mere being embedded, embodied, performed or 
networked into a nomotopic or nomospheric spatiality. Finally, by thinking the spatiolegal 
not only as a structural relation between the two poles of the logos (violence and order), 
but also as a dynamic relation between a logic ordering and a nomic dislocation, this 
conception allows to overcome the one-sided, negative-only understandings of law, in the 
direction of an affirmative and vital normativity.  
To correlate more in depth this conceptualisation of spatiolegal materiality with the 
ontological understanding of life proposed in the last chapter, it is particularly useful to 
briefly intersect the work of Roberto Esposito, who has elaborated a compelling way to 
integrate a positive understanding of the spatiolegal within a Deleuze-inspired vitalism, in 
the direction of an affirmative biopolitics where the emphasis lies in the immanent 
normativity of life.  
In order to provide an alternative to a merely negative understanding of the legal 
mechanism, Esposito neither seeks to unfold a dimension opposed to and thus separated 
from the law (e.g. space, life), nor resort to transcendental principles supposedly dislocating 
or sabotaging it. Instead, he focuses on the “generalised diffused normativity that 
characterises life, what Spinoza has called ‘rules for living’”.420 Elaborating from 
Canguilhem’s conception of ‘normality’, he defines a ‘positive’ and ‘affirmative’ 
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understanding of norm, which is not derived from the exclusionary and static 
presupposition of a given ‘normal state’ (of exception) with respect to which variations 
would be defined (and sanctioned) as deviations. Norm is not something external (and 
transcendentally imposed by law) to living beings, i.e. a systematic abstraction from life. It is 
instead ‘biological’ and ‘biopolitical’, that is, ‘intrinsic and immanent’ to the living, always-
already belonging to the materiality of life: a norm-of-life: ‘differently from law, this norm is 
not situated at the border of separation, but rather at the point of tangency between life 
and the living’, in the ‘middle’ where life germinates.421 If Benjamin once observed that 
behind law’s self-presentation as transcendent there is no other than immanence, Esposito 
provides such legal immanence with a fully positive and vitalist dimension which resonates 
with the materialist perspective that has been so far provided.  
Accordingly, the generative and differential repetition of the norm-of-life is opposed to the 
‘false' and exceptional repetition of the juridical norm: whilst the latter is based on the 
reduction of each singularity to a particular which is recognisable into a generality, the 
norm-of-life is a living normativity emerging out of contingent and singular encounters. 
Opposed to the immunitary paradigm of ‘conservation’, what counts for this norm-of-life is 
the capacity to integrate rather than deny variations. Not a matter of producing ‘ontological 
interruptions’ to the flow of life through mad decisions, but rather a capacity to adapt to 
this becoming by entering into ever-new relations. Following Deleuze, Esposito observes 
that the risk for life is not dislocation, disorder and chaos, but rather the atrophying of one’s 
capacity for integration, transformation and adaptation. What should concern us then is not 
the weakening of life’s immunitary capacity for conservation, but rather the surfacing of an 
‘excess of conservation’, i.e. the rigidification that life undergoes by becoming increasingly 
‘incapable to face new risks’, to produce new problems. Consequently, the ethico-political 
task to ‘preserve’ life is not a negative matter of building spatiolegal apparatuses of 
compensation, immunity and re-equilibrium but rather, in the Nietzschean sense, it means 
preserving the vital power to produce new norms, keeping life open in possibility: to exist is 
to endure in atmo-rhythmical agencement, to be able to adapt, cope with and engage in 
different relations, to live in variation.422 
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From a similar Deleuzian perspective, yet also deeply influenced by Latour’s work, Laurent 
de Sutter somewhat echoes these observations when proposing to ‘get rid of legal theory’ 
and developing a purely immanent ‘practice of right’, i.e. an ‘art of creating new relations’, 
producing assemblages in extensive and corrective forms and thus ‘providing juridical 
operations with a becoming’, a practice of association and chance which only knows 
concrete singularities and it is indifferent to law, politics and economics.423 Sutter’s 
approach is purely effectual and radically relational: “there is no ontology in [law’s] 
declarations of imputation. There is no content. There is only the effect of words that allow 
things and people to stick together”.424 In the style of Deleuze’s famous injunction ‘to have 
done with judgement’, in Sutter resonates an iconoclastic optimism: “law does not adapt 
itself to social change; law is the language of social change ... is revolution – everyday 
revolution ... the lawyers should never trust what is. Instead, they should trust what 
becomes”.425 Accordingly, jurisprudence is indifferent to justice and laws, it only ‘gives 
account to life, jurisprudence is life’.426 Deleuze’s call for a ‘right to problems’ and a ‘right to 
metamorphosis’ thus becomes the cornerstone around which a ‘practice of right’ should be 
organised.427 
With Sutter and Esposito we face two different and equally compelling ways to overcome 
the presupposition of law as a merely negative, immunitary and oppressive apparatus: “laws 
and institutions are positive tools; rather than being limiting or organizing, they spread like 
rhizomes”.428 Yet, is the nomic dislocation provided by these differently-elaborated 
immanent normativities an excess able to ultimately problematise the operation of 
exception? Is the latter only a cumbersome apparatus that denies variation and prevents 
the production of new relations into a static rigidity? Or instead, does not the post-
sovereign folding of the state of exception of contemporary neo-liberal societies prefigure a 
flexible, dynamic and immanent configuration whose peculiarity exactly rests in the capacity 
to adapting, coping with and adhering to the pulsating spatiality of life without pretending 
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to re-collocate it into a given order? As Noys demands, “why proclaim the need for a right to 
difference, variation, and metamorphosis, if capitalism will supply them in far more radical, 
a-subjective, and inhuman forms than any mutated subject?”429 Above, I criticised 
deconstruction for its insufficiency vis-à-vis the spatiolegal state of exception. Yet, does not 
Sutter’s call to ‘get rid of law’ – thereby optimistically and uncritically endorsing the 
tumultuous and rhizomatic production of relation and association of an immanent practice 
of right – risk to equally mirror the becoming dynamic of the state of exception, becoming 
indistinguishable to its uneventful liquid and accelerated circulation? Are variation, 




Sutter observes that legal critique in its different forms always subordinates law to 
something beyond: the Kantian critique to a higher Judgement; the deconstructive critique 
to a transcendental Justice; the ‘denouncing critique’ of the ideology to some deeper 
truth.431 In this way, it always occurs within the pseudo-dialectic of law and justice 
traversing Western thought. Focusing on the materiality of law and justice is a way to 
overcome this impasse. In this chapter I began to gesture in this direction, towards an 
understanding of the spatiolegal as simultaneously concatenated and dislocated, as well as 
exceeded by its evental taking place.  
Prior to continue, a qualification is necessary. When assuming the nomic as what utterly 
dislocates the law as well as simultaneously keeps it ‘alive’, in ‘movement’, I hasten to stress 
that I do not intend to conflate it with the notion of justice. Were this the case, that would 
amount to simply ‘materialise' Derrida’s ghost without, however, fully challenging its core 
flaw, namely the fact of postulating a subverting dislocation inside law, that is, an excess de 
facto produced by law itself through its differing and deferring operation. An ultimately 
juridifiable justice, that is. A corollary trouble with conflating the nomic with justice, 
moreover, is to assume such nomic dislocation as emancipatory and ‘just’ per se. This is, as 
will be discussed at length, a dangerous ethico-political strategy: “never believe that a 
smooth space will suffice to save us”.432 
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Therefore, to qualify: the spatiolegal materiality is neither only a structural relation between 
the two poles of the logos, nor only a dynamic relation between a logic ordering and a 
nomic dislocation. It is also an event. Every spatiolegal concatenation, in its 
deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, takes place. This taking place is simultaneously 
what sanctions the inescapable as well as dislocated belonging of law to a situation (the 
impossibility to transcend space), as well as the non-relational, ‘evental viewpoint’ insisting 
in every situation, that opens the spatiolegal to the cosmic contingency of a world not for 
law – what above, following Woodward, I termed the impersonal ‘making-available’ of the 
material potentialities which every situation harbours, its radical irreducibility to the 
spatiolegal closure.433 Every immersion in the spatiolegal is simultaneously within and 
‘beyond’ its relational actualisation, not simply in the sense of dislocating such relations, but 
rather insofar as opening them to the non-relational event of their occurrence. This is what 
networks, nomospheres and nomotops are arguably unable to convey. This is also what 
naïve vitalism seems to overlook, thus risking to becoming vulnerable to contemporary 
forms of biopolitical control whose functioning logic, as I hinted, does not entail blocking the 
variation and metamorphosis of life, but rather neutralising its eventful potential into a 
smooth variation within an uneventful horizon.  
The ‘problem’ of relationalism (namely, an unsatisfying account of the notions of event and 
thus justice) complements that of deconstruction (namely, an unsatisfyingly immaterial 
notion of justice and an inability to fully overcome the paradigm of exception), indicating 
the direction which I intend to follow. A notion of justice, that is, that neither coincides with 
the logic nor the nomic of the spatiolegal, but is rather ‘between’ the two or, more 
precisely, their eventful excess, perforating their texture by folding them back to their geo-
legal rootedness. Not a force subverting or sabotaging law. Not law’s paradox or 
impossibility. Not an indefinite à venir. Justice is not the nomic of law. Justice is the cosmic 
of law. It is in this sense that justice should be understood as what allows law to be used, 
that is, what allows its intensive ethico-political potential to emerge, by opening every legal 
situation to the geo-philosophical potential of a world not-for-law (i.e. non-juridifiable) 
which is nonetheless here-and-now. 
This is the concept I seek to delineate in the final chapter as well as in the conclusion. Prior 
to do that, however, it is still necessary to account for what I term the spatiolegal 
architecture of control, both in its theoretical foundations, as well as in the legal, 
securitarian and economical operations through which it shapes the space accordingly. This 
is the dynamic ‘state of exception in which we live’ (Benjamin), that is, the abstract form 
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that the spatiolegal takes in contemporary times, in the sense of the politico-legal 
deterritorialisation of neo-liberal capitalism, declined in the biopolitical modes of the post-
disciplinary logic of ‘control’, i.e. an immanent, impersonal, unauthorised (i.e. without 
author) and self-regulating configuration of power that adheres to (and preventively 





































In its virtual truth, law has already disappeared from 
the Earth. What remains of ‘law’ is a dissolving 
complex of relics from political sociality, nostalgic 









According to the Holy Scriptures ‘glory’ is the attribute of God, who as such attracts the 
incessant glorification of his creatures. Yet, what if God is not the cause but rather the 
effect, that is, not simply glorified but ontologically produced by glorification itself? In 
political theory, a well-known formula expresses this theorem: the King is the King as long as 
the people believe him so. A void lies at the core of divine, monarchic and legal sovereignty. 
This is the ‘secret’ that public ceremonies and all the other spectacular instances of ‘public 
display of power’ are meant to conceal: public recognition, acclamation and glorification are 
not the consequence of sovereign glory, but rather what constitutes it. Who could be more 
appropriate than Hegel to capture the dialectical nuance of this circularity? The master is 
the master insofar as the slave recognises him qua master. Recognition is the operation 
whereby the slave literally constitutes the master. At the same time, recognition is the 
operation which defines the slave, who is a slave insofar as he recognises the master. The 
operation of recognition is the vanishing point of the master/slave dichotomy, the circularity 
in which they fold. 
                                                          
434
Nick Land, 'After the Law,' in Fanged Noumena: Collected Writings 1987-2007, eds. Robin Mackay and Ray 
Brassier (Urbanomic/Sequence, 2011) pp. 259-60 
115 
 
The definition of human beings as ‘operators’, that is, those who produce and whose ‘doing’ 
is praxis – i.e. the ‘manifestation of a will which produces a concrete effect’ through a 
precise art (techné) –  has been shown as depending on the preliminary postulation of 
nothingness: the theologico-politico-legal paradigm of techné always emerges ex nihilo.435 It 
now appears that in its profound sense this ontological operation is a sovereign-producing 
techné, that is, the constant filling of the void at the core of sovereignty (God, King, Law...), 
and thus the productive concealing of the latter’s unspeakable impotence. Within the 
perspective of nihilism, what the humans produce is nothing other than their own 
subjection to a sovereign power. More precisely, they (as political and legal subjects and/or 
creatures of God) ontologically coincide with this operation: “the creature is essentially the 
glorification of glory”.436 
Therefore, although at first it appears that the possibility for a sovereign to hold its power 
rests on a capacity to deny and conceal this ‘secret’, i.e. to ‘administer the mystery’ in the 
sense of articulating the presupposed gap between the king and its people; more 
profoundly, it is the paradigm of operation (i.e. the reduction of being to praxis) to ground 
the sovereign state of exception. For this reason, whereas the apparent unmasking of the 
‘secret’ propels the crisis of sovereignty, this by no means constitutes the collapse of its 
mechanism, but rather its reformulation, no longer as concealment from, but rather as 




Bio-politics, the management of life. It is on this notion that the spatiolegal evolution 
explored in the second chapter converges with the material vitalism unfolded in the first. 
Framed in biopolitical terms, the spatiolegal ‘exceptional’ double-move appears as the 
erasure and partitioning of life, i.e. the insertion of a fracture between a (pre-supposed as) 
homogenous, flat, ‘bare life’, and a ‘qualified’ life, to be then differently dressed with 
various categories (e.g. the individual, subject of right, member of a society).437  Besides the 
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countless interpretation to which it has been subjected, I believe what is particularly 
significant with the notion of bare life is the biopolitical or indeed bio-nomical separation it 
expresses, namely the necessity for law to deny (that is, to immunise from) the singularity of 
beings, by plunging them into a homogeneous and bare substratum where it is able to 
operate on them: as observed above, law cannot act on space without a priori projecting 
the where in which it is to be applied.438 On this split between, so to speak, life and the 
living, reverberates the basic scission of Western metaphysics (soul/body). A bionomical 
caesura that posits human beings as self-owning subjects, endowing them with (moral) 
conscience and free will to perform their own actions, and yet ties them to the burden of a 
bare life they need to ‘manage’. In this way it is introduced the ethico-moral-political 
question of the soul’s ‘management’ of the body, i.e. the necessity for the subject to govern 
and conduct its own body (i.e. bare life) towards a higher, divine or profane good.439 This is 
an ethics whose ontological core is the ‘ought’, not the ‘being’, one according to which 
humans are assessed regarding the operations they perform and the result they achieve.440 
What is significant, as already hinted, is that such ‘reduction of being into praxis’ has the 
ethico-political consequence of implanting a constitutive ‘guilt’ within every being: is not, in 
fact, the task of governing and managing oneself according to divine or profane (legal) virtue 
a constitutively unfinished one, i.e. a constant approximation to principles which, by 
definition, cannot ever be matched? Does not this configure an existence of an infinite duty, 
and thus infinite debt, thus forcing humans (and nonhumans alike), in Zartaloudis words, “to 
bear the burden of law’s own groundlessness, of law’s ‘own’ guilt”?441 
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If such a bionomical split is the exceptional dispositif for ‘making governable’ beings, the 
crisis of sovereignty can be read as the crisis of this mechanism of capture. The folding of 
the state of exception that follows could be then reframed as a shift in the configuration of 
power, from the presupposed capture of beings within the spectacular transcendence of the 
sovereign glory, to the actual capture of beings through the immanent techniques and 
technologies of bio-power. In Foucault’s effective formula, “what generalizes the power to 
punish, then, is not the universal consciousness of the law in each juridical subject; it is the 




In the thought of Michel Foucault we find one of the most radical attempts to account for 
the reconfiguration of systems of power as result of the crisis of sovereignty. His well-known 
theory of the emergence of disciplinary societies investigates a logic of government which 
no longer seeks to capture its own subjects within the glory of public spectacles, and rather 
shifts the attention from the soul to the body of the individual, a body to be disciplined 
through an ‘infinitely minute web of panoptic technique’. The shift from ancient regimes to 
disciplinary societies is famously framed through Bentham’s notorious architectural project, 
the Panopticon. Thinking through the latter Foucault is able to define the immanent logic of 
what he famously terms the ‘disciplinary society’, i.e. panopticism, namely “the pure 
function of imposing a particular taste or conduct on a multiplicity of particular individuals, 
provided that the multiplicity is small in number and the space limited and confined”.443 The 
concept is not to be understood in a metaphorical, but rather analogical sense: instead of 
merely being a ‘signifier’ employed to refer to heterogeneous phenomena, the panopticon 
is paradigmatic insofar as it is a singular case that, by means of being isolated from its 
context, exposes a certain functioning, i.e. the ‘canon’ it shares with the other phenomena 
to which it is paradigmatically related.444 The panopticon, a singular case, expresses the 
panopticism, i.e. ‘the diagram of a mechanism referred to its ideal form’. This is what 
Foucault implies, referring to panopticism as simultaneously a formal diagram as well as a 
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precise, historically-situated political technology developed in 18th century not only in 
prisons, but also in schools, factories and in the society in general.  
However, with the surfacing of a “generalised crisis in relation to all the environments of 
enclosure”, from the family to the school to the state, a further modification in power 
configuration occurs, along the path leading from the ancient regime to contemporary 
societies.445 A different logic of management begins to surface, whose function is that of 
addressing a novel problem: i.e. the need “of administering and controlling life in a 
particular multiplicity, provided the multiplicity is large (a population) and the space is 
spread out or open”.446 The name of this diagram is governmentality. It does not simply 
require authoritarian rule, since it is a power strategy more directly adapted to the context 
of liberal democracies, responding to the need to manage a ‘free’ and moving population, 
so as to mould it into a docile and productive force. It thus requires a deep knowledge of the 
population itself. Whilst in former times people were conceived as a uniform mass to be 
subdued, exploited and occasionally aroused through public displays of power, they now 
become a population to be analysed in details through systematic observation and data-
collection.447 Co-constitutive to this evolution is the surfacing of a new series of savoirs, i.e. 
social sciences, that provide an image of society as a homogeneous body, whose patterns of 
behaviour are to be discerned by collecting and correlating data (hence the rising of 
disciplines such as demography, statistics, etc). Governmentality sanctions the beginning of 
the shift from transcendent models of governance based on a dichotomical, top-down 
subjection, to immanent ones, aimed to the self-regulation of the whole, i.e. 
to establish an equilibrium, maintain an average, establish a sort of homeostasis, and 
compensate for variations within this general population and its aleatory field ... Unlike 
discipline, which is addressed to bodies, the new nondisciplinary powers applied not to 
man-as-body but to the living man, to man-as-living-being; ultimately, if you like, to 
man-as-species448 
What begins to surface is a concern with the factical existence of beings, as the materiality 
of being-together is no longer abstracted into stable categories but dealt with directly, in 
the open. This means that the chaotic disorder of the social is no longer spectacularly 
denied, nor simply confined into enclosures, but rather fully accepted and directly targeted 
                                                          
445
Gilles Deleuze, 'Postscript on the Societies of Control' October 59 (1992) 3-7: pp. 3-4 
446
Deleuze, Foucault, op. cit. pp. 60-1. 
447
See Michel Foucault, ‘The Birth of Biopolitics’, in: Michel Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, ed. by Paul 
Rabinow (The New Press, 1997) pp. 73-79. See also Foucault, The History of Sexuality op. cit. 
448
“…In a word, security mechanisms have to be installed around the random element inherent in a population 
of living beings so as to optimize a state of life “Michel Foucault, “Society must be defended”: Lectures at the 
Collège de France, 1975-76 (Penguin Books, 2003) p. 242 
119 
 
as such: if “discipline wants to produce order, security wants to regulate disorder”.449 
Incidentally, beneath this ‘acceptance’ lies the convenient (preliminary) framing of this 




Moving from these considerations, this chapter sets out to account for the surfacing of what 
I term the ‘spatiolegal architecture of control’, which sanctions the folding of the sovereign 
state of exception into the immanent and fully bio-political configuration it takes in the neo-
capitalist societies of late (or post) modernity.450 When doing so, I stress it is important to 
account simultaneously for the continuity which this ‘unauthorised’ emergence maintains 
with the former model, as well as with the radical discontinuity it inserts.451 At the same 
time, this architecture (i.e. arch-techné) must be addressed in both its abstraction (and thus 
the way it reformulates the bionomical exception above-mentioned), as well as in the 
concrete materialities it produces. These levels, as I will qualify, cannot be kept separated. 
This endeavour joins the ontology presented in the first chapter and the spatiolegal 
framework sketched in the second, especially in what will be shown as being their ideal and 
indeed actual point of convergence, i.e. the urban. It is there, both as a reformulation of the 
‘image of the city’, as well as through its concatenated tunings, that the spatiolegal 
architecture of control can be investigated most directly, and that also lies, I contend, the 
potential for resisting, reworking, dismantling it. By focusing on the urban materiality and its 
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raised by this production” [Foucault. The birth of biopolitics, op. cit. p. 65]. Biopolitics emerges with liberal 
governments, in which control will be no longer based on disciplinary containment – although certain settings 
will retain such characteristics – but rather on apparatuses of security, which are founded on regulation, rather 
than simple prohibition and prescription [See Foucault, Security, territory, population: Lectures at the Collège 
de France, 1977-1978 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) pp. 46-7]. The corollary, as we are to see, is that liberalism is 
necessarily characterized by ubiquitous data-gathering practices, i.e. extensive surveillance, in all its different 
declensions, aimed at guaranteeing the security of freedom, or freedom in security.  
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The reason for using the term ‘architecture’ is twofold. First, its etymology can be employed to refer to the 
fundamental compromise of the paradigm of operation (the logic of techné). Spatiolegal architecture can be 
thus reformulated as ‘spatiolegal arch-techné’, i.e. the quintessential (arch) expression of the logic of techné in 
the spatiolegal dimension. Second, the concept of architecture conveys simultaneously the contingent 
spatiality of its ‘products’, as well as the theoretical and projectual scaffolding which oversees them. It is thus a 
useful definition to convey the simultaneously material and yet abstracting mechanism whereby space is 
configured in politico-legal sense.  
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In the sense of Stramignoni: “unauthorized for being both largely at odds with the established authority—
sine auctoritate—and not closely linked to any specific agent—sine auctore)” [‘Francesco’s Devilish Venus’, op. 
cit. p. 218]. 
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tuning, moreover, it is possible to observe how the spectacular and the managerial side of 
power converge in configurations in which marketing and security logics are no longer 
distinguishable: atmo-rhythms of consumption and immunity in which contemporary urban 
life is increasingly shaped. Let me stress that the ‘dynamic’ state of exception of law cannot 
be separated from the neo-capitalist apparatus. The juridical and the economic overlap in 
the spatiolegal architecture of control, both in the abstract urban form it implies as well as 
in the concrete materialities it gives shape to. 
I am aware of the ambitious challenge that this chapter takes up, and that its attempt to 
hold together the dimensions of capital, law and security risks slipping into excessive 
simplifications. This accusation would be most likely to stem from those who work confined 
within each one of these fields. Yet, what I deem important is that this effort would be able 
to provide an adequate account of the materiality of urban control, and this cannot occur 
without a properly trans-disciplinary ambition. In this sense, I do not intend to perform a 
simplification, but rather an explicitation of the abstract and concrete spatialities in which 
these dimensions appear to converge. I take up this challenge through three main concepts, 
dividing the chapter into as many parts: life, spectacle and brandscaping.  
For the first two I take inspiration from Foucault’s theorisations of biopolitics and seek to 
develop them towards some the potential avenues he was unable or unwilling to fully 
pursue. First, the question of the ‘bio’ of biopolitics. In Thacker’s useful reflection, 
Contemporary theories of biopolitics often emphasize medicine and public health, 
political economy and governmentality, or the philosophical and rhetorical dimensions. 
But if biopolitics is, in Foucault’s terms, that point at which “power takes hold of life,” 
the moment in which “biological existence was reflected in political existence,” then it 
follows that any theory of biopolitics will also have to interrogate the morphologies of 
the concept of “life” just as much as the mutations in power452 
What is biopolitics with respect to the demonically vitalist ontology I proposed in the first 
chapter? The notion of control, as developed by Deleuze, will offer a way to push biopolitics 
beyond Foucault and to make it consistent with the bio-power of contemporary ‘control 
societies’.  
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Second, the question of the fate undergone by the spectacular and glorious aura of 
sovereignty in post-sovereign societies of control. Foucault too hastily dismisses the 
spectacle by confining it to the pre-disciplinary era of the ancient regime. Similarly, I detect 
a tendency in many characterisations of neo-capitalist societies, to describe novel 
configurations of (bio)power in purely immanent and non-representational terms. Yet, I 
believe it is simplistic to assume a shift from spectacle to biopower, representation to 
‘production’, ‘glory’ to management. More precisely, the two poles of sovereignty can be 
said to fold onto each other into an abstract-and-concrete spatiolegal architecture whose 
bipolar character does not disappear, but rather takes a new shape, which is what we need 
to address. The sovereign glory (with the ‘universal consciousness of law’ and the infinitely 
guilty sense of duty it entails) is not simply substituted by immanent forms of governance, as 
if it were a simple veil which has now been removed for good. It instead takes a different 
form, which I believe is worth exploring, even more importantly if we are to gesture towards 
alternative models of biopolitics. To explain this point, I will ‘weaponise’ Marx’s notion of 
‘real abstraction’, in order to address the concretely abstract quality of the spatiolegal 
architecture of control.453 
Third, I introduce the concept of brandscaping, as an attempt to apply the concept of 
spatiolegal architecture of control (or more simply, as I will often refer to it: control)454 in 
more explicitly material terms to the urban and its tuning, Although in certain context they 
are used as exchangeable terms, brandscaping is meant to provide control with a more 
explicitly spatial as well as phenomenological dimension, what often lacks from certain 
account of 'control society' depicting control as a configuration that simply dissolves the 
thickness of space into deterritorialised flows.455 Brandscaping is a way to investigate how 
control rhizomatically ramifies in such a spatial thickness, both as a certain ‘form of urban 
experience’ as well as in its concrete realisation into urban assemblages of consumption and 
immunity. At a more pragmatic level, if control, as we are to see, can be assumed as an 
impersonal and unauthorised emergence of an immanent configuration of power, 
brandscaping is a tool flexible enough to allow for exploring its unfolding through more 
explicit and context-specific attempts to ‘steer’ and 'retune' the urban by generating 
commodified experiences of safety and safe experiences of consumption in the city, in the 
sense suggested by Ball and Wood, according to whom “brandscaping can be viewed as a 
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‘Weaponise’, that is, and perhaps perverting it, as a ‘tool’ to build my argument and not as an artefact to be 
contemplated in the museum of Marxist Orthodoxy. 
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The notion of 'spatiolegal architecture of control', I believe, integrates Deleuze's concept of control by 
providing it with a proper 'spatiolegal' dimension and allowing to frame it within the evolution of the state of 
exception described in the second chapter. Therefore, unless contextualised otherwise, my use of the term 
'control' is to be assumed as abbreviation for 'spatiolegal architecture of control'.  
455
This is the case for instance of Maurizio Lazzarato's otherwise compelling work.  
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more or less successful institutional attempt to inscribe spaces and their inhabitants in their 
own terms”.456 This implies, finally, that brandscaping can be also employed as a very useful 

























                                                          
456
Kristie Ball and David M. Wood, 'Brandscapes of Control', paper presented at The 3rd Surveillance & Society 
Conference, Sheffield, April 2008  
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Bio and Control 
 
1. 
We need to witness our own limits transgressed, and 




In his short and hugely influential Postscript on the Societies of Control, Deleuze hints to the 
evolution of a further diagram integrating as well as moving beyond the model of 
governmentality. Deleuze’s main frustration with the Foucauldian approach, often concealed 
beneath friendly admiration, concerned his prioritisation of systems of power, and the 
consequent understanding of the social as constituted by them. For Deleuze systems of 
power do not constitute, but rather emerge out of the social and its concatenations of 
bodies, which they then seek to capture and striate, “crush or plug”.458 There is a 'primacy' 
of life, for Deleuze, over systems of power.459 Deleuze's whole project, in a nutshell, is 
enshrined in Thoreau's beautiful injunction: "we need to witness our own limits 
transgressed, and some life pasturing freely where we never wonder”.460 That is, in 
Esposito's term, the attempt to unfold an impersonal life in a 'zone not yet occupied by 
diagrams of power'.461 Yet, were this to imply a quest for some sort of power-free, innocent 
and neutral (i.e. bare) life, then its ethico-political consequences would be seriously 
problematic. As already observed, the notion of an uncontaminated and undifferentiated 
bare life, ‘far from being a subtraction from bio-power, is the latter’s product and structural 
effect’, de facto ‘generated’ out of the bionomical caesura of exception just discussed.462 
Any enterprise aimed at reaching an uncontaminated life 'beyond diagrams', therefore, 
would risk to paradoxically confirm and reproduce, rather than challenge, the bionomical 
split itself. I believe, however, that the Deleuzian injunction can be understood differently.  
                                                          
457
Thoreau, H. D. The Variorum Walden (Twayne Publishers, 1962) p. 255 
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“it is rather the systems of power which, at the same time, find themselves produced by these assemblages, 
and crush or plug them”, Gilles Deleuze 'Desire and Pleasure', 1997 [translation of "Désir et Plaisir", in 
Magazine Littéraire 325, 1994, 59-65] available at http://www.artdes.monash.edu.au/globe/delfou.html#1 
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Deleuze in the same text articulates it as a "primacy of desire over power" (ibid)    
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This point is beautifully articulated by Branka Arsic, 'Thinking Leaving', in Ian Buchanan and Gregg Lambert. 
Deleuze and Space (University of Toronto Press, 2005) 
461
Esposito, Terza Persona, op. cit. p. 171 (my translation) 
462
See Rametta, BIOPOLITICA E COSCIENZA, op. cit (my translation). There is no ‘bare life’ targeted by 
biopolitical control. First of all, ‘bare life’ is produced by the latter. I therefore find problematic Thrift’s 
definition of ‘bare life’ as the ‘half-second delay’ between an event and our consciousness of it. See Thrift, N. 
"Intensities of feeling: towards a spatial politics of affect", Geografiska Annaler 86 (1) 2004 
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Above, I tried to distinguish my position from naïve vitalism and its understanding of life as 
an “inherently positive, primal propulsive force that opposes domination and control”.463 
Instead, the demonic vitalism I proposed dismisses any separation between an 
undifferentiated ‘bare life’ and an already-determined ‘individual life’, and rather 
emphasises the ‘point of tangency between life and the living’, that is, the ‘impersonal yet 
singular [inorganic] life’ which is enshrined within each body.464 In this sense, the 'zone not 
yet occupied by diagrams of power' should not be understood as some sort of plasmatic 
origin to be reached through an ascetic purification from power relations. It should be 
instead understood as the (inoperose) potentiality, that every being harbours, to swerve 
from the grasp of systems of power themselves, and thus from being 'reduced' and 
'exhausted' into the relationality of ‘organisms’, ‘subjects’, ‘personae’, ‘organisations’: “if 
everything is alive, it is not because everything is organic or organised but, on the contrary, 
because the organism is a diversion of life”.465 This ‘zone’, in this sense, should be 
understood as the cosmic 'viewpoint of the event' to which I hinted above.466 This does not 
signal the possibility to actually achieve a mode of life free from power, as the life beyond 
politics that Marx envisages in his Manifesto. Instead, it is the claim that in every action, 
every ‘entering into relation’, is an impotentiality, an ‘inoperosity internal to the operation 
itself' where lies the potential for developing an ethico-political model alternative to the 
exceptional paradigm of operation.467 If systems of power 'crush and plug' life, then the 
question is not that of 'liberating' some sort of neutral life in a world beyond power 
relations, but rather that of ‘deactivating’ and 'unplugging' these systems, and thus 
reorienting their residual power to build alternative configurations.468 This is the task that 
the final chapter takes up. 
At this moment, I employ this still incomplete reflection to indicate the biopolitical novelty 
that control expresses. I am certainly sympathetic with a positive understanding of life as 
variation, movement and metamorphosis. Yet, to uncritically derive over-enthusiastic ethico-
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Hall, Birchall & Woodbridge, ‘POSTSCRIPT’, in Culture Machine, 11 (2010) p. 42; an understanding whose 
contradictions we are to further dwell in soon. 
464
The first quote is from Esposito, Immunitas, op. cit. p. 171; the second from Gilles Deleuze, Pure Immanence: 
Essays on A Life (Zone, 2001) p. 28; let me qualify one more time that I am not necessarily implying a full 
correspondence between such demonic vitalism and Deleuze's. Again, as he taught me, I understand his 
theory as a tool-box, and as such I employ it to build my argument. Of course, this should not lead to blatant 
contradictions. Yet, it should neither imply a strenuous attempt at maintaining a theoretical fidelity.   
465
Deleuze and Guattari, ATP, op. cit. p. 550;   
466
The notion of whiteout, that I employ in the fifth chapter, can be exactly understood as the always 
contingent and situated opening of such a 'zone'. 
467
Agamben, Regno e Gloria, op. cit. pp. 268-76. What Sloterdijk terms the ‘impossibility, inserted in the middle 
of life, to have a project’ Ecumes, op. cit. p. 646 (my translation) 
468
On the notion of 'unplugging' structures of exclusion and reorienting their residual power see also Weizman, 
'Political Plastic' op. cit. 
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political models from such premises is, I believe, highly problematic. Any ‘affirmative 
biopolitics’ must necessarily take into account that every reformulation of the question of 
life generates new problematic fields out of which novel re-configurations of power emerge 
accordingly. As we are to see more in depth in last part of this chapter, novel understandings 
and explicitations of the spatiality and materiality of life are always paralleled by novel 
models of control. Foucault’s notion of governmental biopolitics, as just discussed, emerges 
as a response to the problematic milieu produced by a novel understanding of the 
population as a multiplicity which could not “be broken down” and should instead “be 
treated as a single living being (hence, biopolitics)”.469 Likewise, the notion of control, I 
argue, signals a further qualitative shift, whose post-human, atmo-rhythmical and 'planetary' 
dimension governmentality is not able to fully address.  
As I am to show, control has not to do with producing a separation between a ‘bare life’ and 
an 'individual life’, but rather introduces a different abstraction, i.e. the 'flattening' of life 
into a seamless relationalism. Not a 'homogeneous medium' on which drawing a spatiolegal 
partitioning. Not even (or, not only) a multiplicity to be managed. More precisely, control 
directly assumes the task of ontologically producing the reality of its abstraction, via the 
attempt to defuse in every being the inoperose capacity to swerve: not the 'management' of 
life, that is, but the neutralisation of its demonic potential: praeventio. It is in this dimension, 
at the threshold of the (de)activation of techné, where the eventful potential of (urban) life 
lies, that the question of the ‘bio’ of biopolitical control is to be explored. 
 
2. 
In its extreme form, the capitalist religion realizes the 
pure form of separation, to the point that there is 
nothing left to separate
470 
 
William Burroughs defined control as the repressing power of language, and more precisely 
of the ‘word’, understood as a virus which systematically “prevents expansion of 
consciousness” by “controlling thought feeling and apparent sensory impressions of the 
human host”.471 To Burroughs the word ‘entraps’ thought within the ‘dimensions’ of 
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As Brighenti observes, governmentality implies that “for the purposes of governing, the population is 
configured as such a multiplicity: it cannot be broken down and must be treated as a single living being (hence, 
biopolitics)”. Brighenti, On Territorology, op. cit. p. 10. 
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Giorgio Agamben, Profanations (Zone Books, 2007) p. 81 
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(My emphasis). The full quote: “I feel that the change the mutation in consciousness will occur 
spontaneously once certain pressures now in operation are removed. I feel that the principal instrument of 
monopoly and control that prevents expansion of consciousness is the word lines controlling thought feeling 
and apparent sensory impressions of the human host.”. William S. Burroughs Interview, 1961, conducted by 
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language (designation, manifestation and signification), in this way preventing the 
expression of sense, i.e. the event of sense, from occurring.472 Deleuze takes inspiration 
from the American writer, developing his understanding of control as viral and parasitic, not 
‘frontal’, transcendental or “located ‘outside’ of that for which it would ‘legislate’ (as an 
absent centre)”, but always ‘internal’ and immanent to it, as a “field of forces which pretend 
to control and dominate the world without collocating it within an immutable order”.473 
Control does not deal with ‘individuals’ or ‘subjects’ and their position with respect to a 
mass, but with “dividuals, and masses, samples, data, markets”.474 Neither the exercise of 
power over a body, nor social subjection or individuation: control refers to an immanent 
and emergent configuration of power ‘acting’ on the “pre-individual, pre-verbal, pre-social 
dimension”, i.e. the “machinic components rather than the human component”, constantly 
rearranging and enslaving them into legal, securitarian and economical assemblages.475 
Evidently, this is not a configuration that seeks to block, but encourages circulation, 
metamorphosis, translatability, movement and variation. The problem to which it responds  
is no longer that of fixing and demarcating the territory, but of allowing circulations to 
take place, of controlling them, shifting the good and the bad, ensuring that things are 
always in movement, constantly moving around, continually going from one point to 
another, but in such a way that the inherent dangers of this circulation are cancelled 
out476 
Keeping the movement alive, and yet in a paradoxically frozen form, an ‘immobile 
movement’, since depurated of its ‘inherent dangers’, i.e. the events.477 Movement and 
prevention, these are its twin strategies, keeping the social field into a flow without 
becoming, through the systematic neutralisation of any eventful excess from the 
relationality of space. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    




see Nathan Moore, “Nova Law: William S. Burroughs and the Logic of Control.” Law and Literature 19 (3)  
2007, 435-470.  
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Ibid. p. 460 
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Deleuze, ‘Postscript’, op. cit. pp. 5-6 
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Deleuze and Guattari, ATP, op. cit. p. 543, In Lazzarato’s terms, “Machinic enslavement consists in mobilizing 
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Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, op. cit. p. 65. 
477
Meillassoux puts it clearly: “for there to be becoming, something must happen”, otherwise we would be 
“faced with an immobility made of movements”, in ‘Subtraction and Contraction, op. cit. p. 88 
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Thus, to qualify, with the notion of control a new diagram of power is introduced, beyond 
the problem of disciplining bodies in enclosures (panopticism), as well as complementing 
and to some extent pushing forwards the concern with the management of the life of a 
population (governmentality). Above I observed that Deleuze’s philosophy implies an ethico-
political praxis “premised on experimenting with the virtualities ‘of this actual’”, that is, 
seeking to unleash the contingent potentialities of a situation by freeing it from its reduction 
into an actual state of affairs.478 In this sense, control appears as precisely a counter-point to 
this stance, insofar as it does not simply imply the ‘regulation’ (the management of an actual 
multiplicity), but more precisely the ‘modulation’ of life in its inoperose, virtual potential.479 
If on the one hand control refers to the management of flows, relations and circulations, 
most importantly it has to do with the preliminary or more precisely preventive defusion of 
the eventful potential of being-together. In Tiqqun’s terms, what it  
must circumscribe and put a stop does not exist at the level of the actual but at the level 
of the possible. The discretionary power here is called prevention … the enemy ... is 
within. The enemy is the event480 
Describing it vis-à-vis the field of language, from which it derives, Moore explains that 
control does not have to do with discipline and co-ordination, but is rather concerned  
to access and regulate their [the propositions] virtual dimension: the breakage wrought 
by sense itself. In other words, control seeks to control the very creation of propositions, 
striking pre-emptively in the attempt to determine what it will be possible to think and 
say481 
Accordingly, control entails the modulation of the virtual in order to produce ‘fully actual’ 
relations, seeking to neutralise any actualisation, i.e. any taking place, from its excessive and 
eventful swerving.482 What this amounts to is nothing other than the systematic reduction of 
beings to actual relations (relationalism). In fact, the diagram of control is not simply 
‘presupposed’ but ontologically ‘posited’ in a given historical configuration, namely 
contemporary neo-capitalist society: control is both the abstraction which presupposes and 
posits the non-evental closure of relationalism, as well as the concrete form of its 
modulations, i.e. its tunings.  This is its ‘truly biopolitical’ quality, in the sense of targeting the 
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inoperose potency of life, debilitating and atrophying each body’s capacity to swerve, and 
thus to resist, escape and disrupt a given state of affairs: an art of defusing contingency. 
Thus, whereas Deleuze, following Spinoza, maintains that what oppressive forces do is 
separating us from our power to act, the sense of control is more precisely captured by 
Agamben’s observation that today’s ‘democratic powers’ separate us from what we can ‘not 
do’, i.e. from our impotentiality.483 
To be clear, this understanding does not imply the existence of any grey eminence or hidden 
groups of conspirators running the show. Control is an unauthorised and impersonal 
emergence of an immanent configuration of power that is tied to the historically-specific 
convergence of different theoretical, scientific, technological, socio-cultural evolutions. 
Every diagram, Deleuze observes, is both abstract (a ‘pure function’ or ‘logic of ordering’) as 
well as immanent to a series of given techniques, technologies and savoirs through which it 
gains ontological reality. This does not entail necessarily an historical contemporaneity. It is 
instead the degree of consistency that these different elements achieve with respect to a 
diagram of power to sanction its immanent surfacing. For instance, whereas prison were 
obviously in place well before the surfacing of the ‘disciplinary society’, it will be only within 
the latter that they would become a central technology, that is, that the panopticon would 
mutate into panopticism: “if the techniques – in the narrow sense of the word – are caught 
within the assemblage [agencement], this is because the assemblages [agencements] 
themselves, with their techniques, are selected by the diagrams”.484 As Deleuze makes clear, 
“machines don't explain anything, you have to analyse the collective arrangements of which 
the machines are just one component.”485 Through the immanent coming-together of 
different components, selected, invented and machined into the given diagram [or abstract 
machine] of a certain epoch, certain techniques or technologies become central, “cross[ing] 
the [socio]technical threshold”.486 Therefore, there is no technological determinism, but 
rather the emergence of a machinic consistency between different components – of which 
actual technologies are only a part – in a given socio-historical context. Of course, the 
relevance of specific technological shifts cannot be denied either. For instance, Moore 
observes that control is  
differentiated [from governmentality]… by distinctive technological apparatuses: control 
can only develop once an "electronic revolution" has occurred, enabling it to not only 
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pursue its aims more extensively and vigorously, but which also (and most importantly) 
transforms those aims through a logic developed in and through the technology itself487 
More precisely, it could be suggested that cybernetics is both the technology and the actual 
logic of control: it makes explicit its principles (self-regulation, feedback and continuous 
movement), and “entails a transformation from static to dynamic, from linear to circular 
models,” that is a folding of the spatiolegal state of exception into an immanent and 
dynamic form, both presupposing and ontologically producing the totalising, relational 
‘closure’ of the world permitting the iterative and self-referential manipulation that 
characterises the reality of control in contemporary society.488 
To repeat: whilst the ‘static’ mechanism of exception is based on the bionomical ex-
traction/abstraction of individuals from the spatiality of being–together, a different nuance 
is implied by the abstraction that the dynamic logic of control introduces: as anticipated 
above, no longer the static separation of a bare life from a life worth living, but rather the 
reduction of the whole life to a bare life, the whole space to a bare space. Separation 
sublimates into the flatness of a seamless and uneventful relationalism. Abstract flattening 
and concrete manipulation are not distinguishable: ‘bare life is free only insofar as it is 
manipulated, and it is manipulated only if it is let “naturally” be’.489 Here then appears the 
                                                          
487
Moore, ‘Nova Law’, op. cit. p. 10; a more general and significant role is played by the trans-disciplinary 
surfacing of a ‘spatial awareness’ about the materiality of being-together. This is discussed in the Brandscaping 
section.  
488
Ana Teixeira Pinto, ‘The Whole Earth: In Conversation with Diedrich Diederichsen and Anselm Franke’, E-Flux 
45, May 2013, available at http://www.e-flux.com/journal/the-whole-earth-in-conversation-with-diedrich-
diederichsen-and-anselm-franke/. The word ‘cybernetics’ derives from the Greek kybernetes, i.e. steersman, 
which in Latin is translated as gubernator: the verb to govern initially developed from the field of navigation, 
and cybernétique in French means exactly "the art of governing". As Guattari explained, ‘enslavement’ is used 
by him and Deleuze “in a sense akin to that used in cybernetics: in other words, remote control, feedback and 
opening up to new lines of possibles.” Quoted in Lazzarato ‘Machine’, op. cit. 
489
As evident in the capitalist obsession with the constant production of new fashions and life-styles as a way 
to constantly ‘dress’ bare life with ever-new styles, whose key property is that of being interchangeable, since 
grounded exactly on the presupposition of an undifferentiated bare life [See Tommaso Tuppini, 'Ontologia 
della comunità. Nancy & Agamben. Parte seconda: Agamben', Giornale di filosofia.net, January 2010: pp. 23-32  
[available at http://www.giornaledifilosofia.net/public/scheda.php?id=126]. The convergence between the 
abstraction (i.e. the neutralisation of the inoperose ‘potency to swerve’ which lies at core of the double-
structure of every body, i.e. at the indistinction of life and the living, and thus the flattening of the social into 
an uneventful relationalism) and the concrete unfolding into the affective tuning of the atmo-rhythmical being-
together, is indirectly captured by Thacker who, through Aristotle, observes that “a body – be it plant, animal, 
or human – undergoes or is capable of undergoing any number of affections. Thus, affection (pathos) is itself 
the relation between Life and the living.” Affection appears as what must be simultaneously de-potentiated 
and tuned, otherwise the risk is that of becoming pathological, i.e. “threatening to the coherence of the body 
politic” [Nekros, op. cit]; Incidentally, in a text accompanying the exhibition Making Things Public, Latour plays 
with Lippmann’s notion of the Phantom of the Public and, criticising the all-encompassing, humanist, organicist 
and globalised understanding of ‘body politic’, frozen around overarching tropes of the ‘body’ and the ‘state’, 
proposes an impalpable, relational and circulating notion of politics which “will pass through you as a rather 
mysterious flow, just like a phantom ... It’s to the flow of words and images that we have to confide the task of 
imitating the ghostly but spirited figure of politics.” Beneath this interesting elaboration of the pathos of 
politics in antithesis to the cumbersome Leviathan of body politics lies the core problem of Latour’s project, 
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direct correspondence between the ‘liberated’ life of neo-liberal credo and its being always-
already re-captured into the uneventful movement of control. As Deleuze observes, “the 
man of control is undulatory, in orbit, in a continuous network”, meant to negotiate its way 
through multiple lifestyle choice, whose empowering flexibility – the apparent liberation of 
the post-modern flaneur – hides the constant injunction to ‘keep on moving’, never sit back, 
always strive for something, consistent with the accelerationist (see below) ethos of neo-
liberalism:  
in the disciplinary societies one was always starting again (from school to the barracks, 
from the barracks to the factory), while in the societies of control one is never finished 
with anything.490 
In ‘societies of control’ flexibility becomes ‘forced’, it turns into precariousness, in the 
constant exposition to values of meritocracy and competition, constant learning, fixed-term 
jobs, uncertainty and perpetual examination. A truly egalitarian perspective that is, since it 
actually realises the absolute ‘equality’ of life enshrined in the juridico-economical notion of 
persona: accordingly, every relation becomes an equally manipulatable resource to be 
consumed and capitalised.491 Everything is possible is the slogan of this era, akin to both 
new age spiritualism and corporation marketing, a formula which underscores at once the 
liberating call of capitalism, the empowering undertone of human rights and the 





Let us pause for a moment. Although Deleuze’s short text offers important and prescient 
insights the evolution of contemporary neo-capitalist societies, we should resist the 
temptation to apply it in a simplistic, unsophisticated and apocalyptic manner. Otherwise, 
the risk is that of providing an over-simplified, rigidifying, deterministic as well as over-
paranoid account of contemporary society, moreover succumbing to a ‘revelatory’ hubris 
that would be simply another declension of the paradigmatic ‘will to know’ that propels 
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control itself. These are in brief the most significant critiques to which the so-called ‘control 
society’ thesis is usually subjected.492 Although they are admittedly valuable in targeting 
some simplistic application of the Deleuzian notion of control, what these critiques normally 
miss is that such notion, whether taken in its properly radical interpretation, requires to 
overcoming the language of sovereignty, and thus cannot be framed within the coordinates 
of a repressive, intentional and centralised form of power.493 Otherwise, from the latter 
standpoint, the thesis of control would certainly appear as ridden with shortcomings.  
First, it would assume a simplistically linear evolution (the shift from one model of sovereign 
power to another, and the taking-for-granted dichotomies this entails: discipline vs. control, 
factory vs. corporation etc.). Second, it would provide with a paranoid and conspiratorial 
reading of contemporary forms of power. Conspiratorial, since such concept of ubiquitous 
control would be assumed as necessarily related, directly or indirectly, to some entity 
orchestrating it: the language of sovereignty, as Goodrich reminds, “helps to maintain the 
mystery of an ineffable and ungraspable center of power”.494 Paranoid, since this all-
encompassing characterisation would appear as rather inadequate to take into account the 
failures and opacities that characterise the reality of power: the language of sovereignty 
assumes power as necessarily implying transparency, certainty and infallibility. Third, the 
thesis would betray a structuralist rigidity (since understood as implying a re-structuration 
of the sovereign power, rather than the removal of its substantial principle) as well as a 
techno-deterministic bias. Fourth, as already observed, it would depend on an economy of 
truth and revelation, in the sense of assuming a sort of “hidden logic, a structure of control 
underpinning diverse collective arrangements that can be ‘exposed’, a riddle that can be 
deciphered, a thread that can be traced, or a conspiracy that can be unmasked beneath 
totalising environments of control”: if the basic mechanism of sovereignty is the ‘secret’, 
then the basic mechanism of the critique of sovereignty is the ‘revelation’.495 Let me qualify 
then: the complexity of contemporary society warns against simplistic and linear accounts. 
Apocalyptic scenarios of oppressive and ubiquitous control appear to reside more on the 
minds of who describes them, than on the tentative, opaque and fragmented reality in 
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which they live. Indeed, as Birchall et al. suggest, these theories often seem to tell us more 
about “the will to power and knowledge of their authors”, than of the actual functioning of 
society.496 Yet, if many simplistic applications of the ‘control society thesis’ present such 
faults and thus justify the critiques, the latter tend to misfire if applied to the notion of 
control that Deleuze hints at, and that I am elaborating in these pages.497 
Control, let us reassert it, has to do with a contingent emergence of an unauthorised and 
immanent configuration of impersonal power with no conspirators or all-encompassing 
intentionality behind. It is not an emanation from a substantial centre. It signals a 
simultaneously abstract and real, formal and historical shift, in Pottage’s terms, between 
“two attitudes to contingency, one which avoids or absorbs contingency (substance), and 
another which pre-supposes, and thrives on, contingency (emergence).”498 As I explain more 
in depth in the next section, there is no transparency, no infallibility, no secrecy, no 
structuralism, no determinism and no linear evolutionary logic in this concept. Failure, 
opacities, mistakes, uncertainty and unpredictability are fully assumed as self-justifying 
rationales. Instead of transcendent notions of repressions and subjection, ideology and 
domination, secret and revelation, control is grasped through such notions as coping, 
flexibility, adaptation, that do not refer to an imposed but an emergent configuration, not to 
‘subjects’, ‘individuals’, ‘bodies’, but rather to machinic compositions, circumstances, 
relations, atmo-rhythms and events. It is most importantly in this sense that control moves 
further with respect to that of governmentality, that is unable to fully grasp the ‘socio-
technical threshold’ whose crossing characterises the advent of control (not only vis-à-vis 
the 'digital revolution', but more generally the spatio-affective explicitation of the 
materiality of being-together that I explore below), and it is still too entangled with the 
notions of subject and human, state and population, to fully address its post-human, 
planetary and impersonal dimension, as well as ultimately unable to account for the that 
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characterises the emergence of control.499 Moreover, whilst crucial in raising the question of 
the managerial dimension of power, governmentality somewhat overlooks the spectacular 
dimension (which Foucault relocates in the ‘society of spectacle’ of pre-disciplinary era), as 
well as the abstractions through which control thrives (see below).  
However, to abandon the language of sovereignty does not mean to get rid of the concept 
of sovereignty as an obsolete veneer no longer of theoretical use. More significantly, it 
entails demanding: what form does the spectacular and glorious catafalque of sovereignty 
take, once it folds into the spatiolegal architecture of control? Answering to this question 
means to avoid assuming such configuration as the result of a simple shift from sovereignty 
to control, spectacle to biopower, representation to production, from ‘the sovereign 
language of law to the biopolitical language of norm’;500 but rather as the subtle folding 
together of the two terms into a circular, immanent configuration. Understanding control in 
both its spectacular and managerial character, I believe, allows to frame its functioning not 
in the sense of a hidden secret, but as an ‘open secret’, not an illusion to be unveiled or re-
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the true problem, the core arcanum of politics is not 
sovereignty, but government, not God, but the angel, 
not the King, but the ministers, not the law, but the 
police – that is, the governmental machine which they 




Let us recall the above-quoted passage by Foucault:  “what generalizes the power to punish 
… is not the universal consciousness of the law in each juridical subject; it is the regular 
extension, the infinitely minute web of panoptic technique”.502 Beneath the glorious 
abstraction of law lies the ‘apparatus of capture’ of legal operations: the ‘decisive act of 
power’, as Canetti put it, is ‘seizure’.503 The configuration of the spatiolegal state of 
exception rotates around two poles. On the one hand, there is law’s pretence ‘to possess 
the capacity to realise the harmony’ between law and justice, between violence and 
equality, between its always traumatic application to the world and its self-description as 
neutral, objective and necessary.504 A self-description, that is, which is a self-justification 
that must be publicly communicated in the form of a spectacular de-politicisation of every 
operation, so as to democratise and tame law’s own violent materiality. On the other hand, 
there is the ‘machinery of non-legal governance’, i.e. the bureaucratic, securitarian, 
economical ramifications into which law blurs and through which law ‘entangles’ its subjects 
beneath the façade of their acceptance as free-willed individuals.505 Kafka of course comes 
to mind: on one side, a law which only nominally functions as a transcendent power, 
immutable and inflexible, whose glorious aura keeps K. ‘entrapped’ in his doomed attempt 
to seek justice; on the other, the capillary bureaucratic, psychological, securitarian, 
panoptical operations which gradually and inescapably ‘capture’ him.506 In a similar fashion, 
the glorious spectacle of law threatens to divert the efforts of the legal thinker, either by 
proposing itself as a positive ideal to follow (i.e. fostering the belief in the intrinsic value of 
law itself as a solution or counter-balance for socio-economical contradictions, political 
violence etc.), or as a hypnotising illusion to be unmasked through the revelatory work of 
critique. The idealistic search for legal solutions ironically overlaps with the critical work of 
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legal deconstruction, both blinded by the glorious light of law, both losing sight of its ‘real 
operations’.507 Should we thus ignore the spectacular façade of law and concentrate on the 
capillary apparatus of management into which it proliferates, i.e. its 'angels, ministers and 
police'? The answer is affirmative, and yet requires a qualification. To focus on the material 
concatenations in which law unfolds does not entail to simply ignore (or unmask, denounce, 
deconstruct) the abstraction of law as an illusionary veil behind which more concrete reality 
would supposedly reside. The legal abstraction cannot be dealt with from a merely 
epistemological point of view: it must be addressed directly in its ontological reality. 
 
2. 
law weighs with all its might, even before its object is 





Kant offers perhaps the most effective configuration of law’s apparatus of capture through 
the mechanism of legal subjection. As hinted above, in Kant the concept of guilt and the 
sense of duty it entails are emancipated from any reference to an external power (God, the 
natural law, etc.) and instead internalised into a purely abstract form of law, that is, the 
immanent and self-generated ‘moral law inside me’. Accordingly, the sense of duty is self-
referentially conceived as a ‘necessity to act for the pure respect of the law’.509 Respect 
(achtung), that is, is the operator of such subjection. It is conceived as a ‘feeling’ that ‘the 
reason produces by itself’ and that every subject experiences before the law. 
Simultaneously objective (an obligation) and subjective (an impulse which affects me), the 
achtung does not imply a mere obedience to a norm, but rather a respect and reverence to 
the law qua law: respect is the reflexive self-consciousness of knowing oneself as ‘subject’, 
and thus one’s always-already being ‘captured’ within the bionomical apparatus of 
exception.510 It is, in other words, the form of law qua subjection. Accordingly, one complies 
with the law not for the mere fact of being obliged (as well as threatened) by an external 
entity, but more precisely for the inner sense of duty which derives from one’s self-
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recognition as being constituted as subject of law by the law itself.511 Agamben notes that 
according to this scheme the norm appears to be structurally constituted by the imperative 
form, i.e. the command: to materially ground the subjection to a norm is the simple fact 
that the norm is commanded, that is, that it must be complied with.512 To qualify: the sense 
of duty produced by the imperative materiality of the norm does not simply depend on the 
subjective, threats-and-opportunities evaluation of a subject vis-à-vis the consequences of 
complying or not complying with the law. Instead, it must be understood as a material and 
affective seizing which exceeds any characterisation of the norm according to normative, 
rational and cognitive schemes. An immanent understanding of the norm, that is, that 
expresses the material weight of law’s spectacular image, its being always-already “rooted 
in the direct and immediate action and reaction of bodies, long before any normative 
abstract scheme”.513 Brighenti offers a compelling way to grasp this material and affective 
quality of law, its simultaneously normative and imperative functioning, by means of looking 
at the menace which any norm supposedly implies. This menace, he observes, does not 
consist 
of a clear linkage between a specific behaviour of the menaced and a specific negative 
sanction ... [since] very often the negative sanction is widely indeterminate, and ...  
such indeterminacy actually serves the effectiveness of the menace. What really 
counts in menace, therefore, is not the specific link between behaviour and sanction, 
but primarily the redefinition of the situation of the menaced, what we might call the 
‘menace mood’514 
The menace mood is the materialised description of the Kantian sense of duty. Whilst in 
Kant this is posited as fundamentally ‘subjective’, internal, representational and self-
reflexive, I propose to force this interpretation so as to unfold its affective and machinic 
character, that is, the ‘non-contractual’ and ‘non-binary’ materiality of the legal norm, a 
‘pure tension without subject, without object and without interpretant’ that overflows the 
logic correspondence between action and sanction, and is felt on bodies with all its 
weighting force.515 Such a material ‘indeterminacy’, I stress, should be understood as the 
'ontological product' of the bionomical abstraction of law. In other words, this ontological 
noise (i.e. indeterminacy) is the reality of the abstract guilt (and thus, of the endless striving 
to 'repay' a debt that is constitutively infinite) that law implants in every being. The above-
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quoted statement of Deleuze can be thus re-read under a new light: “law ...  defines [i.e. 
ontologically produces] a realm of transgression where one is already guilty”.516 This is what 
is missed by the simple critique of legal abstraction per se: namely, the fact that the voiding 
of legal abstractions that the critique achieves via the removal of their reference to 
transcendent and sovereign scaffoldings, leaves untouched the ontological reality that such 
abstractions produce, as well as their immanent articulation into the contingent, 
historically-specific conditions and concatenations of a certain epoch.517 They may have 
been ‘unmasked’, yet they do not disappear, remaining firmly “inscribed in [and 
contributing to carve] the rhythms and the articulations of the real”, as Boundas puts it.518 
Seeing through these lenses we are able to appreciate more clearly the modification that 
the spatiolegal undergoes in contemporary control societies. 
With the surfacing of the latter, the contradictory gap between law’s necessity to 
spectacularly communicate itself as neutral and objective, and the reality of the apparatuses 
through which it applies to the world, is no longer presupposed as ‘contradictory’ (and thus 
denied) but rather assumed as the real content of law’s relation to the world, a gap which is 
to be operationally ‘coordinated and managed’.519 Accordingly, there is no shift from the 
                                                          
516
Deleuze, Cold and Cruel, op. cit. p. 83; 
517
See Cunningham, “Spacing Abstractions”, op. cit. p. 467  
518
Boundas, ‘Review of Laurent de Sutter’, op. cit. Likewise, logic abstractions cannot be eliminated by turning 
the attention towards the immanent, nomic normativity of life, since they contribute in producing it, they are 
real, as the material relations they produce. Therefore, contradictory is the presupposition of the nomic as 
necessarily liberating, desirable and emancipatory with respect to its ‘logic’ oppression. As explained above, 
the spatiolegal should be understood as the interplay of mutual confirmation and/or mutual dislocation 
between nomic and logic – without assigning any moral, political or ethical priority to one of them. Challenging 
a spatiolegal configuration entails challenging simultaneously its logic and nomic materiality, i.e. its abstract 
and concrete character, in order to produce alternative, abstract and concrete normativities. I will expand on 
this understanding, for which I take inspiration from Cunningham [see 'Spacing Abstractions’, op. cit. pp. 464-
8; and ‘Metropolis’, op. cit. p. 23] in this and in the fifth chapter.   
519
The mismatch between the two poles (the spectacular and the managerial) of control is overcome “in their 
mutual exposure and in the redrawing of their constant (if constantly suppressed or marginalised) co-
ordination”, Schütz ‘Imperatives Without Imperator’ op. cit. p. 242. Cunningham observes that “Law ... is — as 
a specific form of abstraction — necessarily a form of misrecognition at some level, and as such practically 
functions quite differently from the ‘concretely abstract’ form of capital, viewed as an actually universal global 
form of social mediation today. And it presumably cannot do otherwise, cannot, to put it another way, bridge 
the gap, in its own capacity, between ‘the [abstract] “right” and the “duty” of its enforcement”, ‘Spacing 
Abstractions’, op. cit. p. 465. Likewise, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos maintains that the “lawscape is law and 
city brought together in a circular continuum, and kept separate in a distance of différance that feeds into the 
paradox”, ‘Fear in the Lawscape’, op. cit. p. 83. This circularity implies a gap, the void of the circle’s interior, 
which sanctions the unavoidable proliferation of blind spots that continuously frustrate law’s ‘panoptical’ 
attempt at producing a perfectly visible ‘city saturated with control’, Andreas Philippopulos-Mihalopoulos,  and 
Sharron FitzGerald. “From Space Immaterial - The Invisibility of the Lawscape.” Griffith Law Review 17, 2008: p. 
442. Yet the post-sovereign configuration of control is not frustrated, but rather propelled by the 
acknowledgement of the inevitability of the continuous production of blind spots. In fact, control refers to a 
system in which the gap is no longer sought to be bridged, but is rather articulated. As Moore puts it, “this gap 
is the zone where law, in all of its technical and historical modes, unfolds ... it is not the case that this gap does 
not exist under regimes of sovereignty, but that there it exists only negatively, or even unconsciously", with 
138 
 
‘spectacular’ to the ‘managerial’, but rather a folding of both poles into an impersonal and 
glorious techné. Yet, there is a further aspect. Above, I observed that the spatiolegal 
architecture of control sanctions the assumption of the chaotic, noisy and turbulent status 
of reality that the sovereign apparatus earlier denied. In the light of what has just been 
written, it can be argued that control does not simply imply the direct attempt at managing 
such a chaotic outside (an outside which, I observed above, can be understood as the very 
presupposition that grounds its operation) – it sanctions, more profoundly, the very 
assumption of the need to ontologically produce such a reality. In other words, control can 
be defined as the internalisation and constant re-production of the crisis of sovereignty onto 
the social, fully assuming the task of constantly reproducing the indeterminacy just-
described, as the reality of the crisis on which it thrives – a constant reproduction which is 
“necessary in order to circumvent interpretation and deconstruction and to assert the 
imperative of ‘coping’ and attention”, adaptation, vigilance, flexibility, that characterise its 
smooth movement.520 Here lies the ontological shift sanctioned by the spatiolegal 
architecture of control: both the spectacular production of ‘crisis’ and the simultaneous 
deployment of the operations through which is to be managed.  
Evidently, critique risks remaining entrapped within this circularity, hypnotised by the 
abstractions of law and caught within the glory of techné. A strategic shift is required, one 
that would allow to address the ontological reality produced by this spectacular abstraction, 
as well as the eminently anti-evental character of this configuration. For this purpose Marx's 
notion of real abstraction is particularly helpful. 
 
3. 
what creates an inauthentic totality is, technically 




The notion of real abstraction challenges the simplistic assumption of abstraction as merely 
intellectualist and epistemological, “generic, humanist, or anthropological”, and rather 
orients towards an understanding of “abstraction not as a mere mask, fantasy, or diversion, 
but as a force operative in the world”.522 Accordingly, real abstraction refers to an abstract 
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form, devoid of quality and determinations, and simultaneously to the concrete and 
historically-situated spatial relations it produces.523 It is in this sense then that the 
abstraction of control can be understood as not simply presupposing but ontologically 
positing the reality of relationalism, both in its immanent totality (as a closed horizon) and 
as a probabilisable chaos or, with a more common language, a permanent crisis inserted 
within what before was posed as the stable ordering principle of administration. There is no 
secret behind, the secret being a paradoxically open one, “not the content hidden by the 
form ... but, on the contrary, the ‘secret’ of this form itself’”, its 'reality'.524 Consequently, 
control should be addressed as regards the ‘abstract form’ of spatial relations it produces, as 
well as simultaneously vis-à-vis the specific socio-technical and historico-material 
configuration in which this ‘reduction’ is actually realised (most importantly the 
contemporary city, see below) and, finally, with respect to the capillary biopolitical 
modulation of these relations in conditions of uncertainty, through the various strategies, 
techniques, practices, technologies and expertise – converging on the twin requirements of 
consumption and immunity – that characterise it.  
In fact, the abstraction of control gains full material reality only in the historically-situated 
‘control societies’, since it reaches a certain degree of consistency by overcoming crucial 
'socio-technical thresholds': most notably, the process of gradual explicitation of the 
materiality of being-together that has surfaced during the last century, as Sloterdijk has 
shown, and whose profound ontological consequences we are to explore in the next part of 
this chapter. Prior to do so, a brief example will be useful to preliminary underline some of 
the strategic consequences that the notion of real abstraction entails, both grounding the 
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Goodrich notes that law produces legal subjects “within the spectral spaces of governance” 
by making “being appear, and the body become visible in the symbolic sense of taking place 
in the spectacle of the civic, as public or relational being”.525 Not a simple 'extraction', this 
implies the ontological production of “the spectacular space of the social” in which “persons 
[are] catapulted”.526 Taken in its material sense, Guy Debord’s notion of Society of Spectacle 
expresses nothing but this conception, that is, a society in which the mediation of the real 
abstraction of the juridico-economical persona gains full ontological reality.527 It follows that 
a critique of the abstraction of persona cannot be limited to epistemological, hermeneutic 
and interpretative attempts at deconstructing it. Instead, it requires an ontological 
engagement with the reality this abstraction produces, and consequently with the 
‘machinery of administration’ (i.e. rituals, practises, techniques, technologies etc.) that 
keeps it in place.528 Beyond a negative-only acceptation, therefore, it is the positive quality 
of abstraction that is to be dealt with, “the theatrical installation of the person” out of which 
it emerges and that contributes to ontologically produce.529 Important strategic 
consequences follow. To challenge the spatiolegal abstractions of control from the 
supposedly ‘more concrete’ standpoint of reality is a contradictory enterprise. 
Understanding their positive, i.e. ontologically generative role allows to grasp the strategic 
value abstraction can play vis-à-vis the production of "'concrete' forms of spatial 
relationality generative of social meaning".530 As Toscano observes, abstractions are thus 
assumed as “social facts and objects of practical struggle”.531 Significant in this sense is the 
critique Goodrich moves to Esposito and his attempt to get rid of the mask (of the juridico-
legal notion of persona) so as to exhume a sort of ‘sanctity of the impersonal’ lying beneath: 
“not so much impersonality that needs to be sought but rather and more aggressively it is 
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the process of emblematization, the inhabitation of the roles, the apparatuses. Regimes and 
machines that institute and induct that deserve to be revolved”.532 If I understand it 
correctly, Goodrich is suggesting to deal with the reality that the juridico-economical 
abstraction of persona produces, and thus with the machinery and apparatuses which 
establish and keep it in place, rather than either remaining hypnotised by its glory or 
embarking on a quest for some more genuine, authentic or impersonal substratum 
supposedly lying beneath.  
I will come back to this question later on. In the next section instead I explore more in depth 
the urban dimension of this ‘inhabitation of roles’, and thus the ontological materiality of 
the 'machinery of governance' which sustains it, by looking at the significant consequences 
that the above-mentioned 'spatial explicitation' implies in this sense. I thus introduce the 
notion of brandscaping, as a way to focus more in depth on the exceptional tunings in which 
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The Europeans are becoming more similar to each 
other; they become more and more detached from the 
conditions under which races originate that are tied to 
some climate or class; they become increasingly 
independent of any determinate milieu ...an essentially 
supra-national and nomadic type of man
534
 





According to Gabriel Tarde, the perfect and absolute’ form of sociality would be “such an 
intense concentration of urban life that as soon as a good idea arose in one mind it would 
be instantaneously transmitted to all minds throughout the city”.536 This more than one-
century old image captures the archetypical anti-spatial dream of the city and its 
deterritorialising hubris, in its compromise with the cyber-ideal of perfect, immediate and 
unmediated communication, converging into the perfect ou-topos, i.e. an angelopolis 
“perpetually floating in a post-conflict space” of unimpeded circulation and multicultural co-
existence, so placeless to render redundant any nostalgic musing on non-places:  ‘city is 
everywhere, ergo city is nowhere’.537 This ‘homogeneous-totalitarian space, the civitas 
maxima of the Equals’, is the (no)where in which the self-perpetuating myth of the city 
merges with the self-perpetuating myth of the law, finally pacifying the contradictory and 
conflictual tension at the core of the lawscape:  no longer two arrows projected on opposite 
ends but, as observed above, a smooth embrace in which both ends meet, a universal 
(international) law, a universal (global) city.538  
If it is the modern State that gives capitalism its models of realization, what is thus 
realized is an independent, worldwide axiomatic that is like a single City, megalopolis, or 
‘megamachine’ of which the states are parts, or neighborhoods539 
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Incidentally, the original locus of this ‘bad utopia’ is not the Greek polis but the Roman 
civitas. Differently from the ethnically-enclosed polis, the civitas emerges out of the ‘coming 
together of extremely different (ethnically, religiously etc.) people whose common accord is 
granted exclusively through law’.540 If the polis, as Plato and Aristotle told us, has the 
problem to ‘maintain its spatially-controllable character’, Rome is by definition the civitas 
augescens (city that grows), constitutively expanding, mobile, delirious, an infinite empire 
(imperio sine fine) open to ingesting more and more citizens and territories in its movement 
without end towards the spatiolegal Romanisation of the world. Rome, as Virgilio wrote, 
“must give laws to all the world”.541 
The constitutively urban form of the spatiolegal architecture of control finds here its 
archetypal presupposition, although only “a ‘necessary’ but not a ‘sufficient’ condition of 
later forms”, that would gain a full ontological reality only in the historical condition of post-
modernity, overcoming a certain socio-technical (as well as philosophical, geographical, 
politico-legal) threshold: that is, after the emergence of the economic-industrial machine of 
the metropolis, and then through its own self-overcoming into a deterritorialised 
‘megalopolis’, emancipated from space and ideally connected to a smooth global space of 
networks and flows.542 Metropolis is the abstract-and-concrete locus of the convergence 
between the economic and the juridical, law and the capital, the urban diagram of control, 
that is, in the form of the city of Equals, (equal individuals, equal spaces, equal rights, and as 
such interchangeable) which gives form to the paradigmatic placeless-ness of techné.543  
Of course, this is not all, and indeed it can never become All. Understanding control as a real 
abstraction prevents us from drawing apocalyptic scenarios as well as yearning for post-
apocalyptic nostalgias. Not only indicates that the deterritorialisations of the megalopolis 
are always re-rooted by the inescapable fact of its taking place. It also means that the 
diagram of control always emerges from, as well as contributing to produce, the rhythms 
and the atmospheres of the urban, retuning this materiality into the immanent 
configurations through which its abstraction (e.g. the smooth space of flows and mobility, 
the frictionless circulation neutralised of events) "attains ‘real existence’ by virtue of the 
spatial production of its open and dispersed totality of specific material assemblages ... 
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which are in themselves highly differentiated, if always related to its general form”.544  It is 
in these tunings and retunings, and in the attempt to exploit and neutralise their 
eventfulness, that the biopolitical game is played. Therefore, it is by looking at their 
increasing explicitation that the materiality of the exceptional tuning of control in both its 
phenomenological and ecological quality, as well as with respect to its converging 
(economical, securitarian and legal) operations, can be fully appreciated. 
 
2. 
we are, we move and we thus live in the work of man! 
We are grasped and controlled (maîtrisés) within the 
proportions he has chosen. We cannot escape ... being 
inside the work of man as fishes are in the sea, being 




In his erudite genealogy of the ‘spatial revolution’ begun from the end of XIX° century 
onwards, Sloterdijk explores the explicitation of the affective materiality of being-together 
in our society, i.e. of the common spaces on which life depends. What has become gradually 
explicit, he explains, is our essence as space-creating being, always ‘inhabiting the outside’ 
through a ‘praxis of world-making’, co-producing tangible and intangible ‘interiors’ whereby 
we guarantee our physical and affective immunity.546 Although this awareness does not only 
belong to our epoch, it is in the latter that it reaches a certain degree of consistency among 
various disciplines and practices, propelling the emergence of a properly ‘spatial 
awareness’:547 from the birth of chemical warfare in WWI to the ever-rising environmental 
concerns, from the evolution of interior design to the development of experience economy, 
to the increasing fascination with collective ‘containers’ such as shopping arcades (then 
malls) and stadia, to the success of installation art and the increasingly atmospheric logics of 
security.  
As the abstract individual becomes aware of depending on the materiality of his own co-
constituted spacing, the materiality of our being-together, hitherto intangible, implicit and 
invisible, turns into an evident, tangible and explicit field of mission, immunisation and 
projectuality, in which questions of control, entertainment, culture, market, aesthetics, 
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sociality, politics, art and even death are played out.548 The deterritorialising hubris of the 
homo democraticus of Western modernity (what Nietzsche terms the “essentially supra-
national and nomadic type of man”) undergoes a re-calibration from a ‘vertical’ aspiration 
to a ‘horizontal’, technical project: the ontological question of inhabitation, i.e. everyone’s 
praxis of world-making, 'becomes the place where the individuals follow their vocation to 
the accomplishment of pure immanence. The realisation of oneself is a disguised definition 
of the consumption of oneself.'549 The question of consumption, in its widest sense, 
increasingly merges with that of immunity. This new ‘spatial consciousness’ profoundly 
reworks the basic contradiction at the core of liberal societies, namely the simultaneous 
quest for autonomy and protection, the libertarian strive for the unconstrained realisation 
of one’s own interests, and the interconnected demand for the protection of these 
interests.550 In fact, a novel awareness for the co-constitutive spatiality of co-existence 
means a renewed attention to our ‘co-fragile’ condition, and thus the surfacing of a new 
immunitary ethos: in Sloterdijk’s efficacious image, the passage from a theological to an 
immunological paradigm.551 Countless authors have described the surfacing of what Jensen 
terms the Project Society, in which the old logics of discipline and institution are supplanted 
by a new emphasis on projectuality and activities, and a therapeutic ethos of self-
responsibility for one’s own security, safety and health, what Dean calls “new 
prudentialism”, that is, “the multiple ‘responsibilization’ of individuals, families, households, 
and communities for their own risks”.552 As hinted above, Sloterdijk offers a radically 
materialistic account of this ‘post-modern condition’, avoiding the optimism of libertarian 
vitalism as well as any conservative techno-phobia, and rather emphasising the need to 
develop an ‘atmospheric ethics’ based on the common immunological attempt to 
synchronise our being-together according to an ecological and constructivist praxis of world-
making. Awareness of co-immersion is awareness of co-fragility, hence the need to 
synchronise, to develop “a new ethics of techné” so as to envisage new ways to build the 
“global work of installation art” in which we live.553 
Yet, this process of explicitation also provides knowledge and tools for increasingly 
monitoring, re-shaping and modulating the co-immersion for various, not necessarily 
desirable purposes. Neuro-cognitive studies on the non-conscious or pre-conscious way in 
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which we are involved in the world propel increasingly sophisticated techniques to 
intervene on the ‘half-second delay’ preceding our becoming-conscious about something.554 
“What was ephemeral, transient, unmappable, and invisible [becomes] permanent, 
mappable, and viewable”, and the ‘theatrical installation of the social’ thus becomes the 
field of advanced tactics, techniques and technologies of visibilisation, monitoring and 
modulation of the affective being-together.555 Almost seeking to actualise in socio-bio-
political terms Paul Valery’s famous definition of architecture as modulation through 
immersion, socio-psychologist Saadi Lahlou proposes a theory of ‘world as installation’, to 
indicate how ‘culture creates local installation by combining’ contextual affordances, 
representations and institutional practices, ‘to nudge and scaffold human activity’ – and, 
consequently, how politics can be effectively reconfigured as a ‘nudging’ enterprise.556 The 
question then is: how does Sloterdijk’s project avoid becoming a conservative attempt at 
the manipulation of the spatiality of being-together?  
The problem, as already explained, lies in the totalising closure that spherology seems to 
produce. In this context, the synchronising solutions Sloterdijk offers appear as difficult to 
distinguish from the cybernetic ethos of control, above-described exactly as a shift from an 
“exercise of power over society” to “an exercise of care and vigilance”, from a “sovereign 
who ‘decides about the state of exception’” to an impersonal paradigm, “whose role is no 
longer one of authorising or authoring imperatives, but of internally discovering and 
communicating information in view of ‘common survival’”.557 
To be sure, Sloterdijk’s proposition is a valuable counterpoint to the all-too-easy fascination 
with deterritorialisation and flows.558 Moreover, it is also an insightful and helpful way to 
deal with the abstract and concrete installations of the social, resisting to the tendency to 
resort to paranoid approaches to techné. Finally, it is a healthy reminder of the 
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inconsistency of merely oppositional and ‘ideological’ approaches to (juridical, economic 
etc.) abstractions, and especially of the temptation to find some more ‘authentic’ 
dimensions behind them, e.g. in the creative praxis of multitudes, the post-human 
relationalism of networks, the propulsive materialism of naive vitalism and so on. This 
resonates with Goodrich’s suggestion: 
Saying ‘‘let’s exit,’’ ‘‘new words must be devised,’’ ‘‘time to escape’’ is simply, well, no 
avoiding it, escapist” ... As with any functioning machine, it is dubious to treat it as junk, 
better to take it apart, piece by piece, frame by frame to see what can be used, what 
jettisoned, how to improve on the show559 
Nonetheless, I fail to see how his immunological paradigm would be able to ‘improve the 
show’ without being recaptured or, in Situationist parlance, recuperated into the 
modulation of control. Perhaps its prioritisation of praxis of synchronisation over the 
eventful frictions and excesses which constantly splay them out, is symptomatic of his 
underestimation of the significance that events play in the urban, and more precisely of the 
centrality their prevention assumes for the apparatus of control. In this sense, it could be 
argued that Sloterdijk overlooks a second aspect of the explicitation he describes. Not only 
an increasing awareness about the affective materiality of our inhabiting-the-world and thus 
of the possibility to manipulating, shaping and synchronising the spatiality of being for the 
purpose of living together. Also, the surfacing of an immanent configuration of power 
whose logic is eminently preventive. In other words, whilst Sloterdijk avoids the 
demonization per se of techné, thus criticising any prejudicial understanding of strategies 
and tactics of spatial manipulation, at the same time he seems to overlook that what is at 
stake with control is not simply manipulation but, first of all, the neutralisation of the urban 
from its excessive eventfulness. It is for this reason, I believe, that Sloterdijk’s project in the 
end appears not to challenge, but rather to somewhat conform to the logic of control and 
its preventive (ante-evental) pacification of the urban from conflict, frictions and 
antagonism. 
Let me qualify. I am not suggesting that Sloterdijk’s spherology implies a rigid 
conceptualisation of the social. The German philosopher proposes an immanent and 
tensegritous notion of immunity which is not static, stable and pre-given (as the liberal 
‘individual sphere’) but rather results from battles, interventions and on-going adaptations. 
His concept avoids the rigidity of liberal immunity, at the same time eschewing the 
accelerated vulnerability of naive vitalism and its deterritorialised complicity with control. 
Yet, there is an unresolved tension that traverses his work. As Borch emphasises, although 
Sloterdijk’s theory preserves an emphatic ‘vitalist impetus’ which differentiates him from 
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the systemic self-organisation of a Luhmann, a problematic oscillation remains between the 
celebration of (foam) vitalism and the need to synchronise and immunise.560 Is there not a 
risk of such a tension being internalised as just another variation of the liberal call to ‘strike 
a balance’ between vitalism and management, autonomy and protection, freedom and 
security? In this sense, is not the search for a ‘new ethics of techné’ bound to be ingested 
and modulated by the impersonal techné of control? Does not the quest for synchronisation 
risk being entrapped into the post-dogmatic dogma of efficiency, usefulness, correct 
procedures, defusing every situation from its evental potentiality, accepting the space as it 
is, and thus reducing political action to the search for ways to cope with the conservative 
and claustrophobic task of living-together? Indeed, could we not argue, perhaps, that a 
‘dangerous assumption’ underlines this quest for synchronisation, i.e. “that (geographical, 
architectural [as well as affective etc.]) matter is ultimately innocent”, and that can be thus 
used, manipulated and adapted to our being-together without taking into account the 
relations of power as well as the exceptional reality of the abstractions that are inscribed in 
it?561 
It is evident that the problem with synchronisation is not that of being somewhat oppressive 
vis-à-vis some sort of un-synchronisable vitalism or joyful disorder. It is more profoundly, 
the fact that such synchronisation is prefigured within the closed ontological horizon of 
control. It is for this reason that an alternative and properly emancipatory (for lack of a 
better term) ethico-political stance should not entail the celebration of vitalism as opposed 
to the need to synchronise. It is exactly that unresolved tension that must instead be 
debunked. What is needed, so to speak, is an ethico-political stance which is more abstract 
that any need to synchronise and more concrete that any naive exaltation of disorder per 
se. Concrete, that is, since certainly does not abdicate to the necessity to ‘look after our 
common spaces’. Abstract, that is, since it challenges directly the abstraction of control, and 
rather than resigning to find ways to live together within the reality of this state of 
exception, reorients the unavoidable task of cohabitation towards the excessive 
eventfulness of being-together. The task, that is, becomes that keeping open any situation 
to the absolute event of its taking place, i.e. to the immanent contingency of its cosmic 
justice. Another kind of abstraction, that is, that prefigures an every time contingent and 
absolutely strategic task: an ‘inoperose’ praxis of deactivation of the apparatus of exception, 
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detecting urban frictions and exploiting their intensity to pierce the ontological closure of 
control by generating alternative ways of being-together.  
Otherwise, we are served with a synchronised ‘world of cohabitation’ that remains in the 
end undistinguishable from the ‘eco-socio-techno-cultural complex’ of control, according to 
which the urban is shaped as the post-conflictual, uneventful locus of the ‘retreat’ of the 
political and thus the neutralisation of justice.562 In the fifth chapter I will provide a deeper 
conceptualisation of the strategy envisage in the last paragraph. In the rest of this chapter 
instead I explore the urban unfolding of such a ‘complex’.   
 
3. 
One could yield suspicion that history itself, as a 
technological process, obeys the rule: where there was 





The urban form of the spatiolegal architecture of control is a resolutely preventative one, a 
smooth circulation of people and goods to be both lubricated and immunised, so that the 
‘inherent dangers of this circulation are cancelled out’ (Foucault), and thus the twin 
requirements of security and freedom (of consumption) are permitted. In fact, security and 
(capitalist) market could be said to have been born together out of liberalism. Initially, their 
socio-technical overlapping could be observed especially in the locus of production and 
surveillance par excellence, the factory, yet very soon it spread beyond the disciplinary 
enclosures onto the open world of consumers. Andrejevic has made a compelling synopsis 
of the process which saw the industry pursuing a twofold symmetrical activity of 
surveillance and data-gathering for the sake of efficiency, to optimise both production and 
consumption phases.564 He shows how the history of marketing is the history of the 
developments of techniques to collect, gather and analyse data about potential consumers 
so as to narrow down wide patterns of (purchasing) behaviour from an indistinct mass to 
ever smaller groups. Initially absorbed into CRM practices, these premises soon spilled over 
policing institutions, willing to employ data-gathering practices in order to profile people 
and foresee criminal behaviour. With the gradual shift from the factory to the metropolis as 
the new diagrammatic locus of power, the technical, technological and strategic 
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convergence of security, surveillance and marketing is increasingly ‘spatialised’.565 The 
growing awareness about the affective materiality of being-together thus becomes explicit 
in the production of spectacular urban installations, wherein different institutions, 
technologies and practices overlap, converging in the common objective of producing 
commodified experiences of safety and safe experiences of consumption in the city: in other 
words, simultaneously secured and enticing spaces, defused from their eventfulness and 
stabilised by legal injunctions so as to be safe, consumable and capitalisable. Thrift, after 
Sterling, has termed it the security-entertainment complex: i.e. “a complex made up of two 
particular linked assemblages which have gained increasing purchase by feeding off each 
other”.566 
Direct result of such ‘spatio-affective’ explicitation is the surfacing of experience economy, 
which signals the emergence of a marketing strategy concerned with organising and 
manipulating the contextual and contingent modality of fruition of a commodity, that is, the 
actual encounter between consumer and product and thus, more precisely, the relational 
spatiality of the experience of consumption itself.567 In this context appears the notion of 
brandscape, a concept as well as a strategy that ‘spatialises’ the brand into the urban 
landscape of everyday life. First introduced by anthropologist John Sherry, in marketing 
literature brandscape indicates the convergence of brand and space in branding strategies, 
i.e. the convergence between the promotion of a certain image (informed by a certain 
narrative, symbolic imaginary, atmosphere (young, cool, serious etc.) and so on) and a 
place-making activity.568 The branded landscape, brandscape, is the “social, economical and 
cultural landscape where brands are produced and consumed”,569 both the projection of an 
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institutional discourse as well as “a material and symbolic environment that consumers 
build with marketplace products, images, and messages”.570 The brandscape is “not merely 
a landscape filled with logotypes and images, but rather a culture where consumption and 
commodities are given meaning … a landscape where norms and values are produced and 
consumed … a field of relationships where consumers’ experiences are ideologically 
infused”.571 In the brandscape notions of performance, event, seduction and affectivity 
complement those of functionality and rationality in producing ‘atmospherically enriched 
experiences’ in which the figure of the producer and the consumer are no longer 
distinguishable.572 If instances such as Disneyworld and Starbucks are by now textbook 
examples in marketing, today this practice widens beyond the private and the commercial 
sector, encompassing urban renewal projects, mega events and whole cities, as part of a 
“concerted attempt to re-engineer the experience of cities”573 by making them increasingly 
interactive, omnisensorial, adaptive and event-generating, i.e. “to create a new set of 
‘experience’ commodities which are, in effect, the spaces themselves”.574 
As marketing experts are interested in conveying atmospheres of enjoyment and 
predisposition to purchasing, security experts are interested in producing atmospheres of 
safety. Thus also for the latter, terms like ‘enjoyment’, ‘happiness’, ‘relax’ become explicit 
strategic objectives, to be pursued through the affective management of space. I should 
qualify that the evolution this process triggers in the realm security complements – and yet 
is not to be confused with – the well-known shift from the ‘transformative’ to the 
‘managerial’ paradigm that has characterised more generally social control strategies in the 
last decades. To grasp this qualitative difference, a brief parenthesis will be helpful. In the 
introduction I noted that as result of the on-going re-planning of cities according to the 
needs of business and financial sectors, consumption and tourism, as well as thanks to 
technological innovation, security strategies are undergoing important modifications, being 
increasingly employed as a glue protecting and guaranteeing the safety, efficiency and 
convenience of every socio-economical transaction.575 Accordingly, and consistently with 
the discussion developed so far, the dogma of ‘correct procedures’ becomes the self-
referential concern of a managerial, ‘post-moral’ ethos of social control, no longer 
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concerned with law-abiding citizens but with efficient users.576 To make sense of this shift 
various, still-popular theories of context-based crime prevention have emerged – e.g. 
‘situational crime prevention’ (Clarke) ‘defensible spaces’ (Newman), ‘broken windows’ 
(Wilson and Kelling), ‘environmental design’ (Jeffery), ‘deterrence by design’ (Clarke and 
Newman) –, sanctioning the passage, in the proverbial quest for ‘the root causes of crime’, 
from the moral status and socio-economical background of the potential offender, to the 
contingent calculus of risk and opportunities.577 
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However, the spatio-affective explicitation here exposed produces a further ‘criminological’ 
evolution. Differently from the just-mentioned approaches, still concerned with “repelling 
the bad guys, reducing opportunities, cracking criminal energy down” and so on, this novel 
ethos of social control is concerned with “the aesthetic, affective, positive features of urban 
space …their atmospheres as well as items involved in shaping these atmospheres (such as 
dresses, lights, colours) are part of the (security-relevant) communication”.578 
Entertainment and security become one and the same. Whether ‘Broken Windows’, 
‘Deterrence by Design’ and similar theories understood the potential offender as a rational, 
decision-making subject or a disciplinable body, the new approach appears to be alimented 
(either implicitly or explicitly) by different ontological assumptions, not only concerned with 
‘subjects’ and ‘bodies’ but with atmospheres and rhythms.579 In other words, security is no 
longer a question of disciplinary or governmental subjection, but a matter of atmo-
rhythmical tuning, i.e. a strategy aimed at “generating engagement through the 
manipulation of mood ... generating the same wavelength”.580 To be sure, this does not 
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mean the abandonment of representational strategies.581 The spectacle does not disappear, 
it rather loses all its vestiges of transcendence: acclamation becomes acclimatisation:  
… biopower means only that power adheres to life and life to power … from the 
perspective of its classical form, power is changing radically before our eyes, from a solid 
to a gaseous, molecular state. To coin a formula: Biopower is the SUBLIMATION of 
power.582 
For instance, in criminology this is evident in the reworking of the concept of fear, no longer 
understood in combination to harm, but rather as an affective harm per se, an atmospheric 
pollution to be targeted as such, independently of the actual danger: “not only are risks 
spatially, temporally, and socially de-bounded [as Beck’s original notion of de-bounded risk 
entailed], they are also de-bounded from quantitative, predictive actuarialism and 
invigorated with cultural constructions and speculative popular imaginations”.583 Nowhere 
this is more evident as in the instance of terrorism, where the pervasiveness of danger, and 
thus the presence of fear, becomes absolutely deterritorialised, that is, apparently 
emancipated from spatiotemporal needs and by consequence always potentially about to 
occur. Risk is understood as a virtual event, always real even when non-actual, an ever-
present occurrence whose very potentiality has to be constantly defused and neutralised 
and yet, exactly for its absolutely unpredictable and ungrounded character, bound to be 
constantly re-produced. According to what has been written above, control becomes the 
spectacular production of noise, that is, the abstract presupposition and concrete 
production of the unpredictable chaos which justifies its deployment.584 
Consistently with this narrative, law atmo-rhythmically sublimates in the spatiolegal 
architecture of control, blurring into both security and marketing strategies of 
acclimatisation and providing them with an immanent, stabilising scaffolding – for instance 
by channelling the tuning of entertainment into specific brands (e.g. through ‘ambush-
marketing’ laws), or targeting behaviours, gestures and objects for their ‘poisoning’ effect 
vis-à-vis the atmosphere of a place. Eminently affective legal concepts thus surface, such as 
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the right to be free from fear.585 If the constant dissimulation of law into the operations of 
security and marketing prevents its weight from becoming oppressive, it nonetheless 
remains absolutely present, playing a key part (as social control rules, criminal and 
administrative sanctions, intellectual property protection and so on, and thus all the 
techniques, strategies and technologies connected) in the ontological production of the city 
and in its affective modulation.586 See for instance the already mentioned notions of ‘hostile 
environment’ or anti-social behaviour (ASB) – where anti-social is a "conduct which caused 
or was likely to cause harm, harassment, alarm or distress”587 and “which, without 
necessarily being a criminal offence, can by its cumulative effect generate a climate of 
tension and insecurity”.588 Also in this case then, it is the indeterminacy ontologically 
produced by the legal abstraction (of course, through its concatenation with media 
representations, cultural constructs, dangerous objects, security technologies etc.) that 
justifies its very deployment as device for the re-immunisation of space, by ‘depurating’ its 
atmosphere from the ‘polluting’ effects of ‘anti-social’ and ‘fear-producing’ behaviours.589 In 
this way, this ‘affective juridification’ produces potentially disrupting results on the very 
atmosphere of the city it apparently sets up to stabilise. For instance: on the one hand, the 
ethos of self-responsibilisation implies constant preparedness, that is, a pervasive need of 
‘being responsible’ for one’s own immunisation, and thus to constantly rehearse one’s 
capacity to perform and provide for one’s own security: do not become a crime victim, as a 
common sign in the London underground effectively suggests. On the other hand, constant 
preparedness is necessarily connected with delegation.590 The witnessing of CCTVs, the 
affective right to be free from fear and distress, the increasingly omnipresent threat of 
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litigation, the enclosing self-referentiality of health and safety regulations: texts, strategies 
and technologies overlaps in prompting constant de-responsibilisation, as well as the 
specular immunisation from the risk of being 'held responsible'. As a result, as we are to 
explore more empirically in the next chapter, the abs-co-traction of being-together loses 
‘tension’, the potential for the surfacing of fear increases, and this prompts further 
interventions, in a self-alimenting circularity: atmospheric laws, not necessarily an entirely 
new evolution, tend to become in this context a self-fulfilling prophecy, producing more and 
more ‘noise’ that justifies their ever-increasing deployment for the preventive pacification 
of the urban.591 
 
4. 
The society that moulds all its surroundings has 
developed its special technology for shaping the 
concrete basis of this ensemble of tasks: its own 
territory. Urbanism is that taking possession of the 
natural and human environment by capitalism that, 
developing logically into absolute domination, now can 





The last section, whose density was perhaps at times disorienting, had the purpose of 
providing an instant sketch of the machinic processes through which the urban is tuned, 
conveying the converging concatenations of increasingly gaseous strategies, in which 
techniques and technologies of security and marketing overlap, enacted and stabilised by 
legal atmo-rhythms, converging in producing spaces of immunised consumptions. Ball and 
Wood define brandscapes of control as 
the apex of late capitalism, of hyper-consumption, personalisation, niche-marketing, 
lifestyle … It is the seamless combination of surveillance, marketing, and socio-spatial 
construction, where the timespace of the subject becomes ineluctably aligned with the 
techno-social protocols, tools and ideology of particular institutions.593 
Following this inspiration, I define brandscaping as a way to address the immanent material 
production of the ‘installations’ through which the urban is tuned.594 Modernity, as I 
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reminded above quoting Heidegger, is the faith in the capacity to reduce the world to 
image, the faith in re-presentation or the abstraction of the world into a space of exception. 
Brandscaping signals the shift from the concern with mapping the world to a much more 
explicit attempt to produce the ‘inhabitable maps’ in which we live. From the myth of full 
legibility of the city (Plato) – updated in some paranoid reading of the ‘surveillance society’ 
– to the coding of the city, i.e. the ‘direct generation’ of immersive cartographies. The 
relationalism that grounds control implies the assumption that in society “no coherent, 
autonomous entity is acting ... it is the whole context that is acting; the individual is its 
context, no more, no less.”595 The consequence is not a context-based, but a context-
generating strategy, not simply by seeking to manipulate a context (as in ‘broken windows’ 
theory for instance) but actually producing it, i.e. worlding.596 
As already explained above, Deleuze refers to control as ‘modulation’ in order to emphasise 
that control does not imply the shaping of what is to be thought, but rather the modulation 
of what could be thought, in other words, with generating (and thus neutralising) the space 
of the thinkable, the environment of thinking. The notion of brandscaping is a way to 
translate this concept into the urban. It does not indicate an attempt to disciplining into 
acting in a certain way, but rather the modulation of the space of the experienceable, the 
‘environment of experiencing’: i.e. the urban. This does not simply mean to arrange a space 
in a certain way. Brandscaping simultaneously refers to the abstract urban form of control in 
the sense of the ‘image of the city’ (i.e. a unitary idea of the way in which the city should be 
experienced, namely as an ‘all-encompassing and yet open’ experimental surface of 
movement, flows, excitement, awareness and constant exposition to prevented events); as 
well as to the actual operations into which this is enacted into urban assemblages of 
consumption and immunity.597 The diagrammatic world thus produced is one of 
experimenting and coping, in which the permanent states of exception (from the war on 
terror to the permanent economic crisis) overlap with “pervasive entertainment, both 
sharing the linked values of paranoiac vigilance ... and the correct identification of the 
potential of each moment”.598 Security itself, as Hentschel observes, becomes a ‘style’, to be 
performed continuously, to be ‘experienced’ and to be shown around as sign of 
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distinction.599 In these compulsive, hyper-stimulating spaces, the complicity between the 
acceleration of naive vitalism and the deterritorialised constitution of a consumer 
subjectivity is explicit: je bouge, donc je suis.600 
In this sense, brandscaping must be understood principally as simultaneously arousing and 
pacifying the ‘experience’ of being-in-the-city, through a frenetic production of spaces and 
happenings which strive to make ‘you feel vibrant, alive’, and which at the same time are 
constantly neutralised from their potentially disrupting eventfulness, so as not to 
compromise their commodifiable and consensual potential.601 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 
notes that the urban is traversed by a paradox, since “urban hyperesthesia goes hand in 
hand with a punctilious attempt at separating the senses” into ‘sanitised’ atmospheric 
insulations such as museums.602 Even more relevant appears the actual convergence of 
these conflicting impulses into a museification of the city, that is, not only as a 
compartmentalisation between hyper-stimulation and sensorial deprivation, but rather as 
their convergence in the production of ‘hyper-experiences’ (see below) simultaneously 
neutralised from their eventfulness. This is what Agamben defines as the contemporary 
condition of ‘deprivation’ of experience that the modern urban dweller constantly faces, in 
the overwhelming and saturating exposition to events which do not become experience, 
which are never actually experienced.603 
 
5. 
What happens between bodies during a demonstration 




Let us pause for a moment. It is legitimate at this point to ask whether in the last section I 
indeed succumbed to the “all too tempting gesture of revealing the relations of power at 
the heart of affective modulations”, offering a “paranoid reading of the systematic and 
instrumental ‘engineering’ and ‘manipulation’ of affect by the powerful” and reducing 
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“affect to a diagnosis of our times of late capitalism and the like, as exemplified in the 
affective modulations of the security society”.605 What is wrong with the latter stance 
should be evident. Simply put: the reduction of atmo-rhythmical affects to a merely 
manipulatable and engineerable instrument of the powerful is a position which is twice 
wrong, since firstly assuming a substantial rather than emergential understanding of power, 
still implicitly referred to one or more sovereigns able to wield it; and secondly, denying the 
excessiveness of affects, and thus the always uncertain and fallible character of any spatial 
‘manipulation’. By focusing on some practices of micro-resistance such as humour and 
seduction, Bissel et al. show that affective atmospheres are always excessive, open and 
unpredictable, thus escaping the rigid depiction of those theories that assume them as 
always-already captured within the hidden logics of power.606 However, I do not think this 
argument runs counter the configuration of control so far described and which, to 
paraphrase Thrift, is “naturally experimental ... aspires to be all-encompassing but it must 
perforce retain an openendedness”.607 Let me qualify then: with the notion of brandscaping 
I aim to explore urban control by looking more explicitly at material and context-specific 
attempts to retune the city, through a direct convergence between institutions, practices 
and technologies of security and entertainment, enacted and stabilised by the legal 
scaffolding. However, in this way I am not inferring that brandscaping is to be understood as 
an oppressive model of atmo-rhythmical manipulation. The function that this configuration 
of power exposes is not that of the blanket-elimination of resistance and transgression, 
whose intensive potential, as I stress further below, it absolutely needs. In fact, opacities, 
failures and blind-spots are all constitutive part of the reality of control, which exactly by 
means of being flexible is able to internalise transgression and resistance. The function that 
brandscaping expresses is exactly one of preventive de-potentiation of the intensity of 
urban life, exploiting its potential and simultaneously (and of course, always tentatively) 
defusing it from its conflictual and eventful charge: brandscaping “tolerates transgressions, 
provided they remain soft ... [keeping] the lowest possible minimum of intensity... to make 
sure that the confrontation does not take place”.608 
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Nowhere is this evident as in the proliferation of multiple scale ‘urban events’ (from the 
inauguration of the new Apple shop to the festival of the local borough, to the outstanding 
relevance gained by international mega-events, as we are to see soon) which syncopate the 
rhythm of contemporary urban life. Increasingly, the city becomes an eventful space of 
deterritorialised happenings, instrumentally employed for political action (manifestations, 
marches, protests), commodified entertainment, urban planning (so-called event-led 
regeneration), image-restyling and so on,  generally to render more ‘tangible’ and effective 
the urban being-together, ‘mobilising people, publics and crowds in order to transform 
them’.609 ‘Producing’ events means to enter into the always complex, tentative and 
ultimately risky task of employing the affective charge of being-together whilst defusing it 
from its unpredictable intensity.610 As Boullier observes, the ‘resonant fusion’ of the crowd 
is simultaneously the dream and nightmare of event-organisers, who rely in this ‘fusional 
instant that produces the event’, but at the same time are aware of its ‘explosive mixture’.611 
The intensity of life is, to paraphrase Anderson, “the limit to the effective functioning of 
power even when it is its object”, simultaneously the locus of the ‘acclimatising’ practices of 
marketing and security, as well as their constant dislocation.612  Incidentally, as I will expand 
in the next chapter, this also means that urban events, and especially mega events, play a 
significant methodological relevance for urban research, since they express and perform 
(and thus offer a compelling chance to investigate) the very essence of brandscaping as a 
strategy that, to employ Severino’s terms, ‘welcomes the event to put it on trial ... seeking 
to employ the event to enmesh the event itself’.613 A logic which can be encapsulated within 
an oxymoronic formula: the pre-emptive production of events, or the production of always-
already neutralised events.614 
Therefore, if we assume that brandscaping concerns the prevention of events from 
becoming too intense, then we may have an argument to counteract the otherwise 
insightful point made by Bissel et al. Could not we argue that their admittedly ‘capricious 
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examples’ of micro-resistance to control strategies occur exactly insofar as ‘capricious’, that 
is, low-intensity occurrences that fall short from threatening to disrupt the internal 
consistency of the brandscaping in which they occur?615 This is not to say that humour and 
seduction, together with other instances of everyday resistance, are irrelevant. Everyday life 
is full of these moments of liberation, which are important in themselves, and 
unaccountable only by referring to some supra-structure into which they would be already 
subsumed. Freedom and resistance are not only to be understood as “heroic escape[s] from 
a totalising logic”, decisive acts of revelation of hidden logics of oppression.616 I certainly 
agree with Deleuze’s more modest and strategically consistent observation that “our ability 
to resist control, or our submission to it, has to be assessed at the level of our every 
move”.617 Yet, it is also important to eschew the problematic romanticisation of these 
‘liberating moments’, an attitude that too many accounts of everyday life and its 
‘revolutionary’ potentials betray. My position is eminently strategic in this sense. I believe 
that key are not the moments themselves, but more precisely the level of intensity they are 
able to produce, their ability to “engender new space-times” and disrupt existent ones, by 
producing or exploiting the frictions between the different scales, apparatuses and 
materialities of the urban.618 It is in these eventful frictions that the potential for generating 




How this is to be done? First of all, a question must be addressed, that is, the relation 
between contemporary radical, post-structural and materialist model of thought, and the 
reality of control. In fact, does not the rather unorthodox way in which Deleuze deals with 
control (often ‘laterally’, in variously different and unconventional formats) testify for his 
uneasiness with a notion which seems able to seriously compromise his whole project, the 
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… the enemy interprets space in a traditional, classical 
manner, and I do not want to obey this interpretation 
and fall into his traps. Not only do I not want to fall 
into his traps, I want to surprise him! …. I said to my 
troops, “Friends! This is not a matter of your choice! 
There is no other way of moving! If until now you were 
used to move along roads and sidewalks, forget it! 
From now on we all walk through walls!
620
 
In their video on Deleuze’s postscript, Birchall et al. ask half-ironically whether the effort of 
scholars to interpret the web by revealing hidden logics of functioning could actually “result 
in an attempt to discipline the web in order to make it more like Deleuze’s philosophy”.621 
As social scientists risk becoming increasingly responsible of emergent model of material 
modulation, Palmas asks, “are today's specialists on Deleuze and Tarde the social engineers 
of our time?” The famous instance of Israeli Generals learning from post-structural theories 
to perform military operations in the West Bank is just the most striking example of many 
possible others.622 Think for instance to the potential (ab)uses to which Lahlou’s theory of 
‘world as installation’ is open. How can Sloterdijk’s ‘ethics of techné’, as I hinted above, 
avoid being recuperated within the exceptional techné of control? How is Esposito’s call for 
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a legal system oriented towards an adherence to the ‘immanent impulse of life’, in which 
‘the value of a norm would be related to its traducibility from a system to another’, that is, 
assessed according to vital capacities for translatability, integration and variation – to be 
differentiated from a ‘Situationist’ control which depends not on mechanisms of 
subjectification but rather on effective action, performance, and thus with coping with, 
integrating adapting and reacting to the moving materiality of spatiality, rather than merely 
attempting to block it?623 Is not Sutter’s 'practice of right', in its constant adaptation to the 
immanent variation of being-together, ultimately entrapped into a non-evental movement 
from which justice is unable to emerge, and thus ultimately vulnerable to co-optation by the 
apparatuses of control? Is not a living and nomadic jurisprudence, which Moore oppose to 
the striating self-referentiality of law, running the risk of replicating the ‘omnivorous 
immanentization’ of spatiolegal control whose normativity, dramatically widening law’s 
juridical scope and thus threatening to close off the potentiality for justice?624 Let us recall 
Noys' question once again: “in the end, why proclaim the need for a right to difference, 
variation, and metamorphosis, if capitalism will supply them in far more radical, a- 
subjective, and inhuman forms than any mutated subject?”625  
Perhaps these critiques are ungenerous. Differently to far more reckless ‘Deleuzians’ and 
the likes, these authors are certainly aware of these risks, as they express in their work. Yet 
often their ‘solutions’ appear, in my view, insufficient to avoid the danger of control’s co-
optation. Take for instance Sutter's exclamation that “what counts is not the form of law but 
the contingent form of the concatenation in which it is collocated”.626 Since law is ‘without 
content’, he adds, “there is nothing to know about law. There are only things to do”.627 I 
disagree. The emptiness of legal form does not mean that there is no content: it is the very 
reality of this abstract form to be its content. As the discussion developed in this chapter has 
sought to show, abstractions cannot be disposed of as such, since that amounts to 
overlooking the ontological reality they generate, the tunings they contribute to produce 
and carve, and that won’t melt into thin air by merely looking somewhere else. Simply 
pretending to having done with abstraction of control in the name of the creative praxis of 
multitudes, the post-human relationalism of networks, the vibrant materialism of naive 
vitalism, is thus a deeply problematic approach that runs the risk of de facto remaining stuck 
within – as well as reproducing (since refusing to challenge) – the ontological reality of 
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control itself. In this sense I can further contextualise the above-mentioned critique to 
Latour and his attempt to "remove an abstract capitalism and replace it with a world of rich 
concrete actualities".628 Simply put, by pretending to get rid of capitalist abstractions, 
Latour’s model in the end reproduces their very reality, i.e. the reality of the “entirely 
seamless capitalism that he claims to contest”.629 A similar problem emerges in certain 
instances of (naive) vitalism, for instance in the notorious concept of ‘multitude’ in Hardt 
and Negri and its problematic unfolding. As Toscano stresses following both Virno and Zizek:  
A humanist or liberationist stance that would seek the warm life of praxis ‘under’ these 
cold forms would thereby miss out the specificity of contemporary, post-Fordist 
capitalism, which is precisely to be found in the abstract connections, or real 
abstractions, that make society cohere ... Against any turn to a vitalist materialism, or a 
primacy of praxis630 
The risk moreover, as Baudrillard observes, is that of succumbing to a “compulsion towards 
liquidity, flow” which somewhat mirrors rather than actually challenge the novel biopolitical 
logic of control.631 Benjamin Noys, following and criticising Land, has termed accelerationism 
this strategy to deal with (or indeed against) a system by radicalising and ‘accelerating’ its 
tendencies. Simply put, “if capitalism generates its own forces of dissolution then the 
necessity is to radicalise capitalism itself: the worse the better”.632 As already hinted, 
Badiou’s critique to Deleuze, although moving from different presuppositions, ends in 
similar conclusions. Accordingly, Deleuze would propose a sort of ascetic vitalism, as implied 
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in his profoundly a-political (and thus politically vulnerable) injunction to: “separate and 
dissolve oneself ... to be a creator, what Deleuze calls a ‘purified automaton’, a surface more 
and more porous to the impersonal modalisation of being”.633 A quest for reaching a purely 
virtual, plasmatic and de facto ‘bare’ dimension that has troubling political consequences.634 
Moving from these presuppositions, Zizek argues that the shift from the 'ascetism' of 
Deleuze to the 'activism' of Deleuze and Guattari would thus imply an always-already 
doomed vitalism: a neo-romantic, nomadic and ‘accelerationist’ exaltation of becoming 
merely replicating, rather than contrasting, the hyper-active logic of control, dissolved in its 
‘impersonal modalisation’, overwhelmed by its continuous non-evental movement, lacking 
any ‘lever of agential intervention’ from which to oppose an eventual resistance.635  
I already noted the problematic presuppositions that orient the latter critiques.636 Yet, they 
certainly deserve attention. The ambiguous convergence between contemporary instances 
of 'radical thought' and the smooth and uneventful logic of control must be fully addressed 
if we are to develop a truly alternative and strategically viable approach. In this problematic 
not only is encapsulated most of the motivation of the present thesis, but also one of the 
most pressing ethico-political questions of contemporary thought: how to construct “a 
political philosophy and practice adequate to the deterritorialising dynamic of global 
capitalism”?637 Overcoming this impasse, I believe, requires neither a mystical nor an 
escapist stance, neither reckless accelerationism nor a synchronising ‘ethics of techné’, nor 
finally any nihilistic revolutionary hubris. This is the problematic field that the final chapter 





Through Deleuze’s notion of control and Agamben’s reflections on glory I elaborated the 
notion of spatiolegal architecture of control, in which the spectacular and managerial 
intersperse into an unauthorised and immanently emerging configuration of power. In the 
attempt to look more closely at this concept and be able to apply it more consistently to the 
urban, I thus introduced the notion of brandscaping as a way, first, to address the material 
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consequences of the increasing atmo-rhythmical convergence of security and marketing, i.e. 
the spacing of the security-entertainment complex; second, to account for the folding of 
spectacle and biopower, materially understood as a simultaneous generation-and-
manipulation of ‘inhabitable maps’ “based on exceptional  topologies rather than 
sovereignty as such and founded in protocols of resonance”;638 third, to provide the notion 
of control with a more explicitly material lens, as well as an attention for both its ecological 
and phenomenological unfolding; fourth, to offer a useful concept to explore the unfolding 
of control in more direct, explicit and context-specific instances; finally, and for all these 
reasons, to provide a methodological tool to explore control in the urban, as the next 
chapter shows through an empirical investigations of a urban mega event. 
In this context, the normally fragmented and scattered reality of urban brandscaping 
reaches rare levels of intensity, expansion and syncretism of its multi-faceted operations to 
an urban-wide extent. It unfolds in what I term the 'mega event brandscaping', a urban-wide 
installation that exposes to a paradigmatic extent both the abstract form of the spatiolegal 
architecture of control and the reality of its atmo-rhytmical modulation. It follows that mega 
events cannot be simply reduced to a compelling object of study in themselves. More 
significantly, I contend, they are one of the privileged contexts for exploring urban control. 














                                                          
638
Thrift, ‘Lifeworld Inc.’, op. cit. p. 13. This in the sense Thrift intends when observing that “maps are not just 








In this chapter I explore some of the theoretical issues defined so far by looking at the city of 
Johannesburg, South Africa, in the context of the 2010 FIFA Football World Cup. A key 
consideration orients the chapter and justifies its chosen subject: mega events (such as the 
World Cup or the Olympics) are not to be seen as exceptions, but rather explicitations of 
emergent configurations of control in the city. They are thus relevant both as an object of 
study in themselves, as well as a methodological tool to explore the urban more in general. 
This, provided they are approached through a radically material and ‘situated’ perspective 
that avoids ‘explaining away’ the event by referring to pre-given theoretical structures, and 
instead proposes to investigate the encounter between the mega event and the city in its 
contingent unfolding. Mega events do not occur on flat surfaces, but rather on urban spaces 
which are already normatively tuned in unique ways: they are always tentative processes of 
re-tuning. The chapter thus offers an opportunity both to test the spatial framework 
proposed in the first chapter – by applying the notion of urban tuning to the city of 
Johannesburg – and the spatiolegal framework developed in the following two chapters and 
culminated with the introduction of the notion of brandscaping. It is organised into four 
parts: 
In the first I introduce the notion of mega event (ME), as a public ritual thrown onto the 
urban space and accelerated to a maximum of socio-cultural, economical, symbolical and 
political significance. I thus define the ME as an urban-wide ‘air-conditioning’ installation, 
exploring its abstract form and concrete spatialities, as well as emphasising the relevance it 
can play to study processes of urban brandscaping – providing an appropriate methodology 
is employed. This is the focus of the second part, where I deal with some pressing 
methodological questions such as: how to address empirically the urban ontology so far 
described? How to attune oneself to urban tunings? How to account for them without 
ending in the mere drifting per se of the flaneur? How to do justice to the antagonism of the 
city without defusing it into a pacifying account?  In the third part I filter the ethnographic 
experience through my theoretical lenses in order to define the Joburg Tune, i.e. the 
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immanent getting together of bodies, spaces and laws that normatively tune one’s being-in-
Johannesburg. In the fourth part I finally investigate the 2010 FIFA World Cup, looking at its 
brandscaping of security, entertaining and law, as well as discussing how it encountered, 
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The Mega Event 
 
Capitalism ... ‘concretely and deliberately’ organises 







Mega-events are “international, large-scale ... collective events”, ‘discontinuous’ to the 
urban routine.641 Paralleling their ever-rising relevance in contemporary world, the 
sociology of MEs has emerged as a gradually autonomous field of study whose roots are to 
be located in the well-established strand of anthropological analysis of public rituals.642 
Émile Durkheim famously described public rituals as symbolical processes through which the 
cohesion and continuity of society is reaffirmed and reinforced by producing a sense of 
collective identity and solidarity among the individuals.643 I already mentioned the main 
limit of this conception, namely the tendency to affirm as self-evident the ‘collective 
effervescence’ produced by the public ritual, however leaving unexplained the contingent 
‘mechanism’ through which this effect is generated.644 Yet, its main insight remains 
relevant. Roche updates it to contemporary Olympics, which he sees as facilitating the 
adaptation of individuals to the turbulent processes of globalisation, capitalism and 
mediatisation characterising modernity. As he observes, “to understand mega-events better 
is to understand something more broadly about the nature and fate of human agency and 
social structure, and of continuity and change, in modernity”.645 I follow this inspiration, 
although with a rather more critical tone, by seeking to understand the ME as a peculiar 
explicitation of the commodification and immunisation of everyday life that characterise 
urban brandscaping.646 To do so, however, the analysis must be calibrated according to the 
materialist perspective I am developing.  
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Admittedly, many interesting works analysing MEs vis-à-vis the ‘social cement’, enthusiasm, 
effervescence and cohesion they allegedly generate, share with their predecessor Durkheim 
the same problematic reliance on the all-explaining ‘container’ of the Society. Less attention 
has been given in this field to other contemporaries of Durkheim, such as the already-
mentioned Gabriel Tarde or Arnold Van Gennep, whose (different) approaches do not take 
for granted the ‘effects’ of the public rituals, and rather seek to explore their actual, 
performative and pragmatic enactment.647 A certainly crucial role in orienting the study of 
public rituals towards these aspects was played by a novel interest with observing them 
away from the traditional and exotic settings of early anthropology, and rather within the 
context of the nascent urban society, and especially in relation with the fascinating and 
disturbing phenomenon of the ‘urban crowds’. Observed away from the tightly codified 
contexts of tradition, the ritual could more evidently appear as characterised by elements of 
uncertainty and uncontrollability – and thus by a complicate array of strategies put in place 
to control them. According to Esposito, the existence of every community depends on the 
common, pre-subjective spacing of being-together, a ‘shared’ ontological substance which 
keeps its member together and, at the same time, threatens to dissolve them into an 
undifferentiated common: accordingly, the existence of every community is based on an 
operation of self-immunisation.648 The public ritual is perfectly consistent with this 
contradictory necessity, between the need to stimulate the common, affective and material 
getting-together of bodies, as well as the deployment of spectacular and managerial 
practices aimed at immunising the collective from its own potential dangers – in other 
words, at defusing it from its eventfulness. Accordingly, and especially in their urban 
dimension, public rituals are understood as practices of acclimatisation, stimulating the 
affective atmo-rhythms of the urban and thus opening potential spaces of effervescence 
and turbulence, and at the same time seeking to ‘re-tune’ them towards an ordered, 
consensual and risk-minimising outcome.649 As Jansson’s sums up effectively, “the social 
power of public spectacles … stems from their capacity to: create, reinforce and circulate a 
public sense of fatefulness; and, promote a (superficial) solution to the very same fateful 
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moment.”650 Therefore, I suggest that it is in the tentative, immanent and contingent 
relation of re-tuning between the ME and the urban that a perspective able to account for 
its material and affective unfolding should be grounded. Few however are the works in the 
field addressing this dimension.651 
Even insightful contributions such as those of Marivoet and Pramod for instance – who 
differently emphasise the role played by ever-controversial tendency to build grand works 
(most notably, stadia) in producing a ‘special atmosphere’ as well as crystallising the 
symbolical charge of the ME – appear to take these affirmations as self-evident.652 More 
interesting for our concerns is the work of Vida Bajc who, focusing on George Bush’s 2005 
presidential inauguration, explores the role of security practices in immunising the ritual 
from the uncertain liminality opened by its taking place: in this sense security, as she puts it, 
could be understood as a ‘meta-ritual’ constituted by a precise set of bureaucratic, 
securitarian and legal procedures aimed at assuring the practical, logistical as well as 
meaningful tuning of the ritual itself.653 Not only this entails policing the preferred, atmo-
rhythmical narrative to be produced, but also instilling certain normativities as regards the 
ritual’s functioning which then spill over everyday life: the “bringing about of public security 
through a meta-ritual legitimates surveillance practices of the state security apparatus and 
normalizes the social order it creates”, generating a sort of pedagogy of security and thus a 
de-sensitisation to over-control.654 Applying this observation to the context of ‘big’ MEs, 
namely World Cup and Olympics, Boyle and Haggerty usefully emphasise the interplay 
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between the operational ‘‘nuts and bolts’’ of security provision and the management of the 
representational elements of those efforts”, that is, the increasing convergence between 
the managerial and the spectacular in ME-related security strategies: a ‘spectacular security’ 
increasingly concerned with ‘communicating’ safety, even regardless of logical relation with 
actual dangers.655 We already explored how this tendency emerges within the so-called 
security-entertainment complex, in the form of an experience economy of security whereby 
the urban is ‘brandscaped’ into normative tunings in which consumption and immunity are 
no longer distinguishable. What is crucial is the extent that this process reaches in the 
context of MEs. Whereas brandscaping is a fragmented urban process, always reworked and 
displaced in its urban unfolding, during MEs (especially those which are really ‘mega’, i.e. 
Olympics and FIFA World Cup, absolutely unique as regards their enormous symbolical, 
political and economical significance, global visibility and so on) it gains an unmatched level 
of concentration, intensity and extension, with an explicit convergence between technical, 
tactical, semiotical operations of security and entertainment, whose intersecting logics 
complement and dissolve into each other as different instances and inclinations of the same 
event-neutralising effort: i.e. the operational production of a spectacular consensus, a city-
wide brandscaping enacted and held-together through a dynamic and atmo-rhythmical 
spatiolegality of exception. 
For these reasons thinking MEs through the affective materialism so far developed not only 
provides ME-studies with a much-demanded angle to explore the contradictory and 
contingent dimension into which they occur, but most importantly offers significant insights 
on the urban and its spatiolegal normativities more generally. To be sure, this requires 
eschewing the tendency to see MEs through a “set of preexisting social, cultural, economic, 
or political conditions too often ... explain[ing] away the eventfulness of events by referring 
them back to a set of conditions that structure and, ultimately, determine them”.656 
Moreover, this does not mean to overlook questions such as income polarisation, urban 
propaganda, social exclusion, suffocating securitisation, resident displacement, widespread 
corruption, excessive expenditure and so on. Yet, we can neither narrow down our 
understanding of MEs to them. In other words, we should use them as part of the 
contingent assemblage of the ME, rather than as supra-structural shortcuts to simplistic and 
dichotomical oppositions (the ideological smokescreen of an Olympic narrative and the 
reality of exploitation, the spectacular securitisation triggered by World Cup and the 
everyday reality, the show and the content).657 What is not to be missed is the material 
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eventfulness of the event, the potentialities unleashed by its taking place, and the ‘frictions’ 
between the different scales of its contingent unfolding, aspects that are too often 
smoothed out by top-down accounts. This is certainly not a call for a romantic endorsement 
of the ME as instance of social cohesion. Yet, it is a suggestion to study the mega event vis-
à-vis both the lines of flight it opens by the very fact of taking place in the urban and the 
tentative, controversial and conflictual attempts that are put in place to manage and cope 
with this turbulence. Every mega event is a ‘controlled decontrolling’, an attempt to 
spectacularly manage into a ‘normalised’ exceptionality the contradictory task of 
simultaneously generating and regulating enthusiasm.658 It is in the frictions and intensities 
that this operation generates, I believe, that promising opportunities for ethnographic 




Let me reassert: I am proposing to apply the framework so far developed in order to gain 
insights on MEs and, through them, on urban brandscaping. First, I understand MEs as the 
quintessential explicitation of the abstract and concrete urban form of control. This entails 
that in order to address them, we need to look at both the abstract form they presuppose 
and the concrete materialities into which they unfold. Second, understanding a ME as a 
grand-scale instance of urban-wide brandscaping means that its re-tuning cannot be 
analysed independently from the existing urban tuning in which it occurs. It is on the 
encounter and frictions between the tuning of the urban and its ME-led re-tuning that 
analyses of MEs should be oriented. Were we to assume the urban as a flat surface on 
which the brandscaping of the ME is applied (as in certain structuralist accounts) we would 
simply mirror the exceptional logics of the ME-brandscaping itself. This also means that any 
account of MEs must be radically situated and contextualised: again, abstractions must be 
always re-conducted to their real unfolding. The study of the ME must always focalise on 
the immanent ‘measure of its working existence’: both the phenomenological this-ness of 
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its deployment and the ecological prolongations it produces.659 It follows that, third, we 
must take into account the potentialities which the ME unleashes, and thus the 
simultaneously abstract and concrete tunings towards which its taking place projects, at 
least potentially, the urban. Let us unpack these three points. 
I contend that the ME must be formally understood as ‘without content’, an abstract form 
which can be defined in at least three important senses. First, in the sense of incorporating 
the concretely abstract ideal of publicness that public rituals convey, as simultaneously a 
transcending feeling of common belonging as well as the situated, actual resonance 
produced between bodies;660 second, as a form (as well as a ‘format’) of urban control, that 
is, a “form which unites a differential whole in which every particular ‘place’ is rendered 
‘equi-valent’ in a universal circulation and exchange”;661 and, finally, as making explicit the 
negative logic that grounds the double-move of the spatiolegal state of exception. Let me 
explain. Through its purely abstract form, the ME appears as one of the most efficient 
generators of capitalistic deterritorialisation: it is applicable to ever-different settings, able 
to perform an extremely efficient and accelerated deterritorialisation of the urban from its 
immanent tuning, and thus its consequent re-territorialisation into the global circulation of 
bodies, services and commodities of control’s ‘mega-machine’. The systematic spreading of 
MEs in so-called emerging economies, most notably in BRICS countries, further goes to show 
their role as ‘operators’ between the different scales of the urban, that is, what mediates 
(smoothing out the frictions) between the specific, local instances of ‘metropolis’ and its 
global, universally deterritorialised form.662 Of course, the abstraction of the ME is always 
materially and historically situated into a specific tuning, the ‘where’ in which its 
deterritorialising hubris always gets ‘dirty’, diffracted and problematised. There is no 
smooth subsumption, but an always tentative and contextualised re-tuning. It is through 
this concept that we can make explicit the abstract form of the ME without explaining it 
away into self-sufficient supra-structures and rather exploring it through the ontological 
reality it produces, i.e. the material re-tuning it enacts. Brandscaping, understood as a 
“more or less successful institutional attempt to inscribe spaces and their inhabitants in 
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their own terms”,663 thus appears at its most evident in this context. Accordingly, MEs 
appear as not exceptional moments (of capitalistic exploitation, legal suspension, 
securitarian siege), as many inconsistent copy-and-paste applications of the ‘state of 
exception’ theory suggest, but rather explicitations of formal urban processes of control, 
whose ‘realisation’ is enacted in a smoother, quicker and more effective (yet by no means 
unproblematic) way with respect to ‘normal times’.  
In the specific, the actual operations of the ME-brandscaping enacts: an extremely flexible, 
deterritorialised, dynamic and spatio-temporally contained, spatiolegal space of exception 
(explicit for instance in the event-specific by-laws, yet certainly not reduced to them); a 
quantitatively extended and qualitatively advanced deployment of security (especially 
allowed by the interplay between elevate amount of funding and the weakening of both 
legal as well as socio-cultural counter-weights to measures normally perceived as excessive 
and/or oppressive); an enormous level of investments which propels further privatisation 
and commodification of the urban space, highly concentrated both in given spatio-temporal 
zones (patrolled by legal, securitarian and physical boundaries, e.g. through ambush-
marketing laws, precise zoning, tax-free areas, fencing and so on) as well as in the sense of 
being enacted by a very limited amount of institutions (the few sponsors, the public 
institutions and the ME’s governing body); an abstract form of ‘sociality’, made explicit in 
the just-mentioned sense of the resonant and carnivalistic effervescence of being-together 
which urban- and nation-wide celebrations always trigger, and which is crucial to foster the 
de-politicised consensus (also favoured by the fact of representing the supposedly a-political 
realm par excellence, i.e. sport) which MEs enjoy among various strata of the society, 
essential lubricant for easing its process of urban (re)tuning. This complex, abstract-and-
concrete apparatus is a perfect instance of the preventive logic of control, understood as  an 
attempt to immunise the urban from the turbulence of its own spatiality, allowing for 
movement and circulation whilst neutralising the potential for events to occur, ‘sacrificing 
the intensity of [urban] life to its conservation’.664 The ME-brandscaping aims to keep the 
urban flow alive, producing atmospheres of ‘pervasive entertainment’ and frenetic festival 
rhythms whose ‘effervescence’ must be constantly kept at ‘low intensity’, within the 
controlled materialities of its brandscaping: the ‘mega’ event is meant to be the un-eventful 
event par excellence, its frenetic production of novelty, attention, exaltation and electricity 
is to be constantly policed away, as we are to see soon, from any friction and thus ‘politico-
ethical’ potential.  
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Finally, it should be added that the form of the ME appears as an essentially nihilistic one: its 
existence (i.e. its justification) is always premised on a void, simultaneously posited and 
naturalised, with respect to which the ME itself emerges as a ‘ful-filling solution’. Compelling 
instance is Anderson and Holden’s analysing of the ‘hopefulness’ ME’s narratives produce, 
according to which a ‘present lack’ – e.g. the lack of global recognition (China), the image of 
a crime-ridden country (South Africa), or more simply the ‘need to regenerate’ a 
‘degenerate’ neighbourhood (London) – is connected to a future ‘non-yet’ which the ME will 
supposedly create.665 Complementary to the during-the-event management which I 
investigate below, this ‘preliminary’ management of expectations has a key role as a pre-
emptively immunising narrative.  
Let us take the most recent example, the London 2012 Olympics. In this case, the 
discrepancy between the narration of the here-and-now of London East End – characterised 
by lack of housing, facilities and development – and the vision of development and 
regeneration promised by the narratives of the 2012 London ‘Regeneration’ Games, opened 
a limbo of expectations and thus pre-dispositions to be affected by potential hopes, and 
thus a greater probability for the narrative of the ME itself to be accepted.666 In fact, such 
‘affective effervescence’ is what the brandscaping seeks to simultaneously keep open as 
well as ‘normalised’, protected and capitalisable. In a formula already stated, what is 
presupposed in advance is the very disposability of what, subsequently, it is intended to 
dispose of. For this reason among the most brilliant critiques of the 2012 Games have been 
those coming from artists whose work was not simply focused on socio-technical 
speculations on the potential negative effects of the Games (speculations which can always 
be countered by narratives of positive effects, i.e. legacy), but rather in contesting the 
preliminary ‘erasure’ which supported the whole narrative of the ‘regeneration games’. Just 
like their colonising ancestors, the LOCOG presupposed the evidence of a terra nullius in 
Hackney (a ‘wasteland’, a ‘void’, an ‘emptiness’, a ‘dead space’), on which to justify a priori 
its own version of regeneration.667 Instead of playing within this already-closed horizon 
(‘what is the best way to regenerate this wasteland’), and thus entering the debate as 
                                                          
665
See Anderson and Holden, ‘Affective Urbanism’, op. cit. 
666
ibid. p. 150: “Hope for Blanchot, then, is a type of relation that emerges only from some form of dissolution, 
from loss, disappearance, or damage. And it is this that makes so suggestive the resonance with regeneration.” 
See also Raco and Tunney (my emphasis) “[Legacy Reports] not only paint a bleak picture of the area’s 
marginal and invisible spaces but also set out a prophetic logic of ‘inevitability’ over the decline of existing 
manufacturers. This logic is then used to legitimate and justify their removal”, Mike Raco and Emma Tunney. 
‘Visibilities and Invisibilities in Urban Development: Small Business Communities and the London Olympics 
2012’. Urban Studies 47 (10) 2010, 2069–2091: p. 8; on “the disposition of hopefulness”, see also Ben 
Anderson, ‘Becoming and Being Hopeful: Towards a Theory of Affect’. Environment and Planning D: Society 
and Space 24 (5) 2006, 733-752: p. 746  
667
On the characterisation of the East End as ‘dead space’, see Raco and Tunney ‘Visibilities and Invisibilities’, 
op. cit. p. 2082 
177 
 
already-weakened actors, these critical artists exposed the already-existent tunings of the 
‘pre-Olympic’ space, the spaces and bodies of the city that were irreducible to being 
appropriated within the exceptional Olympic machine. Their 'resistance' was not only 
reduced to (rightfully) questioning the actual, socio-legal-economical consequences of the 
ME but, by emphasising the frictions produced by the ME’s re-tuning, gestured towards 
other forms of abstractions and normative tunings not always-already recuperated within 
the operational logic of techné. Hence the particular significance of their critiques, insofar as 
embodying a protest which, if on the one hand acts directly on the concrete space of the 
urban with artistic, ironical, demonstrative and sabotaging guerrilla-like initiatives of 
opposition to the ME-brandscaping, at the same time was directed towards its abstract 
form. In other words, this was not simply an attempt at re-imagining space, but rather an 
ontological challenge to the reality of the Olympian abstraction, piercing through its 
immanent closure by means of letting emerge the frictions that its smooth planning sought 
to defuse. It was the unquestioned consensus for its glorious techné (the self-fulfilling claim 
to have a solution in the form of a legacy, whereby urban space is de facto eliminated into a 
self-justificatory temporal horizon) that these initiatives indeed questioned, emphasising 
that beneath the a-political and technical debate on the hows there are ontological 
questions regarding the whys which must be posed. This is what is at stake in every urban 
'battle': the ‘right to create problems’ by defining the questions at stake in urban space.668  
This observation, whose consequences are to be fully unpacked in the final chapter, helps 
me qualifying that the understanding of ME I am proposing strives to eschew the 
temptation of apocalyptic, conspiratorial and revelatory approaches to which it is usually 
subjected in ‘critical’ milieux. The ’abstract structuring’ of the ME does not exhaust in any 
way the ‘productive possibilities’ of the urban, since each urban-wide process of re-tuning 
always emerges from and occurs within the complex, turbulent and conflictual spatialities of 
the city, and thus “is unavoidably ‘articulated with other, ‘non-capitalist’ social forms and 
relations; indeed it cannot reproduce itself without them”.669 This means that, regardless of 
their level of ‘exploitation’, ‘commodification’ and ‘securitisation’, MEs also provide 
glimpses of forms of being-together “emerg[ing] in the space between invisible resistance 
and normative hegemony” – i.e. in the space in which the urban tuning and the ME-
brandscaping encounter and clash –,that are alternative in both concrete and abstract 
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sense, and not merely in opposition, to the securitised and capitalised brandscaping of the 
ME itself.670  
The eventful potentialities of the urban do not surface, as either romantic or grand political 
positions suggest, only in spontaneous, unpredictable and/or politically explicit occurrences 
such as ‘retake the street’ parties, clandestine raves, mass demonstrations or indeed 
revolutions, but can also occur in the accurately pre-planned context of a ME. The urban 
always harbours unactualised potentialities. This is not easy romanticism or, as Harman 
polemically contends in another context, “a dodge that ... reduces what is currently actual 
to the transient costume of an emergent process across time, and makes the real work 
happen outside actuality itself”.671 Quite the contrary, it is an eminently strategic position, 
which assumes the atmo-rhythmical tunings of the urban, their creation and contestation, 
as the locus of ethico-political actions. It is by acting upon these tunings and their potentials, 
on the frictions they produce with abstract forms of control, that lies the potential for 
producing “particular way[s] of occupying, taking up, space-time, or inventing new space-
times”, for the good and for the bad.672 
For all these reasons, let me stress again the need for situated analyses, able to grasp the 
specificity of the battleground into which different abs-co-tractions clash, and thus to 
account for the tunings which emerge out of this atmo-rhythmical conflict. The 
methodological consequences of this observation are to be dealt with soon. Before that, I 
need to briefly position my effort vis-à-vis the ever-expanding area of research which could 
be tentatively defined as ME-urbanism, and that explores MEs with specific reference to 
what they mean and do for the host city. I will not embark in a recollection of all the 
different works in the area. Instead, I’ll briefly refer to three limits that they often betray, 




Situated in a niche of quasi-activism, works on ME-urbanism are certainly relevant in 
documenting/denouncing ME-related abuses, yet often betray a certain under-theorisation, 
limited to taking certain ideological frameworks (e.g. the ‘entrepreneurial city’ etc.) for 
granted, and uncritically copy-pasting them into the context of mega events, often assumed 
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as ‘Trojan horses’ fostering neoliberal politics of hyper-commercialisation and hyper-
securitisation.673 Especially as regards the latter, there is an ever-increasing body of works 
that look at the security strategies, practices and technologies implemented in the context 
of MEs, and that are significant in challenging the often a-critical acceptance of over-
securitisation that MEs trigger.674 Yet, even in this context the tendency is to present 
descriptive applications of existent theories of security and control by somehow taking for 
granted an over-simplistic correspondence between increase in security and decrease in 
freedom. This is a problem especially explicit in trans-national analysis where the tendency 
has usually been that of transferring patterns of ME-securitisation from one context to 
another, an even more problematic practice when this occurs along the ‘North-South’ 
axis.675 What is lost, among the amount of useful and insightful information provided, is a 
sense of the material unfolding of the ME itself, its contingent taking place. Few, moreover, 
are the works focusing on the convergence between legal, securitarian and economical 
strategies of urban control. Indeed, if this angle is rather uncommon in urban-studies, it 
seems almost inexistent in ‘ME-studies’.  
A second aspect is the lack a “more detailed insight into the ways in which people 
experience and cope with the splintering urban spheres of security on an everyday level”.676 
In other words, often missing is a more detailed and nuanced understanding of urban 
tunings and the way the ME interacts with, shapes and is shaped by them. Symptomatic is in 
this sense the scarcity of studies which deal with MEs securitisation (and more generally, 
with the ME-related implementation of the security-entertainment complex) during its 
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spatio-temporal occurrence, besides analyses of pre-ME security strategies, planning and 
abuses (displacements, evictions etc.)677, or post-ME legacies of legal, social and 
technological over-securitisation.678 Although from a different perspective, it is worth 
mentioning works such as those of Porter et al., on the emotional impact of ME-related 
displacement, and Raco and Tunney on the process of invisibilisation that Olympic discourse 
entails: these are significant contributions insofar as showing a particular sensibility towards 
the frictional space in which the ME encounters with the city – a sensibility that I wish to 
carry within my approach.679 
Third, simultaneously the consequence and the cause of the former limits, is the 
prioritisation of methodological approaches still relying on classical humanist sociological 
practice – as well as mainly concerned with the before-and-after phases of the ME – over 
less conventional post-humanist methodologies, also minimising the employment of 
ethnographic practice – whose role I deem crucial in addressing the event’s actual, 
contingent unfolding. There are very few ethnographic works addressing this dimension, 
e.g. the work of Frey and Macgilliray, Schreiber and Adang, Millward, focusing on the way 
events are enacted through promotional and securitarian means, how this impacts on fans 
perceptions and actions, and the way ‘security and entertainment’ institutions dealt with 
them.680 Taking inspiration from these works and aiming to widen their angle to the whole 
urban dimension, the following part of this chapter seeks to apply (and thus test) the 
framework so far developed to Johannesburg, investigating ethnographically the encounter 
and clash between the tune of the city and the retuning of the ME.  
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Something else orders and locates, gathers and 
situates, binds and distinguishes, sets the pace and the 
rhythm, but that something no longer has the shape of 





My urban methodology, consistent with the reflections so far developed, avoids ontological 
distinctions (and the related prioritisations) between social representations and individual 
practices, narratives, affects, rationalities, regulations, human and non-human objects.682 
Accounting for the ‘tuning’ of the city means to observe the way in which all the bodies of 
the urban get together in the performative, ongoing, open-ended dimension of everyday 
city-life, constituting different and more or less unstable assemblages. This requires a 
constructivism which, as already mentioned, is simultaneously more ‘abstract’ than naive 
empiricism and more ‘concrete’ than social constructivism.683 In his insightful book on ‘post-
methodology’, John Law convincingly challenges some methodological premises of social 
sciences from a radical actor-network perspective. Principally, he contests the taken-for-
granted assumption of an independent, definite, singular, anterior (to the observer) and 
constant reality. Instead, he observes that realities are continuously produced by a set of 
assumptions, practices, arrangements, an assemblage which is necessarily ontologically 
incomplete, vague, indefinite, contingent: “if things seem solid, prior, independent, definite 
and single then perhaps this is because they are being enacted, and re-enacted, in practices. 
Practices that continue. And practices that are also multiple”.684 This does not lead to a 
post-modern abdication of research in the face of the absolute relativism of flows. Solidity, 
whilst not dependent on an anterior and external reality, is not an illusion of the observer, 
but rather is the result of the crystallisation of heterogeneous elements into given 
assemblages, that is, of a sedimentation produced by habits and routines which efface the 
co-constructed nature of assemblages, but for this very fact always contains lines of escape, 
points of rupture and reformulation.685 
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I am extremely sympathetic with Law's approach although, for the reason above exposed, I 
am sceptical with the ontological presupposition that animates it. His radical relationalism 
deprives external things of their own reality. Their ‘solidity’ is taken only as the result of a 
more or less stable crystallisation behind which, however, lies the nothingness of their 
purely ‘relational substance’ (i.e. an oxymoronic reality). As showed above, this is a 
problematic presupposition. The reduction of bodies to their relations exposes them to 
potential categorisation, appropriation, capitalisation... It prefigures the possibility to 
define, control and indeed 'produce' them through the modulation of relations – and as 
such it is ethically problematic. To be sure, Law vehemently opposes any of these outcomes, 
and his book is indeed a passionate attack to the 'will to know' that permeates social 
sciences, a desire which is systematically pit against a complexity of events exceeding our 
capacity to know them.686 Yet, this is not enough. The ontological role that relationalism 
plays vis-à-vis control should not be overlooked. Arguably it is on this basis that the 
unwitting complicity between post-structural academy and sophisticated forms of control 
rests, and it is especially on the methodological ground that it is to be challenged.687 
This means that my endorsement of Law's approach as well as my use of some of his 
methodological suggestions is attuned by a different orientation, probably difficult to 
appreciate vis-à-vis the practical unfolding of the ethnographic fieldwork here presented, 
and yet significant with respect to the ethical attitude that aliments it. Our incapacity to 
know reality, I contend, is not simply due to its plasmatic fluidity, but to the ultimate fact 
that whilst bodies are always involved in some sort of relation, they are never fully defined 
by them, and certainly not by our relation to them. The ethical attitude behind such 
endeavour, therefore, is not the iconoclastic optimism of ‘relational’ approaches, looking for 
solidities perennially hanging on the void which their fully relational structures implicitly 
presuppose, but instead a sort of ‘methodological pessimism’, fully aware of the 
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impossibility to extrapolate the singularity of reality into whatever methodological 
template. Here pessimism is, as in Leopardi’s famous definition, truly cosmic, in the sense of 
being radically open to one's situatedness in a world that is never reducible to our relations 
to it, absolutely not for us. Not a negative denial but rather the unavoidable acceptance of 
the materiality of our taking place. In the sense Masciandaro elaborates from Cioran:  
The real significance of cosmic pessimism lies less in doctrine than in its conscious 
disowning of the comprehensiveness of knowledge in the name of an ineradicable gap 
between science and its event, between knowing and the capacity to know ... showing, 
outside the parameters of formal proof, the non-philosophizability of the universe688 
Although I will develop the ethico-political nuance of this orientation in the next chapter, 
here I assume it as a call for a method which does not ‘pursuit or follow after’ something 
(meta-hodos), does not analyse the city as a closed system in which to apply the ‘right 
technique’ of knowing, but rather strives to ‘make space’ for the eventful contingency of the 
urban, i.e. what always escape its relational closure. 
 
2. 
When we define the Commune ... we will not leave the 
other aspects of the events: we will forget neither its 
antecedent and circumstances, not the relations 
between people and groups and the ideas that took 
part in action, not finally the demand of analysis and 
historical accounts. But we intend to show how Paris 




I believe ethnography is almost a necessity if we are to consistently explore the immersive 
and tuned materiality of the urban. Taking for granted the need to avoid the ‘immortal’ 
yearning of certain methodological presuppositions, such ethnography should avoid 
explaining away the field into supra-structures as well as losing touch with the 
phenomenological ‘this-ness’ of the urban, whilst at the same time eschewing any 
temptation towards the exaltation the field per se, i.e. its fetishisation (the holy grail of the 
here-and-now).690 Thus, an ethnography focused simultaneously on the different ‘scales’ of 
the urban, the excessive frictions that constantly problematise both structures and 
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relations.691 What matters is not really knowing a substantial, abstract or relational reality, 
but rather letting the contradiction, frictions and eventfulness of such reality emerge.692 
Making space for the conflictual coming-together of urban bodies, for the frictions between 
the different tunings traversing the urban. As Doel emphatically suggests, this is “our duty as 
geographers ... simply to make space for the deforming force of alterity”.693 
For me, this has meant immersing within the tuning of Johannesburg, through the web of 
overlapping official and unofficial advises, coming from the street and institutions, from 
every class, race and profession, from the policeman to the academics to the squatter, the 
‘safety tips’, the foreign and national media, the special legislations, the geographical, 
architectural and infrastructural elements, the changes of light and density of human and 
non-human objects etc., all intersecting, contrasting and somewhat held together into the 
consistent normativity of a ‘tune’. The impossibility for the ethnographer to claim any 
neutrality was self-evident: this was no ethnography to be conducted from the ‘Cartesian 
window’ of Lefebvre, but rather an immersive stance, understanding myself as a body 
among other bodies, willing to intervene, touch, provoke and breach à la Garfinkel, 
experimenting with the potentialities of the urban rather than merely “glancing intently at” 
them from above.694 Yet, this was no “just glancing around” either.695 As any other 
inhabitant, my being-in-the-city neither consists in determined ‘reactions and adjustments’, 
nor in ‘intentional and teleological acts’, but rather in contingent responses to the spatiality 
of the city, to its tunings.696 Yet, researching the urban cannot be reduced to simple 
spontaneity and exaltation of immediacy. This would mean merely shifting from the 
untenable externality of the objective observer to the overwhelming proximity of the urban 
stroller.697 Immersed into, and exposed to the urban, I could not simply get carried away like 
a flaneur. Needed was another sort of passivity with respect to the latter, not understood in 
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opposition to ‘activity’, but rather in the sense of a ‘passability’, that is, making oneself 
traversable (passable) by the tuning of the city, developing a sort of "affectivity to a number 
of external fluxes”.698 As Law puts it, the researcher must become a ‘research tool’, a ‘radio 
receiver’ constantly attuning to – and thus accounting for – the frequencies of the urban 
and the way s/he is tuned by them.699 Just like a surfer, the ethnographic researcher is 
willing to attune to the tune, to the waves of the city, but also aims to respond to and ride 
those waves, to stand on them skilfully and critically.700  
In this way, perhaps, the excessive eventfulness of the urban can be addressed, that is, 
letting it emerge by methodologically attuning to it. Yet, how to express this attunement 
into an empirical account? How to write this ‘chaotic experience’ without at the same time 
‘pacifying’ it, that is, depriving it from its frictions, conflictuality, eventfulness? Perhaps, it is 
useful to understand this process as the drawing of a sort of ‘commentary’ of the urban. A 
commentary to an implicit text, that is. In his geo-philosophical elaboration of the genre, 
Masciandaro explains that a true commentary never attempts to go beyond, behind or 
below the text in order to find hidden meanings. It rather “stays within its text”.701 This is 
what geo-philosophy means: neither to flee, nor to ascend, but rather to stay within the 
urban, to remain, since  
staying with the earth is the means of not remaining stuck on it … staying within the encounter 
of the crux and passing through its difficulty (ex-per-ientia, coming out of and going through) … 
the geophilosopher is one who experiences rather than flees the earth, who passes through by 
remaining with it702 
This affirmation of immanence as literally in-manere (to stay within, to remain) is the 
affirmation of a method that wishes to ‘stay with the urban without ‘getting stuck’ on it, 
thus avoiding the result-obsessed tendency of academic methodology without falling into a 
mere wandering for its own sake, that is, beyond presumptuous and arbitrary attempts to 
structure the world, as well as naive and/or lazy renunciations to understand it: not getting 
carried away in some accelerationist hubris, but rather “to maintain oneself in the Outside, 
but to hold oneself close, thus to some degree closed, and thus to discipline into writing a 
chaotic experience.”703 Stewart usefully terms this task an attempt to produce a “writing 
and theorising that tries to stick with something becoming atmospheric [...] approaching the 
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thing that is happening by attuning to it”.704 Making space for these tunings to emerge, 
therefore, means to constantly challenge one’s own personal ‘state of exception’, i.e. one’s 
own subject position, tentatively reasserting the evental viewpoint of one’s own 
situatedness: not as a subject in the city, but a body among other bodies. This is what a 
commentary applied to the urban should be, paraphrasing Masciandaro: a practice which 
“materializes the movement, the flow of the [urban] that makes it more than itself … 
[thereby holding] open the event of the [urban]” without simply succumbing to a drifting 
per se or to Joycean soliloquy, but rather generating “more and more perceptual enclosures, 
spaces within which the unrepresentable is brought into presence”.705 
Hence the style of my commentary, at the same time accounting for my own singular 
experiencing of the city, as well as expressing its real abstract forms, a style that oscillates 
between the unavoidable singularity and partiality of its situatedness, and yet can also 
obtain an elevate degree structuredness, as in the way it describes the ‘Joburg tune’, since 
the point is certainly not that of emancipating methodology from order, rigour and 
structures, but simply from their tendency to suffocate the eventful potential of the urban 
into neutralising accounts.706  
 
3. 
knowing the city is dependent on attunement to a 
particular wavelength, a process involving the 





In the specific, as a means of recording and reflecting I employed memory, notebooks, 
pictures and videos. To complement these outputs, I carried out about 50 ‘vox pop’ 
interviews with randomly selected people (from fans to security guards). With respect to in-
depth interviews, this seemed the most appropriate technique, as Frew and McGillivray 
suggest, in order to capture the fleeting ‘festival atmosphere’ of the city and the way it 
overlaps with the practices and perceptions of security.708 Furthermore, I analysed various 
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documents (online and offline safety tips, fan guides, media reports, promotional, 
informative and legal material, etc.) – selected through a “convenience sampling approach”, 
i.e. according to their relevance to the research – forming the assemblage of official and 
unofficial, public and private texts through which the normative tuning of the city is 
produced.709 Special attention has been given to the immunising character of the latter, due 
to the crucial significance it assumes in the context of Johannesburg. My purpose was not 
simply to understand how people “think and experience” the city, but rather to explore 
“how meaning is produced and sustained in-the-moment”,710 out of the getting-together of 
different bodies in atmo-rhythmical tunings, by means of attuning to “the latent potentiality 
in a situation”.711 For this reason, rather than subjecting those texts to exhaustive content 
analysis, I joined them in a ‘method assemblage’ constituted by the various research 
outputs – observations, notes, pictures, interpretations, documents, interviews – constantly 
re-shuffled in a feedback-loop between personal account, self-introspection and analytical 
interpretation.712 
Finally, a last remark. I am aware, how could not I be, of the different ways in which blacks 
and whites, Western tourists and African migrants, gated communities and township 
dwellers attune to and are tuned by the atmo-rhythms of the city. It would be extremely 
imprecise and naive to pretend to extrapolate my ethnography from the fact of me being a 
foreigner, in the country only for a limited amount of time, and lacking an in-depth 
knowledge of its intricate social and historical evolution. Any pretence of exhaustiveness, 
completeness or generalisation would be highly untenable. Yet, my situation also provided 
some advantages. Sloterdijk suggests that the condition of a foreign visitor of a city, 
characterised by increased vulnerability, heightened attentiveness and little entanglement 
with the urban routines, is a privileged position to experience its normative tension: the 
latter, if often imperceptible to the local, is materially felt by the foreigner.713 In this sense 
the way in which I could experience my own immersion into a web of advises, tricks, 
suggestions and regulations, as well as fragmented imaginaries, concatenated into the 
tuning of Johannesburg, could be said to have some empirical value, at least. 
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The Joburg Tune 
 
China Miéville’s novel The City and the City is set in two overlapping cities, Beszel 
and UlQoma. Although there are ‘total’ areas, belonging ‘only’ to Beszel or 
UlQoma, for the most part the cities are ‘crosshatched’, sharing the same 
overlapping buildings, streets, parks. Seeing the other city however, is illegal: the 
citizens have learned to unsee the other city’s human and non-human bodies, 
and violations are promptly addressed by a policing entity called Breach. 
Visitors, as we may imagine, have a hard time. Visa procedures are long and 
tough, and include a mandatory training as well as an exam with theoretical and 
practical role-play parts to check the degree of one’s attunement. This assures 
that visitors “would know, at least in outline, key signifiers of architecture, 
clothing, alphabet and manner, outlaw colours and gestures, obligatory details 
[…] distinguishing Beszel and UlQoma, and their citizens”.714 Although they 
would be unable, after such a short course, to “have metabolized the deep 
prediscoursive instinct for our borders that Besz and UlQomans have, to have 
picked up the real rudiments of unseeing”, they would be supposed to act as 
they had, expected to comply with the tuning of the city, and pretending not to 
see and experience, though unable to actually unsee and un-experience, the 
other, ‘crosshatched’ city.715 
 
1. 
Johannesburg loses its original contours, is reduced to 
an empty set, or, paradoxically, gains depth. By forcing 
the city to open up, this process of deframing and 
enframing has set different repertoires of spatial 




After the Apartheid, Johannesburg confronted a dramatic spatial crisis: with the dissolution 
of the former state (of exception), the multiple spatialities of the country, hitherto frozen by 
the Apartheid rule, literally exploded opening an unstable limbo of ‘weakened immunity’.717 
The ensuing deterritorialisation of the urban was only partially, patchily reterritorialised by 
the tentative constitutional, securitarian and urban planning efforts that ensued. Whilst 
                                                          
714
Mieville, The City & The City op. cit. p. 76 
715
Ibid: p. 93 
716
Achille Mbembe, ‘Aesthetics of Superfluity’, Public Culture 16 (3) 2004, 373-405: pp. 399-400, 402: “The 
space inherited from the apartheid city is either drawn out and stretched, or the links of each part of the city 
with what used to be the whole are interrupted or saturated. … The architecture of hysteria in contemporary 
South Africa is the result of a painful, shocking encounter with a radical alterity set loose by the collapse of the 
racial city”. 
717
See Achille Mbembe, On the Postcolony (University of California Press, 2001)  
189 
 
spectacularly re-established in the form of a monumental constitution, the legal sovereignty 
faced an unavoidable erosion of legitimacy and national cohesion, failing for a long time to 
crystallise into standardised patterns of application, and thus having each time to 
precariously and tentatively take place in the uncertain and contingent multiplicity of the 
city. In this destabilised post-apartheid space, increasingly fragmented and privatised 
through economical, legal and securitarian devices, unauthorised normativities began to 
emerge. Not a direct result of top-down interventions, these exceptional tunings are 
explicitation of the 'immanent ordering logic' of the city, post-sovereign configurations of an 
immanent and impersonal power “whose role is no longer one of authorising or authoring 
imperatives, but of internally discovering and communicating information in view of 
‘common survival’”.718 
How to account for them? If in the introduction I referred to the necessity to overcome 
urban studies’ ‘fixation with the binary’,719 this is an even more pressing need when dealing 
with a city like Johannesburg, which by definition escapes stereotypical academic modes of 
thinking usually framed according to the Western image of the city. Let us for instance see 
how Michael Watts, criticising a piece by Nuttall and Mbembe, describes it:  
a particular sort of hybrid of urban involution [...] weak citizenship, and limited 
governmentality [to] the extent to which a Foucauldian reading of Johannesburg – a 
rendering of the city and its subjects visible and regulated – is inadequate even within 
the circumference of Africa’s most modern metropolis.720 
What here is taken for granted is an equivalence between the notions of order and 
regulation and those of institutionalisation and formality, with the corollary of finding only 
disorder, precariousness and unpredictability where a strong institutional presence – in the 
form of law, policing, social state and so on – appears to be lacking.721 Contrary to that, I 
stress that visibilities, regulations and orderings emerge out of the urban fabric as result of 
heterogeneous concatenations of different bodies organised in tunings in which the direct 
role, or even presence, of institutions is not to be taken for granted. In this sense, 
Matshikiza’s claim, that “no one has really been able to wrestle Johannesburg into any kind 
of civilised order”,722 should be only accepted if we link the formula ‘civilised order’ to its 
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Western origin: that Johannesburg has never achieved – and probably never will – such an 
order is true: that, however, does not imply that Johannesburg is just a ‘disorderly city’.723 In 
the city order and disorder intersect in specific atmo-rhythms, which cannot be evaluated 
according to an urban evolutionary chart going from sheers chaos to ‘civilised’ order. When 
Alan Smart suggests that “we need to pay more attention to areas in which control seems to 
be conspicuously absent, where neglect is more apparent than surveillance’”,724 Watts adds 
“neglect, but also incapacity, incompetence, and inability”.725 This is not the point. Smart’s 
observation should be instead assumed as a call for developing “ways of seeing and 
engaging urban spaces that are characterized simultaneously by regularity and 
provisionality”, that is, way of attuning to and accounting for the immanent and 
unauthorised normativity of the city.726 Take for instance Simone’s analysis of Johannesburg 
inner city, where regularities appear to emerge out of multiple negotiations with the 
environment, from a capacity to interpret and improvise rather than a strict compliance to 
institutional rules. Surely open and flexible, these are orderings nonetheless, rhythmically 
organising the urban experience. Let us quote him fully:  
it is important to emphasize that these flexible configurations are pursued not in some 
essential contrast to non-African urban priorities or values but as specific routes to a 
kind of stability and regularity that non-African cities have historically attempted to 
realize … a conjunction of heterogeneous activities … capable of generating social 
compositions across a range of singular capacities and needs (both enacted and virtual) 
and which attempts to derive maximal outcomes from a minimal set of elements.727 
This approach is even more important whether we refer to issues of social control and 
security. In fact, in (usually paranoid) accounts of urban securitisation, the opposition 
between panoptical surveillance and institutional control and, on the other hand, 
‘disordered and chaotic’ everyday life, is often taken for granted. The corollary is a narrative 
of over-securitisation according to which the increase of institutional control unavoidably 
leads to freedom-reduction, as if freedom would only reside in disorder, informality would 
necessarily lack of order, or indeed security and freedom would be mutually excluding. This 
narrative misses the fact that formal and informal practices intersect and re-configure the 
way the city is experienced in different, often unexpected ways. Security and liberty, 
freedom and self-regulation, order and disorder are in constant interplay, enacted and re-
enacted in contingent assemblages that static dichotomies cannot account for. As 
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mentioned above, topical is the case of mega events, where the increase in social control 
and spatial securitisation tends to be always framed as unavoidably oppressive for the 
citizens. To be sure, this could often be the case. However, and especially vis-à-vis urban 
South, a blind transposition of worn-out equivalences – as the usual pre-supposition that 
any technological, legal and sociological ‘security legacies’ of a ME are necessarily negative – 
should be avoided. What if, for instance, ‘enduring legacies’ of ME-securitisation would not 
produce an oppressive rise of self-regulatory behaviour, but rather allow for its relaxation? 
The challenge is to find a way to observe how these contradictory tendencies unfold 
immanently in the city. This is what I propose to do through the notion of urban tuning, that 
in the next section I use to explore the ‘immunological’ tuning emerged out of the 
‘weakened immunity’ of Johannesburg.728 
 
2. 
Back in my country everybody was telling me I was 




Going to Johannesburg is to become attuned to an atmosphere of alertness where one 
dwells already before touching the South African ground. Affective flows of panic and 
danger, media-ted and anecdotal reports of violence, statistical evidences: all these 
together forming an assemblage of crime-ridden South Africa which is not simply 
‘representational’ or ‘meta-discursive’, but ‘carries an affective charge’: “not only an 
imagined space [but] also a space of affective materiality actualised through the ongoing 
movement of bodies”, producing a “distributed space of expectancy existing as a diffuse 
field of potential”.730 The country’s most notorious town already awaits its visitors as a 
‘menacing monster’, its atmosphere of real even if non-actual danger constantly haunting 
one’s being-in-Joburg.731 Like a visitor of Beszel, attuning to the syncopated rhythm of the 
city means to undergo a ‘training’, through the tide of overlapping narratives, practices, 
advices, official and unofficial ‘safety tips’, rules of seeing and unseeing... 
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A qualification is needed. Although these features (safety tips etc.) are common to many 
other countries, as a quick visit on official embassy websites around the world would show, 
their amount and the prominence they have in South Africa and most notably in 
Johannesburg is peculiar, as is the level of awareness by both citizens and visitors about 
them – virtually every visitor I talked to knew and to some extent complied with them. 
Therefore, their significant contribution to the tuning of the city is incontestable. Moreover, 
as my observation confirmed, remarkable is the correspondence between official and 
unofficial safety tips, and the word-of-mouth advises coming, often unprompted, from any 
social and racial background. What lacks, in other words, is the usual discrepancy between 
over-paranoid advises appearing on official sources and the counter-balancing reassurances 
coming from the street: in Joburg there is a quasi-literal correspondence between the two 
sets of advises, formal and informal, official and unofficial, oral and written, narratives and 
practices, the different levels overlapping and reinforcing each other by tuning the city onto 
a peculiar atmo-rhythm.  
What I call the Joburg Tune (JT) is an atmo-rhythm of attention, interpretation, anxiety and 
syncopation, a wavelength shaping (though not determining) the way the city is experienced 
and lived. It is simultaneously affective and dromological, phenomenological and ecological: 
socio-cultural representations, density of people, historical memories, changes of light, 
buildings, fear, suspicion, walls, global flows, ways of saying and seeing, urban interventions, 
commodification, the way of feeling and walking the city... A coming-together of bodies, 
practices and affectivities that intersect, overlap and crystallise in constituting the JT, to 
which our being-in-the-city soon becomes attuned and unstably immunised. To be sure, the 
JT should not be understood as a meta-discursive frame filtering out subject’s perception, or 
as a hidden logic the inhabitants unconsciously follow. It is instead an atmo-rhythm where 
sensing and sensed, conscious and unconscious blur. There is more than a Goffmanesque 
interaction-order at work here: neither only a set of rules we rationally decide to follow, nor 
simply subjects pragmatically choosing to inter-act in a certain way, but a pervasive ‘menace 
mood’ holding bodies in the tension of an effervescent state of alertness from which we 
cannot simply opt out.732 Like a diver in the water, we have to inhabit by attuning to it, by 
responding, complying with or swerving from its impersonal imperatives of coping and 
attention, care and vigilance, showing confidence and being suspicious. The attentive reader 
could note that in the description that follows the pre-eminence given to the web of 
advices, tips etc. through which a visitor ‘attunes’ to the ordering of the city, apparently 
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sidelines the role of law in producing the tune. Yet, as just suggested, it is important not to 
reduce the analysis of law only to its texts and formal legal apparatuses, but rather to look 
at the way normativity emerges in less obvious ways. In the weakened immunity of 
Johannesburg, this ‘web of advices etc.’ appears as the very way in which the immunological 
ordering of the city operationally unfolds, the way in which bodies immanently attune to the 
city’s nomotopic tensions. In this sense, rather than side-lining the legal discourse, the 
Joburg Tune is an attempt to investigate it more deeply, in its material and affective sense. 
Notwithstanding the unavoidable differences in which this normative materiality is dealt 
with in the city, I propose to describe it through three overlapping ‘keys’, which I treat 




I. Develop an awareness of what people in the street around you are doing734 
 
Since from the start – “be particularly aware at airports and transport hubs: you’ll be most 
vulnerable when you first arrive”735  – a ‘constant state of preparedness’ is produced by the 
constellation of formal and informal advises, warnings, clues, tips.736 The advices to develop 
‘an awareness of what people in the street around you are doing’ is complemented by the 
discouraging of the interaction with, and trust for, others: “be aware of your surrounding” 
pairs with “don’t let strangers get too close to you – especially people in groups”.737 
Therefore: “don’t walk alone” and “beware of anyone asking you for help”.738 “It may sound 
harsh, but ignore anyone stopping you in the street and asking you to, say, sponsor them for 
a scholarship or other such good cause, and never give cash to anyone begging”.739 
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Attuning to this menace mood means to be an attentive interpreter, scanning the space for 
menace and trickery.740 A position incidentally shared along socio-economical lines: the 
constant awareness of the visitors scanning the environment for trouble is somewhat 
mirrored by the African migrants’ “need for maintaining hyperawareness of their 
surroundings […] constantly on the lookout for police officers”.741 The key condition here is 
alertness. In post-9/11 if-you-see-you-report Western societies we have become 
accustomed to slightly dystopian depictions of a sociality characterised by what Lianos and 
Douglas termed dangerisation, i.e. the tendency “to perceive and analyse the world through 
categories of menace”.742 If in many metropolises of the North such atmosphere is often to 
be found only in the paranoid depictions of academics and activists, its density and 
pervasiveness in Johannesburg is incontestable, where it weights over bodies as a set of 
potential, always on the brink of being actualised dangers that carry “an affective charge, 
heightening their expectancy and mobilising affects of fear.”743 
 
II. You have to rhythmise yourself 
 
In the urban spatiality sensibilities and materialities overlap in a continual, resonating 
movement out of which a tune emerges and through which certain ‘subjectivities’ crystallise: 
how is one supposed to act, to be actor in the city? The key condition is confidence, as 
obsessively reminded by everyone and most eloquently stated to me by a policeman: ‘never 
look disorientated, always look confident [...] you don't have to seem that you don't know 
where to go [...] you have to rhythmise yourself’.744‘Try not to look like a tourist’, as every 
guide suggests. The synoptical presentation of one-self as ‘confident’ overlaps with the 
panoptical scanning of the environment to decrypt potential menace: an attentive going 
with the flow in which can be recognised the properly post-modern way to live the city in the 
age of uncertainty. 
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As in every other town, official and unofficial narratives produce an imagined geography that 
gains reality by producing concatenations with the physical one. Fear and safety play an 
important role in this process. Every city has its own notorious areas. Yet it is the 
pervasiveness of this mapping that characterises the peculiarity of Johannesburg. Not 
simply, of course, a matter of standard advises against going to the dangerous suburb or the 
deprived township. Here, the whole city becomes a map of ‘potential curfews’. As one could 
expect, different people do different mappings, often dependent on their socio-economical, 
racial as well as experiential background. A street which is an utter danger for one, can 
become perfectly safe for another. Yet everybody experiences dangerous spaces whose 
categorisation as safe or unsafe can may shift depending from day and night, the density of 
people and so on. Nobody seems to ultimately contest the geography of danger of 
Johannesburg: the different mappings never remove, simply shift the spatial threshold 
between the safe and the unsafe in the city. 
What is the rhythm that such mappings ‘force’ on the movement of bodies? The logic is: 
‘plan your route in advance’. No city for flaneurs. Walking in the city is supposed to be a 
highly structured, pre-arranged experience, a point-to-point endeavour to be performed 
quickly and self-confidently, zigzagging through no-go and better-not-to-go areas: pre-
planning, no asking no phoning no map-checking: “Do not stop to ask for directions”.746 In 
fact, as Vladislavic reminds in his intimate portrait of Johannesburg, “asking for direction, 
city people ... declare their vulnerability”.747 Walking itself is deemed a sort of enterprise – 
“get advice from your hotel prior to embarking on foot” –, to be avoided if possible.748 
Likewise public transport, particularly the notorious old Toyota 13-seater taxies, is usually 
advised against, especially at night. Moving in the city has a pre-planned, motorised and 
privatised rhythm centred on cars, whose movement is as much tuned to a state of 
alertness: drive smoothly through the city, “fasten your seatbelt, lock your door and only 
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leave your window open about 5 cm [...] Be aware of you surrounding when you stop at a 
robot or stop street”.749 The key condition here is pre-planning: “everyone becomes a route 
planner in the dense traffic of crime and disorder”.750 
 
4. 
Day after day I begin to understand the imposed 
rhythm of Joburg, its written and unwritten code 
mapping the city according to light and darkness, 
density and emptiness, speed and slowness, 
danger and safety.751 
 
As in Caldeira’s Sao Paulo – where crime and violence are everyday dealt with through 
“narratives and practices [which] impose partitions, build up walls, delineate and enclose 
spaces, establish distances, segregate, differentiate, impose prohibitions, multiply rules of 
avoidance and exclusion, and restrict movement ... simplify and enclose the world”752 –, the 
JT appears as the ordering of a ‘disorderly city’, generating, modulating, fixating atmo-
rhythmical patterns which simultaneously lubricate and immunise the everyday life. 
In the city’s post-Apartheid patchwork of malls and townships, gated communities and 
Business Districts, insufficient transport systems and huge highways, the JT surfaces as an 
affective mood sensible to changes of light, cop uniforms, the increasing or decreasing 
density of people... as well as a syncopated rhythm of point-to-point movement, speeds and 
slownesses, moving fast, minimising the stops, then to relax in atmospherically-sealed 
interiors, a rhythm of cars and malls and cautious, attentive walking. In this sense, a ‘double-
rhythm’, as what Prior distinguishes in London between the ‘turbulent rhythm of the 
metropolis’ and the ‘quiet rhythm of civic humanism [...] and professional control’ of the 
National Gallery.753 The JT entails a modality of inhabiting-the-city by ‘generating 
redundancy’, extracting flows from the multiplicity of the city, dynamically shaping them 
into certain rhythmic and atmospheric patterns, tuning the urban experience into a shared 
frequency which works to eliminate the risk of chance: its “different timings and spacings 
produc[e] the ordinary”, differentiating it from – as well as constituting – the un-usual, the 
extra-ordinary, the dangerous: the routinised experience of being-in-the-city increasingly 
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takes the form of a ‘bubbled experience’, screening from, as well as propelling the 
perception of danger.754 According to an already-observed mechanism, the reduction of 
noise is bound to its simultaneous re-production in the form of insecurity, fear and thus 
vulnerability. Reactive attempts to escape the unstable ‘outside’ into the insulated comforts 
of gated suburbs, shopping malls and other armoured bubbles, beneath the temporary 
relaxation and escape from its oppressing mood they seemingly offer, only reinforce the JT 
itself by confirming its ‘double’ rhythm. 
From the 'immunological' perspective provided by Sloterdijk, the JT appears as perfectly 
consistent with the immanent, exceptional tunings in which the contemporary metropolis is 
ordered: in fact, in the post-holistic world “immunity and integrity are not to be gained from 
the submission to a larger whole, but must be achieved as the outcome of a personal effort 
of seclusion,” that is, through an eminently individual way to immunisation tied to neo-
liberal logics and grounded on the individual ability to develop the skills and obtain the tools 
of private defence.755 In this context flexibility becomes precariousness, as the neoliberal 
responsibilisation for security generates “self-perpetuating cycles of activity which makes 
‘security’ less a stable condition of well-being and more a state of endless striving”.756 Ever 
more evident this appears in the 'weakened immunity' of Johannesburg, traversed by 
private bubbles moving through an insecure public space whose enormous socio-
economical disparities are mirrored by the unequal degree of immunity available, a different 
ability (and possibility) to surf the noisy urbanity of the city: if Apartheid as a juridico-
political system had crumbled, an invisible Apartheid is still looming over the psycho-
geography of the city in the form of an exceptional tuning in which consumption and 
immunity strictly overlap.757 Walking in some areas of the notorious CBD (City Business 
District) means having to constantly negotiate between the contingency of here-and-now – 
with all its encounters, details and occurrences – and the ever-present potentiality of a 
violence which, when occurring, is often assumed as ‘deserved’. Here lies the ‘weight’ of the 
JT: not simply the result of the anxiety it generates but more importantly of the layer of 
responsibility it secretes. Failing to attune, being out-of-sync, is perceived as an 
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unacceptable irresponsibility to the point of ‘deserving’ the crime. As the individual of 
neoliberal globalisation is supposed to be always motivated, learning, optimistic and 
responsible, with meritocracy surging as quintessential value, the individual of this state of 
crisis must always be on alert, concerned about his own immunity and under constant moral 
examination: ‘do not become a crime victim’.758 
I should qualify that I do not wish to suggest an excessively totalising, deterministic or 
pacifying understanding of the JT. Certainly the JT provides a stabilising frequency around 
which the city organises itself, its syncopated rhythm continuously traverses, constituting – 
and being constituted by – the atmospheres of alertness and scanning, suspicion and 
mistrust overlapping in Johannesburg. Yet, at the same time it is constantly overflown by 
the excessiveness of urban. The conflictuality of the city can only be traversed but never 
actually sedated by the tune, constantly punctuated and dislocated by frictions and always 
potentially open to contestation. In fact, transgressing the tune equates to performing a 
‘breach’ (as in Mièville’s book) which often triggers a response from the city itself. The JT is 
an exceptional tuning insofar as it internalises frictions as a self-regulating system, as if 
'sensing' the differences and discrepancies in the "environment that trigger self-organising 
processes”.759 From an impersonal and machinic perspective, its way to responding to 
transgressions can be understood as amounting to both actualising of dangers (anecdotal 
and statistical evidences of violence are everywhere) as well as preventing them from 
occurring through a sort of caring response whereby the out-of-sync individual is ‘re-
immunised’ – a caring response, of course, which is again strongly influenced by class and 
racial belonging, thus reinforcing the invisible apartheid above referred to.760 In my surely 
privileged condition of European visitor, I experienced this caring response in the form of 
unprompted help by random passers-by, taxi drivers, volunteers, all willing to help me by 
informing, advising and even escorting me whether my actions appeared as out-of-tune, or 
my presence in a certain area was out-of-place, and thus potentially in danger. Interestingly, 
this modality of transgression had a neatly different meaning during apartheid, when, 
“because of the logic of segmentarity and overlapping divisions, crossing boundaries, 
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transgressing them, or eluding them became the main modality of action for blacks in the 
city”.761 If transgressing the spatiality of Apartheid was a common act of political resistance, 
transgressing the invisible Apartheid of the JT seems to be reduced to a private matter of 
irresponsibility.  
In this context, rhetorical affirmation such as the following – "this event [the World Cup] 
provides us with a chance to reinforce the sense of nationhood. We will have an opportunity 
to mobilise our people to create a sense of belonging"762 – should not be simply dismissed 
as smokescreen concealing a reality of capitalistic exploitation. If this cynicism has clearly 
more than a point, that is not all. Could we not read such a ‘sense of belonging’ as a willing 
attempt to challenge the private precariousness of insecurity instituted by the tune, towards 
a way of being together in which antagonism is not eschewed privately but dealt with 
commonly? Or instead is this just a call for a denial of the tune itself, a doomed attempt to 
conceal its oppressive and discriminating logic onto the narcosis of consensus? Certainly, in 
order to address this question it is necessary to understand how the WC-brandscaping 
encountered and clashed with the JT. It is by looking at this complex and contingent 
encounter that the next section progresses, firstly by introducing the general meaning of the 
2010 World Cup vis-à-vis South Africa, and then seeking to define in what way the 
brandscaping enacted by the World Cup as a city-wide effort of atmo-rhythmical 
management intersected, impacted and coped with the immanent normativities of the city. 
How a certain atmosphere of safety and enthusiasm was south to be implemented (through 
legal, promotional, technological and spatial means), and what did actually emerge from the 
specific assemblages of human, nonhuman and discursive bodies, in the performative and 
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World Cup Brandscaping 
 
2010 has become the benchmark against which 
everything in South Africa is measured
763
 
The chosen theatre of megalomania –  the dictatorial – 
is no longer politics but entertainment
764 
 
Well before touching the South African soil international media helped me 
visualise the potential nightmare I was heading for. Under the reassuring 
headline “Why Going to South Africa for the World Cup Terrifies Me”, Louise 
Taylor was briefly summarising that “Statistics, anecdotes and research suggest 
that touring the Rainbow nation as a fan next summer could be a dangerous 
option”.765 If security is an unavoidable issue in a country with worrying crime-
rates and a deeply entrenched culture of violence produced by a turbulent past 
joined by huge levels of socio-economical disparities, war-zone-like description 
were perhaps a step too far. Few weeks before the event, the security-firm G4S 
decided to renounce to take part at the event. Its CEO, Nick Buckles, stated "we 
are not going to be involved because we don't think the security is going to be 
that good -- they are not that well organised yet”, adding that “for G4S, South 
Africa was the most dangerous country in the world to work in – ahead of Iraq 
and Afghanistan – with around two staff fatalities every month.”766 The 
Telegraph was pretty discouraging as well, with an article apocalyptically titled: 
“World Cup 2010: England fans 'virtually certain' to die in South Africa”.767 
Another security firm, Baysecur, was adding to the global paranoia by suggesting 
that “the possibility for the players of moving outside of the hotel boundaries 
should be kept to a minimum. Otherwise there must be a full escort; armed 
security guards and bullet-proof vests for the players”.768 In fact, the same firm 
was also protagonist of the surreal marketing-campaign of bulletproof vests for 
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tourists.769 In the months preceding the event we were also bombarded with 
information about the huge effort of SA police in enrolling new personnel 
(during the World Cup the police officer-foreign tourists ratio would 
approximately be 1-to-10)770 and new equipment (“R665-million worth of new 
equipment. This includes six new helicopters, 10 mobile command vehicles, 100 
high-performance vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles, body armour and water 
cannons”, as well as a brand new CCTV system in Joburg),771 for what was 
assuming the contours of a war-like build-up. Perhaps the apt preparation for 
what Altbeker cynically describes as ‘a country at war with itself’.772 
 
“Without security guarantees there cannot be a successful Olympic Games, and without 
security guarantees the national image will be lost”.773 These words by the Chinese 
president HU Jintao testify for the unquestionable relevance played by security in today’s 
MEs. According to Atkinson and Young, it was most notably in the 2002 Salt Lake City Winter 
Olympics, the first post-9/11 one, that Olympic humanism was extensively joined by the 
need for a pervasive and reassuring showcasing of security: American new war-on-terror 
ideology was to be translated at the international level, as a global affirmation of the 
American (and generally Western) capacity to guarantee security in the face of the terror.774 
According to a consistent, if reversed logic, the 2010 World Cup was immediately framed as 
the stage for South Africa to finally demonstrate to embody Western standards, most 
notably in the sense of being capable of providing security, not simply in the face of terror, 
but more precisely vis-à-vis its own devastating crime reputation. ME-securitisation usually 
appears as a question of immunisation vis-à-vis dangerous others, event-specific threats 
triggering event-specific responses (e.g. terrorism in London 2012, hooliganism in Germany 
’06, political protest in Beijing ’08). Instead, in the case of South Africa the source of trouble 
is both an absolutely internal and ordinary issue: crime. More than spectacular anti-
terrorism measures, implementing security at the 2010 World Cup first of all means dealing 
with an everyday problem in an extraordinary spatio-temporal context: securing the World 
Cup would be not simply a matter of possible disruptions to the event, but rather its main 
narrative. Much more than elsewhere, here the effort to assure and communicate security 
does neither sit uncomfortable with the ‘festive atmosphere’ of the event nor risks over-
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militarising it, but it is meant to be a constitutive part of the World Cup atmosphere: not a 
safe atmosphere, but an atmosphere of safety. Consistent with the logic of brandscaping 
explored above, in this context security explicitly becomes both what allows for an event to 
unfold and the event itself, a brandscape of control. The ‘legacy of safety’ in South Africa is 
not feared as a potentially Orwellian outcome as in other ME narratives, but generally 
auspicated as a chance to breach the everyday experience of violence in the city (i.e. to relax 
from the oppressive JT), as well as the crime-ridden international image of the country, 
towards a ‘new-found sense of safety’.775  
If a World Cup could fit this ambitious purpose is another matter. Whilst the radical 
potential of urban events lies in shaking existent tunings by potentially generating new 
cartographies that challenge the status quo, a socio-economically, politically and symbolical 
successful brandscaping requires the capacity to control the uncontrollable, i.e. to normalise 
the turbulence of the (mega) event, capturing the immanent desires it unleashes within a 
temporal continuity and spatial coherence which would allow for control, predictability and 
capitalisation. It is in the delicate balance between international visibility and internal 
matters, social and economical concerns, national and FIFA interests, that this atmo-




As for the JT, I analyse the World Cup Brandscaping (WCB) through three main ‘keys’, 
heuristically divided in the exposition but actually overlapping in reality.776 
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I. Caring for you 
In this time, we need good South Africans. Let them 
just for four weeks be good. Just for four weeks [...] Let 
us forget our own problems for a moment and make 




If welcoming the visitors was intended as a patriotic mission for every South African, for the 
thousands World Cup volunteers was an official duty, corresponding to a clear ME-strategy 
to ‘mobilise’ people, generating public acceptance and a ‘friendly’ atmosphere.778 The 
various ‘city ambassadors’, ‘information officers’, ‘goodwill tourist ambassadors’, ‘match-
day marshals’ and so on had the role “to give advice to spectators, point them in the right 
direction, hand out information pamphlets, such as ‘Safety Tips to Prevent Crime’ and 
generally to be a friendly welcoming presence on the streets of host cities and at airports 
and other points-of-arrival”.779 Besides giving information, they complemented police’s role 
in producing symbolical security by providing actual security – i.e. orienting people, sedating 
tensions etc.780 Briefly, their role was that of promptly re-tuning those who appeared ‘out-
of-sync’ vis-à-vis the WCB. Besides observing many instances of this practice, I also 
experimented with it myself, purposively seeking à la Garfinkel to ‘breach’ the tune: 
whether I would be standing isolated from the crowd, perplexed, disorientated and unsure 
about where to go, it would be matter of minutes to be approached by a volunteer’s kind 
‘you seem lost, where do you need to go?’ When instead I would insist in seeking off-key 
activities such as walking out of Fan Parks alone at night, I would be either discouraged or 
even sometimes escorted to my destination. If these are of course normal, if slightly over-
zealous practices of ME-volunteering, what was peculiar in Johannesburg, and significantly 
different from Cape Town for instance, was the eminently securitarian nuance they 
assumed, and thus their explicit role in reinforcing the immunising normativity of the JT.781 
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On the one hand, volunteers did challenge the atmosphere of suspicion (i.e. ‘do not trust 
anyone’, ‘ignore anyone’), by showing a friendly and trustworthy readiness to help. On the 
other, however, by constantly stressing their ‘official’ trustworthiness, sanctioned by their 
uniform, vis-à-vis un-official people whose help they encouraged to mistrust, they were a 
constant reminder of their own exceptionality vis-à-vis ‘normal people’ – and thus, of the 
exceptionality of the World Cup atmosphere vis-à-vis the everyday alertness demanded by 
the city.782 Likewise, whilst the volunteer’s caring response somewhat rarefied the 
atmospheric weight of the JT, decreasing the individual need to be responsible for one’s 
own security, on the other hand, by systematically re-synchronising bodies within the tune 
as well as through their constant reassertion of the necessity for everyone to comply with 
their advises to ‘avoid troubles’, they implicitly confirmed and indeed magnified the urban 
dangers looming outside of their protective caring. Therefore, besides “providing the human 
face for what otherwise might seem as overly policed city”,783 the volunteers ultimately 
reasserted its normative tuning, functioning as a visible, uniform-ed and institutionalised 
caring response of the city.784 
 
II. Police visibility 
The police system is not simply an unseen seeing eye; it 
also exercises an exemplary visibility through its own 
visibility [employing] uniforms to create and stabilise a 




Johannesburg was indeed an over-policed city during the World Cup, with security 
personnel of every kind, local, metropolitan, national, custom police, private guards, the 
army. Yet, it would be too easy to draw a direct equivalence between an elevated police 
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presence and an oppressive over-militarisation. To this rather automatic and abstracting 
reading I oppose a situated attention to the atmo-rhythms actually produced by the police, 
and their interplay with the JT.786 In fact, as far as my observation was concerned, rarely this 
over-policing appeared as threatening and oppressive. Quite the contrary: it was almost 
unanimously praised by both visitors as locals for its capacity to immunise public space, 
allowing for usually-avoided behaviours and producing spaces in which the urban ‘brushing 
of shoulders’ between strangers could occur. Although my sample of interviewees was far 
from being statistically exhaustive, it proved to be at least atmospherically indicative: even if 
unprompted, people would always express their immediate approval and indeed 
enthusiasm for the police presence, independently from their nationality, age, racial or 
class-background. From squatters in the deprived areas of Hillbrow and Joubert Park to 
inhabitants of the rich suburbs of Sandton and Rosebank, everybody was eager to 
emphasise how important was the quantity as well as the quality of policing. Normally 
criticised for being corrupt, incompetent and brutal, police was now praised for its newly 
focused and ‘vigilant’ attitude, not only for relieving people from their ‘need to be alert’ but 
also fostering an unusual hopefulness, in relation to the potential ‘legacy’ that the event 
could foster in terms of a renewed approach to policing the city.787 In fact, generally 
acknowledged was the police’s ‘soft approach’, usually polite, non-threatening and laid-
back, to the point of being criticised as ‘too bland’ by some Western observers.788 
Of course, on the one hand this was rather fitting with the soft logic of the security-
entertainment complex, according to which security becomes “increasingly implicit, soft, 
and embedded” with entertainment,789 an affective policing focused on “acting within a 
festive context” and thus both aimed to guarantee safety as well as avoiding any disruption 
to the ‘World Cup atmosphere’.790 On the other hand, however, the self-fulfilling 
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presuppositions of ‘revelatory’ approaches should be eschewed. The encounter between 
the WCB and the JT should not be explained away into pre-given templates. Instead, 
policing strategies and the concatenations they generate are to be situated in the material 
contingency of their taking place, by observing and accounting for their encounter and 
friction with the tuning of the city, and thus for the resulting atmo-rhythm that emerges. In 
this sense it is undeniable that this affective policing functioned to ease the weight of the 
spatiolegal normativity of the urban, by providing people with a newly-found ability to go 
out of tune, allowing for crossing, if only temporarily, some invisible barriers and thus to 
challenge the sur-geography of the JT. Could this approach prove relevant in generating an 
enduring ‘mood of safety’ even after the event, i.e. a ‘legacy’ of safety? Arguably, it is 
dubious how extraordinary measures of security, besides guaranteeing a short-term safety, 
could actually turn this out into a legacy able to challenge, rather than instead reinforcing 
and further institutionalising, the Joburg Tune. Indeed, how to keep open the potential 
unleashed by the 'weakening' of the oppressive alertness of the tune? As the event-related 
over-policing disappears, also the event-related ‘sense of safety’ seems destined to wane, 
unless an effort to capitalise on both the short-term increase in urban safety and police 
reputation – which the strategic coupling of higher police visibility and ‘softer’ approach has 
produced – is pursued. Promisingly, this seemed to be the official intention, as stressed in a 
post-event report on the ‘possible legacies’ of the event, where the emphasis is on the need 
to “build on the good reputation that JMPD [Johannesburg Metropolitan Police 
Department] has achieved during the event with respect to public perceptions of Joburg as 
being a safe city. This requires that JMPD enhance visibility, especially in the Inner City and 
at night”.791 Only accurate and long-term post-WC researches could possibly provide an 
answer to the outcomes in this sense.  
At the same time however, avoiding the bias of revelatory approaches must not lead us into 
naivety. Repeating the critique I moved above to Bissel et al., let us recall that contemporary 
forms of urban control are not characterised by simple 'manipulation', but have more 
precisely to do with the prevention of events from becoming ‘too intense’: that is, with an 
art of defusing contingency by keeping urban potential alive as long as it is below certain 
thresholds of intensity. This should warn against uncritical emphasis on the supposedly 
'liberating potential' that the volunteers and police alike did play vis-à-vis the JT. I do not 
wish to cynically dismiss the latter, yet framing policing within the logic of brandscaping 
means especially to take into account the reaction and recalibration implemented in 
response to surges of intensity: in other words, the way in which the frictions and excesses 
produced by the WCB were sought to be managed. The idyllic picture of soft and 
                                                          
791
COJ (City of Johannesburg) Delivering a promise, Creating a Legacy (2010) p. 91 
207 
 
enthusiastically-praised policing is thus recalibrated, whether we observe police’s swift 
reactions vis-à-vis the occurrences that threatened to ‘poison’ the atmosphere of 
consumption and immunity and thus to disrupt the smooth flowing and the coherence of 
the WCB. Most notably, those acts and initiatives that either challenged the de-politicised 
consensus for the event by inserting a political conflictuality within, or threatened the legal 
immunisation of economic privileges by breaching ‘ambush-marketing’ protections and the 
likes. The heavy-handed, armed response of police to the security-guards strikes, with 
documented use of teargas and rubber bullets, is a compelling case in point.792 In this sense, 
such reactions should not be understood as ‘exceptional’ vis-à-vis the spatiolegality of the 
WCB, but rather as fully consistent with its 'excepting' event-defusing mechanism. Below, I 
will offer further examples to support this observation.  
 
III. Fan zoning 
Unless they are in the stadium, no other event during 
the FIFA World Cup™ will allow South African to 
experience the authentic FIFA World Cup™ atmosphere 




Fan zoning refers to the direct, material projection of the WCB onto the city through an 
immersive spatiolegal cartography, in which the gate-keeping and flow-regulating presence 
of security and volunteering personnel was complemented by a disembedded network of 
micro-geographies (Venues, Team Hotels, Road Networks, Fan Parks etc.) officially defined 
as Controlled Access Sites.794 In this way, the WCB was given a physical, legal and 
atmospheric (the FIFA ‘look and feel’ of safety and entertainment) consistency, projecting 
onto the urban a truly ‘inhabitable mapping’. Among those spaces, especially relevant have 
been the so-called Public Viewing Areas (PVAs).  
Briefly, these are zones (usually squares or parks) provided with giant screens, where fans 
gather to watch the games during the event. Although watching the World Cup match of the 
national team in the city’s main square is a tradition in many countries, this became a very 
popular happening during the Korea and Japan 2002 World Cup, with many spontaneous 
                                                          
792
Security guards protested for low-wages as well as for job positions which, notwithstanding the pre-World 
Cup promises, were missing. See ‘World Cup embraces triumph and disaster’, Mail and Guardian, 19 June 
2010, available at  http://www.mg.co.za/article/2010-06-19-world-cup-embraces-triumph-and-disaster 
793
FIFA, Fan Fest FAQs for the 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa, available at: 
http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/tournament/fanfest/01/14/09/88/fifafanfest-faqs.pdf   
794
Controlled Access Sites are Stadium, Official Events locations, media and accreditation centres, FIFA Fan 
Parks, official Hotels and “any other area designated or demarcated by the Municipality as a Controlled Access 
Site and shall include private property located therein” – see eThekwini Municipality. 2010 FIFA World Cup 
South Africa by-laws (from 1.1.21.1 to 1.1.21.10) 
208 
 
PVEs (Public Viewing Events) with no FIFA involvement and no particular legal, security and 
copyright restriction. These events were very successful and convinced FIFA to officialise 
them from the Germany 2006 World Cup onwards. Since then, FIFA has the monopoly of 
PVAs during the event (officially named Fan Fests, Fan Zones or Fan Parks) and although 
unofficial PVAs can be organised, they nonetheless depend on FIFA granting the licence, and 
must comply with the same branding restrictions.795 Although entrance is free, Fan Fests are 
surrounded by high fences and patrolled by security personnel (both private and public) 
regulating the access at the gates through search and seizure procedures, not only for 
weapons and the likes, but also for food, drinks as well as any branded product not 
matching with the official sponsors. In fact, Fan Fests are strictly branded spaces where only 
official sponsors are accepted, with minor exceptions made for ‘informal areas’, i.e. zones 
dedicated to local food-seller, provided their products are not direct competitors of the 
official brands (which have their own food-and-merchandising stalls within the premises).796 
Special by-laws (see below), allowing hitherto-forbidden behaviours (e.g. drinking alcohol in 
a public square) and forbidding hitherto-allowed ones (e.g. wearing a Pepsi t-shirt in a Coca-
Cola-led event), further reinforce the normative re-tuning produced by the fan zoning.797 
Hagemann contends that fan zones are part of the process of festivalisation of city politics 
according to global capitalism’s standards: her “main thesis is that the stadium has become 
a spatial prototype for the temporary and long-term changes observable in urban spaces, 
projecting its functional, economic, social and regulatory conditions into public spaces.”798 
In fact fan fests, together with demarcated, more or less secured and branded ‘Fan Walks’, 
allow FIFA to translate the spatiality of the ME from the stadium directly into the urban 
space, channelling the flow of high numbers of ticketless fans into a tightly-controlled, 
securitised and branded geography.799 This responds simultaneously to the ME-related 
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needs of immunity and consumption: first, by minimising the risk of overcrowding around 
stadia, as well as the common problem of potentially troublesome fans roaming around the 
city;800 second, by addressing the main economical shortcoming of the ME, namely the need 
of channelling the consumption of visitors towards the official sponsors, and thus of 
guaranteeing to the sponsors themselves the ‘symbolical monopoly’ of the city-branding; 
third, by allowing for a more concentrated, intensive and controlled acclimatisation of urban 
space according to the tune of the ME. In fact, in the official documents the indistinction of 
security and entertainment, spectacle and biopower, is expressed in explicitly atmospheric 
vocabulary. For instance, in Johannesburg’s Transport Operation Plan, it is stated that 
“planning for a limited number of large exhibition sites would have the appeal of 
concentrating activities such as security, big screen transmissions and assist in promoting a 
carnival atmosphere”,801 i.e. what FIFA terms an “authentic FIFA World Cup Atmosphere 
[with a distinctive] FIFA look and feel”.802 The ME is defined as a ‘democratic spectacle’, and 
the fan fests as “communal gatherings [that] reinforce the game’s power to unite”,803 meant 
to be a “cultural melting pot”, providing a “safe, recognised and exciting environment for 
visitors who have limited comparable alternatives ... Hospitality, tolerance and mutual 
understanding must have absolute priority . . . what is more, in a friendly, peaceful 
environment even violent fans behave more peaceful, and join in the relaxed, cheerful 
atmosphere”.804 Security, branding and entertainment are encapsulated in the definition of 
these spaces as ‘safe, recognised and exciting’.  
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‘People power reigns at Fan Fests’, 3 July 2010, available at 
http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/news/newsid=1266969/ 
804
Organisation Committee of Germany  ’06, quoted in Frew and McGilliray, ‘Exploring Hyper-experiences’ op. 





The WCB must be understood as emerging immanently from the overlapping of these three 
aspects (volunteers’ caring, the police visibility, fan zoning), and more generally as an 
assemblage of bodies, (security personnel, volunteers, performers, athletes, fans, fences, 
CCTVs, slogans, signs, discourses, media), practices and affectivities. In its simultaneously 
panoptical and synoptical character, it corresponds fittingly to the description of 
brandscaping as a bipolar configuration (spectacular and managerial) modulating the 
(impersonal) ‘experiencing’ of being-in-the-city. That is, a system which does not deal with 
rational or emotive individual, but rather with the atmo-rhythmical wavelengths of urban 
co-existence, through the manipulation of affective milieux of intensities, without simply 
blocking the movement – as in the disciplinary enclosure of stadia – but rather keeping it 
alive whilst defused from its (whatever positive or negative) eventfulness, turning the 
potential desire unleashed by the advent into a controllable, consensual and capitalisable 
pleasure (i.e. de-politicised enjoyment).805 What I referred above as the ‘dissolution of 
beings’ into (affective) relations and flows – i.e. ‘waves’ of being-together to be monitored, 
modulated, fine-tuned – here unfolds explicitly in a security-entertainment apparatus that 
‘captures’ bodies within the ‘blinding glory’ of the WC, not in ideological but rather in the 
ontological sense of reducing them (in fact, seeking to reduce them) into a ‘glorifying 
praxis’: as simultaneously producers and consumers of the World Cup spectacle. As Frew 
and McGilliray explain, “the sport fan becomes more central to the experiential 
representation of the spectacle, therein. In their desire to sustain spectacular and 
memorable events organisers are increasingly turning to the spectator to create event 
‘content”.806 Nowhere as in the fan zones this is more evident, as the atmospheric 
                                                          
805
The distinction between desire and pleasure refers to Deleuze [see for instance ‘Desire and Pleasure’, op. 
cit.], according to whom ‘desire’ is a dynamic, generative and vital process, whilst ‘pleasure’ is an interruption 
of the flow of desire, a re-framing of desire within a specific definition, that captures  and tames its turbulent 
opening(s) into a controllable and co-optable form. Incidentally, one could argue that fan parks, with their 
fences, are more consistent with the old disciplinary model of enclosures than with the logic of control. Yet 
this is not the case: they are porous and open, fitting more evidently with a logic aimed at managing flows 
rather than secluding ‘individuals’. This does not mean that evident exclusionary practices are not present. In 
Durban, I assisted to three youths being prevented to enter inside the Fan Fests because, as a policeman 
explained, “they are street kids, they are dirty, they come here to steal, to make trouble” [interviewed by the 
researcher, 07 July 2010]. Incidentally, this confirmed what a 13-old boy in Durban told Times in the months 
preceding the World Cup: "They tell us we must go back where we came from. They say Durban is dirty 
because of us" [Sibongile Khumalo, “S. Africa rounds up poor, prostitutes ahead of World Cup”, AFP, 18 May 
2010].  
806
Frew and McGilliray, ‘Exploring Hyper-experiences’ op. cit. p. 182; As they explain, fan zoning is the "new 
apex in the development and management of mega events ... a strategically formalised and commercially 
planned spectacle where prescribed performative subjectivities can be assumed and enacted" (p. 186). On the 
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management unfolds through a systematic attempt to produce ‘celebration’, ‘enjoyment’, 
‘party’, through rhythmical syncopation and atmospheric stimulation. A series of security-
entertainment repetitions (from the searches at the gates to the waving of the flag) 
generating an atmo-rhythm which is multi-sensorially pervasive and involves individuals into 
a set of practices typical of the stadium and, to some extent, of staged spectacle.807 In fact, 
as the speaker at Cape Town Fan Fest summarised: ‘it doesn't matter the result, here it's all 
about celebration, it's all about fun, it's all about entertainment’.808 Entertainment, that is, 
carefully channelled within the flow of consumption, as in the overlapping between crowd 
incitement and marketing promotion that was explicit, for instance, in the speakers’ 
continuous prompting to shout the term 'ayoba': a term meaning 'cool', 'great' in South 
Africa slang, but at the same time the key word of the mobile company MTN’s World Cup 
marketing-campaign. 
If law seems to disappear in this “mixture of control through surveillance and distraction 
through entertainment”, in reality it is merely dissimulated, instead playing the central role 
of enacting and sustaining the WCB by preventing the intensities it stimulates from 
becoming uncontrollable, and thus defusing the affective charge of being-together into an 
a-political, spectacular consensus.809 
 
2. 
Any hooligans or criminals who try their luck during the 





The legal scaffolding of the WCB is centred on special, spatiotemporally-delimited FIFA by-
laws, defined as  
an addition to the Municipality's existing by-laws … if any, and to the extent that 
conflicts may arise between the Municipality's existing by-laws relating to Advertising; 
Controlled Access Sites, Public Open Spaces and City Beautification; Public Roads and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
overlapping between the figures of ‘consumer’ and ‘content-provider’ see above Andrejevic [iSpy, op. cit.], in 
ch. 3, Brandscaping, par. 3 
807
For instance, the repeated ‘initiations’ at the gates (corporeal and bag searches, seizures of any food, drink 
and unwanted brand etc.), followed by relaxation inside the fenced, securitised and CCTV-monitored areas, 
where other sets of choreographed repetitions (blowing the Vuvuzela, waving the flag, cheering when 
prompted by the speaker etc.) intersected with commercial transactions (food, drinks, gadgets etc.) 
808
Observed by the researcher in Cape Town Fan Fest, 27 July 2010 
809
The quote is from Thrift, ‘Lifeworld Inc.’, op. cit. p. 11 
810
Deputy Justice Minister Andries Nel, in Irene Naidoo, ‘Special courts ready for World Cup’, SouthAfrica.Info, 
27 May 2010, available at http://www.southafrica.info/2010/wccourts-260510.htm; about 56 Wold Cup 
Courts were set up in South Africa during the World Cup 
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Traffic Guidance and Street Trading, if any, and these By-laws, the provisions of these 
By-laws [the World Cup by laws] shall prevail811 
FIFA by-laws deal with various issues (advertising, controlled access sites, beautification of 
public space, roads and traffic, street trading) so as to satisfy the main requirements of the 
climatic installation enacted by WCB, i.e. the securitisation, commercialisation and 
‘beautification’ of public space. They allow for stabilising the WCB and its ‘look and feel’ by 
protecting it from tangible incursions (e.g. crime) and intangible, atmospheric poisoning to 
its value and reputation, preventing ambush marketing as well as any expression of ‘racist, 
xenophobic cause, charity or ideological concerns’, forbidding ugly scaffolding, unwanted 
sounds, ‘protected’ words, unpleasant smells, unofficial events and so on: the whole city is 
meant to be ‘free and clear’ from any disruption, airspace included.812 Carefully protected is 
also the mediatisation of the ME, also by limiting the possibility to provide real-time 
information about the event to those unauthorised to do so.813 This capillary acclimatisation 
of the urban is also given financial protection, through the constitution of "tax bubbles" 
around stadia, fan parks and other controlled access sites, de facto “making any income 
earned off goods sold within them exempt from taxation”.814 
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2010 FIFA WORLD CUP SOUTH AFRICA BY-LAWS 1.2.3 
812
Moreover, at people's cost: those who expose signs, scaffolding or other elements which could undermine 
the ‘beautification’ of the public space must remove them “at their own cost” [FIFA Host City Agreement, 4.1]. 
Even the airspace, besides being secured from attacks and patrolled by army and drones, must be free from 
advertising [FIFA Host City Agreement4.12.2 (v)]. According to the FIFA Host City Agreement [3.3(i)], FIFA can 
temporarily change stadium names, as it did, for instance by re-naming the historical Ellis Park into Coca-Cola 
Park. A capillary word-policing is also in place, with a series of  ‘protected words’ which nobody can use 
without FIFA’s authorization: for instance 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa, World Cup 2010, RSA 2010, 
Football World Cup, FIFA World Cup South Africa 2010, SA 2010, ZA 2010, 2010 FIFA World Cup, 2010 FIFA 
World Cup South Africa, Africa 2010, Soccer World Cup, World Cup, South Africa World Cup, World Cup South 
Africa, Confederations Cup 2010, Twenty Ten, Win in Africa for Africa, Football for a better world, and any 
association of host cities with ‘2010’ [2010 FIFA WORLD CUP SOUTH AFRICA Rights Protection Programme, 
available at 
http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/marketing/01/18/98/99/march2010rightsprotection_a5_20
100308.pdf]. During the ME, no events are allowed: no other substantial cultural events other than those 
approved by FIFA shall be organised [FIFA Host City Agreement: 4.13.7 (iii)] 
813
For instance in Stadia among the prohibited items are “p) cameras (except for private use and then only 
with one set of replacement or rechargeable batteries) video cameras or other sound or video recording 
equipment; q) computers or other devices used for the purposes of transmitting or disseminating sound, 
pictures, descriptions or results of the events via the internet or other forms of media” [FIFA Stadium Code of 
Conduct. available at 
http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/archive/southafrica2010/organisation/ticketing/stadiumcodeofconduct.html] 
814
See http://www.sa2010.gov.za/node/522 [also in FIFA Host City Agreement: 8.2];“The Act creates a “tax-
free bubble” around FIFA-designated sites so that profits on consumable and semi-durable goods sold within 
these areas will not be subject to income tax; neither will VAT be applied” [Revenue Laws Amendment Act ( 20 
of 2006), available at http://www.polity.org.za/article/revenue-laws-amendment-act-no-20-of-2006-2006-01-
01]. “The Host City hereby waives any and all claims of liability against the LOC, FIFA, any FIFA subsidiaries and 
their officers, directors, members, agents, representatives or employees, for any loss or damage to the city 
whether or not such loss or damage may have been caused by or resulted from the[ir] negligence”[FIFA Host 
City Agreement: 9.5 (i)] 
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The setting up of such an inhabitable space of exception (i.e. explicitation of the exception) 
within the city produces unavoidable exclusionary effects, weighting more explicitly on 
those lacking the resources to ‘participate’ in the WCB, and/or prevented from taking 
advantage of it. For instance, begging in public space and roads is explicitly forbidden,815 and 
street trading is subjected to oppressive limitations. Atlanta, during the 1996 Olympics, was 
famously called a ‘street bazaar’, a nightmare for the event organisers as the ‘uncontrolled’ 
street trading seriously compromised the value of the Olympic brand, that is, the immunity 
of its brandscaping.816 Since then the protection of sponsors’ monopoly over consumption 
has been heightened to a remarkable extent, making it increasingly difficult for street 
traders to capitalise on the enormous flux of fans triggered by the event. Even more 
controversially in South Africa, where it is a widespread and well-established activity, street 
trading has been systematically excluded from actively taking part to the World Cup, 
through high costs for authorisations, strict controls, exclusionary zoning and draconian by-
laws, chasing street traders away from the ‘designated areas’ and, when present, failing to 
provide them with promotional and logistical facilities to compete with the sponsors.817 
Not only special laws but also special ‘World Cup Courts’ have been established during the 
event. Paralleling the aforementioned support for the quantity and quality of policing during 
the World Cup, also this judicial accelerationism gained praises for constituting a potential 
antidote to the impunity vis-à-vis crime which allegedly characterises South Africa. Johan 
Berger, of the Pretoria-based Institute for Security Studies (ISS), notes that "there is no 
bigger deterrent [to crime] than a successful prosecutorial system", hoping that ‘special 
courts’ would stay after the World Cup.818 Some were less enthusiast, observing that faster 
sentences are not necessarily fairer sentences, and rather increase the concerns about the 
lack of basic guarantees for the accused (sentences such a 5-year term for a stolen mobile 
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2010 FIFA WORLD CUP SOUTH AFRICA BY-LAWS: 4.2.13, 5.1.1.10 
816
In Vassil Girginov and Jim Parry, The Olympic Games Explained: A Student Guide to the Evolution of the 
Modern Olympic Games (Routledge, 2004)  p. 89 
817
See ‘No Bonanza for Cape Town Street Vendors’, Radio Netherlands Worldwide Africa, 7 June 2010 
http://www.rnw.nl/africa/article/no-bonanza-cape-towns-street-vendors; and Karabo Keepile, ‘Cape traders 
to be moved ahead of World Cup’, Mail and Guardian, 26 April 2010, available at 
http://www.mg.co.za/article/2010-04-26-cape-traders-to-be-moved-ahead-of-world-cup; The 2010 FIFA 
WORLD CUP SOUTH AFRICA BY-LAWS widens powers of search and seizure as regards street trading [7.5.1.1], 
to the point that any place (private property included) can be declared restricted to street trading during the 
Term [6.4.1]; in Durban for instance, several criticism was raised for the lack of services provided to the 
informal traders, as well as for the decision to move them away from the seafront’s central promenade, i.e. 
from the more economically attractive spot. See Anelisa Kubheka, ‘Fan park stall holders feel short-changed’, 
Daily News, 17 June 2010;    
818
Clare Byrne, ‘Speedy justice in World Cup courts’, Mail and Guardian, 16 June 2010, available at 
http://www.mg.co.za/article/2010-06-16-speedy-justice-in-world-cup-courts   
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phone seems to prove this point).819 Others criticised the special courts for being simply a 
means for FIFA to have the national judicial apparatus working on its behalf.820 
Very controversial in fact were the restrictions as regards advertising, not only for the broad 
and thus highly-discretionary definition of the latter – “visual representation [of different 
forms and element] ...  or any combination of such elements with the object of transferring 
information”821 – but also for the explicit urban-wide ambition (i.e. beyond the designated 
spaces of the ME) of the legislation, according to which nobody can “affix, place, arrange or 
create any Advertisement of whatever nature anywhere within a Public Open Space”.822 
Such a vague and discretionary style, through which law is sublimated into a vaporous, 
atmospherically-sealing device, also characterises other provisions which, besides their 
explicit public-order concerns, have an implicit role in acclimatising the space by protecting 
and de-politicising the WCB. For instance, the forbiddance to bring into the stadium “objects 
which could compromise public safety and/or harm the reputation of the Event as assessed 
at the sole discretion of the FIFA World Cup Authorities”;823 the restriction to “use abusive 
or otherwise objectionable language or behave in abusive, objectionable or disorderly 
manner”;824 the explicit forbiddance (in stadia as well as fan parks) to “engage in conduct 
which expresses racist, xenophobic cause, charity or ideological concern related materials, 
including but not limited to banners, signs, symbols and leaflets, objects or clothing, which 
could impair the enjoyment of the Event by other spectators, or detract from the sporting 
focus of the Event”.825 Local activists have observed the absurdity of such legal provisions, 
pre-emptively defusing any potential for the ME to act as a global platform for publicising 
political matters to global media and visitors.826 De Vos stresses their blatant 
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David Smith, ‘World Cup kicks violent South African crime into touch’, Guardian, 9 July 2010, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2010/jul/09/world-cup-football-south-africa-crime-falls 
820
In fact, the majority of the cases dealt with by the court have been those of ambush marketing, a violation 
controversially upgraded by FIFA from administrative to criminal one. See for instance Nkepile Mabuse, ‘FIFA 
criticized for over-protecting 2010 World Cup sponsors’, CNN, 29 April 2010, available at 
http://edition.cnn.com/2010/SPORT/football/04/29/football.fifa.world.cup.africa/; and also the 
characteristically piercing article by Marina Hyde on the topic, ‘World Cup 2010: Fans, robbers and a marketing 
stunt face justice, Fifa style’, Guardian, 20 June 2010, available at  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2010/jun/20/world-cup-2010-fans-marketing-justice-fifa 
821
2010 FIFA WORLD CUP SOUTH AFRICA BY-LAWS 1.1.3 
822
2010 FIFA WORLD CUP SOUTH AFRICA BY-LAWS 4.6.2  
823
FIFA Stadium Code of Conduct, 4.r 
824
2010 FIFA WORLD CUP SOUTH AFRICA BY-LAWS 3.5.5, 4.2.2 
825
FIFA Stadium Code of Conduct 4.e, 5.6.e [my emphasis] 
826
“Said Shamitha Naidoo, community chairwoman in Pinetown of the social movement Abahlali Base 
Mjondolo: ‘We need to show them (tourists) what’s happening. How will these poor people benefit from the 
World Cup?’” in Kamcilla Pillay, ‘Marchers protest against World Cup’, Daily News, June 17, 2010 Edition 1, 
available at http://www.abahlali.org/node/7086; Similar protest over the prevention to political 
communication was made by activists claiming “that that the tournament’s organizers have hindered HIV/AIDS 
awareness and prevention campaigns by blocking condom and safe-sex information distribution at official 
game venues .... ‘To date FIFA has not permitted any civil society organization to distribute HIV or health 
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unconstitutionality, since banning “both commercial advertising and any form of political 
expression in and around the stadiums as well as the fan parks – which are situated on 
public property”.827 Alice Thomson, of the Durban Social Forum was arrested for distributing 
anti-FIFA pamphlets at the Durban Fan Fest,828 and a similar fate was reserved, under my 
eyes, to activists leafleting for an evidently less controversial subject (an anti-xenophobic 
rally) according to a rather loose interpretation of the FIFA ‘Stadium Code of Conduct’.829 
Evidently, these behaviours were not targeted for their ‘illegality’, but rather insofar as 
playing a disruptive, poisonous role vis-à-vis ‘festive atmosphere’ of the WCB. 
It would be compelling to frame the spatiolegal installation of the World Cup vis-à-vis the 
way in which the relation between sport events and political protest is being rearticulated 
as part of the general surfacing of preventive brandscaping strategies in the security-
entertainment field, that is, towards the systematic de-potentiation of the political potential 
from sport events.830 The designation of specific areas for political protest (and, of course, 
for capillary monitoring and categorisation of protesters) in Beijing ’08 is only the more 
explicit instance. Although there is no space here to pursue this avenue, it is worth briefly 
mentioning how hooliganism is being treated at EU level, as a relevant example that mirrors 
in at least three aspects the spatiolegal apparatus of the ME: namely, its urban-wide scope 
(that is, beyond the event-venues); the vague, discretionary and atmospheric legal 
language; the event-defusing strategy. As Tsoukala observes, the EU approach to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
related information and FIFA has not provided any written confirmation that condoms may be distributed at 
stadia and within the fan fest’” in ‘FIFA under fire over safe-sex stance’, Nbc News Blog 9 June 2010, available 
at http://worldblog.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2010/06/09/4485323-fifa-under-fire-over-safe-sex-stance- 
827
“any person from distributing any pamphlets near or in stadiums or fan parks without the prior written 
approval of the Municipality. A person who nevertheless distributes any pamphlets could be convicted and 
fined up to R10 000 or six months imprisonment. This provision seems to impose quite a drastic limit on the 
freedom of expression of everyone in South Africa. It in effect bans both commercial advertising and any form 
of political expression in and around the stadiums as well as the fan parks”, Pierre de Vos, ‘On the Fifa World 
Cup by-laws’, Constitutionally Speaking Blog, 17 June 2010, available at 
http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/on-the-fifa-world-cup-by-laws/ 
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Kamcilla Pillay ‘Marchers protest against World Cup’, op. cit. 
829
FIFA Stadium Code of Conduct, art 4.e, 5.6.e – Accused of ambush marketing and incitement for promoting 
an anti-xenophobic rally, filmmaker Giuliano Martiniello, research student Samantha Spencer-Mura and 
director of Centre for Civil Society (CCS) Patrick Bond were detained at the Durban FIFA fan fest. Policemen 
told Patrick Bond, according to his reconstruction: ‘No distribution of pamphlets, especially which mention 
xenophobia.’ Bond continues: “The reason the pamphlet was banned was not just procedural – it was political. 
‘You are reminding [people] of xenophobia. Even myself I had forgot about that thing, but now you write it 
down’”. In Patrick Bond, ‘Fifa Forbids Free Speech At World Cup Fan Fest’, ZSpace, 09 July 2010 available at 
http://www.zcommunications.org/fifa-forbids-free-speech-at-world-cup-fan-fest-by-patrick-bond.html 
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Steve Greenfield and Guy Osborn [‘Enough Is Enough: Race, Cricket and Protest in the UK’. Sociological 
Focus 30 (4) 1997, 373–383: p. 381] discuss for instance the political significance of sport through an account 
of the anti-South Africa protests in Cricket matches during Apartheid, comparing it with the increasingly 
restricting legislation enacted by the UK Criminal Justice Act, a veritable counter-move to depurate sport from 




hooliganism has been oriented by a gradual extension of control beyond the enclosures of 
stadia, as well as by an increasingly wide and blurred definition of its target population, 
from ‘known troublemakers’ to all “potential troublemakers and people under the influence 
of alcohol or drugs”, allowing for widening restrictions to fan-behaviour in general.831 
Interestingly, this evolution is characterised by a significant shift in the framing the issue, 
from the legal notion of ‘offence’ to the political one of ‘conflict’, defined as "any act that is 
contrary to the general public's perception of normality or which adversely affects their 
quality of life".832 A very fitting example of the sublimation of the urban spatiolegal state of 




In his nostalgic book Sport, Space and the City, John Bale narrates an 
involutionary parable of football as a collective gathering, from a game being 
played in pitches with blurred edges and attendants surrounding the fields, 
without a neat distinction between players and spectators, to one played 
simultaneously in the detached mediation of televised games as well as in the 
segregating territorialisation of hyper-securitised and commodified stadia. The 
will to control and capitalise on the separation between the game and the 
spectators, he observes, has gradually eroded the eventful potential that the 
taking place of 'football' as collective gathering possessed. In 1992, during the 
European Championship Final between Germany and Denmark (in Sweden), 
several Danish supporters gathered on a spontaneous PVA set up in 
Copenhagen.833 Excessive to the logic of consumption and immunity expressed 
by both stadia and television, this was according to Bale the paradigmatic 
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As Tsoukala notes “most importantly, in defining its target population, this policy went well beyond the 
“known troublemakers”, which were the sole target of the Recommendation N° R(84)8, to cover “potential 
troublemakers and people under the influence of alcohol or drugs”, Anastassia Tsoukala, ‘Combating Football 
Crowd Disorder at the European Level: An Ongoing Institutionalisation of the Control of Deviance’, ESLJ 7 (2) 
2006: p. 8 
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As emerges from the related document of the Council of Europe [Council of Europe (1985) European 
Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events and in particular at Football Matches 
CETS n° 120. art. 3]. Consistent to what we observed above as the shift in the aim of crime prevention towards, 
as Tsoukala puts it (ibid: pp. 29-30), an explicit attempt to “reduce or otherwise contribute to reducing crime 
and citizens’ feelings of insecurity”. In similar terms Osborn and Greenfield analyse the ticket-touting policy in 
UK, where the practice has been tied to its potential production of conflict and disorder, thus engendering its 
blanket application of the law beyond the activity of ticket-touting, to the point of forbidding any act of ticket 
re-selling, S. Greenfield, G. Osborn and S. Roberts, ‘Contradictions Within the Criminalisation of Ticket Touting: 
What Should Be the Role of the Law?’, Web Journal of Current Legal Issues (JCLI) 3, 2008 
833
The screen was set up in Fælled, a locus of “significance to Danes, being the 'home' of their footballing 
traditions”, John Bale, 'Virtual Fandoms: Futurescapes of Football', in A. Brown (ed.) Fanatics: Power, Identity 
and Fandom in Football (Routledge, 1988) available at http://www.efdeportes.com/efd10/jbale1.htm 
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opening of a ‘third space’, “exemplify[ing] a tension between the apparently 
logical need for a predictable environment and the place-making potential of 
fandom”.834  
 
There is a soothing nostalgia in this account, which however should not lead to simplistic 
dichotomies. Processes of spatial commodification, securitisation and juridification are not 
to be read in opposition to some sort of more genuine and ‘authentic’, phenomenological 
and immediate urban space: the urban is always-already “saturated with mediations and 
prolongations”.835 Thus, provided any Frankfurt School-like nostalgia is eschewed, Bale's 
account provides some interesting inspiration.  
According to Brighenti, “the public appears when a certain urban site is turned into a venue 
of ‘public address’”.836 Accordingly ‘publicness’ is to be understood as alternative, although 
not merely in opposition, to the securitised and capitalised brandscaping of the ME, 
“emerg[ing] in the space between invisible resistance and normative hegemony”, that is, in 
the space in which the urban tuning and the ME re-tuning encounter and clash.837 
Publicness in this sense is always frictional, conflictual, kept alive by the eventfulness of its 
taking place. Beyond facile romanticism, the space referred by Bale can be certainly 
assumed as an instance of such an eruption of ‘publicness’, as the unleashing of the 
intensive potential of the football event away from its defusion into the logics of 
consumption and immunity. Beyond facile pessimism, it is evident that the evolution of 
spontaneous PVAs into today’s fan fests is a parable consistent with what Baudrillard in 
typically apocalyptic fashion maintains: “spectators may cease to be spectators and slip into 
the role of victims or murderers ... sport may cease to be sport and be transformed into 
terrorism: that is why the public must simply be eliminated”.838 ME-brandscaping can be 
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“This was not domesticated television space ... Nor were there any obvious controls on the sale and 
consumption of alcohol. A vast crowd attending the game. It was mediated by television but the crowd could, 
for a night, celebrate in the open space ... thousands watching in open spaces without being able to influence 
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Brighenti, Publicness, op. cit. p. 38 
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Ibid: p. 39: the notion of ‘public address’ is elaborated from Kurt Iveson, Publics and the City (Blackwell, 
2007) 
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Brighenti, Publicness, op. cit. p. 40 
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Jean Baudrillard, The transparency of evil: essays on extreme phenomena (Verso, 2009) p. 79, quoted in Bale 
['Virtual Fandoms’, op. cit.] (my emphasis). See also Deleuze's sibylline ‘Letter to Serge Daney’ [op. cit. pp. 104-
5], where he describes the television as what, through a socio-technical professionalization, generates “an 
immediate and sufficient perfection, immediately controllable and controlled”: whilst cinema (through its 
different phases) was to be understood as an attempt to produce something out of images, that is, to craft 
images to be contemplated, in the case of television the purpose is no longer that of crafting images, but 




seen as a strategy to deal directly with these ‘third spaces’, i.e. with frictional spaces, not by 
simply denying them into synoptical or panoptical confinements but rather directly adapting 
and coping with their ‘place-making potentials’, by seeking to re-capture and exploit them 
within the controllable and capitalisable passivity of a ‘trained fandom’.839 
Accordingly, the WCB is more than the "culmination of a long process of segregation, 
standardisation and commercialisation of fandom".840 More precisely, it is the ‘concrete 
realisation’ of the empty form of the ME onto the urban space, as an immunising strategy 
aimed at stimulating, arousing and propelling the turbulence of urban being-together and at 
the same time working as a mechanism of coping with a city-wide enthusiasm by defusing it 
from any radical, dangerous or non commercially-exploitable outcomes,841 channelling the 
affective ‘effervescence’ of the city within an atmospherically-enclosed, bubbled-up 
spatialisation, enforced by technologies (from fences to CCTVs), regulated and policed by 
private and public guards as well as volunteers, ‘protected’ by by-laws, as well as infused by 
a de rigueur rhetoric of multiculturalism. Karrholm proposes to understand the rhythmic 
logic of consumption in the city as a process of ‘isorhythmia’, whereby different flows and 
mobilities are not homogenised in a single order, but rather kept separated and yet tuned 
on a given wavelength, the rhythm of consumption.842 The WCB functions in this way, 
superimposing a palimpsestic heterogeneity of different space-times tuned according to a 
common refrain, whereby the constant production of events is systematically re-calibrated 
within the heterogeneous rhythm of consumption and immunity.843 An event-defusing 
machine, that is, deterritorialising the urban from its materiality and reterritorialising into 
the global circulation of capital, explicit allegory of which is Global Fan Fest project: an 
addition to the South African fan fests which consisted in six contemporaneous ‘global’ fan 
fests set in Berlin, Mexico City, Paris, Rio de Janeiro, Rome and Sydney, a veritable 
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In this way “creating the impression of practices of freedom” and enacting “ideal-type sport fan” 
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‘coached’ and ‘cared for’ [people] would be less likely to engage in deviant behaviour”, as well as in any 
political and potentially disrupting activity, Frew and McGilliray, ‘Exploring Hyper-experiences’ op. cit. p. 186, 
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have-fun’, as the fan park speakers relentlessly reminded. 
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 In this sense it is evident how the ‘threat’ (i.e. the reduction of complexity from public space, the defusion 
of the potential for events to occur) does not lie in synchronisation per se (linear time, repetition etc.) but 
rather in the capacity to gather different activities, events, transgressions that, if from a narrow perspective 
might seem to introduce complexity, from a wider urban-wide perspective appears to re-tune space according 
to an event-defusing, controllable and capitalisable logic (ibid.)   
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"superterrestrial topography” of ME-brandscaping.844 Whilst Blatter claims that “The FIFA 
Fan Fest will continue to be a fundamental part of future editions of the FIFA World Cup ... 
That decision was taken a long time ago, by the fans themselves”,845 it is tempting to read 
this sentence in reverse, that is, as a gradual attempt to close the unauthorised public space 




It is hard to deny that “FIFA’s attempt to implement a security and surveillance assemblage 
is to be understood as a means to enhance profit”.846 Moreover, I am perfectly aware of the 
notorious role played by mega-events in displacing people, cleaning up public spaces from 
‘undesirables’, curbing local business by advantaging aggressive corporation branding, 
increasing and legalising hitherto illegal social control measures through special legislation, 
and generally smoothening the process of privatisation, commodification and securitisation 
of public space. Many witnesses, activists, papers and books have been doing an 
outstanding work in denouncing these issues, some of which I briefly touched upon, and 
they seem to leave little room for both ‘alternative’ and non-naive perspectives on the 
overwhelming role FIFA plays in bullying the host nations into de facto allowing for 
extraordinary and undemocratic measures to be put in place. I acknowledge these works 
and their worries. Yet, this is not all.  
Notwithstanding the attempt to ‘neutralise’ of the eventful potential of the urban via the 
capillary production of an atmospheres of secured consumption where fandom can be 
'freely' expressed according to pre-ordered modalities tied to commercial interests, the 
resonance produced by the spatio-temporal syncope of the ME can never be completely 
channelled into the modulation of brandscaping and its relentless attempt to taming and 
theming the city. The (‘non-capitalist’ and non-immunitary) potentialities of being-together 
are stimulated by the taking place of the ME and never truly re-captured by its brandscaping 
machine. Thus for instance, whether the routine of the JT arguably decreases ‘the capacity 
of the body to experience more positive affects’, then the disruption of such a routine 
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promises to unleash it with uncontrollable results.847 We do not know what bodies can do. 
Fan parks reproduce the logic of enclosure of malls and gated communities, but at the same 
time they are much more open and less disciplined, offering an opportunity for the 
emergence of unusual urban assemblages. According to some the ‘place-making potential’ 
of fan parks, whether employed “as a network of critical intervention(s) within the urban 
fabric”, could be conducive to reinsert a dimension of publicness into an urban space 
weakened by low levels of security, mutual attachment and shared responsibility.848 Non-
FIFA fan parks, for instance, offer opportunities to get-together in contexts where the 
discipline, control and branding of the security-entertainment ethos of FIFA fan parks 
function in a less ‘aggressive’ and much more fragmented way.849 Probably, the potential of 
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With respect to the meticulous set up of the bio-spectacular brandscaping of FIFA fan parks (heavily fenced 
with big FIFA banners, with spiked tops to prevent physical trespassing and colourful logos preventing ‘visual’ 
trespassing; characterised by theme-park-like grand gates  suggesting the entrance to a different level of atmo-
rhythmical spatiality; with strict searching procedures and a constant, proactive attempt by performers to 
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water or sandwich sneaked through, as well as generally allowing the entrance to ‘vagrants’ and ‘street kids’, 
which were often stopped in FIFA fan parks [see supra note 805]. Inside the atmosphere is more akin to a place 
for people to enjoy the game and relax, without being ‘forced’ to ‘rhythmise’ themselves to the brandscaping 
as it occurs more invasively in the official fan parks, either by being prompted to buying of stuff or through the 
experiential involvement into the ‘celebratory and festive’ FIFA atmosphere. It is interesting in this sense to 
briefly mention some of the peculiarities of Johannesburg's fan zoning with respect to Germany ’06. As Frew 
and McGillivray observe, in Germany fans were orderly channelled through the city by the fan zoning: 
“Watching fans assimilate the prominent Fan Park signage and move in line towards the Olympic Stadium 
metro-stop emphasised the rational, planned approach employed to direct incoming visitors to the officially-
sanctioned public viewing spaces” [Frew and McGilliray, ‘Exploring Hyper-experiences’ op. cit. p. 190]. 
Completely different was the setting in Johannesburg, where huge highways and a notorious township 
(Alexandra) surrounded the main fan park (Innes Free Park). Reaching the place by walking meant to negotiate 
one’s way through traffic and pollution. At night, this was strongly advised against. Buses, taxies or private cars 
were used to reach the park instead. In the City Business District the central fan parkwas connected to the Ellis 
Park stadium by a ‘fan walk’ passing through notorious neighbourhoods such as Joubert Park and Hillbrow. Yet, 
also due to some communication problems, it never worked. Without the fences providing an added 
experiential value of safety, it did not offer enough affective ‘break’ from the ‘dangerous’ surrounding area. 
Consequently, the fans mainly avoided it. The officials did not bother to inform them too much either, perhaps 
sensing that the risk was too high. In Germany, Frew and McGilliray note, the main purpose was that of 
controlling, smoothening and sedating the potential for dangerous behaviour, according to the "continuing 
governmental concern with a hyper-masculine football culture and the deviant spectre of hooliganism", and at 
the same time offering a platform for attracting ‘accepted’ agencies as preferred ‘fan behaviour’ (pp. 191-2). In 
Johannesburg this logic worked in reversed fashion. Instead of seeking to protect the city from the fans by 
enclosing them in fan parks, the concern here was to protect the fans from what the 'city' could do to them. We 
could thus appreciate better the difference in policing between a pro-active, invasive and panoptical stance 
(Germany) and a protective, sheltering and synoptical one (Johannesburg), not a matter of containing 
potentially troublesome flows of people, but of offering them a shelter, a bubble of safety to screen the fan 
from the inhospitable outside. Here lies the key ‘experiential value’ of security. Joburg’s fan parks were less 
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‘unofficial’ fan parks should be taken into account in future mega-event strategies and 
analyses, especially in the sense of deactivating the spatiolegal apparatus of exception of 
the ME in order to open it up to the potential of its contingent eventfulness – a concept I 
explore in the following chapter. Likewise, the multifaceted policing of the city allows many 
people for the first time to walk into zones they would normally never venture into (let 
alone by walking), thereby partially challenging the taken-for-granted psycho-geographical 
assumptions of the JT, and thus producing (temporary) publicness into usually-neglected 
areas. Could not the dimples in the smoothness of the JT generated by these occurrences be 
employed to propel strategies of public space reformulation?  
Regardless of the different answers that one can provide, the point here is to avoid 
instrumental readings of ME-brandscaping as a pacific application of pre-given sets of 
narratives, strategies and practices into a passive and flat urban surface. Its outcome is 
always the turbulent and situated result of the encounter with the complexity of the urban, 
always bound to produce frictions and excesses, whose singularity requires situated 
analyses, radically material perspectives and consistent methodologies. In fact, could not 
the re-tuning emerging out of the encounter and clash between the JT and the WCB lead to 
unexpected reformulation of urban space, alternative to either the ‘official’ or the ‘critical’ 
vulgates? 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
hyper-experiences of enjoyment providing “micro-level resistance to the everyday banality of work” 
(Germany) and rather more mundane experiences of ‘liberation’ from the urban alertness, micro-level 
resistance to the everyday anxiety of the Joburg Tune: a joyful atmosphere of safety, that is, mirroring the role 
shopping malls play in South Africa as places in which, as Fred de Vries notes, “you can walk around without 
any worries [...] an antidote to Apartheid, a place where people blend and can forget about the past and 
current anxieties” [‘Megamalls, Generic City,’ in Sarah Nuttall and Achile Mbembe (eds.), Johannesburg the 
Elusive Metropolis (Wits University Press, 2008) p. 302]. In fact, similar atmo-rhytmical configurations to the 
‘hyper-experiences’ of fandom described by Frew and McGilliray in Germany could be observed in the smaller 
fan parks set up in Johannerburg’s big shopping malls such as Rosebank, Melrose Arch, Montecassino. 
Arguably, shopping malls are sterile, securitised and disciplined spaces of consumption. Within these spaces, 
the fan parks did not functioned as bubbles of safety amidst a space of danger, but rather as bubbles of hyper-
enjoyment within a commodified space of control. In other words, within what I above referred to as the 
‘slowed-down’ rhythm of malls, the fan park produced a re-acceleration of the tempo directly conducive to a 
‘carnival’ atmosphere, insofar as in direct opposition (i.e. alimented exactly for the fact of being opposed) to 
the disciplined environment in which it was taking place. Different authors have noted the role shopping malls 
play in context such as US or South Africa, where with the parallel privatisation of public space they are 
increasingly taking the role of “modern-day marketplace or city square” [Alison Wakefield, ‘The Public 
Surveillance Functions of Private Security’, Surveillance & Society 2(4) 2002: p. 533], that is, the place where 
people hang out, meet and spend their social life (see introduction). This also means that a ban from a 
shopping mall in certain contexts could play the same significance of being banned from a public square. 
Moreover, being privately owned, malls and other privatised formerly-public places are characterised by 
higher behavioural expectation (e.g. the forbiddance to drink) and far wider and discretionary powers of 
surveillance, control and exclusion [Kempa et al. ‘Policing Communal Spaces’, op. cit]. In this context PVAs 
opened spaces of ‘chaotic enjoyment’ ‘liberating’ from the discipline of the mall, breaking its strict rules (no-
drinking, no-smoking, no-shouting  etc.) and allowing people to ‘act unruly’, for instance drinking beer, 
smoking and blowing Vuvuzelas, in this way spatio-temporally reconfiguring the place. By functioning as a 
‘bubble within the bubble’, the fan parks thus produced tunings much closer to the ones observed in Germany.  
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My tentative conclusion is that the clash between the JT and the WCB ultimately left the JT 
unchallenged. The strategical operations of caring, policing and fan zoning allowed certain 
agencies, otherwise ‘restricted’, to be expressed. The JT’s mood of alertness, anxiety and 
distrust was been sought to be defused through spectacular narratives of multicultural joy 
[the Rainbow Nation], police high-visibility and great effort in ‘welcoming’ the visitors. This, 
however, rested on a hyper-immunological spatialisation consisting in the production of 
atmospherically-enclosed areas through physical, legal and techno-securitarian boundaries, 
which confirmed and indeed reinforced the slow-tempo of shopping malls onto a wider 
urban space: by producing, enclosing and patrolling an atmosphere of fun and safety, the 
WCB ended up reinforcing the syncopated rhythm of bubble-to-bubble movement (‘ensure 
that you walk along the demarcated pedestrian routes’) and fragmented atmospheres 
characterising the key tonalities of the Joburg Tune: alertness and immunity. Acting as a 
pharmakon, the WCB inoculated a ‘low level of transgression’ to the JT’s atmo-rhythm of 
alertness, mistrust and exceptional mapping, yet without addressing the conflictual 
antagonism of the city, but rather spectacularly denying it in the de-potentiating strategy of 
consensus, as well as practically confining it, through securitarian, legal and commercial 
operations, outside the World Cup zoning and its smooth, secured and capitalised 
circulation. In this sense, the WCB institutionalised the JT, adapting to its pulsating 
immanence by recalibrating its frequency to the securitarian and commercial needs of the 
FIFA ‘look and feel’, through the caring response of volunteers, the therapeutic security of 
visible policing, and the physical, legal and branded boundaries of the fan zoning. In the end, 
it is difficult to offer an affirmative reply to Christopher McMichael’s rhetorical question: 
“will turning our cities into heavily patrolled corporate theme parks make life safer and 
more secure [and generally, improved] for ordinary South Africans after the tourists and 
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atmosphere is a field of virtual movement from which 





It was the night of the elimination game between the last African team 
remaining in the competition, Ghana versus US. The atmosphere was electric. 
Doctor Cape, Cape Town’s notorious Ocean wind, was blowing furiously. The 
giant screen in the fan park oscillated worryingly. Too much. The fan park was to 
be closed. People moved to the various pubs, restaurants and cafes in the central 
avenue, Long Street. Sheltered from the wind in fragmented micro-spaces of 
fandom, they watched the emphatic last-minute victory of Ghana. After the 
match, pan-African enthusiasm had no longer fences to be contained. The party 
that was to take place in the fan park now spilled over the street, a celebratory 
affectivity disruptive to both the traffic and the controlled and securitised flow of 
the event: no fences, no guards, no channelled consumption practices, no 
spectacular production of entertainment. Affects, bodies and wind conjured 
together in allowing the eventfulness of the ME to escape the brandscaping 
modulation, a friction too intense to be contained. You never know how objects 
can get together, what configuration they may take. The intensive charge of the 
moment resonated for hours in the city centre. This was celebration, and yet no 
peaceful one. The lack of security and panoptical control allowed for unleashing 
the urban conflict (in its material sense, beyond good and evil). There were 
shouts, dancing, hugging, and also some minor fight. The assemblage of bodies, 
affects and wind de-activated the operational mechanism of the ME, its 
immunitary, event-defusing brandscaping, and yet kept in place its eventful 
resonance, transforming the city-centre into an open air festival, for some time 
irreducible to the spectacle of the ME.  
It is easy to romanticise this instance as a sort of more ‘true’ and ‘authentic’ dimension of 
being together. Instead, I propose to take it as a partial and uncertain instance of a 
temporary de-activation of the operational mechanism of the ME. Not a critical 
deconstruction, but a direct dismantling of the operation of brandscaping, that is, of its twin 
strategy of immunity and consumption, through an immanent, unauthorised, impersonal 
emergence of a configuration of bodies, affects, wind, in which different scales conjured.  To 
assume it as an instance of emancipatory urban politics would be quite naïve, if not utterly 
ridiculous. Yet, beyond the easy fascination with notions such as the immediate and 
spontaneous liberation of urban potentialities, this example is helpful in offering some 
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inspiration, from the methodological issue of how to observe and account for these fleeting 
moments of friction, to the political question of how to ‘use’ the potentialities that these 
frictions produce, how to ‘keep open’ the space they generate, the lines of flight they 
potentially trigger. Precise strategic questions follow: how can the intensity of urban life be 
allowed to emerge, beyond the immediate spontaneism that the just-narrated example 
suggests? How to deactivate the immunising attempt to reduce it into predictable, 
controllable and capitalisable tunings, and yet avoiding the dangerous outcomes of 
‘liberationist’ tendencies? How to dismantle the spatiolegal mechanism of exception, 
without pretending to eliminate it, and instead opening it to different uses? How to open 




































This chapter interrupts the flow that in the last two carried this thesis through the notions of 
control, brandscaping and mega event, and folds it back where the first two culminated: i.e. 
the concepts of event and justice. Consistent with the thesis’ spiralling movement, here I go 
back to its principal vectors and seek to project them towards a common vanishing point: 
namely, the notion of cosmic justice, where the ethico-political lines of flight generated so 
far are meant to crystallise. 
For this purpose, I delineate an approach which does not deny, conceal or pacify but rather 
endeavours to stay within and traverse the conflictual materiality of the urban. A resolute 
conviction aliments this endeavour, namely, the necessity to challenge the exceptional 
tunings of control through a radically materialistic perspective, that is, by addressing the 
ontological reality of its abstraction – i.e. the uneventful relationalism in which the urban 
horizon is seemingly enclosed. As I already hinted during the thesis, doing so requires a 
simultaneously more abstract and more concrete strategy: more precisely, a strategy that 
exactly by means of being sufficiently abstract is able achieve an effective degree of 
'concreteness'. Following Cunningham, the juridico-economical abstraction of the spatiolegal 
architecture of control cannot be simply opposed from a supposedly ‘more concrete' 
standpoint, and is instead to by perforated through another kind of abstraction.853 In fact, an 
abstraction 
does not entail a retreat into the transcendent passivity of the idea, but rather it 
accelerates the friction between the interior and exterior, as an agent of constant 
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distress, at once empirically `there' and `inexistent', ever-nearing the world and yet ever 
tempted towards withdrawal854 
This is what propels my attempt in this chapter, that is, envisaging an 'inoperose' ethico-
political action that refuses to be grounded on the comfortable presupposition of a 
negativity out of which waging the attack to the ontological reality of control, and yet does 
not resign to the administrative task of simply finding better ways of being-together within 
the reality of this state of exception. Instead, it proposes to confront control on the 
dimension in which both its abstract form and the reality of its modulating operations 
unfold: the event. This entails a two-step strategy: first, the always contextualised ‘making 
inoperose’ of the spatiolegal apparatus of exception, so as to open the urban to the eventful 
contingency of its cosmic justice; second, the ethical injunction to use ('counter-effectuate') 
such potential for generating alternative and potentially just tunings. What this means is 
envisioning an alternative abstract form of being-together, one in which the inescapable 
necessity of cohabitation is reoriented away from the administrative duty of synchronisation 
or the micro-activism of temporary autonomous insulations, and directed towards the 
common task of keeping the urban open to the immanent contingency of its cosmic justice. 
First, I provide a brief overview of some significant attempts to think the notion of justice in 
connection with space, mainly focusing on the concept of spatial justice. Individuating some 
fault lines within this milieu, as well as drawing a link to the reflections developed in the 
second chapter, I am able to provide a more accurate indication of the concept of justice I 
am envisaging. Second, I employ the notion of surfing to qualify what I mean by ‘inoperose 
action’ and what form of ethico-political interventionism such a stance entails. At the same 
time, I clarify my position vis-à-vis the danger of being internalised within the ethos of 
control, through a brief detour to ancient China. Third, I relate this interventionism to the 
spatiolegal reflections developed so far, suggesting a strategy that moves beyond the false 
alternative between a ‘justice within law’ and ‘justice without law’, and rather envisages the 
potential of a non-immunitary, ‘inoperose’ use of law, by means of disorienting law itself, 
deactivating its exceptional apparatus and thus forcing it to reorient towards the event of its 
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The declaration of the Rights of Man should be 
reformulated in topological terms to express the idea 
that all men are not only born free and equal but that 




Most of the early attempts to think justice in connection to space have been developed 
within the field of geography and urban studies, through concepts such as just city, right to 
the city, territorial justice, spatial justice. In this section I mainly focus on the latter, which I 
see as perhaps the most promising attempt to unfold the materiality of justice in the terms I 
have been discussing so far. Promises that, however, appear to have remained unfulfilled in 
most of the variations through which the concept has being conceptualised. Generally, this 
has meant falling short from fully unfolding its excessive and material character, in this way 
neutralising its radical potential and thus exposing it to both being instrumentally co-opted 
by conservative ideology as well as de-politicised into multicultural and ‘distributive’ 
rhetoric. This is not meant to be an exhaustive genealogical overview of the concept. 
Instead, I am concerned with detecting some of the problematic threads shared among 
different accounts (that also spill over another potentially relevant concept: i.e. the right to 
the city), so that to calibrate my trajectory accordingly.  
David Harvey’s spatial approach to justice has undoubtedly merits and deserves at least a 
mention, although as I already noted I find his conceptualisation of space rather 
problematic, insofar as positing a separation between tangible (physical) space and 
intangible space (supra-structures) – and subordinating the former to the latter –, which 
leads him to ultimately leaving unchallenged untenable dichotomies.856 Moreover, at odds 
with the conceptualisation I have developed so far is the eminently processual, social and 
human dimension in which Harvey appears to confine space.857 We need to look for other 
directions. In the end, as Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ puts it, Harvey’s is not “a 
conceptualisation of spatial justice, but a spatial perspective on social justice”.858 
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Henri Lefebvre, Harvey’s main inspiration, offered a more sophisticated conceptualisation 
through what he famously defined as ‘right to the city’, a concept which I believe, if taken in 
its radical acceptation, indicates a direction consistent with what a radical notion of spatial 
justice promises to unfold.859 As Harvey puts it, the right to the city is the “right to change 
ourselves by changing the city”.860 In Lefebvre's own words, “the right to the oeuvre, to 
participation and appropriation (clearly distinct from the right to property)”, and thus to 
political and fully material involvement in the urban-making process.861 This prefigures a 
radical re-conceptualisation in urban and material sense of the notion of human rights, a 
“potential … displacement of formal notions of political citizenship by a broader concept of 
urban citizenship” akin to Sloterdijk’s proposal to ‘reformulate human right in topological 
terms’, so as be consistent with the fact that human beings “are not only born free and 
equal but that they’re condemned to look after the space in which they live”.862 The 
mounting resonance of this concept in an increasingly urbanised world has been officialised 
by the drafting of a World Charter on the Right to the City in 2004, and is being testified by 
the significance it is playing as a strategic tool in various initiatives around the world.863 Its 
risk however is that of falling prey of the tendency which Lefebvre somewhat tends to 
succumb to: namely the temptation to dialectically overcome the contradictions of ‘abstract 
space’ and ‘linear rhythm’ into the post-conflictual ‘promise of a sublime differential 
space’.864 Accordingly, the danger for the right to the city is that of being diluted into post-
conflictual rhetorics of community and multiculturalism, or romanticised into merely direct 
and oppositional anti-capitalist stances. The politically-sedating flavour of these tendencies 
already encompasses and to my opinion fatally compromises, the related concept of ‘just 
city’ and its rather uncritical use of such notions as re-distribution, deliberation and 
participation.865 Whether deprived of its radical aspiration and depurated of its conflictual 
substance, the right to the city is equally threatened to being diluted into “weakly 
participatory forms of urban governance” and other similarly uneventful practices.866  
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In his recent book Seeking Spatial Justice Ed Soja maintains that the relevance of spatial 
justice particularly rests in allowing to eschewing the totalising universality of the concept of 
‘just city’, as well as the lack of critical edge of notions such as ‘distributive’ justice.867 
Notwithstanding the promises, however, his book is limited to a rather instrumental 
understanding of spatial justice, reduced to a strategic tool to test urban decisions, i.e. 
another way to insert the ‘spatial’ into the logic of social justice. To be sure, this is not 
necessarily a problem in itself. If however this is the case, how the concept of ‘spatial justice’ 
could embody a radical and innovative value, remains to be seen. Moreover, also Soja’s 
conceptualisation appears unable to shrug off an eminently anthropocentric and ‘social’ 
understanding of justice.  
Mustafa Dikeç has sought to provide a more sophisticated approach, understanding spatial 
justice neither as a mere instrument to act surgically in space by artificially isolating an area 
from the city, nor more generally as an inclusionary tool for allowing more participation 
within the given order, but rather, more radically, as a tool meant to wrong the given order 
itself.868 Dikeç develops a challenging exploration of urban politics employing a non-naïve 
and strategically promising understanding of space.869 However, I sense that his 
conceptualisation of justice is ultimately unable to fully eschew a certain ‘spatial 
romanticism’ and, in the end, appears to be still framed within, in Weizman terms, a ‘too 
soft’ understanding of space.870 This seems to emerge for instance when, following de 
Certeau, he maintains that whilst the ‘given order’ “excludes the possibility of two things 
being in the same location” (since confining ‘everything at the right place’), the space of the 
political (and thus of spatial justice), with its unstable and non-univocal quality, is what 
allows for such a possibility to occur.871 If this is the case, spatial justice risks being 
somewhat rarefied into an almost epistemological tool to 're-imagine' urban contradictions 
rather than facing the task of addressing its thick materiality. Dikeç is surely aware of this 
risk, and yet he seems to fall short from providing with a clear-cut and sufficiently radical 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
for instance observes that “the right to the city can be extended beyond the urban to be conceived of more 
generally as the right to inhabit – the right to participate centrally in the decisions that shape one’s everyday 
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tool in this sense. What he lacks, it could be argued, is the strategic sharpness that instead 
characterises Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ notion of spatial justice which, in a basically 
symmetrical definition, he defines as “the ultimate expression of the claim to one’s unique 
spatial position which by necessity excludes all others: the fact that only one body can 
occupy a specific space at any specific moment is the phenomenological basis of spatial 
conflicts”.872 There is no escape from the materiality of the urban, no possibility to occupy 
the same place at the same time: inhabiting means displacement, inequality and conflict, 
and it is only by accepting, addressing and traversing such a dense complexity that justice is 
to be conceived. Finally, what generally strikes in Dikeç’s as well as in the other approaches 
touched upon above is the very little engagement with the question law. Why does law play 
such a minor role in these accounts? Is not the legal, or indeed spatiolegal question a 
fundamental one when discussing about justice? I believe so.  
The last paragraphs perform some unavoidable (and admittedly ungenerous) simplifications 
of works whose complexity cannot be summarised in few lines. Even more ungenerous 
perhaps, has been the decision (for reason of ‘space’) to overlook other potentially 
interesting contributions to the debate. Yet, I feel this was sufficient to achieve the purpose 
of this section, which was not meant to provide a complete synopsis of the concept of 
spatial justice but rather to set the stage for the discussion to follow, by delineating the 
problematic field in response to which the concept of spatial justice appears to emerge, and 
which this chapter aims to traverse. An indication of the direction to follow is provided by 
the limits that these different conceptualisations of spatial justice seem to share: in a 
sentence, a general unwillingness to fully pursue its radical promises.  
It is not enough to define spatial justice as “a critique of systematic exclusion, domination 
and oppression”.873 Spatial justice is neither an aspect nor a companion of social justice. It 
does not ‘derive’ from the latter, and is not the “ultimate goal of many planning policies”, as 
Marcuse puts it – indeed, if there is something that the concept of justice should 
problematise is exactly the anxiety for ‘the result’ that characterises contemporary urban 
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policies.874 It neither spatialises nor materialises justice, nor is a simple shorthand for “social 
justice in space”.875 Far more radically, spatial justice removes the ‘social’ from justice, by 
asserting justice’s always-already spatial and material character. This is the sense proposed 
by Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, whose conceptualisation overcomes such shortcomings by 
pointing towards a properly material and excessive understanding.876 Equally important is 
his emphasis on the necessity to address spatial justice through the question of law. This is, I 
believe, a crucial point. As I contend below, it is exactly through the contingent deactivation 
(making inoperose) of the spatiolegal mechanism of exception that the eventful potential for 
justice emerges.877 
However, in the following pages I will move beyond this notion. I believe that the concept of 
spatial justice has been already subjected to enough elaborations and indeed 
neutralisations: it appears, in other words, already too compromised.878 Moreover, I feel 
that it is ultimately unable to convey the non-relational and eventful quality that I seek to 
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The prefix geo does not signify a specialized branch of 
philosophy; it signals, rather, the topos, or the 
nowhere, of philosophical inquiry in place of a 
transcendental metaphysics that believes itself above 





In the second chapter, I observed that an insufficient understanding of the materiality of law 
is the symptom of the incapacity to properly deal with justice. Accordingly, I questioned the 
tendencies to subordinate law to some higher principle, sovereign, hidden or yet-to-come 
since, as Sutter rightly observes, this ultimately de-materialises justice, de facto positioning it 
out of this world.880 At the same time, I sought to differentiate my direction from some 
pragmatic, materialist and immanent models, and their suggestions to ‘get rid of’ the 
spectacular façade of law in order to ‘liberate’ the materialities of a purely pragmatic and 
immanent ‘practice of right’ supposedly lying beneath the cloak of spatiolegal abstractions. 
First, this risks confining ‘law’ into ‘abstract’, ‘oppositional’, ‘negative’ and ‘prescriptive’ 
domains, assuming it as a ‘simple abstraction’ separated from its outside (life, space, justice) 
and thus overlooking its ontological inscription into the atmospheres and rhythms of the 
real. Second, this also equates to overlooking “the generative role that abstraction plays in 
disclosing and giving consistency to different kinds of worlds”, more precisely the positive 
quality of abstractions (legal abstractions included) as “constitutive of new ‘concrete’ forms 
of spatial relationality generative of social meaning”, and thus the positive role they can play 
vis-à-vis opening the urban to the eventful potential of justice.881 Barnett is right when 
observing that, when thinking about ethics, justice and responsibility, we need more than 
“just telling stories about spatially extensive networks of connection and entanglement”.882 
We should be suspicious about the ‘healing’ properties of relationalism, as well as wary of 
                                                          
879
D. Chisholm, ‘Rhizome, Ecology, Geophilosophy (A Map to this Issue)’ Rhizomes 15 (4) 2007, available at 
http://www.rhizomes.net/issue15/chisholm.html.  
880
These positions ultimately share the assumption that ‘there is the need of a law because God, justice and 
truth are not of this world’ [Sutter, Deleuze, op. cit. p. 49 (my translation)]. 
881
McCormack, ‘Geography and Abstraction’, op. cit. p. 727; and Cunningham, ‘Spacing Abstractions’, op. cit. p. 
465; Cunningham is here referring to Lefebvre’s notion of ‘abstract space’, yet I believe that legal abstractions 
as well have a potentiality in this sense. Whilst, as he notes following Miéville, “force and violence are intrinsic 
to the legal form as such” [p. 467], below I argue that the strategy of deactivation of the legal apparatus of 
exception gestures to the possibility to open law to other uses, not in the sense of overcoming notions of 
violence and power, but rather 'reorienting' their residual intensity towards the dimension of justice. 
882
In Clive Barnett, ‘Geography and ethics: Justice unbound’, Progress in Human Geography 35(2) 2011, 246–
255: p. 252; Barnett gathers too many approaches under his critique, unavoidably producing untenable 
simplifications. Nonetheless, his observations are useful in providing a further qualification to the problems of 
relationalism. See also Barnett, ‘Geography and ethics: Placing life in the space of reasons’, Progress in Human 
Geography 36(3) 2012, 379–388 
233 
 
iconoclastic urges to ‘have done with law’. Differently from Sutter, I believe that here lies the 
sense of Deleuze’s famous injunction to ‘have done with judgement’: not a call to ‘have done 
with law’, but rather, a call to have done with the operational mechanism of exception 
which grounds law’s judgement.883 This is not, of course, an attempt to preserve the prestige 
and mystical aura of law. Paraphrasing Whyte, what this entails is thinking law beyond the 
false alternative between its glorification and its dismissal, "beyond the reactionary desire to 
re-instil law with a lost meaning, the nihilistic embrace of law’s emptiness, and the dialectic 
of constituent and constituted power”.884 Thinking the possibility of an ‘inoperose use’ of 
law, that is, through the deactivation of its immunitary mechanism of exception: dismantling 
the second without eradicating the first. 
Surely, justice cannot come only through law. Yet, to Miéville’s observation – i.e. the 
‘systematic amelioration of social and international problems cannot come through law’ – I 
add that justice cannot come without law either.885 I agree with Cunningham when stressing 
that  
a politics adequate to the contemporary must always go beyond the terrain of the 
‘legal’, but equally cannot afford to ‘eradicate’ it, for this would risk merely reinscribing 
rights, in an illusory desire for the ‘concrete’, as a purely ‘moral’ category divided from 
questions of political accountability or enforceability886 
Justice, then, simultaneously “through and despite the law”.887 ‘Going beyond the terrain of 
the legal’ does not mean to abandon law, since law and justice occupy the same ontological 
space, a spatiality (spatiolegality) that cannot be shattered through ‘leaps of faith’ occurring 
in pre-ontological vacuums. As Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ suggests, ‘the law is not just 
legalistic ... the law is both legalistic and just’.888 This, I believe, is what is enshrined in the 
sibylline sentence uttered by Deleuze and Guattari in their book on Kafka: “The 
transcendence of the law was an abstract machine, but the law exists only in the immanence 
of the machinic assemblage of justice”.889 Not a dismissal of law, but the affirmation of its 
inseparable as well as non-coincident relation with justice, what sanctions both the 
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inescapability of every situation as well as the eventful materiality of its haunting excess. 
This is what Derrida misses, by situating justice in a pre-ontological dimension, assuming it as 
an impossible possibility, reducing it to a ‘temporal’ instance à venir. Justice is not à venir but 
always-already here: simultaneously an “absolute horizon, independent from any observer”, 
and yet here-and-now, as a “local absolute, an absolute that is manifested locally”, and that 
is never reducible to a configuration for us, or to a world yet-to-come according to our 
desires.890 
Therefore, once its exceptional operation (i.e. the reduction of the world to a world for law) 
is made inoperose then law can truly become a vehicle towards justice, since no longer 
artificially separated from it. “Justice without law is not the negation of the law, but the 
realization and fulfillment, the pleroma, of the law”, Agamben reminds.891 Thus “what opens 
a gateway towards justice is not the elimination of law, but its deactivation and inoperosity – 
that is, another use of law”, in the sense of a non-immunitary and non-appropriating 
aperture of law to a world not-for-law, i.e. a non-juridifiable world where what is 'absent' is 
not law itself, but only its juridifying operation, whose deactivation discloses the geo-legal 
fact of law’s real contiguity with justice.892 
How is this to be (un)done? Neither through all-encompassing principles nor vague 
yearnings for a world beyond: this “state of the world in which the world appears as a good 
that absolutely cannot be appropriated or made juridical”, is not another world but rather a 
potential that any situation in this world harbours.893 This implies engaging at every moment 
an ever-new struggle, not acting beyond, outside or without law, but rather forcing law to 
transform sur place, thus clearing the space for the possibility of the properly creative, un-
authorised emergence of justice.894 
What kind of ethico-political action such an understanding envisages, what kind of urban 
politics that entails? Indeed, what does ‘action’ mean in this sense, and how can we rescue it 
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from the reduction into the compromised paradigm of operation? Prior to come back to the 
law/justice relation, it is with such ‘inoperose’ dimension of acting that we must confront. 
 
3. 
What deed would man capable of if he had not first 




The urban, so far described in its multi-scalar concatenations, conflictual turbulence and 
eventful potentialities, presents a level of complexity that advises against any more or less 
well-intended faith in unilateral solutions to its immanent problems, or post-political beliefs 
on the possibility of impartial actions oriented by pragmatic and non-ideological ‘ideas that 
work’, spaces that fix.896 What this entails is the necessity to assume one’s inescapable 
placed-ness (the unavoidable fact of occupying one place, of taking place) as a body 
amongst other bodies. Yet, a being-placed that is irreducible (although not independent) 
from physical, representational or phenomenological ‘states of affair’, i.e. to an actual 
relationalism traceable via socio-legal-empirical means. A being-placed, that is, always 
potentially open to its non-relational eventfulness. This means accepting one’s being 
simultaneously situated in the actual, phenomenological and ‘concrete’ contingency of the 
situation, and yet open to its ecological (or more precisely cosmological) prolongations and 
eventful excesses. Yes, we are always within a dense materiality in which every movement is 
fraught with consequences, to the point that we cannot even ‘afford to choose to be either 
active or passive’.897 As the very dichotomy of action and inaction loses meaning, the 
question of whether this ultimately leads to an inescapable political impasse cannot be easily 
dismissed. Could not such a perspective be assumed as atrophying the possibility for ethico-
political action, entangling agency within such a dense and complex web of indefinite 
consequences to the point of rendering it pointless? According to some, this “intensely 
demotivating” position is conducive to either passive renunciation or to resigning oneself to 
low-profile and innocuous tactics of small-scale transgressions that in the end do little for 
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problematizing the reality of control, and instead become “comforting substitutes for effect-
ive success”.898 
This is not necessarily the case. The approach I develop here does not imply resignation or 
renunciation but rather a motivation to act within this world, the only world there is, by 
refusing any operational and nihilistic pretence of a nothingness which would ground the 
possibility for action, as well as without falling into the a-political passivity of inaction. This 
prefigures an interventionism based on a mode of acting ‘drained’ from the hubris of 
activism: inoperose acting.899 Zourabichvili once defined Deleuze’s ethico-political stance as 
'involuntarism'. I apply this definition to the position I am elaborating, provided that the 
term is understood in the sense of being incompatible with the ‘voluntarism’ of a subjective 
will.900 To define the act of thinking away from intentionality, subjectivity, voluntarism and 
thus a conception of thought as generated ex nihilo by a cogito, Deleuze and Guattari 
propose to understand it as an act of diving, or surfing. This is what intervention means: 
inter-venire, i.e. to come between, entering the flow of things, always beginning in the 
middle, coordinating ‘one’s body with other modi’, always “‘get[ting] into something' instead 
of being the origin of an effort”.901 Surfing, that is. 
Of course, it is not that simple. There are legitimate critiques that cannot be shunned just by 
resorting to adventurous analogies. Moreover, how can surfing be a viable model for ethico-
political action in the age of control? Does not the flexible capacity to ‘flow between things’ 
in today’s neo-capitalist times, turn into a precarious vulnerability to the flows themselves, 
stuck within a closed horizon at the mercy of the modulated waves of brandscaping and its 
pervasive “world of infinite mobilisation”?902 We already encountered this critique. In 
Hallward's terms, a surfing politics would imply as its quintessential task the dissolution of 
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“limitations in order to become a more adequate or immaterial vehicle” to the 
undifferentiated flow of the virtual.903 Vulnerable ascesis. In fact, once the stable immunitary 
cages of ‘individual’, ‘selfhood’, ‘persona’, ‘subject’ are overcome by means of diving, how to 
avoid dissolution into the atmo-rhythmical waves of control?904 Is not surfing the perfect 
explicitation of the reduction of every being into an ‘automaton’ prey of biopolitical 
apparatuses, a conceptual persona that expresses an ethos of Zen-like ‘letting go’ which 
perfectly fits the accelerated ideology of late capitalism? Yes, Zizek replies. This ethics is 
premised on the renunciation to “any attempts to retain control over what goes on, 
rejecting such efforts as expressions of the modern logic of domination” and instead 
prompts to “‘let oneself go’, drift along, while retaining an inner distance and indifference 
toward the mad dance of the accelerated process”.905 Therefore, this entails not challenging 
but rather accepting a given condition, and only secondarily trying to ‘surf it’ towards 
‘libertarian ends’.906 
 So far I have only provided partial and mainly reactive responses to these legitimate doubts. 
It is now time to clarify more precisely how my proposal attempts to overcome them. I do so 
with a brief ‘Chinese’ detour. Taking inspiration from the main target of Zizek’s last quote – 
i.e. the Westernised appropriation of Eastern philosophy (from ‘pop-Buddhism to Taoism) –, 
and employing François Jullien’s compelling Treatise on Efficacy, in the next two sections I 
qualify how such inoperose ‘surfing ethics’, whilst avoiding the operational paradigm of 
action as well as the hubristic search for ‘revolutionary’ authenticity, at the same time does 
not simply unfold into innocuous micro-activism or problematically vulnerable stances at the 
mercy of control’s modulation. 
 
4. 
I choose to merge with the environment. Instead of 
saying that I simply disappear into the background, it 
would be better to say that the environment has 
engulfed me and that I cannot afford to choose to be 
either active or passive.
907
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In his Treatise on Efficacy, subtitled ‘between Western and Chinese thinking’, François 
Jullien embarks on a brief and engaging analysis of the Chinese concept of action by drawing 
on classical texts of Taoism. He presents the latter as an immanent and eminently strategic 
philosophy, utterly alternative to the operational, project-oriented paradigm of Western 
action. In one of the most famous instances of Western strategic thinking, Clausewitz 
laments the ultimate impossibility for a theory of warfare to bridge the gap with the actual 
practice of war. Unfortunately, he complains, a strategy must always enter (and thus be 
dislocated by) the ‘atmosphere in which the War moves’.908 What for Clausewitz is a major 
concern, is absolutely a non-problem for Chinese thinkers. Untouched by the projectual 
anxiety of the ‘plan’, Chinese strategy is totally immanent to the situation in which it occurs. 
Theory and practice become one. Accordingly, the atmosphere of the battle is not an 
atmospherics dislocating the ‘war-plan’. Instead, it is everything that war is about, i.e. a 
contingent configuration of forces carrying an inherent and ‘circumstantial’ potential, which 
is the duty of the strategist to act upon in-the-moment.909 There is neither determinism nor 
indeterminacy in this conception. Every situation is understood as an ‘objective 
configuration’ in which the dao – i.e. ‘the natural course of things’ – flows, guiding without 
determining, i.e. tuning the possibilities for action.910 How these potentials unfold in the 
actual situation is the task of the good strategist to accurately evaluate, calibrating the 
action accordingly. Adequate preparation is needed, yet abstracting ‘projectuality’ is of no 
use. As Jullien qualifies, this is a ‘phenomenology of effectiveness’ whereby one does not 
abstract from a situation in order to decide upon it, but rather seeks to dissolve into the 
flow of things, ‘harmonising’ immanently with their becoming.911 What counts is being able 
to act at the “stage of pre-actualisation” where reality is more ‘malleable’ and ‘flexible’: i.e. 
acting ‘upstream’, that is, plugging into the unformatted, plasmatic dimension where the 
potential of a situation lies, and thus where vast transformations can be engendered with 
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minimal effort: butterfly effect. As Benasayag puts it, non-action within this perspective 
does not mean ‘inaction’ but rather indicates a way of ‘non-acting in response to the 
accident, non-being in agitation, non-reacting by means of resisting the urge ‘to exercise 
some power to be’.912 Action, yet ‘freed’ from activism and its prefigured objectives: the 
world as no longer an object for us, i.e. an ‘object to be acted upon’, but rather a reality in 
evolution to which we must conform through a process which is neither magical nor 
technical, neither goal-oriented nor chancy, and “instead of being willed ... stems from the 
conditions implied in a situation”.913 
I must stress that probably Jullien is heuristically simplifying Taoism. As some has noted, he 
is also skipping the contemporary Chinese philosophical debate, thus offering a frozen and 
almost mythical image of ‘Chinese alterity’.914 This is not relevant for the present discussion 
however, since I am as much employing Jullien’s text (Jullien's Taoism) heuristically as a tool 
to build my own argument. What is relevant, in fact, is the evident similarity between the 
model of ‘action’ he is sketching and the one I am proposing. Jullien describes ‘acting’ as 
merging with the immanence of a situation in order to unfold its potentialities by ‘impinging 
upon them’ as well as, as he puts it, literally “swerving from the aim of achieving” them; 
never ‘saturating’ an effect (i.e. the inherent potential of a situation) and rather ‘letting it 
grow’, liberating it from its ‘goals’ and its operational apparatus, since “intending an effect 
kills it, dries it up, exhausts it”.915 This seems very consistent with the 'surfing 
interventionism' I began to sketch above. Yet, at least two crucial differences should be 
emphasised.  
First, Jullien understands the potential of a situation as a ‘fund of potentiality’, “the 
undifferentiated basis of all things – which is also the basis of all their virtualities”.916 Beings 
are denied consistency within this perspective, posited as 'sterile' entities emanating from a 
deeper flux of becoming. Actuality appears as just a limitation that must be overcome so as 
to dematerialise oneself into such undifferentiated substratum.917 Second, the event 
disappears within this perspective, ‘dissolved’ into ‘silent transformations’, sublimated into 
the flow of things.918 This processual philosophy of becoming understands reality as a 
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smooth, continuous and anti-evental movement into which we are called to conform and 
dissolve, thus fully justifying Zizek's remarks about the suspicious proximity between Taoism 
and the ethos of neo-capitalism. What is assumed, by updating Taoism as an ethico-political 
model for the present, is the supposed 'innocence' of the ‘natural course of things’ (dao), 
and this amounts to overlooking the key question of its ontological production vis-à-vis 
power configurations. The injunction to become an 'immaterial vehicle' of the dao risks 
becoming a receipt for utter vulnerability, Taoism's exposure to which, in fact, is not a new 
fact.  
Already in VI-III century BC, Taoism was being co-opted within the authoritarian philosophy 
of so-called Legalist tradition. ‘Legalist’ thinkers exploited Taoist teachings by taking to the 
extreme their underlining presuppositions in order to build a model of despotic 
authoritarianism aimed at establishing a form of absolute and ‘automatic’, i.e. self-
regulating control over the population.919 Han Feizi’s ‘theory of impersonal sovereignty’ is 
indeed a textbook case of the spatiolegal logic of control here discussed. It proposes an 
absolutely immanent model of government in which the ruler must be depersonalised and 
de-humanised to the point of ‘disappearing’ into the flow of things, becoming a ‘void’.920 
Here, the emptiness of sovereignty is not concealed behind a rhetoric of power, but directly 
assumed as the empty core of a system able to ‘run smoothly on its own accord’, i.e. 
automatically: a ‘cybernetic’ apparatus of power organised in “a completely artificial fashion 
(it is completely independent from the sentiment of the ruler and rests solely on the norms 
that are imposed and the control that is exercised) ... [a system expected to] operate on its 
own”.921 This ‘theory of political manipulation’ grounded on the “reduction of all others to 
passivity ... [treating them] as pure automatons”,922 is perfectly consistent with the 
‘glorious’ logic of control, i.e. a configuration aimed at defusing the eventful potentiality of 
being-together, “manipulat[ing] the situation so as to influence one’s adversary indirectly, 
progressively getting him to move in a particular direction”.923 At play are all the elements 
discussed in the last chapters: a system of power which is self-justified by its own internal 
regularity, keeping alive a smooth and frictionless movement which does not offer anything 
tangible to oppose, 'defusing antagonism', ‘disarticulating solidarity’ and dissolving the 
‘possibility of event’ according to an eminently preventing logic in which anticipation 
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supplants projection.924 An immobile movement, that is: “the defenders of despotism 
sought to monopolize all the potential, making it converge to the throne in such a way as to 
immobilise the situation”.925 The ‘recuperation’ of Taoism within the oppressive model of 
Legalism mirrors the recuperation of naïve vitalism within the oppressive model of control 
and its self-justifying techné. Consistently, Tiqqun define control as neotaoism, an immanent 
and centre-less configuration of power, a 'mastery without masters' thriving onto a global, 
deterritorialised and smooth space where operates without frictions: the ruler is like a 
‘ghost’, “as a perfect manipulator, he is dissolved within his manipulation”.926 
Keeping with this parallel, equally telling is the counter-strategy Taoist thinkers envisaged 
against the exploitation of their thought by Legalism. The injunction, as Jullien tells us, was 
to let the tyrant following “his own inclinations and sink to the extremes”, to let him 
accelerate until self-destruction: liberation would not be come through revolution, but from 
the ‘self-regulation of reality’.927 Conformation risks becoming conformism. The faithful 
reliance on the self-regulation of reality and the implicit assumption on its divine neutrality 
prefigure an endlessly postponed wait for the miraculous event of liberation, nothing but a-
political inertia stuck within the horizon of the reality that the abstraction of the system of 
power has produced. Here lies the danger that strategies of absolute deterritorialisation and 
de-subjectification entail. Never believe the smooth would suffice to save us. Both vitalistic 
accelerationism, horizontal relationalism and Taoist ascesis appear to share the same 'lack of 
depth': they are too superficial. They do overcome transcendent dichotomies, only to remain 
stuck into a flat and seamless ontological surface, at every point coinciding with the 
relational immanence of control.928 Neither acceleration nor passive renunciation, the reality 
of this abstraction should be challenged through the patient dismantling of its exceptional 
operations.929 Overcoming the verticality of ‘heights’ and ‘depths’ without getting stuck on 
the horizontal closure of ‘surfaces’: this is what we should achieve.930 Yet, is not a 'surfing 
ethics' an as much superficial stance?   
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... they do not move. They are nomads by dint of not 
moving, not migrating, of holding a smooth space that 
they refuse to leave, that they leave only in order to 
conquer and die. Voyage in place...931 
 
I do not believe so. Surfing implies the dismantling of rigid dichotomies as well as the 
swerving away from the relational immanence which reproduces the smooth surface on 
which control thrives. Inter-venire, as being ‘forced to coordinate one's body with other 
modi’, is a question of selection rather than ‘dissolution’: ontologically unable to transcend 
it, a surfer must stay in the water, not simply relinquishing through spontaneous, reckless 
and naive affirmation to the smoothness of the sea, but rather riding through its materiality, 
never simply dissolving but always retaining a singular potency to swerve, with style.932 
Contrary to its post-modern accelerationist caricature, every surfer knows that surfing is an 
“art of dosages, since overdose is a danger”.933 This is not a renunciation to oppose reality, 
not an aristocratic capacity dependent on one’s lineage, nor a-critical affirmation: the surfer 
is not the one who joyfully utters YES to what occurs, (acceleration bound to manipulation, 
‘empty enjoyment’ fitting capitalist production of juissance, passive conformism), but the 
one that “knows how to say ‘no’”, the one who selects, able to detect and ‘ride’ the 
excesses, blind spots and contradictions that every system of power produces, exploiting the 
conflictual intensity that palpitates in the cracks and fault lines dimpling the apparent 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
even to an archaic depth ... intensity was presented as coming from depth ... In the Logic of Sense the novelty 
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smoothness of control.934 By means of 'abstracting' surfing into an analogy for ethico-
political action, an absolutely strategic orientation emerges, one that resonates in what 
Benjamin describes as ‘politics of revolt’, that is, in Hirvonen’s concise description: 
neither a politics of great revolutionary programmes, ends, events and heroes, nor an 
infinite gesture of waiting for an always yet-to-come justice and democracy or 
revolutionary moment. Instead, we must read this as an interruptive and ruptural 
politics which recognizes in every instant a ‘small gateway’ in the continuum of global 
capitalism and its legal systems and which aims to exploit these in order to bring about 
liberation, equality and justice935 
What characterises this stance is the fact of being resolutely free from the anxious necessity 
to presuppose a negativity which would provide the ‘lever for agential intervention’.936 In 
this world the ontological reality (the worlding) of control is produced, and in this world it 
can be dismantled, deactivating its operations and acting upon the intensities thus 
unleashed: unplug and reorient. From this dense ontology no-body can ‘exit’. This would be 
just escapism. No room for the hubristic exaltation of the revolutionary subject emerging ex 
nihilo. There is no nihilistic trampoline out of which such irruption would occur.937 Likewise, 
what is also opposed is the ‘eschatologically nomic desire’ that any revolutionary enterprise 
carries: no revolution, but diavolution, in Brighenti’s term, i.e. inhabiting and traversing the 
problematic fields of a given historical configuration, dismantling it by remaining within.938 
This is what an inoperose acting entails. Dismantling the anxiety for control, solution, 
revolution: neither uncritical affirmation of what is, nor nihilistic renunciation, but an 
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immanent staying (in manere), inoperose: ‘beyond being and nothingness ... inhabiting until 
the last moment in the impotent possibility which exceeds both’.939 
As hinted already, however, for some the refusal of a ‘properly revolutionary’ ambition in 
the end means "resigning oneself to a piecemeal re-engineering, re-formation, of the 
existing world”.940 Rescuing the image of the surfer from a parody of libertarian 
accelerationism is not enough to avoid its reduction to an ethico-political stance of modesty 
and complacency vis-à-vis the status quo. Eschewing the latter definition requires even 
greater abstraction. If we are to challenge the state of exception in which we live, avoiding 
the always-compromised short-cuts of nihilism as well as the naivety of affirmationism, then 
what is required is perforating this enclosing horizon, opening up the here-and-now of our 
situation to its cosmic contingency, that is, to the non-relational event of its taking place. 
This is what is meant by 'installing oneself' on the 'viewpoint of the event', as Deleuze 
asserts: a post-human and impersonal gaze on the world, that from (t)here 'appears' as "a 
fractal clump rather than an exotic blue marble … a passing oval meteorite whose crater has 
already bored into the skin of astral corpses".941 What this equates to is the cosmic 
appreciation (rather than personal realisation) of the indifference of the world to our 
inescapable placed-ness in it, a world absolutely not for us, utterly non-disposable, non-
appropriable and non-juridifiable.942 If this is hardly reason for jubilation, it should not lead 
to personal demotivation either: "if there is indeed bitterness, let it not be my bitterness".943 
As I will argue in the last part of this chapter introducing the notion of whiteout, this 
aperture, disclosed through the deactivation of the immunitary and proprietary mechanism 
of exception, is the locus of a truly radical and emancipatory politics, as the opening of a 
vortex that calls us upon us to act vis-à-vis the impersonal justice that insists in every 
situation. Here lies the sense of the refusal of the hubris of revolutionary ambition. 
Accepting the ultimate incompatibility of the world with our appropriating operations does 
not mean resignation, but rather prefigures an inoperose attitude "founded on the unilateral 
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nature of cosmic contingency against which there is no chance of resistance – there are only 
opportunities for drawing schemes of complicity", conjuring novel, non-immunitary and non-
proprietary configurations of being-together.944  
This is what a surfing ethics implies, neither passive nor impassive, but aiming to be 
‘passable’, not passively ‘accepting a situation’, but rather the inescapable complicity with 
anonymous materials one cannot objectify, a mere body among other bodies in a world 
ultimately independent from one's involvement.945 It is not only ‘situatedness’ that this 
understanding conveys, contrary to its ascetic characterisation.946 There is also a radical 
attempt at de-centring the human-centric perspective on ethics and politics that chimes with 
the ethical orientation of OOO. Yet, there is also a decided and decisively constructive 
aperture to a radical notion of event that seems to be missing in the latter.947 This is how I 
interpret Deleuze's famous injunction to be ‘faithful to’ and ‘worthy of’ the event: being 
faithful to a world which is ultimately not ‘for us’ – i.e. never fully reducible to its relation to 
us – and yet here-and-now. Following Peguy, Deleuze and Guattari explain that two are the 
ways of dealing with an event: “one consists in going over the course of the event, in 
recording its effectuation in history, its conditioning and deterioration in history”, i.e. its 
actualisation; “the other consists in reassembling the event, installing oneself in it ... going 
through all its components or singularities”.948 This is, crucially, a ‘counter-actualisation’, 
‘wanting’ not what happens (the mere actualisation of the here-and-now) but rather the 
spark in what happens, the intensive potential that its (cosmically) contingent taking place 
generates. Deleuze observes that “the free man is the one who caught the event itself, he 
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doesn’t allow the event to effectuate as such without ‘operating’ in it, as an actor, its 
counter-effectuation”.949 Through such a 'strategic' abstraction we can rescue the image of 
surfer from both piecemeal localism and passive ascesis. This is what counter-effectuation 
allows for, Toscano observes, i.e. “transforming Badiou’s ascetic image [of Deleuze’s 
concept] of the ‘purified automaton’ into a constructivist one”.950 Not a-political attempt to 
overcoming the actual so as to plunge into an undifferentiated immateriality where 
“everything is possible", but rather the absolutely strategic assumption "that, in every here 
and now, there are potentials that can be acted upon”, complicities to be conjured.951 As 
already stated: it is by means of being sufficiently 'abstract' that this perspective can avoid 
the quicksand of 'direct action' (that is, of its fetishisation) and thus resigning itself on being 
just a matter of piecemeal attempts at carving temporary comfort-zones of ‘radicalist’ self-
fulfilment. Instead, what is envisaged is a 'localised' political strategy that 'acts on the 
potentials of this actual' as well as on the 'abstraction of this real', simultaneously oriented 
to what is “non-local, abstract, and rooted deep in our everyday infrastructure”.952 The task 
is ‘freeing’ the situation from its ‘state of affair’ by perforating its exceptional configuration 
and thus opening it up to its eventful potential, in the manner of a surfer who avoids the 
sublimation into the modulating waves of brandscaping that a naive affirmation of reality 
qua reality entails, not going beyond but entering within, hollowing it out: tube-riding.  
By surfing we dig through the smooth superficiality of the libertarian emancipation of naive 
vitalism and reckless nomadism, avoiding the perils of nihilism, ascetic emptiness and 
acquiescent inertia, the sterility of deconstruction, the quest for authentic praxis, as well as 
the dialectical sublimation of the smooth and the striated into a pacific interspersion, and 
we rather splay them out into a perforated materiality: “escavate the land instead of 
striating it, bore holes in space instead of keeping it smooth, turn the earth into a Swiss 
cheese”.953 This is where the enigmatic Deleuzoguattarian notion of holey space gestures 
towards: what ‘communicates’ with the striated and the smooth yet exceeds them both, 
simultaneously dismantling the striating logic of sovereignty and the smooth logic of 
control.954 In other words, a ‘perforating’ appropriation of the Nietzschean geo-
philosophical cry of being true-to-the-earth, the hollowing out of space that opens up the 
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situation to its cosmic contingency beyond the closures of immanent relationalism.955 No 
escapism or mere opposition then. Neither a question of ‘wildly de-stratifying’ nor ‘going 
underground’ to flee the smooth spaces of control.956 Instead, it is a call to cut through the 
false alternative of a vitalistic affirmation and nihilistic negation. A call whose powerful 
speculation, I believe, promises to actualise the potential for a truly radical urbanism, that 
is, a strategy of opening ‘positive voids’ in the urban texture, i.e. voids devoid of any 
negativist/nihilistic hubris, in this way allowing to incorporating a non-negative negativity 
into a creative approach.957 In the strategic language of Situationism: 
[Since] all space is already occupied by the enemy ... The moment of authentic 
urbanisms’s appearance will be the creation, in certain areas, of the absence of this 
occupation. What we call construction starts there.958 
According to Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, this should be the mission of a truly radical right 
to the city, i.e. “to dig holes in the urban texture and to make the city … a ‘holey space’”.959 
Undoing (making inoperose) the operation of control means to create such ‘absence of 
occupation’, the opening of the smooth surface of the urban to the eventful potential of its 
cosmic justice, plugging into which creative construction becomes possible. Here lies the 
deep compositional and constructive sense of holey space as well as the double strategy 
that the surfer suggests. First, de-activating the terrestrial machine of the exception, 
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following the “flows of pause and revolt carved on the fabric of the earth”, inhabiting the 
problematic field of the situation rather than pretending to escape it into transcendental 
ascesis, overcome it through mad or authentic decisions, or simply solve and fix it through 
‘appropriate’ operations.960 Deactivation as perforation, that is, boring holes in the smooth 
surface of control so as to make space for the ‘small gateways’ in which events can occur. 
Second, counter-effectuating unactualised potentialities by turning “physically and 
conceptually, against the flow of the world around it”, turning suspicious ‘liberationism’ into 




The oscillation between 'abstract' speculation and pragmatic strategy that characterises this 
section should not appear contradictory. As I already observed, the one implies the other. 
On the one hand, I am interested in the materialism of certain Situationist approaches, the 
attentiveness to the potential of the situation, and even the 'phenomenology of effectivity' 
that Jullien's account of Taoism conveys. On the other hand, I believe this strategic attitude 
must be complemented with a radically abstract orientation, literally pulling away (abs-tract) 
the situational confinement of these purely relational approaches into the cosmic dimension 
of the event. Keeping the strategic efficacy of the former together with the radical aperture 
of the latter, I believe, allows for envisaging an alternative, abstract and concrete form of 
urban politics, which is able to simultaneously address the materiality of being-together by 
means of keeping it open to its eventful justice. This is what I explore more in depth in the 
final section of this chapter, where I merge the notions of cosmic contingency and event into 
the concept of cosmic justice. Prior to do so, in the next two sections I relate the discussion 
so far delineated to the spatiolegal question, envisaging a strategy of spatiolegal perforation, 
i.e. boring holes within the spatiolegal state of exception so as to open it up to a non-
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[Hollow Law is a] law that is so riddled with loopholes 




According to what has been written so far, only by revoking the exceptional logic of 
separation and the operational paradigm on which it is grounded, the legal closure can be 
perforated, making its appropriating and immunitary mechanism of exception ‘tilt’. Opening 
law to the ‘geo-legal’ fact of a non-juridifiable world from which law is ‘inseparable’ 
nonetheless. This signals the beginning of a new legal modesty. Law is ‘forced’ to 
acknowledge its ‘complicity with anonymous materials’ which are independent from its 
juridification, and that it cannot objectify (and thus immunise from) either 
representationally or empirically, theoretically or practically.963 Zartaloudis defines justice as 
“the experience of encountering the limit of the law, where one encounters the possibilities 
of the law (its own juridical potentiality) and all other non-juridical possibilities to law”.964 
This is what a geo-legal approach implies: simultaneously law's situated-ness in the spatio-
temporal here-and-now, as well as its immersion into the ‘unhistorical vapour’ of justice, the 
cosmic excess through which alone can law be fulfilled, applied, used. For this reason justice 
cannot be assumed as what ‘irritates or sabotages the law’. It is the state of exception to 
systematically sabotage the law, making it ‘function’ by dis-applying it, and thus it is this 
separating machine that needs to be made inoperose, at least temporary, tentatively, 
contingently, so as to unfold the inseparable contiguity of law and justice.   
Antoine Hennion provides us with the chance of an interesting analogy. He describes the 
activity of climbing as an encounter between – as well as a ‘double erasure’ of – the 
climbing body and the rock, as their ‘separation’ disappears in the ‘zone of contact’ in which 
the activity of climbing itself unfolds, through gestures which are no longer precisely 
ascribable to specific bodies.965 For the climbing to occur it is necessary to experiment with 
the rock, “in and through contact”, yet this “in no way does ... signal a reduction to the here 
and now of the situation”.966 The rock is ‘a reservoir of differences’ whose relation to the 
climber’s body in no way exhausts it. Gestures are counter-effectuations which ‘free’ the 
climbing from its reduction to a phenomenological relation (or, worst, from its abstraction 
into a mere ‘social construction’), and at the same time connect this here-and-now to other 
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locales, overflowing abstractions and floating potentialities.967 The climber knows how to do 
justice to the rock, neither transcending nor sliding over but rather ‘proceeding by staying’, 
deterritorialising by perforating a holey space in which the inoperose gesture of climbing 
can unfold. 
This is the question we face then: how to perforate law’s state of exception in order to 
unfold the ‘zone of contact’ between law and justice, that “grey zone that eludes every 
attempt to establish its relation to a dichotomy we feel familiar with – that of law and non-
law”?968 The strategy I have in mind entails pushing law beyond its static representational 
strictures, neither simply making it more totalising and suffocating as an ever-more 
encompassing control, nor dislocating it, but rather ‘hollowing it out’ from the entrapments 
of its operational apparatus, perforating the totality of its immunitary state of exception in 
order to let it be affected and infected by justice. This, in the vein of Alexander Lefebvre's 
proposal to ‘de-familiarise’ law by “experimentally allowing the law to be affected by an 
encounter”, that is, by events that only once the preventive operation of techné is de-
activated can unfold.969 There is no separation: law and justice are always in a vermicular 
zone of contact: a hollow law, a holey justice. In legal parlance the term ‘hollow law’ is 
usually employed to refer to a specific law so ridden with contradictions to be 
unenforceable. My use of the term is consistent with this interpretation, yet 
unenforceability is in this case no reason for discomfort: this paradoxical law turned into a 
Swiss cheese is actually a law which is fully oriented, and exposed, to a world not for law, 
and only in this sense is able to do justice to it. Hollow law is neither a law we have gotten 
rid of, nor an endlessly dislocated law, nor a law which must be enforced: it is rather a law 
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Santiago Cirugeda is a self-defined social architect whose projects often involve 
spatial explorations in the city and engagement with its spatiolegal mechanisms. In 
Seville, for the project Scaffolding, he graffitied a wall and then sued himself so as 
to be able to install a temporary scaffolding on the street, which then became for 
several months a new (abusive) room for the adjacent house. Deactivating legal 
abstractions from their operations (the exclusionary repression of the anti-graffiti 
law, the separating delegation of litigation), he showed how their residual power 
can be reoriented to generate alternative assemblages of urban bodies, digging 
positive voids for action within the urban. In Vigo for the project Alegal Benches, he 
set up six benches in residual lot of peripheral neighbourhood. The authorities first 
reacted negatively, for the lack of authorisation, yet subsequently cleaned the lot 
and provided it with public illumination.970 By positioning himself in the ‘alegal’ 
threshold, again, he disoriented the spatiolegal, forcing it to reorient towards urban 
bodies beyond its appropriating operations. These are minor examples of course, 
and yet interesting for their paradigmatic value. They expose a simultaneously 
abstract and concrete, vermicular way of acting within and without the law, by 
“exploiting the loopholes and legal voids in the city planning legislation”, 
perforating the membrane of its spatiolegal apparatus of exception, detecting and 
exploiting frictions between the legal abstractions and the physical landscape in 
which they are inscribed, thus indicating the eventful potential that in any urban 
configuration lies for other, 'inoperose uses' of spaces, objects and laws.971 
 
7. 
Law is not justice but only the gate that leads to justice. 
To open a passage towards justice is not the 
elimination of law, but rather its deactivation and 




To orient law towards a world which is not for law means to emancipate law’s relation to the 
world from the immunitary and proprietary mechanism of exception. This is what using law 
and legal representations means. Let us recall the Kantian instauration of the logic of 
correlation between the ‘I-subject’ and its representations, according to which the 
‘condition of possibility’ of any representation is the fact of this representation belonging to 
someone, being mine, i.e. of me being its proprietor. Kant posits this relation as a ‘de jure 
question’ (a necessary condition of possibility). As Sartre asks, for Kant “it must be possible 
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for the ‘I think’ to accompany all our representations, but does it accompany them in actual 
fact?”973 This rhetorical question challenges Kant’s de jure explanation de facto 
molecularising his transcendental subject into what Sartre calls the transcendental field.974 
This ‘impersonal’ field ‘without an I’ radically revolts the Kantian correlation towards 
another potential dimension of thinking, acting and thus living, emancipated from the 
proprietary relation to an I-subject. This is the question we should ask then: what remains of 
the correlation once the proprietary mechanism is de-activated? How do we ‘relate’ to 
objects in a non-proprietary sense (as objects not for us)? Consistent with the perspective 
developed above, I understand legal representations as objects whose materiality is 
effective and affective, and whose (‘demonic’) potentialities can neither be reduced to a 
proprietary relation with a legal-subject, nor fully referred to socio-legal concatenations, nor 
exhausted into technical operations. The question can be reformulated as such: what occurs 
to (legal) representations, once the proprietary mechanism in which they are imbricated is 
de-activated?975 How can legal representations be ‘profanated’, dismantling their separating 
operation so as to be restored to a ‘common use’?  
Agamben has recently explored the concept of ‘use’ through the experience of St. Francis of 
Assisi and the Franciscan movements, surfaced in central Italy around 12th/13th century. In 
the thought of his founder the notion of property and its relation with poverty plays a key 
and complex role. According to St. Francis, the conception of man as dominus sui actus (i.e. 
proprietor of his own actions) is an original sin.976 Consequently, the famous Franciscan way 
of life in ‘absolute poverty’ (altissima povertà) should not be intended as simply a ‘life in 
poverty’. Instead, it implies a non-proprietary life in the most radical sense: it means 
deactivating the proprietary mechanism of exception (the I-subject) and thus entering into a 
non-proprietary and thus common relation with the world and its objects, by simply using 
them.977 The concept of use assumed a particular relevance in this context, since it was 
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around that the theological battle of the Franciscans with the Church – increasingly worried 
by the destabilising role that a non-proprietary doctrine could play vis-à-vis its right over its 
vast possessions – would be fought. Facing the mounting pressure of the Church, Franciscan 
theologians introduced the notion of usus facti (factual use), seeking to carve a space of 
action ‘outside’ of the grasp of law’s proprietary mechanism. The factual use of things 
indicates a series of acts (e.g. minimum amount of eating, drinking, wearing clothes) 
supposedly without juridical implications. This was an attempt to define use negatively, that 
is, as a dimension of ‘life and human praxis absolutely outside the determinations of law’ 
and its proprietary mechanism’.978 As already discussed, every quest for exhuming a 
dimension of (bare) life or praxis ‘outside’ of law, in the end implicitly confirms the very 
presupposition (i.e. the ‘separation’) on which the legal mechanism of exception rests. In 
other words, it is a contradictory strategy bound to become prey of legal appropriation yet 
again.979 Moreover, it is evident how a notion of use understood as ‘a series of operations 
performed by a subject’ is constitutively unable to challenge the legal apparatus of property, 
since reasserting the very notion of proprietary I-subject (i.e. dominus sui actus) on which 
the latter is grounded. The Franciscans’ nemesis, Pope John XXII, did lucidly address the 
source of this contradiction by arguing that the condition of possibility for using a thing is to 
possess it: in other words, any use necessarily implies a ‘proprietary subject’, and thus any 
non-proprietary use is, simply, impossible.980 As an ante-litteram Kant, what the Pope did 
was to reframe the notion of use into a de jure problem, de facto postulating that the reality 
of any object is exhausted into its proprietary correlation with a subject: an object can only 
be an object for us. The complicity of relationalism with capitalism finds here a correlationist 
archetype: as Agamben observes, capitalism thrives exactly on conceiving any non-
proprietary use as impossible, that is, in reducing every use to consumption, i.e. ab-use. The 
importance of this question cannot be overstated. The impossibility to use an ‘object’ (legal 
representation included), and thus the systematic reduction (consumption) of objects to 
(proprietary) relations, sanction the impossibility to ‘do justice’ to them. Accordingly, every 
object is always-already recaptured (included/excluded) within the mechanism of exception: 
what results is a law which is un-usable and as such constitutively un-just. To qualify then: to 
emancipate life from law into a plane of pure (bare) praxis is to expose life to the realm of 
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control – and this is, arguably, exactly what ultimately occurs with the ‘Franciscan’ attempt 
of Hardt and Negri.981 
Yet, Agamben adds, an alternative non-negative conception of use was encapsulated 
already in St. Francis’ message: not a praxis outside of law’s reach (a usus facti), but rather 
one able to put the very notions of subject, object and praxis (and thus their separation) 
into question. In these terms, the Franciscan theologian Olivi defined use not as ‘the pure 
and simple negation of law, but what constitutes such a negation into a form and a mode of 
life’.982 It is this understanding (regardless of the complex century-long discussions around 
the notion of use) that is important for the present work, since it offers a glimpse towards a 
dimension of acting and living in which exceptional dichotomies (action/non-action, 
possession/non-possession, subject/object, law/life) appear to sublimate into a productive 
tension. As observed in the first chapter, I believe that a crucial ethico-political matter vis-à-
vis the question of the human-world correlation is the dismantling of the proprietary logic of 
possession that underlines it, i.e. of the separating apparatus of exception. This is what 
resonates in the radical acceptation of the Franciscan way of life, exceeding the dichotomy 
of action and inaction by making inoperose such proprietary mechanism. There is no 
abandonment of law in this understanding. In Coccia's terms, the Franciscan concept of use 
allows for ‘digging a void inside law’, i.e. for perforating and dismantling its proprietary state 
of exception and its separating operation, ‘opening up’ the space for its ‘common use’ and 
thus for the potentiality of justice to emerge.983 Such perforation literally resonates with 
what Agamben defines as profanation, i.e. what 
deactivates the apparatuses of power and returns to common uses that spaces that 
power has seized ... profanation does not simply restore something like a natural use 
that existed before being separated in religious, economic, or juridical sphere ... [these 
appropriating and separating uses] are not effaced, but ... deactivated [made inoperose] 
and thus opened to a new, possible use.984 
To repeat then, there is no quest for a more authentic, genuine or natural use implied in this 
concept. Likewise, this non-separated dimension of acting and living is clearly at odds with 
the vulnerability of a de-subjectified automaton or the always-already ‘recaptured’ praxis of 
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an immanent multitude. Recalling the double-strategy of the surfing ethics I exposed above, 
what this instead implies is an ontological post-human constructivism. In fact, it prefigures a 
way to address the real (economico-juridical) abstractions of control by neither dismissing 
nor complying with them, but rather deactivating, perforating/profanating their proprietary 
and immunising mechanism by opening them to a complicity with anonymous material 
through which they can be 'constructively' used.985  
Let me stress for the last time that there nothing universal, mystical or merely abstract in 
this understanding. Surely, such ethico-political surfing is an abstraction. As observed, it is 
exactly by being an abstraction that it can provide a radical way to deal with the real 
abstraction of control, by challenging its preventive reduction of the urban to a flat and 
uneventful relationalism. Pretending to challenge control by simply resorting to some 
comfortably ‘solid and concrete’ refuge is deeply contradictory. Alternative abstractions are 
needed, provided we understand them not as some sort of general principle or final 
solution, but rather as tools to traverse each time contingently, each time tentatively the 




Faced by the need to improve the safety and vitality of public roads, the ‘traffic 
philosopher’ Hans Monderman coined what would be known as shared space 
approach, according to which the separation and thus the hierarchical differentiation 
between the road users (car-drivers, pedestrians, cyclists) is removed, by eliminating 
both traffic signs (from street signals to zebra crossings) and physical demarcations (for 
instance putting pavement and road at the same street level). In these ‘shared spaces’ 
the different road users need to find a new, common way of being together. As 
explained at length, the spatiolegal architecture of control is an immanent and self-
regulating exceptional tuning that tends to reducing redundancy and decreasing the 
‘risk’ of conflict from urban life. In urban space, the overlapping of laws (such as Health 
and Safety, Anti-Social Behaviour ecc.), security design and technologies (such as signs, 
CCTVs ecc.), general ‘pedagogy of safety’ as well as ever-increasing litigiousness tend 
to systematically neutralise antagonism and conflictuality in preventative fashion. The 
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result is a systematic defusion of the potential for (as well as demotivation vis-à-vis the 
need for) ‘taking responsibility’ by acting vis-à-vis the unexpected.986 Not only events 
are prevented, that is, but also their ‘counter-effectuation’ is discouraged and 
neutralised, by being delegated to higher authorities (law, security, technology ecc.). 
Horizontal separation via vertical delegation: the immunitary logic of exception 
functions in the sense of immunising anyone from the risk of being ‘held responsible’, 
in a de-responsibilising and event-defusing movement of legal self-immunisation into 
which justice cannot enter. In the model proposed by Monderman, this logic is directly 
challenged via the de-activation of the spatiolegal mechanism of exception and thus 
the removal of its operational devices (signs and physical barriers, but obviously also 
the legal scaffolding which reinforces them). In other words, holes are excavated 
within the urban space, out of which the intensive conflictuality and the potential 
eventfulness of the urban is allowed to emerge. This is not the place to discuss values 
and limits of this approach.987 Unleashing the eventful intensity of the urban does not 
necessarily generate desirable outcomes, since it does require being constructively 
counter-effectuated: “the only criterion of a good tactic is whether it enables signific-
ant success or not”, and this cannot be known in advance.988 Yet, this instance has 
again a paradigmatic relevance for the present discussion, in the form of a strategy 
aimed to pursuing a ‘more just’ urban space neither through law, nor through its 
elimination, but rather via its dismantling and making inoperose. Legal abstractions are 
deactivated from their separating, de-responsibilising, litigation-bound operations, and 
thus restored to a ‘common use’, i.e. the possibility of being employed as tools to 
retune the urban and build together alternative spatiolegal normativities. Neither 
pursued technically with law by seeking to fix the problems once and for all, nor 
mystically, madly or pragmatically without law: the releasing of conflict and thus new 
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There are instants that last no longer than five or six 
seconds, in which all of a sudden you hear the presence 
of eternal harmony, and in which you have reached it. 
It is not earthly. But I do not want to say that it is 
heavenly either; only that in his earthly form man is 





Whiteout is a weather condition which always occurs in the middle, usually of a snowstorm, 
when a three-dimensional whiteness overwhelms (and denies) the subject.990 The horizon 
disappears, the turbulence eliminates the orientation. This denial of vision plunges bodies 
into the tactile materiality of a vortex.991 In the absolute situatedness of one’s non-
immunitary openness to contingency, the whiteout is the impersonal glimpse into the 
potential of encounters we are no longer able to re-cognise.992 Because ‘we’ is no longer 
there. Prior to ‘what is to be done’, the whiteout prompts the question: ‘what has been 
undone’. Namely, the immunitary mechanism of exception: in the whiteout nobody can 
claim to be dominus sui actus. Seeking to reassert control only produces more 
disorientation, dizziness and nausea.993 Yet, as Pazienza reminds, the nausea we experience 
in the middle of the whiteout is ‘the sign that we are fraught with becoming’.994 
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Let us address the whiteout beyond phenomenological reductionism, as the locus of the 
impersonal encounter with cosmic justice. A whiteout is generated every time the 
immunitary and proprietary mechanism of exception is de-activated, projecting our always 
relational being-in-the-world in the vortex of a cosmic contingency: cosmic, since radically 
independent from us, and yet contingent, absolutely here-and-now. This is the profound 
disconcert in which the whiteout absorbs, and yet simultaneously the line of flight it offers. 
Joyful affirmation, nihilistic negation, reactionary escape, revolutionary overcoming, 
authentic decision, technical solution: all different ways to deny the whiteout, or to get lost 
forever in its sweeping turmoil. What is instead required is to impersonally 'embrace its 
dereliction', the 'universal disquiet' in which we are unavoidably lost. In other words, a 
cosmic pessimism, i.e. the impersonal realisation of the whiteout as the 'real content' of the 
world and the real condition of an emancipatory politics.995 Whiteout, therefore, expresses 
the potential for embracing a truly radical ethics and politics: not a suffocating vortex that 
entraps, but a swerving vortex through which going outside, yet by remaining, against the 
“weird assumption that justice might be satisfied in a world that ought to be otherwise”: 
voyage in place.996 This is I believe the ultimate sense of the vertiginous close of Jean Paul 
Sartre’s first essay: 
The World did not create the me, the me did not create the World, they are two objects 
for the absolute, impersonal consciousness, and it is through that consciousness that 
they are linked back together. This absolute consciousness, when it is purified of the I, is 
no longer in any way a subject, nor is it a collection of representations; it is quite simply 
a precondition and an absolute source of existence. And the relation of interdependence 
that it establishes between the me and the World is enough for the me to appear ‘in 
danger’ before the world, for the me (indirectly and via the intermediary of the states) 
to draw all its content from the World. Nothing further is needed to enable us to 
establish philosophically an absolutely positive ethics and politics997 
This ‘absolutely positive ethics and politics’ is the faithfulness on the eventful potential that 
any situation harbours, a radical orientation that discloses a way of acting and living as 
bodies among other bodies in a world utterly indifferent to everyone’s inescapable 
necessity to inhabit. Being-in-the-world, and yet open to such “absolute horizon, 
independent from any observer ... independent of a visible state of affair in which it is 
                                                          
995
As Masciandaro taking inspiration from Cioran writes, a truly 'cosmic pessimism' entails renouncing the 
"hypocritical … impulse to ‘make the world a better place’" and rather "embrace[s] dereliction, which is the 
only real way the world is actually improved" [Masciandaro, ‘Comments on Eugene Thacker' op. cit.]. In the 
words of Meillassoux: "a politics of emancipation does not seek the happiness of people but rather seeks 
universal disquiet" [Quentin Meillassoux,  'The Immanence of the World Beyond', in P. M. Candler and C. 
Cunningham (eds) The Grandeur of Reason  (SCM, 2010) p. 475]; above I employed the suggestion of cosmic 
pessimism as a methodological orientation, see ch. 4, Method 
996
Masciandaro, ‘The Sweetness of Law’, op. cit. p. 49; “Hell is only destroyed by entering it, by staying in it” 
(ibid. 56) 
997
Sartre, Transcendence, op. cit. p. 30 
259 
 
brought about”.998 It is the openness to such an ‘absolute horizon’ of justice that allows for 
escaping, by paradoxically staying, the enclosing horizon of control and the relentless 
movement that always occurs within its ontological parameters.999 Cosmic justice, that is, 
‘available’ to everything and yet not belonging to anything, as the impersonal, absolute and 
‘non-presentational viewpoint of the event’, truly post-human insofar as extendible 'at 
every point of the matter, from viruses to starts, since it is the very act of matter’, the 
uncorrelated event of every taking place.1000 This is the ethico-political meaning of an 
ontology able to ‘doing justice’ to the non-objectifiable human and nonhuman beings that 
compose the worlds by respecting them on their own terms.1001 The (re)orientation that 
resonates in Nietzsche’s intention, “to learn more and more how to see what is necessary in 
things as what is beautiful in them — thus I will be one of those who make things 
beautiful.”1002 It would be foolish to understand this as a resignation to accept the status 
quo. Instead, it means to accept the world as the only world available, yet one whose 
eventful potentialities are never exhausted by our correlation to it, never totalisable within 
the relational immanence of control. Potentialities that, as we saw, are constantly defused 
by exceptional appropriation, immunitary reaction, projectual insertion of purposes, 
necessities, goals that ‘disrespect’ things, depriving them from their immanent necessity. 
Justice is what does not belong to anyone, and yet can only be found in this world, not as a 
yearning for a beyond, but a yearning for a now-here beyond one’s own appropriation: “not 
a hope for anything, nor a hope of any value, but a hope in the immanent truth of its own 
situation”.1003  
This is the same hope of Simone Weil: “may I disappear in order that those things that I see 
may become perfect in their beauty from the very fact that they are no longer things that I 
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see”.1004 There is neither ascesis nor withdrawal in this disappearance, it is instead the 
appropriating machine of exception that is meant to disappear. In the whiteout the ‘felt 
absence’ of the persona is not an emptiness to be filled by a revolutionary subject or mad 
decisions, not the nothingness of a non-being, but rather the positive void left by the 
excepting machine of persona and its projectual operations, and thus the fullness of 
impersonal, conflictual and ‘common’ potentialities. Likewise, there is no absence of justice 
to justify the revolutionary instalment of justice. The blindness that the whiteout produces 
is the fullness of an ontological whiteness, an obscurity that the excess of light provokes.1005 
“It is precisely the felt absence of justice in the world that shadows forth the fact of eternal 
or infinite justice”.1006 
In their experimental approach, ‘minimalist composers’ developed productive ways to 
generate and traverse sonorous whiteouts through ‘de-familiarising techniques’, unlearning 
their own skills to the point of no longer seeking to ‘produce’ and thus ‘possess’ their ‘own’ 
sounds, but rather resorting to use them.1007 The author/work, author/spectator, 
author/technique dichotomies sublimate in a vertigo, the materiality of a soundscape in 
which the composer ‘must’ accept to be traversed by a contingent multiplicity, a ‘wilful 
succumbing to disorientation’ (i.e. de-activating one’s state of exception), “neither 
resist[ing] the unrest of this sensorial chasm nor assert[ing] himself with the hegemony of 
an outside agent ... but rather assum[ing] the status of a trigger, a catalyst, that which clears 
space for the infiltration of sound's unruly wilting”.1008 This succumbing does not indicate 
loss, renunciation, being at the mercy of the vortex: in the manner of a post-structural 
Franciscan, Cage suggests that “no one loses nothing because nothing is securely 
possessed”.1009 
The whiteout is the aperture in which we are called to responsibly, ethically and creatively 
counter-effectuate, by entering in relation with other objects as objects amongst them, 
building necessarily common, more abstract and more concrete ways of being-together, not 
simply for the sake of mutual synchronisation, but to avert further closures, to keep each 
                                                          
1004
Simone Weil, Gravity and Grace (Routledge, 2002) p. 42 
1005
See Ronchi, ‘Introduzione’, op. cit. p. 14 
1006
Masciandaro, ‘Sweetness’, op. cit. p. 43;  
1007
e.g. John Cage, Morton Feldman etc; Mohaghegh and Golestaneh [‘Haunted Sound’, op. cit. p. 489] 
describe this ‘de-familiarising technique as “turning the acoustic world of the listener and composer towards 
vertigo”.  
1008
Ibid. p. 490 
1009
John Cage, A Year from Monday: New Lectures and Writings (Wesleyan University Press, 1969) p. 108; 
Mohaghegh and Golestaneh [‘Haunted Sound’, op. cit. p. 49]: “... never as a nihilistic drive towards absence 




situation open to the immanent presence of its cosmic justice.1010 Likewise, to ‘whiteout’ 
law means to make law inoperose, not eliminating law and its potentialities, but rather the 
purposes and modalities in which it is inscribed.1011 Neither complying with the excepting 
machine of law, nor having done with (to do without) law. At the threshold of this seemingly 
unavoidable alternative is the inseparable contiguity of law and justice: the legal whiteout is 
the necessary (yet insufficient) condition for the unfolding of justice: the place of a law which 
refuses to be completed through the relentless actualisation of its potentialities into a given 
state of affair. This is the sense of this proposal, a ‘minimalist’ approach to law, i.e. using law 
as ‘a trigger, a catalyst, that which clears space for the infiltration’ of the ‘unlegislated 
movement’ of justice.1012 It consist in forcing law to orient itself to a world not for law:  
clearing the space, ‘creating voids’, boring holes, not to ‘uncover’ the abyss of non-law but 
the ‘luminous spiral’ of the ‘non-juridical possibilities to law’.1013 Just like the de-activation 
of the orienting machine of the subject-persona throws us into a whiteout fraught with risks 
and possibilities, forcing us towards an inoperose and necessarily common (that is, in 
constructivist and post-human sense) way of acting, so the making inoperose of the 
spatiolegal mechanism of exception throws law in a cosmic contingency that law itself is 
unable to juridify. Forced to endure this excess beyond any possible operative articulation, 
law is reoriented towards bodies it cannot appropriate, objectify or immunise from: unable 
to reduce them to its own relation, just a body among other bodies in promiscuous 
complicity, law becomes able to do justice to them, letting impersonal, inoperose and post-
human normativities surface.   
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Decolonising Architecture (DA) is a project set up in Palestine by Eyal Weizman, 
together with Alessandro Petti and Sandi Hilal. In a recent interview, Weizman explains 
that the project has been inspired by the need to overcome the claustrophobic logic of 
the ‘Occupied Territories’, that is, the logic of the solution (one-state, two-state etc.) 
that traps them “in an ‘endless present’, a historical process without culmination”.1015 
The quest for the solution freezes the potentialities of the situation, leaving ‘intact’ its 
oppressive configuration, in the eternal wait for a yet-to/never-to-come salvation.1016 
DA eschews problem-solving anxieties and is rather concerned with inhabiting this 
problematic field, challenging the present situation from within, opening a ‘new 
political temporality’ in which to operate or, in other terms, reorienting a temporal 
yearning (à venir) into a spatially-situated strategy.1017 Strategic are indeed the 
questions alimenting this enterprise, namely whether there ‘could be something in 
excess’ in the order of Occupation, an excess that could be employed in order to use 
the power of colonial architecture, once its apparatus of domination has been 
deactivated (de-colonised).1018 The term ‘decolonisation’ in fact indicates the attempt 
to ‘undoing’ the existent system of inequalities, by depotentiating and defusing 
colonial relations of power, and thus reorienting them towards different uses, 
“articulated differently, inhabited differently”.1019 DA does so strategising Agamben’s 
concept of profanation. As Weizman explains, profanation means the “the deactivation 
of the spatial apparatus of exclusion ... the dismantling of the power that exists ... a 
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restoration of things to the common use”.1020 Yet, does not this strategy imply the 
‘dangerous assumption’, the interviewer asks, that “matter is ultimately innocent, that 
matter, at some level, can be decoupled from power”?1021 
Weizman's answer exposes the double strategy I above presented. The aim, he 
explains, is “not to simply undo the power and techniques of the occupation but to 
reorient them.”1022 The ‘whiteouting’ of the apparatus of exception, I observed, is not 
disorientation, but also the swerving ethico-political potential for a reorientation 
towards cosmic justice. A potential that requires counter-effectuation to be unfolded, 
acting on the intensive potentiality of a power now ‘liberated’, i.e. unplugged from its 
immunitary apparatus of exception: “if resistance is not complete withdrawal, if it is 
articulated through some form of action, the question is whether there is a mode of 
action that might contain the possibility of a break rather than the constant elasticity 
of material organisation and political evolutions”.1023 Thus, in the sense of the 'surfing 
interventionism' presented above, this implies detecting and exploiting the frictions in 
the smooth surface of control, opening up the space to inoperose uses, so that to “use 
it in a way that does not reproduce, that really breaks, this relationship of power and 
its forms”.1024 According to Weizman,  
the city is not spatially governed so much by its structures and buildings but rather by 
the way it organises and divides the surface … [its] ground is a certain code, both at the 
operational and symbolic levels:  the code of the city – its operational logic and its 
ideology ... a ‘thick surface’ in which occurs the designation of private and public, 
walk/drive/no walk, the relation between ﬁgure and ground, between the object and 
the surface on which it relies.1025 
The question becomes that of ungrounding the city, as he puts it, making inoperose its 
structures of power and domination by perforating the smooth surface of its 
spatiolegality, and thus counter-effectuating this eventful potential in order to make 
space for the emergence of novel concatenations. 
The abandoned military base of Oush Grab (crowd’s nest) has neither been destroyed 
by the retreating Israeli army, nor by the re-appropriating Palestinians, as usually 
occurs in these cases. The DA project was assigned with the task of envisaging a way to 
deal with the building. The question here was not only that of thinking new ways to re-
use it. At the same time, there was the necessity to prevent it from being re-
appropriated by the army. In fact, within the regime of “‘revolving door occupation’, in 
which the danger of the place’s appropriation by settlers always exists, it is important 
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to first render the building less amenable to be used, before allowing for new functions 
to inhabit them.”1026 For this purpose, DA devised a strategy consisting in 
“perforat[ing] the buildings of the military base by drilling holes into their walls.”1027 
Through this profanation by perforation, the structure of power entangled in the 
building is literally hollowed out, by dismantling its appropriating, violent and 
exclusionary mechanism and thus creating an 'absence of occupation' that prevents its 
re-occupation, in this way restoring the building to a common use, i.e. to the potential 
for conjuring complicities between human and non-human bodies.  
In the introduction, I concluded by mentioning Lars Lerup’s concept of ‘building the 
unfinished’ as an instance, I suggested, of inoperose building that is oriented to build 
works able to ‘make space’ for the irruption of the eventful potential of being-
together, rather than preventively closing them off into a pre-determined result.1028 In 
this sense, through the inoperose deactivation of the spatiolegal apparatus of 
exception DA opens “a space that escape[s] the grasp of power and its laws, without 
entering in conflict with them yet rendering them inoperative”.1029 A holey space, that 
is, opened to the cosmic justice of its taking place in a world that is ultimately 
irreducible to its mechanism of exclusion, immunisation and juridification.  
Oush Grab is an important stop for thousands of migrating birds in their way to Africa. 
In this holey space, a novel, impersonal post-human normativity surfaces.  
                                                          
1026




Lerup, Building the Unfinished, op. cit. In Weizman’s words, the military base is redesigned “on behalf of 
nature ... design not for a construction but for the controlled disintegration of the building, we accelerate or 
intervene in the process of its disintegration” Weizman, ‘Political Plastic’, op. cit. p. 295 
1029



























...this is what attracted me, a transitory imbalance 





Through this thesis I addressed the relationship between law, space and control, how it 
unfolds in the contemporary city – with particular attention to how this occurs in the 
extraordinary spatio-temporal context of mega events –, and I sought to delineate a 
radically material, ethico-politically worthwhile and strategically adequate concept of 
justice. This endeavour has been articulated through three main parts.  
The first, including the first three chapters, developed along two parallel lines: on the one 
hand I elaborated an original spatial ontology through the notions of life, materiality and 
event; on the other, I investigated contemporary forms of control and their on-going 
reformulation of urban space according to the twin requirements of consumption and 
immunity. These trajectories culminated with the introduction of two main concepts: urban 
tuning, as a way to account for how the urban is ‘held-together’ immanently; and 
brandscaping, to indicate in more explicitly spatial sense the preventive retuning of the 
urban enacted by strategies, techniques and practices of control, as well as to provide a 
methodological tool that would allow for empirical investigation. At the point of tangency 
between these two lines, I explored the configuration that the exceptional relation between 
law, space and justice takes in modern and ‘post-modern’ times. The second part, the fourth 
chapter, tested the theoretical framework through an ethnographic exploration set in 
Johannesburg during the FIFA 2010 South Africa World Cup. First, I employed the notion of 
urban tuning to describe the immanent normativity of the city. Second, I employed the 
notion of brandscaping to investigate the World Cup as an ‘installation’ for retuning the 
urban. Finally, I suggested that mega events could be understood as paradigmatic instances 
of brandscaping. They are not only relevant as objects of study in themselves, but also as 
privileged contexts to explore the urban more generally. The third part, the fifth chapter, 
sought to envisage an ethico-political stance able to challenge the pacifying and uneventful 
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logic of urban control. First, I problematised the Western dualism of action and inaction and 
its political consequences. Second, I proposed an alternative notion of interventionism 
through the conceptual figure of surfing. Third, I applied this understanding in order to 
rethink the law/justice relation and open it up to the concept of cosmic justice. Neither a set 
of new principles nor a panacea for social injustices, what I suggested is an absolutely 
situated, always contingent, simultaneously abstract and concrete strategy whereby to 
employ the intensive potential of the urban to produce alternative, hopefully ‘just’ 
spatialities. 
Through this endeavour I provided an (unavoidably) tentative answer to the questions that 
prompted this thesis. Yet, the problematic field they generated is not going to disappear: it 
is rather to be traversed, each time contingently, using tools like those here proposed. In 
fact, in this conclusion I do not wish to suggest any feeling of completion. I believe this 
would run counter to the attitude alimenting the thesis. Whether introductions provide 
cartographies to orient the reader through the narration, conclusions should venture 
towards unknown territories for which cartographies still need to be drawn. They conclude a 
text, that is, by opening it up to what is outside. Faithful to the stated intention to ‘build 
something unfinished’, in this conclusion I will explore a paradigmatic example, which will 
allow me to perform a survol of the whole thesis, re-exposing its lines of thought and 
possibly turning them into as many lines of flight.   
I already touched upon the notion of paradigm through the definition offered by Agamben, 
different from the more famous one provided by Thomas Kuhn. Kuhn defines the paradigm 
as not only a set of rules and savoirs, but a fundamental worldview or framework which 
members of a scientific community consensually share more of less consciously adhering to 
it, and which guides and shapes the boundaries of the scientific research of a certain 
epoch.1032 Digging through philosophy in his typical archaeological fashion, Agamben 
exhumes a different meaning of paradigm: not the de jure condition of possibilities of a 
science, but its de facto existence.1033 The paradigm can be thus understood as a ‘norm’, 
however not in the sense of a transcendental ‘condition of possibility’, but rather as existing 
and subsisting only in the exhibition of the paradigmatic case: a norm that cannot be simply 
posited or verified from outside but is always generated and produced via the paradigm 
itself: it cannot be applied or enunciated but only exposed, performed, lived.1034 As 
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Thomas S. Kuhn, The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change (University Of 
Chicago Press, 1977) 
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 “not its right to be a science, but the fact that it exists” Agamben, The Signature, op. cit. p. 7  
1034
As in the grammatical example, where in order for a rule to be made explicit, an actual, singular instance 
must be performed (for instance, the imperative ‘go away’) and at the same time ‘suspended’ from its 
contextual signification (the injunction for somebody to ‘go away’) in order to ‘exhibit’ its paradigmatic value, 
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explained above referring to the panopticon, a paradigm is an always contingent example 
(e.g. an architectural project), yet one that, through its ‘suspension from its immediate 
factual reference’, is at the same time able to expose the ‘canon’ or abstract form which it 
shares with the other instances to which it is paradigmatically related (e.g. panopticism, i.e. 
a diagrammatic function detached from any use). There is in other words always an 
analogical relation between a singularity and its paradigmatic suspension, which avoids and 
neutralises the dichotomous correspondence between particular and general.1035 
Understood as such, the paradigm assumes an immanent and generative quality with 
respect to a problematic field:  
the intelligibility of the paradigm is never presupposed, on the contrary, the specificity 
of the paradigm resides precisely in the suspension of its immediate factual reference 
and in the exhibition of its intelligibility as such in order to give life to a new problematic 
context1036 
This is the sense of the ‘paradigm of operation’ I referred to along the thesis. As explained 
above, in Parmenide’s ‘ontological split’ between Being and non-Being I did not see an 
‘original cause’, but rather a paradigmatic example that I employed in order to make 
intelligible the field in which the relation between law and space unfolds: namely a 
problematic context in which the operation is assumed as the necessary mode of legal 
action in order to neutralise the dangers of spatiality. As every problematic field, a major 
necessity polarises it, i.e. the need for law to tame or, more precisely, to immunise itself 
from space. An ‘immunitary paradigm’, that is, essentially grounded on a presupposed 
separation from, i.e. erasure of space. It is such problematic field that the thesis sought to 
traverse and dismantle.  
In the example I offer below, I explore again such a paradigm from an eccentric perspective, 
one that allows for digging more in depth through other related questions which arose 
along the thesis. Most importantly, the questions of how to detach radical thought and thus 
ethico-political action from its exceptional recuperation; how to generate spatialities which 
are truly alternative to the urban brandscaping, beyond reactive opposition, fleeting 
spontaneity or technical synchronisation; how to keep the space open to its cosmic justice, 
once the deactivation of the spatiolegal apparatus has been performed.  
I do so in two steps. First, I dig through the notion of gardening, neither a lazy and unoriginal 
metaphor nor a redundant and pretentious divagation but, analogically as well as to some 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
its norm (in this case, the imperative form) [Ibid. p. 26]. Incidentally, this was the sense of the regula (monastic 
rule) of the aforementioned Franciscan movement: not a set of rules to be followed, but a ‘paradigmatic’ 
example – in this case, the life of Jesus – to be re-lived. [Agamben, Altissima povertà. op. cit. p. 124] 
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extent allegorically, as a paradigm through which the canon of the spatiolegal operation can 
be exposed. If on the one hand this allows me to come back and clarify the exceptional 
relation between law, space and control – explored in the thesis’ first part –, on the other it 
permits to focusing more in depth, in an admittedly peculiar and yet useful way (through 
the conceptual figure of the ‘weeds’) to the question of the potential complicity between 
radical thought and control. In this way I am able to set the scene for a rather unorthodox 
instance of gardening, Ai Weiwei’s art installation Sunflower Seeds. In this last section I seek 
provide further contextual depth and strategic sharpness to the trajectory developed in the 
fifth chapter. I do so by presenting Sunflower Seeds as an (art) installation alternative to the 
(urban) installation which I described in the analysis of the mega event. Contrary to the 
event-defusing logic of the mega event brandscaping, this artwork generates a whiteout by 
making inoperose the spatiolegal operations of the (gallery) brandscaping (security, order, 
property), unleashing the demonic powers of objects and allowing for novel concatenations 
to emerge. The porcelain seeds that form the artwork are taken as instances of ‘inoperose 
acting’, contrasting the operational hubris of the ‘weeds’. Finally, by accounting for the ‘re-
appropriation’ of the space of the gallery that followed its temporary deactivation, I 
conclude by stressing that any deactivation, any whiteout, calls upon us to counter-




I am aware that this conclusion will prompt at least a question from the reader, 
namely: is such a repetition or re-combination in such a paradigmatic format of some 
of the themes already exposed needed? I feel this requires methodological 
justification. In the introduction I stressed that a combination of the conceptual tools 
which build a thesis should be assessed with respect to the conceptual intensity and 
the lines of flight it manages to generate, rather than vis-à-vis the organic and internal 
coherence it maintains with the rest of thesis. How does it hold together? This is an 
undoubtedly relevant question, however subordinated to a more strategic one: how 
does it work? In this sense, I believe that the re-combination of some of the thesis’ 
most important concepts into such a peculiar example, rather alternative to the urban 
context in which the thesis floats, will allow to expose them more effectively, providing 
with added complexity, theoretical depth and strategic sharpness. The same reasoning 
oriented both decisions to choose such a peculiar example and to position it outside of 
the thesis’ main body: the intention, that is, is to exploit both its peculiarity and 
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By its existence alone, the lily of the field sings the 




The garden appears as the mythical and archetypal locus of the mediation of an encounter, 
the articulation of a separation into an ordering operation. In every garden a stable order of 
being is projected, reproduced and summarised. The garden is a ‘universalising heterotopia’, 
as Foucault suggested, “the smallest parcel of the world and then the totality of the world”, 
a microcosm where the whole world mirrors itself.1039 At the beginning was the Garden of 
Eden, where the ‘encounter’ between God and Man is mediated.1040 It is here that the 
utopian dream of an all-encompassing law merges with that of pure happiness in freedom, 
an ever-receding origin which subsequently grounds and justifies the gardening enterprise 
of the human. After being expelled from the heaven by the original gardener, separated 
from and yet thrown into the earth, the human becomes the sovereign gardener of the 
world, with the task of taming its wilderness into a ‘utopia of a perfectly cultivated 
earth’.1041 Corollary is the internalisation of this very task as the essence of the human, as a 
‘creature of lack’ condemned to compensate for the ontological poverty of his ‘fallen’ 
condition by involving himself into productive operations, result-oriented ‘projects’: here, in 
nuce, is the prototypical ‘reduction of human beings into praxis’.1042 
Hence the paradigmatic exposition of the spatiolegal operation that gardening expresses: 
drawing boundaries, turning the earth into a land of projects and productivity, a space for us 
where to plough and sow neat politico-legal geometries. The garden as the ‘homogenous 
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If the footnotes, as I explained in the introduction, have been often employed along the thesis as a way to 
perforate its structure and connect it to other potentialities outside, in this section they will be often 
employed in the reverse direction, i.e. as ways to prevent the thesis from excessive acceleration, by means of 
referring directly to relevant sections of the thesis as they are touched upon by the following exposition. 
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Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, op. cit. p. 75 
1039
Michel Foucault, 'Of Other Spaces, Heterotopias.' Architecture, Mouvement, Continuité 5, 1984: 46-49; see 
ch. 2 Space of Exception, par. 2 
1040
The term Paradise comes from the Persian Pairi-daeza: 'enclosed space', composed of wall [daeza] and 
around [pairi]. This trope appears, albeit in different ways, in the three main monotheisms.  
1041
I am paraphrasing Foucault and his famous description of the plague-stricken town, where distinctions and 
partitions are precisely drawn as in the “the utopia of the perfectly governed city'' [Foucault, Discipline and 
Punish, op. cit. p. 198]. Incidentally, from the etymology of garden derives the Russian and Polish word for city, 
grad. 
1042
On the reduction of being into praxis as result of the postulation of a ‘separated’ no-thing, see ch.1  
Nothingness Separation Operation 
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medium’ where the separation (human/world) is presupposed and articulated into an 
immunising operation: civilisation as cultivation.1043 As stated above, the will to control and 
manipulate beings is presupposed on the preliminary ‘separation’ and thus isolation of 
beings themselves, in this way consigned to man’s disposal. This is reflected in the 
distinction which organises the disciplinary gardens of modernity between “those organisms 
contained, managed and bred for the benefit of the humans, and those which are ‘wild’, 
continuing to live their own territories on, more or less, their own terms” – whose presence, 
incidentally, testifies of the immoral idleness of its savage inhabitants (to be consequently 
cultivated, civilised, colonised).1044 Accordingly, John Locke famously granted the right to 
property only to those who cultivate, ‘civilise’ and make the land productive – the 
justification for expropriation of land from the undeserving hands of those living in the 
various terrae nulliae of “wild woods and uncultivated waste ... left to nature, without any 
improvement, tillage or husbandry”.1045 
Crucial is to keep in mind, however, that beneath the seemingly rational, peaceful and 
ordered gesture of gardening lies the violence of extirpation. Every gardening is grounded 
by a ‘double move’: the erasure of complexity from space – extirpated, weeded and 
ploughed into a bare space – and then the partitioning, i.e. the sowing and fencing of this 
bare substratum into an ordered garden.1046 The sovereign gardener must constantly decide 
upon i.e. ‘cut off’ the weeds in order to re-establish the exceptional order.1047 The latter, 
however, depends on his capacity to conceal the fact of having to continuously perform 
such a contingent (and unavoidably incomplete) operation so that to reassert the order that 
his spectacular authority alone is unable to emanate. Every garden is a garden of exception 
resting on shaky foundations, bound to be soon or later invaded by the weeds whose 
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See ch. 2, Space of Exception, par.. 2-4; and ch. 1 Nothingness Separation Operation; the notion of 
‘homogenous medium’ refers to the above-quoted passage of Schmitt, Political Theology, op. cit. p 13; the 
term exception comes from ex-caping, literally, to take out, to extirpate. 
1044
A correspondence that 18
th
 century Scottish botanist and garden designer John Claudius Loudon coherently 
assumed when inviting “his reader to ‘compare plants with men, consider aboriginal species [i.e. wild plants] 
as mere savages, and botanical species [i.e. cultivars] as civilised beings”. in Richard Mabey, Weeds: The Story 
of Outlaw Plants: A Cultural History (Profile Books, 2012) p. 9 
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John Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government (1690) ch. V: “As much land as a man tills, plants, 
improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property. He by his labour does, as it were, 
inclose it from the common”; Seech.2, Space of Exception, par. 1  3 
1046
See ch.2, Space of Exception, par. 1  4; ch. 3, Prologue, par. 2; I am mainly referring to Western gardening. 
Other practices, most notably the Japanese ‘art of gardening’, are rather different if not opposite to this 
conception (see below) 
1047
I refer to the Schmittean concept of the ‘Sovereign who decides over the exception’. The etymology of the 
term decision is literally ‘to cut off’, from de- ‘off’ and caedere ‘to cut’. On the theme of the impotence of the 
sovereign vis-à-vis the state of exception, see ch.3, Prologue and Spectacle.  
272 
 
existence it obstinately denies. Every garden always-already contains ‘the seeds of its own 
deconstruction’.1048 
Weeds are what inherently deconstructs the gardening of exception, “occur[ing] when this 
tidy compartmentalisation [cultivated/wild] breaks down. The wild gatecrashes our civilised 
domains, the domesticated escapes and runs riot”.1049 They are not simply a wilderness 
comfortably situated ‘outside’ of the gardening endeavour. They are not what ‘opposes’ the 
space of gardening, but rather what wrongs it.1050 As Richard Mabey observes, “the best-
known and simplest definition is that a weed is a plant in the wrong place”.1051 Weeds’ 
continuous and rhizomatic proliferation aptly expresses the ineradicable conflictuality which 
lies within, and constantly dislocates any order: the variation, transformation and 
uncontainable vitalism of life.1052 More profoundly, weeds express the impossibility for the 
sovereign gardening to ever bridge the separation with space, to ever tame and juridify it 
into a normative order, to appropriate it: it is such an all-ingesting hubris for each body to 
be defined, categorised, labelled, guarded and gardened, that the weeds frustrate.1053 
Able to proliferate where all other forms of life disappear, from post-conflict ruins to 
abandoned cemeteries, from desert land to asphalt roads, weeds expose the reality of a 
world ‘not for us’, populated by bodies which cannot be reduced to our relation to them: 
“the weed is the Nemesis of human endeavour ... [it] exists only to fill the waste spaces left 
by cultivated areas. It grows between, among other things.”1054 The legal gardening is 
unequipped to deal with this non-juridifiable “grey zone that eludes every attempt to 
establish its relation to a dichotomy we feel familiar with – that of law and non-law.”1055 
Their anarchic vitalism unmasks the impotence and nakedness of the sovereign gardeners 
but also dislocates the neat fences of the disciplinary gardens. Weeds not only incorporate 
the ‘ontologically intractable’ principle of space. They also appear to run counter the 
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Desutter, Deleuze, op. cit. p. 56 (my translation); see ch. 2, Folding Exception par. 4 
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Mabey, Weeds, op. cit. p. 21 
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Here is a reference to Rancière’s concept of the political as what wrongs a given order; see ch. 5, par. 1 
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Mabey, Weeds, op. cit. p. 5; Among the ways employed through history to define and discriminate weeds, 
Mabey notes the concept of utility (they are useless) toxicity (they are dangerous) morality (they are parasitic 
and thus morally reproachable) aesthetic (they are ugly) evolutionary (they are savage plants, as opposed to 
the civilised botanical species) (p. 9) 
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See ch. 1  Materiality Life Event par4-6, and ch. 2 Legal Matter par.4 
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See ch. 2 Folding Exception par. 3-4, Legal Matter par. 1-3 
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Henri Miller, quoted in Deleuze and Guattari, ATP, p. 20; see ch.2 Folding Exception 
1055
Brighenti, ‘Did we Really get rid of Commands?’, op. cit. p. 70 – As Mabey observes, weeds “aren’t 
parasites, because they can exist without us” [Weeds, op. cit. p. 12 (my emphasis)]. Or, perhaps more 
appropriately, weeds can be understood as a true parasite as in Masciandaro’s observation: “the para-site 
(that which makes food what is beside it) digests the host/parasite distinction into the bipolar disorder of its 
own being” [Nicola Masciandaro, 'Gourmandized in the Abattoir of Openness', in Ed Keller, Nicola Masciandaro 
& Eugene Thacker (eds) Leper Creativity: Cyclonopedia Symposium (punctum books, 2012) p. 189]. See ch. 1  
Materiality Life Event par. 2, 7; ch.4, Method and ch. 5 par. 6 
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utilitarism of the operational paradigm: “of course they don’t have a ‘purpose’ ... they just 
‘are’”.1056 It is perhaps in their ‘just being’ that does their being ‘just’ lie?1057 
 
3. 





In the second chapter I noted that, by removing its grounds as well as the ‘outside’ against 
which it supposedly erects its geometry, deconstruction places the sovereign state of 
exception before the ontological impossibility of its own operations.1059 Likewise, the 
contingent and deterritorialising intractability of weeds plunges gardening into crisis. Both 
the authority of the gardener and the boundaries of the garden are overflown and 
dislocated by the exuberant proliferation of weeds. Yet, if geo-political, socio-cultural, 
philosophical and other critical weeds succeed in unmasking the sovereign impotence and 
disaggregating its stable order, they do not block its exceptional operation. Instead, by 
means of no longer radiating from a given sovereign nor being projected towards a precise 
location, the exceptional techné of gardening becomes boundless, planetary (i.e. fully 
deterritorialised) and impersonal (post-sovereign), assuming its impossibility as its own self-
justifying ends. The state of exception folds onto itself, becoming immanent as a self-
alimenting techné, a purpose-generating movement.1060 What emerges is a new impersonal, 
post-sovereign and immanent configuration of power, a moving and rhizomatic state of 
exception no longer concerned with colonising, striating and crystallising space. Weedy 
deconstruction can only trigger a superficial destabilisation of the garden of exception. By 
inserting a ‘chaos within the garden’, it problematises the sovereign façade of the 
spatiolegal (its sovereign subject and its locus), yet leaving untouched, nay, allowing for fully 
unleashing its deeper functioning.1061 Chaos, to repeat, is not the limit, but rather the 
inherent justification of the ‘will to control’.1062 Assuming the state of exception as a rigid 
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Mabey, Weeds, op. cit. p. 14 
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On the ‘persevering on one’s own being’ as the key character of the vitalism I am proposing, and on the 
notion of ‘inoperosity’ as the purpose-less (demonic) core of every being, see ch. 1, Materiality Life Event par. 
4-7;  
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Negarestani, ‘Solar Inferno’, op. cit. p. 7 
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See ch. 2, Folding Exception 
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See ch. 2, Folding Exception par. 4 
1061
See ch. 2, Folding Exception par. 4 
1062
However see supra note 198 and 387; on the suggestion that the Western ‘will to know and control’, rather 
than simply an attempt to impose an order over a chaos, expresses more profoundly the ‘faith’ in the 
existence of a homogenous chaos which justifies the operation of control itself. Even more precisely, as I argue 
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and arboreal structure bound to collapse before chaos, therefore, appears as much closer to 
the hopes of those seeking to debunk it, than to the reality of its form.1063 
Along the third and the fifth chapter I moved a similar observation to some approaches 
gathered under the precarious labels of ‘relationalism’ and ‘naive vitalism’. I stressed that 
pretending to get rid of exceptional abstractions in the name of the creative praxis of 
multitudes, the post-human relationalism of networks, the vibrant materialism of naive 
vitalism; is a deeply problematic position, that misses the reality of these abstractions. 
Whilst deconstruction appears unequipped to deal with control, such ‘relational’ and 
‘vitalist’ positions seem to remain ‘stuck’ or, which is the same, carried away into the 
immobile movement of its smooth ‘surface’.1064 The result is, at best, a vulnerable position, 
at worst an (unwitting) complicity with control itself.1065 In fact, whilst ‘affirmative 
biopolitics’ contrasts the immunitary logic of the spatiolegal state of exception by proposing 
a vitalism aimed at keeping life open to variation, movement and metamorphosis, control 
appears to depend and thrive exactly on keeping the metamorphosis, translatability, 
movement and variation of life open.1066 The analogy with the weeds offers some peculiar 
insight.  
By blurring the boundaries between cultivars and wild plants, but also parasitically 
dissolving the integrity of each plant, weeds make explicit the trans-individual machinism 
and rhizomatic materiality of the molecular ontology of being-together. On the one hand, 
weeds are the fitting embodiment of what Birchall et al. define ‘naive vitalism’, i.e. the 
expression of life as an “inherently positive, primal propulsive force that opposes 
domination and control”.1067 On the other hand, however, the dislocation of (botanical) 
abstractions that their rhizomatic vitalism triggers is akin to a ‘compulsion to liquidity’ which 
ultimately mirrors the suffocating logic of control.1068 As observed above, whilst the ‘static’ 
mechanism of exception is based on the bionomical extirpation (abstraction) of individuals 
from the spatiality of being–together, its ‘dynamic’ configuration introduces a different kind 
of abstraction, molecularising the static and self-contained individual into the dynamic 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
in the third chapter, chaos is the ontological product, i.e. the reality of control's abstraction: see ch.1 
Nothingness Separation Operation ch.2 Spectacle par. 4 and Brandscaping par.3.  
1063
On the problems with understanding the legal state of exception as a system of truth, see ch.2, Folding 
Exception, par.4 
1064
See ch. 3, Brandscaping par. 5 
1065
see supra note 157; see ch 3 Brandscaping par. 6  
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See ch. 2, Legal Matter, par. 4 
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That is, the quintessential understanding of life that (naïve) vitalism purports: Birchall, Hall and 
Woodbridge, ‘Postscript’, op. cit. p. 42; See ch. 2, Legal Matter par. 4; ch. 3, Brandscaping par. 6; ch. 5, par. 3; 
on accelerationism, vitalism and the risks of ‘recuperation’, see ch. 2, Space of Exception par. 4; and ch. 5 par. 
4-5; ch. 3, Brandscaping par. 6 
1068
Baudrillard, ‘Forget Foucault’, op. cit. p. 25 
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machinism of re-combinable dividuals.1069 This means that there is no longer a static 
separation of a bare life from a life worth living, but rather the reduction of the whole life to 
a bare life, the whole space to a bare space.1070 Static botanical separations are sublimated 
into a molecular relationalism that, accordingly, is ontologically produced by the weeds 
themselves in their viral and parasitic “process of omnivorous immanentization”.1071 If 
weeds superficially sabotage the gardening project, more profoundly they appear to 
internalise and fully unleash its exceptional operation.1072 
In the vast spaces of central US, new species of weeds, so-called ‘superweeds’, proliferate at 
‘warp speed’, smoothing out space into a homogeneous surface.1073 Erasure and 
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See ch. 3, Spectacle, par. 4 
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On the notion of ‘abstract form’ ch. 3, Bio and Control par. 2 and Spectacle par.4, where I observe that the 
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The quote is from Tiqqun, where they define ‘control’ (they use the term Empire) as “a regime of limitless 
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intensity” Introduction to Civil War, op. cit., p. 132; 
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See ch 3, Brandscaping, par. 6; See ch 3, Bio and Control, par. 1, where I refer to control  as the sublimation 
of separation: in other words, the separation between life and the living is apparently revoked, and yet is more 
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Linda Wells, ‘Superweeds spreading at warp speed’, Ground Truth Blog, 7 February 2013, available at 
http://www.panna.org/blog/superweeds-spreading-warp-speed; it would be interesting to draw a parallel 
with the vertiginous appendix of Deleuze’s book on Foucault, where he tries to think what the novel ‘historical 
configuration’ of our times could be. Overcome, in fact, is the vertical transcendence of the ‘God-form’ and the 
universal unfolding to which it centripetally attracted mankind, i.e. the “continual need to unfold and ‘explain’. 
What is God, if not the universal explanation and supreme unveiling?” [Foucault, op. cit. p. 126]. Overcome is 
also the ‘Man-form’, in which the infinite unfolding of God was reversed, i.e. folded back onto the finitude of 
‘horizontal transcendentalism’, as biology, political economy, linguistic, socio-empiricism and so on would 
provide an immanent folding to the vertical aspiration of the precedent era. These ‘unfolding’ and ‘folding’, 
brutally simplifying, are akin to what I have rather imprecisely termed ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ states of 
exception, i.e. the vertical and horizontal form of a differently-rearranged and yet ultimately unchallenged 
‘static’ mechanism of exception [See ch. 2, State of Exception par. 4 and Folding Exception par. 4]. Yet, what 
occurs when both forms are ‘overcome’? Deleuze enters the realm of speculations here, taking inspiration 
Nietzschean ‘Superman’, the one which, if “man imprisoned life” (into the dissemination of savoirs) “frees life 
within man himself, to the benefit of another form” (p. 131). A form which is no longer molar but molecular, 
triggered by the revolutions of molecular biology, contemporary literature and cybernetic. This literally ‘post-
structural’ revolution triggers enormous changes in the realm of life, labour, language. This is of course 
consistent with what, in the realm of the urban, I have described with the concept of ‘spatial explicitation’ [see 
ch. 3, Brandscaping par. 2-3]. Not an unfolding, not a folding, but rather, Deleuze ventures, a superfold, the 
unleashing of the proper forces of immanence. To be sure, this is not necessarily for the good: “a new form”, 
Deleuze observes, “it is hoped, will not prove worse than its two previous forms” (p. 132). Superfold, then, 
here chimes with Superweeds, as an apt embodiment of the attempt to “disperse and regroup life into new 
genetic codes” and, at the same time, of the revenge that “the genetic components take ... over the organism” 
(ibid. modified translation), [see Deleuze, Foucault, op. cit. pp. 124-32]. Above I mentioned the risk of post-
structural theorist unwittingly becoming ‘the social engineers of our time’, enrolled in the deterritorialising 
enterprise of the capital, and even ontologically producing the reality they study [see for instance Birchall et. 
al., “Postscript”, op. cit.]. Here we see a peculiar and yet compelling parallel in the deterritorialised, 
indiscriminate and extensive cultivation of GM-crops by multinationals, together with their production and 
intensive use of war-like herbicides [notoriously Monsanto employs ‘Agent Orange’, already used in Vietnam 
War], that ontologically produce the smooth space in which the ‘gardening’ of superweeds thrives. Needless to 
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partitioning fold into rhizomatic smoothness. According to the scientific community, they 
have principally emerged as unintentional result of the massive employment of chemical 
herbicides which, acting in the manner of a vaccine, in the end stimulated ever-increasing 
capacities of herbicide-resistance on the weeds themselves. Moreover, a role in their 
surfacing was also played by widespread GM-cultivation (through mutation, cross-breeding 
or other indirect causes).1074 Accelerationism finds here its deadly (dis)embodiment, a dark 
and oppressive body without organs whose simultaneous vitalistic proliferation and 
necrocratic parasitism produces a smooth space which deadly colonises any ‘vital space’, 
destroying crops and shrinking cultivation area. I propose to employ this perhaps bizarre, 
and yet inspiring analogy, to expose three key aspects emerged along the discussion of the 
thesis.  
First, capacities for metamorphosis, variation and hybridisation appear as fitting qualities to 
be internalised into the apparatus control, able to "supply them in far more radical, a-
subjective, and inhuman forms than any mutated subject" – as the superweeds aptly 
symbolise.1075 Hence the risk for vitalism to turning into a suffocating nihilism, complicit to 
the ontological production of the very reality it pretends to fight against.1076 Never believe 
that the weeds would suffice to save us. 
Second, the analogy gives us the chance to further qualify the kind of power configuration 
that control entails: namely, an unauthorised and impersonal emergence of an immanent 
and centre-less configuration both (ontologically) producing as well as thriving onto a global, 
deterritorialised space in which it operates without frictions.1077 In fact, the weeds appear to 
literally 'embody' an impersonal and unhuman techné of ‘gardening’, as a self-generating 
rhizomatic proliferation of life independent from any ‘human subject’ performing it, and 
even from any ‘given garden’ where it is to be applied, nor ‘located outside’ of normative 
attempts to impose production and immunity, but rather viral and parasitic, internal to (i.e. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
say, central role in fostering these invasive attempts at both intensive generation of life and widespread 
fabrication of death is played by the capitalist urge to produce ever-greater and meticulously protected 
quantities of mono-cultural crops. 
1074
In fact, there is debate in the scientific community on the convenience of using such a sensationalistic 
definition as ‘superweeds’. Moreover, also the between GM-crops and superweeds is a very controversial 
subject, hotly debated. Evidently, this is not the place for a detailed biological debate.  
1075
I am referring to the above-quoted passage by Noys: “why proclaim the need for a right to difference, 
variation, and metamorphosis, if capitalism will supply them in far more radical, a-subjective, and inhuman 
forms than any mutated subject?”[Persistence of the Negative, op. cit. p. 71] 
1076
Recall the above-mentioned demand posed by Birchall et al. [Postscript op. cit.] as regards the risk, for 
radical theorists seeking to interpret the web by retracing its relations and unfolding its hidden logics, to 
ontologically produce the very web they are (apocalyptically) describing. See ch. 3, Brandscaping par. 6, ch. 5 
par. 4, ch. 3 Bio and Control par. 3 and ch. 2, Folding Exception par. 4 
1077
See the whole ch.3, and especially Spectacle par. 2-3 and ch.5 par. 4 
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internalising) any state of exception.1078 Gardening without gardeners, gardening without 
gardens.1079 
Third, and further stretching the analogy, it is possible to emphasise a key problem of those 
strands of contemporary ‘radical’ thought above criticised, namely, their inability to 
overcome the paradigm of operation, i.e. the reduction of being into praxis. This is, I 
suggest, what the proliferating movement of the weeds expresses. Not a lack of purpose (as 
Mabey observed, above), but rather a precise ‘urge to grow’. Weeds fully embody the 
subjection to this self-generating hubris, as what constantly feeds the force of both their 
propulsive vitalism and lethal nihilism. For this reason, they can be simultaneously taken to 
express both the logic of control and that of its resistance. Let me explain.  
Negarestani, one not foreign to visionary analogies, has recently observed that what 
ultimately joins both negative nihilism and positive vitalism is the common dependence to 
what he terms the Solar Hegemony. With the latter he expresses the logic of Capitalism as a 
system which binds every being to the necessity to consume and preserve energy, a ‘slavery 
to the Sun’, that is. Within this system, he continues, ever-new ways of life (lifestyles) are 
envisaged, that is, an abundance of possibility for self-realisation through self-
consumption.1080 However, all of these possibilities are provided within a horizon (within a 
world or possible worlds) which has already been (ontologically) posited by the capitalistic 
abstraction: pluralities of lifestyles, yet a monism of death.1081 Both negative nihilism and 
positive vitalism as a result, remain stuck onto the surface of the Earth, differently and yet 
equally unable to escape the modulation of Capitalism, and instead contributing to produce, 
as I argued above, the suffocating closure of its seamless relationalism.1082As Williams and 
Srnicek sharply note: “we may be moving fast, but only within a strictly defined set of capit-
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See ch. 3 Bio and Control par. 2, where I refer to control as viral and parasitic, always ‘internal’, not 
functioning ‘frontally’ or transcendentally  
1079
I am referring to Schütz’s ‘Imperatives Without Imperator’, op. cit. as well as to Tiqqun’s “mastery without 
masters”, in, Introduction to Civil War, op. cit. p. 152: 
1080
I refer to Sloterdijk’s observation: in contemporary times, 'the realisation of oneself is a disguised definition 
of the consumption of oneself.' Ecumes, op. cit. p. 498 (my translation); see ch. 3, Brandscaping par. 2 
1081
Negarestani situates the problem in the incapacity to think death in ways which are not singular. Death is 
thus understood as a different way of living and thus vitalistically averted, and reduced to a matter of a ‘world 
of given possibilities’, that is, always thought within a given frame of ‘possibilities’, and never “according to the 
contingency inherent to exteriority—a contingency that is irreducible to both possibilities of the world and 
possible worlds.” [Reza Negarestani, ‘Drafting the Inhuman: Conjectures on Capitalism and Organic 
Necrocracy’. In Levi R. Bryant, Nick Srnicek & Graham Harman (eds) The Speculative Turn: Continental 
Materialism and Realism. Re-press 2011 p. 194 (n. 20); see also, ‘Solar Inferno’, op. cit.] 
1082
See ch 3, Brandscaping, par. 2-3 
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alist parameters that themselves never waver. We experience only the increasing speed of 
a local horizon.”1083 
This is what the figure of the ‘weed’ helps expressing. Weeds' overcoming of the ‘static’ 
separation of modern gardens is still performed within the same Solar Hegemony. Their 
unstoppable urge to grow testifies for their inability to escape such local horizon: just like 
other plants, and yet at an unrestrained and nihilistic ‘warp speed’, weeds remain sun-jects, 
subjects of the Sun and as such condemned to ‘glorify’ its light. They express, in other 
words, the necessity to relentlessly perform a (photosynthetic) operation of self-
consumption (an operation to which, in the end, they are fully reduced and exhausted), 
producing energy, growing without limits, smoothing out space and ‘wildly de-stratifying’ 
even at the cost of suffocating other beings.1084 What their ambiguous vitalism embodies is 
the suspicious superficiality of the political dimension of ‘(neo)liberation’. 
This is the impasse that the geo-sophical position I proposed in the final chapter sought to 
avoid. Evidently, the absolute deterritorialisation of superweeds cannot be contrasted 
through (since constituted by) the accelerated overdose of the ambiguous vitalism of GM-
crops and lethal nihilism of herbicides. Yet, if acceleration is not a solution, neither is the 
mere inertia of an “onto-phenomenological letting-be”.1085 Beyond the false dichotomy of 
action and inertia, lies the art of profanation, that is, the contingent dismantling of the 
apparatus of control (its ‘making inoperose’) and the counter-effectuation of the eventful 
potential thus unleashed.1086 The vitalism of weeds, so to speak, must become truly 
‘purpose-less’, their action fully drained of their hubristic activism.1087 This is what a 
demonic vitalism entails, the elimination of ‘all the purposes that separate life and living’.1088 
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Williams and Srnicek, ‘Accelerate’, op. cit. On their proposal for a radical accelerationism as opposed to a 
compromised ‘speed’ see supra note 632  
1084
Deleuze and Guattari, ATP, op. cit. p. 178. Glorification, I argued above, is the operation of ontological 
production of the sovereign: the glorifying subject ultimately coincides with the operation of glorification [see 
Ch. 3 Prologue, par. 1];  
1085
Michael Marder, Plant-Thinking: A Philosophy of Vegetal Life, Columbia University Press: 2013: p. 3; Marder 
proposes to “doing justice to them [plants] by means of this very onto-phenomenological letting-be”. I think 
letting-be is not enough. See also Timothy Morton [‘Thinking Ecology: The Mesh, the Strange Stranger and the 
Beautiful Soul’, in Collapse VI: Geo/Philosophy (Urbanomics, 2010)] for a critique of this principle of letting-be 
in ecology 
1086
See ch. 5, especially par. 5, 8 
1087
I am referring on an above-quoted passage by Jullien, A Treatise on Efficacy, op. cit. p. 89 [see ch. 5 par. 3] 
1088
Agamben, Nudità, op. cit. p. 144 (my translation); in Masciandaro’s words: “Purpose exists in the separation 
of ends and means, in the empty space between law’s two senses. Purposelessness lives in the inescapable 
free binding of life to itself, wherein what is and what should be are forever reconciled beyond reconciliation, 
where the dialectical circle of law is paradoxically shrunk to an infinite point.” Sweetness of Law, op. cit. p. 51 
(n. 39). On demonic vitalism see ch. 1, Materiality Life Event par. 5  
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Via its profanation, unleashed are the potentialities of a use which pierces through the 
suffocating horizon of techné, a necessarily common use: inoperose gardening.1089 
 
4. 
one must follow what the rock demands
1090 
  
In the third chapter I emphasised the role of the so-called ‘spatial revolution’ (begun from 
the end of XIX° century in various ambits of thought, philosophical, art, politics, science etc.) 
in making explicit the immersive materiality of being-together, as well as in fostering ever-
new attempts at modulating such a co-immersion.1091 This is what I sought to convey with 
the notion of brandscaping. In the fourth chapter I described the mega event as a 
paradigmatic instance of brandscaping: a urban-wide ‘installation’ aimed at stimulating and 
exploiting the eventfulness of the urban by producing pervasive entertainment and frenetic 
festival rhythms, whilst at the same time seeking to defuse all conflict, intensity and frictions 
which could dimple its smooth, secured and capitalised circulation. The mega event 
brandscaping, I observed, is a machine for the pre-emptive production of events.1092 In the 
conclusion of the fourth chapter, I briefly mentioned an instance of a temporary, 
spontaneous deactivation of the brandscaping of the ME, generated by the immanent 
emergence of a concatenation of bodies, affects and wind. This inspired me to pose some 
significant strategic question: how can the intensity of urban life allowed to emerge beyond 
the immediate spontaneism? How to deactivate the immunising attempt to reduce it into 
predictable, controllable and capitalisable tunings, and yet avoiding the dangerous 
outcomes of ‘liberationist’ tendencies? How to open the urban to the contingent potential 
of its cosmic justice? The paradigmatic example explored in the rest of this conclusion 
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See ch. 5, par. 7; I am referring to Agamben’s notion of profanation, in Profanations, op. cit. on demonic 
vitalism see ch. 1, Materiality Life Event, par. 5 
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Jiro Takei and Marc P. Keane, Sakuteiki: Visions of the Japanese Garden (Tuttle Publishing, 2008) 
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See ch. 3, Brandscaping, par. 2 
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What happens between bodies during an installation is 




Arguably, any encounter with art is a glimpse into the impossibility to maintain an ideal 
distance. This is, perhaps, the sublime of art, the dissolution of the subject/object dichotomy 
into a vertiginous experience of threshold.1094 Although in front of a painting or a sculpture 
this remains intangible, ‘implicit’, when walking inside a temple we can exclaim, as Paul 
Valery’s Socrates does, ‘we are, we move and we thus live in the work of man!’1095 This is 
the power of contemporary installation art: it makes explicit the impossibility for us to be 
merely in front of an artwork by actually including the spectator within, thus giving shape to 
the ontological assumption of being as always being-in-the-world, in the form of a literal 
being-in-the-work-of-an-other.1096 
Ai Weiwei’s art installation Kui Hua Zi (Sunflower Seeds) took place from the 12th October 
2010 to 2nd May 2011 in the gigantic Turbine Hall of the Tate Modern Gallery, in London. It 
consists of 100 millions hand-crafted porcelain ‘seeds’ brought from Jingdezhen in China to 
London, to form a soft carpet to wander, ponder, rest and play.1097 This is no work to face, 
contemplate and interpret – it is a work to dive into, a haptic space of undulating vision, 
rustling steps, unusual horizontality. Doing justice to this ‘garden of stones’, I believe, means 
not to treat it as a ‘box’ with some hidden meaning inside to be uncovered and 
interpreted.1098 What does it signify? A legitimate question, yet a pacifying one, that reduces 
the work to a self-contained object and dissolves the intensity it can generate into a 
differential space of interpretations. How does it work? This is a more significant, strategic 
question, that allows to connect the work to its Outside, thus to keep its intensity alive by 
following the concatenations produced in the contingency of its taking place: “there’s 
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I am paraphrasing the quote by Tiqqun: “What happens between bodies during a demonstration is far more 
interesting than the demonstration itself” Introduction to Civil War, p. 211  
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Sublime: sub: under; -limen: lintel, threshold 
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Valery, Eupalinos, op. cit. p. 41 
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Sloterdijk, Ecumes, op. cit. p. 469– see ch. 3, Brandscaping, par. 2 
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More precisely, the installation comprised: 100 million porcelain sunflower seeds; a short ‘making-of’ 
documentary; a ‘One­to­One With the Artist’, where visitors could record themselves asking questions to 
Weiwei as well as expressing what they thought of the work.  
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nothing to explain, nothing to understand, nothing to interpret. It’s like plugging into an 
electric circuit.”1099  
Sunflower Seeds produces a pervasive and contingent immersion which depolarises the 
separation between artwork and spectator and denies the immunity of distant 
contemplation, by plunging into an environment that engulfs us, displacing any possibility to 
choose whether to be active or passive.1100 This is what installation art does: making explicit 
the immersive materiality of being-together. As noted above, it is exactly in the sense of a 
‘modulation of immersion’ that brandscaping is to be understood. Accordingly, the ME-
brandscaping is an installation aimed to defusing the excessive, eventful and ‘politico-
ethical’ potential of the urban. On the contrary, Weiwei’s installation is a machine for 
generating encounters, producing intensities, that is, a machine that makes space for the 
eventful potential of its taking place by generating a whiteout in the spatiolegal surface of 
the gallery. This is not an explanation or an interpretation. Neither is directly relevant with 
respect to the author’s intentions “machines don't explain anything, you have to analyze the 
collective arrangements of which the machines are just one component.”1101  
Kui Hua Zi profanates the immunitary and proprietary apparatus of exception of the gallery. 
Significantly, it does so neither through reactive opposition, fleeting spontaneity nor 
technical synchronisation, but rather, by simply 'listening to the demand of the rocks'. What 
an object can do? This is the question the installation prompts and performs, by ‘freeing’ the 
seeds from their function, "not simply restor[ing] something like a natural use that existed 
before being separated", but rather opening them to a common and post-human use.1102 
Sunflower Seeds does not attempt to impose control over contingency, i.e. 'modulating the 
immersion' into a totalising closure, but rather 'demodulates the immersion', extracting 
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I am referring to Deleuze’s observation about the two ways of reading a book, already exposed in the 
Introduction par. § (4) [Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, op. cit. p. 69]. This is the same logic that oriented my 
ethnographic exploration in Johannesburg, see ch. 4, Method 
1100
I am paraphrasing Liu Bolin, quoted in Mattei, ‘Camouflage’, op. cit.; See ch. 5, par. 3. As Hancox observes, 
in Sunflower Seeds “vision, dominated by the undifferentiated field of grey, rel[ies] on the contact­sense of 
touch”, fostering “a strong desire to move beyond the distanced gaze and engage in a proximate encounter”, 
Simone Hancox, ‘Art, activism and the geopolitical imagination: Ai Weiwei’s ‘Sunflower Seeds’, Journal of 
Media Practice 12 (3) 2012, 279-290: p. 82 
1101
Gilles Deleuze, ‘Control and Becoming’, op. cit. Incidentally, in the short making-of video accompanying the 
exhibition Weiwei explains how he was interested at the unpredictable outcome generated by the encounter 
between visitors and seeds: “Because they are fake seeds, it takes them a while to adjust their minds. They 
would always say: is that possible? Then they would pick up a few, some would even want to put them in their 
mouth to try” [“Ai Weiwei: Sunflower seeds”, YouTube video, 14:42, posted by "Tate" 14 October 2010, 
available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PueYywpkJW8]. In any case, Weiwei does not appear to be 
much concerned with intentionality. As he himself observed, “I act in a way more or less as programmed by an 
uncertain force”, in Rauch, Alex ‘No Fake: An Interview with Ai Weiwei’, Portland Art Website, 9 August 2010, 
available at  http://www.portlandart.net/archives/2010/08/no_fake_an_inte.html 
1102
Agamben, Profanations, op. cit. pp. 77-86; as what Agamben elsewhere terms a "moment of art subtracted 
from the neutrality of aesthetics", in Means Without Ends, op. cit. p. 79 
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intensity from the waves of being together, rather than defusing them.1103 It is no simple 
improvisation, but rather a calibrated experiment in 'building the unfinished', an inoperose 
gardening, that is, that instead of prescribing any peculiar interaction to the human and 
nonhuman bodies involved, lets “them hold together without wounding their disjointure and 
their becoming otherwise".1104  
Contrary to the weeds’ accelerationist hubris, the ‘urge to grow’ is foreign to these seeds. 
What they express is not the propulsive movement of naive vitalism, but the impotentiality 
of demonic vitalism, a retreat from the ‘evil’ urge to exercise some power to be.1105 Let us 
not be distracted by the seeming inconsistency of this analogy. Let us instead follow the 
intensive lines of flight it generates. Doing justice to objects is freeing them from our 
interpretation and appropriation, understand them as double-structures, never fully 
graspable, reducible, manipulatable, always situated within a relational here-and-know, and 
yet never actually resolved, i.e. exhausted by that. What the porcelain seeds express is such 
‘inoperose potency to swerve’, allegorically symbolised by the deactivation of the condition 
of being ‘constantly enrolled into activity’ that characterises the weeds, swerving from being 
'sun-jects' reduced into the glorifying photo-synthesis of a Mao-Sun.1106 In fact, if the viral 
molecularisation of the weeds embodies a suspicious politics of reckless ‘liberation’, always-
already compromised with the immobile movement of the 'techné of gardening', the 
‘inoperose acting’ of the seeds expresses a far more radical gesture. What keeps a body 
‘alive’ is not a ‘capacity to do’, but more importantly a ‘capacity to undo’. An ‘inoperose 
potentiality’ that, by ‘making inoperose’ the operational mechanism of appropriation, 
unleashes the excessive eventfulness of the materiality of being-together, piercing the 
exceptional horizon by opening space to the uncorrelated event of its taking place. The 
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"Demodulation is the act of extracting the original information-bearing signal from a modulated carrier 
wave" (from Wikipedia: 'demodulation')   
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As Doel observes, the “ethical task is to become worthy of one’s encounter with these forces of affectation: 
not to force constancy on them, but to lend them consistency. To let them hold together without wounding 
their disjointure and their becoming otherwise” (Doel, Poststructural Geographies, op. cit., p. 6) 
1105
On the difference between the notions of demonic and evil, see ch. 1, Materiality Life Event, par. 5; Weiwei 
himself emphasises such deactivation of purpose as an element of this artwork: “it’s a work about mass 
production and repeatedly accumulating the small effort of individuals to become a massive, useless piece of 
work” [in ‘The Unilever Series: Ai Weiwei: Sunflower Seeds: Interpretation text’, Tate Modern Website, 
http://www.tate.org.uk/whats-on/tate-modern/exhibition/unilever-series-ai-weiwei/interpretation-text]. Let 
me also stress that I do not wish to suggest an opposition between organic and inorganic vitalism. The 
opposition between the two ‘figures’ is heuristic, employed to potentially generate some conceptual intensity. 
1106
In the making-of video Weiwei suggests a political inspiration for his work: “In the political area all the 
paintings have sunflower seeds. Whenever Chairman Mao comes out there are sunflowers around him, that 
means that Chairman Mao is the sun and all the ordinary people loyal to the party are the sunflowers. 
Sunflowers supported the whole revolution, spiritually and in material ways. In the political area all the 
paintings have sunflower seeds. Whenever Chairman Mao comes out there are sunflowers around him, that 
means that Chairman Mao is the sun and all the ordinary people loyal to the party are the sunflowers. 
Sunflowers supported the whole revolution, spiritually and in material ways.” see 'Ai Weiwei: Sunflower 
seeds', YouTube video, op. cit. 
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seeds’ ‘de-sun-jectification’ is the preamble for the production of the spatiolegal whiteout 
that the installation triggers, unleashing the demonic potentialities of bodies that, liberated 
from exceptional captures, are free to enter into novel relations, producing new power 
configurations.1107 Let us not be fooled by their static, passive, a-political appearance. Seeds 
are ‘nomads by dint of not moving’, escaping the closure of brandscaping by remaining 
within, complicitous with anonymous bodies with which they enter in unpredictable and 
unauthorised compositions, causing frictions with abstract and concrete structures, 
unleashing their demonic, chaotic, immoral, illegal and poisonous potentialities, producing 
alternative normativities: “accomplishing nothing [they] become capable of everything”.1108  
Namely, generating: toxic atmospherics by entering in frictional relation with human 
bodies and their shoes; resonant noise across the aural space of the gallery, through multi-
sensorial interaction with people, polluting the normative ideal of anaesthetic 
contemplation; incontrollable circulation within visitors’ pockets and further locales, 
destabilising the abstract scaffolding of property, disaggregating the artwork’s authorial 
integrity… What they (un)do then, what they pierce through is the seemingly impenetrable 
smoothness of the safe, controlled and capitalised brandscape of the gallery, turning into a 
holey space its sanitised and authorial insulation. Not eradicated, but rather dismantled is 
the event-defusing spatiolegal apparatus of exception, made inoperose are its immunitary 
and proprietary operations (i.e. security, property and order). A de-museification of the 
gallery, that is.1109 Opening the installation to the cosmic event of its taking place, they are 
indeed seeds of justice, an impersonal justice extendible 'at every point of the matter, from 
viruses to starts, since it is the very act of matter’.1110  
No surprise that the Tate did decide not to stay and traverse this vortex. After few days, the 
exhibition was closed to the public and quarantined behind a fence for the rest of its 
duration.1111  
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Important is to note that the ‘unleashing of the demonic potentialities’ of the seeds is allowed by the 
installation itself. In other words, whilst the weeds symbolised a reckless and wild de-stratifying, the 
installation shows that 'making space' for the eventful potentialities is not a drifting praxis of improvisation, 
but rather an absolutely precise, situated and calibrated strategy of deactivation, generating “more and more 
perceptual enclosures, spaces within which the unrepresentable is brought into presence” Masciandaro, 
‘Becoming Spice’, op. cit. p. 30 
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I am paraphrasing Masciandaro, ‘Becoming Spice’ op. cit. p. 52 
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Above I related the notion of brandscaping to Agamben’s concept of ‘museification’ of the city, as the 
condition of ‘deprivation’ of experience that the modern urban dweller constantly faces, in the overwhelming 
and saturating exposition to events which do not become experience, see ch. 3, Brandscaping, par. 4 
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Ronchi, ‘Introduzione’, op. cit. p. 19 (my translation). Ab-solutus, i.e. untied from. On the notion of the 
‘viewpoint of the event’, i.e. the non-presentational event which weighs on every situation, see ch. 1, 
Materiality Life Event, par. 7 and ch. 5, par. 5, 8 
1111
Three were the main reasons of discontent, and although only the question of the 'toxic dust' first proved 








Sunflower Seeds is contingent, oddly moving and 






Soon after the beginning of the exhibition it became clear that the friction generated by the 
visitors’ stepping over the seeds raised a dusty cloud in the Turbine Hall, by-product of the 
black paint used to decorate the seeds. Apparently, a prolonged exposition to this dust could 
prove hazardous to the health. As a consequence, the Tate decided to fence the exhibition: 
“the enthusiastic interaction of visitors has resulted in a greater than expected level of dust 
in the Turbine Hall. Tate has been advised that this dust could be damaging to health 
following repeated inhalation over a long period of time.”1114 Among some approval, many 
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Don't touch Ai Weiwei's Sunflower Seeds (Tate Modern London). Photo by Appelogen.be, creative 
commons. 
1113
Adrian Searle, ‘Tate Modern's sunflower seeds: the world in the palm of your hand’, Guardian, 11 October 
2010 http://prod-images.exhibit-e.com/www_friedmanbenda_com/861a34ac.pdf 
1114
"The series is made up of over 100 million individually handmade porcelain replicas of seeds. Although 
porcelain is very robust, the enthusiastic interaction of visitors has resulted in a greater than expected level of 
dust in the Turbine Hall. Tate has been advised that this dust could be damaging to health following repeated 
inhalation over a long period of time. In consequence, Tate, in consultation with the artist, has decided not to 
allow visitors to walk across the sculpture." From ‘The Unilever Series: Ai Weiwei: Sunflower Seeds’, Tate 
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were those arguing against what they perceived as Tate’s over-reaction.1115 Besides the little 
likelihood of any visitor undergoing a ‘prolonged exposure’ to the dust, duly informed 
visitors, the argument went, should have the right to risk their own safety if they wished to 
do so. A simple monitoring of the dust level and the provision of dust masks to both visitors 
and staff, it was suggested, would have been sufficient.1116 However the issues of insurance 
and public liability proved paramount: this, after all, was a health and safety issue, whose 
immunitary logic of exception functions through delegation onto legal, securitarian and 
technological devices in order to immunise anyone from the risk of being ‘held responsible’, 
in an event-defusing movement of legal self-immunisation into which justice cannot 
enter.1117  This logic “demands a self-policing, premised not upon any sense of justice or 
responsibility, but liability, i.e. what one can get away with”.1118 The Tate in the end, as a 





Another issue gaining coverage in the debate was that of order, or rather, the lack of it. In 
the first wild days before the closure, the visitors, it seems, tended to act rather ‘unruly’, 
running, jumping, throwing seeds: acting in a way which to some seemed closer to a ‘day at 
the beach’ than to an acceptable idea of ‘artistic experience’.1120 Museums often appear as 
installations modulating the “art experience in a highly visual, non-touching, aurally 
insulated atmosphere ... an egalitarian space, where anyone can walk in and appreciate art”, 
insofar as it complies with the egalitarian rule of maintaining a safe and anaesthetic distance 
with each other, human and non-human bodies included.1121 As Philippopoulos-
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Modern Website, available at http://www.tate.org.uk/whats-on/tate-modern/exhibition/unilever-series-ai-
weiwei-sunflower-seeds 
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For instance, endorsement came from those worried about eventual risks for asthmatic people: Mark 
Brown, ‘Tate Modern rethinks Sunflower Seeds show after health fears’ Guardian, Friday 15 October 
2010 http://www.guardian.co.uk/artanddesign/2010/oct/15/tate-modern-sunflower-seeds-ban 
1116
‘Are the Tate’s sunflower seeds a risk to health?’ Recognition, Evaluation, Control Blog, 18 October 2010 
http://diamondenv.wordpress.com/2010/10/18/are-the-tates-sunflower-seeds-a-risk-to-health/:  
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See Ch. 5 par. 7 (§) 
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Nathan Moore, ‘Icons of control: Deleuze, signs, law’, International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 20 (1) 
2007, 33-54 – see ch. 5, par. 7-8 
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As reported by Charlotte Higgins, ‘Sunflower Seeds raise a quintessence of dust in the Turbine Hall’, On Culture 
Blog, 19 October 2010, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/culture/charlottehigginsblog/2010/oct/19/sunflower-seeds-dust-turbine-hall;. 
1120
Adrian Searle, ‘What happened next? Sunflower seeds’, Guardian, 27 December 2010, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2010/dec/27/al-weiwei-sunflower-seeds-tate 
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 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, ‘Atmospheres of Law’, op. cit. p. 3 
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Mihalopoulos notes, in these apparently liberating spaces the constricting weight of law is 
dissimulated, and yet more than present: the art gallery appears as “a striated space 
dissimulating as smooth, yet completely populated by property lines, health and safety 
regulations, consumer protection barriers, public morality risks, insurance diktats and so 
on”.1122 It was exactly the implicit normativity of art’s (an)aesthetic experience to be voiced 
out by those lamenting the ‘unruly behaviour’ of the visitors. Above, I observed that the 
neoliberal ‘museification’ of society fosters an abstract ideal of ‘peaceful interaction’ and 
simultaneously (ontologically) realises it, especially through the deployment of legal, 
securitarian and commercial devices, whereby generating urban brandscapes depurated 
from the ‘polluting’ effects that instances of the aptly labelled ‘anti-social behaviour’ 
trigger.1123 Likewise, in the Turbine Hall the sterile atmosphere of ‘museum (a)sociality’ 
appeared to be polluted by the unexpected concatenations generated by Sunflower Seeds. 
The immunitary concern which ensued is well-expressed in Jonathan Jones’ Cartesian 
understanding of art fruition, whose ‘need to be serious’ he does not fail to remind: 
There is more to art than interaction, after all. Personally I quite like just looking at stuff. 
The imperative to slide down slides or lie on the floor to see yourself in a reflective 
ceiling has always seemed to me a distracting eccentricity of the Turbine Hall 
installations ... [Sunflower Seeds is] a serious and imposing work of art. Why not 





The final issue consisted in a variation to the endless theme of the relation of property vis-à-
vis the work of art. Walking over a carpet made of one-hundred million seeds was for many 
visitors an experience so close to that of walking over a pebble beach that they did not find 
any moral or legal implication in taking home a couple of them as a souvenir. This, 
notwithstanding the Tate, through staff reminders and video suggestions, was busy 
"encouraging people not to".1125 Undeniably, Sunflower Seeds indirectly played on this 
possibility, confusing the proprietary boundaries of the artwork, as well as the meaning of its 




see Ch. 3, Brandscaping, par. 3;  
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Jonathan Jones, ‘Turbine Hall's Sunflower Seeds: Does it matter if they're closed off?’, Jonathan Jones on Art 




As a spokeswoman for the museum put it. Reported by Charlotte Higgins, ‘People power comes to the 




integrity. Questioned about the possibility of people taking seeds home, Weiwei 
diplomatically and acutely observed:  
They might also want to eat one, and that would be a safety issue for the museum ...If I was in 
the audience I would definitely want to take a seed. But for the museum, it is a total work, and 
taking a seed would affect the work. Institutions have their own policies. But I know I would 
want to take a seed.1126 
Discussing the issue with a staff member, I found myself arguing, rather romantically 
perhaps, that the possibility of these seeds being spread around the world by the visitors 
could have been part of the artistic experience this specific artwork could generate.1127 
Grinning knowingly at my interpretation, he promptly replied: ‘as you’ll surely know there 
are works which explicitly contemplate the possibility to bring home a part of them, not this 
one’.1128 This reminded me an anecdote narrated by Jeremy Till in his Architecture Depends, 
a compelling reflection on the relation between architecture and contingency, and more 
precisely on the constant attempt of architects to avoid, control or deny contingency. There, 
Till narrates the story of an architect’s despair at coming home every night into the house he 





Pretending to overcome the proprietary separation between artwork and spectator by 
simply articulating it into an internalised encounter to be ‘explicitly contemplated in 
advance’ (as the staff member put it), is an as much contradictory practice as those 
preached by the political rhetoric of ‘community participation’, in which disagreement is 
always-already internalised and thus neutralised, admitted only insofar as its intensity 
remains low. The outcome is a depurated space in which uneventful events are free to occur. 
Accordingly, Tate’s choice to be ‘on the safe side’ expresses a conservative attempt to re-
assert an immunitary paradigm. Facing bodies not for us (that is, seemingly irreducible to the 
abstractions and operations of law, the prevention of security and the de-territorialisation of 
capital), the spatiolegal apparatus re-configures itself by re-objectifying them into inert 
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matter amenable to legal interpretation, capital appropriation and preventive control. It is 
instructive to see how Tate Modern’s curator justified a posteriori the decision to fence the 
exhibition: 
The thinking behind the work lies in far more than just the idea of walking on it. The 
precious nature of the material, the effort of production and the narrative and personal 
content create a powerful commentary on the human condition.1130  
The latter are certainly sensible words, yet they ultimately defuse the potential of the 
artwork by explaining away the contingency of its taking place into layers of socio-
anthropological supra-structures, reducing seeds to ‘objects for us’, made innocuous and 
thus amenable to safe interpretation and manipulation. To be sure, I am not suggesting that 
elaborating a theoretical reflection on the seeds is a less material activity than walking on 
them. Nor I am suggesting that a representational relation is less material that a physical 
one. Finally, I am not implying Weiwei did not take into account this aspect. Obviously, art is 
also a way to reflect on human condition, as well as the political situation in which an artist 
lives. Weiwei himself suggested in his video a direct political inspiration for the work.1131 
However, by being representationally reduced to a mere metaphor of the human condition, 
and physically secluded in the immunitary and proprietary cage of a self-contained box, the 
seeds are ontologically erased from the picture, deprived of their capacity to generate 




Exhaustion is something entirely different: one 
combines the set of variables of a situation, on the 
condition that one renounce any order of preference, 
any organization in relation to a goal, any signification. 
The goal is no longer to go out or stay in, and one no 
longer makes use of the days and nights. One no longer 
realizes, even though one accomplishes something. 
Shoes, one stays in; slippers, one goes out. Yet one 
does not fall into the undifferentiated, or into the 
famous unity of contradictories, nor is one passive: one 
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Kui Hua Zi performs a spatiolegal whiteout. In this vortex the law is exposed to events that 
are no longer defused by its exceptional operations, before bodies it cannot objectify and 
whose demonic potentialities it cannot prevent, internalise or immunise from.  Among those 
bodies, spaces, scales and laws, non-immunitary and non-proprietary complicities surface, 
engendering frictions that are more than phenomenological and that pierce the smooth 
texture of the spatiolegal. The aperture thus provoked harbours the potential for the 
emergence of immanent tunings in which the abstract and concrete relations between 
bodies, spaces, scales and laws are reconfigured in ways that cannot be known, and thus 
valued, in advance. Some suggestions thus follow.  
First, the desirability of these re-tunings is not to be taken for granted and must be assessed 
every time in the contextual unfolding of their situation, where justice is an ever-present 
potential, never a pre-given guarantee or a justifying goal:  
 In the [whiteout] everything is valued and contained in the event itself, where justice is 
always already present in the moment of the event and not merely present as its 
justifying goal1134   
Second: 'unleashing the eventful potential' of being-together is not simply a matter of going 
with the flow, self-indulging in evocative language and drunken wanderings. This example 
demonstrates so. It is the installation to make space for the demonic potentialities of the 
seeds to emerge. The weeds symbolise a wildly de-stratifying gardening that has done with 
structures, gardens, abstractions: a reckless smoothing out of space whose hubristic vitalism 
borders into a parasitic nihilism. Kui Hua Zi expresses another praxis, neither seeking to 
restore sovereign gardens nor indulging into an iconoclastic post-gardening: inoperose 
gardening. It shows that an intensive and eventful politics is not an improvised praxis but 
rather requires a situated, careful and informed strategy of deactivation. Not a simplistic 
renunciation to build something, but an attempt at doing so ‘inoperosely’: (un)building, as in 
the example of the military base of Oush Grab, ‘escavating’ space for the irruption of 
eventful potentials. Third, this is still not enough. The example also shows how the 
spatiolegal re-configures itself, how spaces can be always re-appropriated. On the one hand, 
this is an important ethical reminder: whether no longer 'respected on their own terms', 
bodies become again prey of preventive neutralisation, capitalisation, de-materialisation 
and safe interpretation.1135 On the other, this is a precise strategic suggestion. Temporary 
autonomous zones are insufficient, innocuous and always bound to be re-ingested. Not only 
an opening then, the ethico-political task is that of counter-effectuating the potentialities 
thus unleashed, constructively turning 'absences of occupation' into novel configurations 
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that would prevent the ever-present risk of re-appropriation. Unplug and reorient, 
prompting the surfacing of common re-tunings by joining the scattered frictions and 
excesses of the urban in "the shape of a music, whose focal points, though dispersed in time 
and space, succeed in imposing the rhythm of their own vibrations.”1136 
This is what Kui Hua Zi paradigmatically exposes, the contours of a radical urban politics, 
whose task is to make space for the eventful contingency of a situation through a work of 
de-activation, perforating the superficial coherence of the spatiolegal architecture of control 
by letting conflict emerge where it has been suppressed and generating frictions where they 
had been smoothed out. Producing urban whiteouts, that is, accepting and traversing 
constructively the immersion in their contingent and inescapable materiality, the ‘cosmic’ 
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